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Abstract
What does it mean to be a rational language user? What is it to obey
linguistic rules? What is the proper account of linguistic competence?
A Fregean answer to these questions would make essential appeal
to the notion of sense: we are masters of a language to the extent
that we are able to recognise the cognitive value of its expressions; we
are rational judges regarding truth-value assignments to the extent
that we are sensitive to the ways in which the sense of an expression
guides us in the semantic evaluation process; and as for obeying rules,
it is our ability to respond to how sense directs us, for a particular
assertion of a sentence, towards the determination of its truth-value
that best exempliĕes what it is like to follow a linguistic rule.
My thesis explores a cluster of closely interrelated issues arising
from these questions (whether or not considered from a Fregean per-
spective).
Accordingly, in tracing the routes of sense my dissertation places
itself at the intersection of the philosophy of language, linguistics,
philosophy of logic, and meta-ethics—and indeed, I end up agree-
ing with Allan Gibbard that the theory of meaning really belongs to
meta-ethical reĘection.
Chapter  introduces some of themain research questions that I try
to address in the rest of the thesis.
In chapter  I state a number of theses which I take to be the deĕn-
ing ones for semanticism. I show that they form a class of jointly
incompatible commitments. I choose nonsense as a problem case for
compositionality and I argue that it forces the semanticist to aban-
don either the learnability or the compositionality constraint. e
escape route I adopt, going radically minimalist about content, is in-
compatible with another key semanticist thesis, namely, that grasp of
meaning is grasp of truth-conditions (robustly conceived).
In chapter , I consider the account of atomic meanings given by
both the semanticist and the pragmaticist and I conclude that on nei-
ther account does interpretation come out as a process of rational
ix
choice between candidate bearers of content. Again, I suggest the les-
son from indeterminacy is that we ought to embrace an ineradicably
minimal conception of content.
In chapter  I turn my attention to the meaning of the logical con-
stants and I argue that indeterminacy worries extend to the very heart
of the compositional machinery.
Chapter  examines the view that logic is the science of reasoning.
Unsurprisingly, I conclude that a defence of this claim requires en-
dorsing content-minimalism.
In chapter  I conclude my dissertation by sketching a radical view
of content minimalism and I try to show how it can solve the puzzles
I had been considering over the course of the previous chapters.
x
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Why is the theory of meaning so hard?
Hilary Putnam
Putnam once posed the question whether semantics was so much
as possible. His answer was a qualiĕed one. Yes, we can still do se-
mantics, but only if we come to accept that natural language seman-
tics is a sloppy, impressionistic discipline. Its lack of precision and of
mathematical rigour should not surprise us, he added: it is, aer all,
“a typical social science.” According to Putnam, the grand, formal-
ist tradition had been guilty of oversimpliĕcation—roughly: that the
technical achievements in formal logic could be transposed without
residue to the ĕeld of natural language (NL) studies.
Despite Putnam’s misgivings, NL semantics continues to be a thriv-
ing area of formal research and, forty years on from his warning,
philosophers are still busily engaged in the attempt to give systematic,
fully rigorous accounts of linguistic phenomena in our vernacular.
No-one denies that there are social aspects to language: but for the
formal semanticist there is a core class of truths regarding linguistic
structure that largely transcend the contingencies of our practices.
ese truths hold universally (in the sense that all possible languages
Putnam 1970: 139.
Ibid.: 152.
Asimilar judgement, but fromadiﬀerent perspective, is drawn inBarwise andPerry (1983: ix).
To put it provocatively: I would reverse Putnam’s judgement and argue that considerations arising
from a proper examination of NL should inĘuence the way we view those technical achievements.
e quest for systematicity extends to cases where one would not prima facie expect to ĕnd
it. See for instance the (exciting) discussion of the semantics of ‘wh- the hell’ expressions in Dever
(2006: §26.13).

 | Chapter 
respect them) and they provide the key to the proper explanation of
linguistic competence.
1.2.e Extension Problem
Now, as I see it, the crucial issue in semantics is the Extension Prob-
lem, the problem of explaining how the semantics for a class of ex-
pressions can be extended to a semantics that covers other, suitably
related classes of expressions. For example, suppose we are given a
semantics for the atoms in the language; then the extension problem
becomes that of deriving a semantics for the complex expressions that
somehow respects the atomic meanings (and analogously for the op-
posite direction).
Clearly, the Extension Problem underpins the main (conceptual)
issue that semantics is standardly asked to confront (and explain),
namely, that of how we understand novel complex expressions.
For Putnam, however, the most pressing question was its converse:
how we come to understand novel atoms. e diﬀerence is impor-
tant and it does indeed separate formal semanticists (henceforth ‘se-
manticists’) from pragmaticists.
In essence, the semanticist’s claim is that we understand novel com-
plex expressions in virtue of our grasp of their syntactico-semantic
structure.
Given that the atoms lack (compositionally derived) structure,
For some claims along these lines within linguistics see e.g. Chomsky’s (1995a: 385) insistence
that ‘considerations of virtual conceptual necessity’ impose speciĕc conditions on the human lan-
guage faculty. For more talk of necessity see also Culicover (1997: 4), Newmeyer (2005: 8), Boeckx
(2006: 10), Hinzen (2007: 27), Moro (2008: 5-6), Hornstein (2009: 18). On the philosophers’ side,
see e.g. Lepore and Ludwig’s (2007: 1) claim that a theory of meaning “seeks to understand mean-
ing at a level that abstracts away from contingent features of human languages”. For linguists, the
crucial facts concern phenomena such as dependence and locality constraints. For philosophers,
compositionality is the central requirement on a semantics. is is my main concern in what fol-
lows.
Roughly, the problem is how to prime the atoms and the compositional rules so that every
combinatorial possibility is mapped (and classiĕed) ahead of use in a manner that delivers the in-
tuitive truth-conditions for NL sentences. Details in ch. 2.
See Putnam (1970: 149).
Under the label ‘semanticist’ I intend to gather all those theorists who hold that (syntactic)
structure determines (fully controls) semantic content—e.g. Stanley (2007). eir opponents are
standardly termed ‘pragmatists’ but following Levinson (2000) I prefer to use ‘pragmaticists’. See
also fn. 17, p. 16.
Henceforth, bare reference to structure will be taken to mean ‘syntactico-semantic structure’.
At least on most views: for one recent exception see Hinzen (2007: ch. 5).
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those who think that the fact crying out for (semantical) explanation
is our grasp of the atoms will tend to place themselves at the oppo-
site (pragmaticist) end of the spectrum, since an explanation of our
competence in terms of apprehension of structural facts will not be
readily available in the case of atoms.
e contrast then is between theorists for whom our linguistic
knowledge essentially rests on grasp of structure and those for whom
it does not.
e Extension Problem is my main topic in what follows. As we
shall see in the chapters ahead, it gives rise to several deep puzzles.
And it seems to me that, in thinking about semantics, this is the
problemwe should worry about, for it brings our theoretical commit-
ments into sharp focus, indeed it tests them to the limit. It is thus the
starting point to semantical and meta-semantical investigation, since
our ability to eﬀect the transition from atoms to complexes (and the
linguistic judgements regarding meaningfulness and grammaticality
that we make based on that ability) is both the main phenomenon to
be explained and the chief motivation for some of the key assump-
tions made within a semanticist framework.
Indeed, where theorists will most diﬀer is precisely with respect to
the proper account to be given of our ability to move between the
lexicon and the set of complex expressions. For the semanticist, that
ability only makes sense if we appeal to grasp of structure; not so for
the pragmaticist.
More importantly still, the proper solution to the Extension Prob-
lem will dictate constraints on our conception of content, both se-
mantic and mental.
e question the problem brings into sharp focus, that is, con-
cernswhat it is that we understand when do we graspmeanings (both
atomic and complex). And indeed whether semantics is so much as
possible (and the extent to which it is sloppy) will largely depend on
the cognitive proĕle of the objects of linguistic competence (and, re-
latedly, of our propositional attitudes more generally).
Let me now introduce some of the puzzles before us.
Note that some pragmaticists will insist that even in the case of structurally rich expressions
our understanding will not necessarily depend on (or be exhausted by) grasp of structure.
One might argue that grasp of atoms and grasp of complex expressions are diﬀerent phenom-
ena, mobilising diﬀerent abilities. It might then seem as if the controversy here is purely (or largely)
terminological. I do not think so. e shi in emphasis across the two camps reĘect contrasting
(and indeed incompatible) claims about the precise shape (and reach) of our linguistic competence.
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1.3. Projecting Meanings
Endowing words with meaning is something we do. And we are also
rather good at recovering meanings from words. Moreover, our
meaning-recovery ability seems appropriately unbound and for the
most part a matter of routine.
On reĘection, this is (or ought to be) puzzling on a number of
counts. If meaning originates with us—i.e. with our choices and con-
ventions—it may appear mysterious that words can acquire an in-
dependent life, as it were, and stably preserve their meanings across
a (seemingly) open-ended multiplicity of sentences which couldn’t
possibly have been incorporated in the original act of meaning-
ĕxing.
Or at the very least: it may (and should) appear mysterious how
such a feat of forward-looking meaning-determination could be ac-
complished—how could anyone predict, from an act of context-
bound meaning-conferral on a word, all the facts about its semantic
behaviour under embedment in an unbound class of as yet undis-
closed linguistic and non-linguistic contexts?
Equally, it may (and ought to) seem just as mysterious how our acts
of meaning-ĕxing can successfully guide future applications of the
language’s expressions; that is, the putative recovery of meanings un-
der precise normative constraints in what looks like a virtually inex-
haustible variety of (linguistic and worldly) contexts is no less per-
plexing than their forward-looking determination.
If genuine, the puzzle, then, concerns both the (relative) stability of
meaning amidst the contextual whirlwind as well as the transmission
(and/or preservation) of (perhaps modestly) normative constraints
on the use of expressions from the initial grasp of a patently limited
lexico-syntactic basis to the (apparently derivative) grasp of a (seem-
ingly) open-ended totality of linguistic expressions—with those con-
straints Ęowing, or so it would seem, from the purported claims of
For brevity’s sake, I am presenting as a given this simplistic picture that assumes a straight-
forward, unproblematic same-content connection between meaning-endowment and meaning-
recovery. ere are dissenting voices, e.g. Gauker (2003), Barker (2004).
Chomsky (2009: 20) draws an intriguing parallel between Humean arguments (pretty much
along these lines) for the positing of a natural “grammar of moral judgements” and his own nativist
conception of universal grammar. We can’t help project meanings the way we do.
Aer all, the original baptism took place in a speciĕc context (or a range thereof). On the
semanticist story, this was abstracted (and generalised) to a standing meaning level. But which fea-
tures of meaning do we help ourselves to when we recover the meaning-in-context? e general or
the particular? See Taylor (1989: §8.4), Evans (2009: 23ﬀ.) and Putnam (1986: 292) for discussion.
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semantic stability.
On further reĘection, we could perhaps be led to deny that these
intuitively compelling considerations carry much weight. It is a delu-
sion that we do really have such powers, the destabilising thought
goes. What an expression means is entirely (more cautiously:
largely) a function of our use at any given time: we decide (more cau-
tiously: evaluate) every time afresh what we are going to do with a
certain expression in a certain context. Nomeaning-conferring act
could possibly have the scope and all-encompassing authority posited
in the picture above.
Meaning, on this view, is profoundly, ineradicably unstable. It is
also inherently local, inextricably conĕned, that is, to the particular,
contrary to the (standard) conception of meanings as entities with
global powers, abstracted from particular instances of use to full, un-
restricted generality—a conception that seems to underlie the very
enterprise of formal semantics.
Suppose however that this deeply subversive thought has not yet
emerged. In our as yet undisturbed semantic paradise, an attractive
explanation of our initial puzzle seems to lie ready at hand: we can as-
sign and recover meanings from linguistic items, the (friendlier) sug-
gestion goes, because the meaning of a complex expression is (solely)
a function of that of its sub-components and their mode of composi-
tion.
In other words, by ĕxing themeanings of the lexical items (roughly:
by employing axioms that ĕx their reference) and by specifying the
output of the sentential connectives via appropriate phrasal axioms,
we have thereby ĕxed the meaning of any expression recursively
formed from that base.
Grasp of complexmeanings is thus grasp of compositionalmeaning.
is is what solves the Extension Problem, the semanticist tells us;
what’s more, it is the only solution that can make languages learnable
by beings like us.
Note that the puzzle arises at a purely technical level (how can we deĕne meaning functions
for all expressions in the language), at a conceptual level (what is the order of determination of
meanings? Is it bottom-up, i.e. from the atomic to the complex, or top-down?) and at the normative
level (whence the authority of language over its practitioners?).
Baker and Hacker (1984: ch. 9) articulate this thought in the form of a long invective against
the generative enterprise. While I’m a lot more sympathetic to attempts to systematise language
mastery than they are, I’m still impressed by the real diﬃculties in this area that their chapter high-
lights.
ethought canvassed in this paragraph is obviouslyWittgensteinian in character. Rayo (2008:
330) proposes a kind of hybrid view in which “linguistic practice involves semi-principled decision-
making”.
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Nailing down the recursive structure of language, then, is an essen-
tial step towards a full explanation of our language mastery, and of
lots more besides, as we shall see (to wit: of our grasp of concepts,
of our conception of ourselves as fully rational agents, of the nature
and character of norms and of the very possibility of rule-governed
behaviour).
1.4. Context and Semantic Content
e explanation is both neat and reassuring. e question now is
whether it is true, that is, empirically adequate. So far, it looks
little more than an a priori stipulation justiĕed on transcendental
grounds—only compositional languages are learnable, we are told.
ere is a familiar (and subversive) Ęy in the ointment though,
namely, the ever-present eﬀects of context on semantic content, the
evident divergence between the bare surface structure of our words
and the richness of content they seem able to express, and not just
convey, in diﬀerent contexts.
e semanticist standard reply is that ordinary language sentences
are to be taken as (variously implemented) shorthand for eternal sen-
tences that do express complete, fully disambiguated thoughts. Re-
covering meanings-in-context is thus a question of completing the
missing bits, a job done by craily (albeit mostly unconsciously) ex-
ecuted recourse to contextual clues.
For any (apparently) incomplete (i.e. semantically underdeter-
mined) sentence, then, there is a corresponding complete thought
and the gap between the two gets ĕlled via appropriate contextual
additions to the surface form of the (abbreviated) sentence.
To a ĕrst approximation, the semanticist response to the challenge
from context can be seen as subdividing into three broad strategies:
the Eternalist strategy (where NL sentences are shorthand for fully-
disambiguated sentences in some other language, somewhat immune
to the vernacular’s defectiveness); the Indexicalist strategy (where
content determination is carried out either at the metalinguistic level
via the assignment of values to various indices or at the Logical Form
level, where hidden parameters awaiting contextual setting reside);
and the Retreatist strategy, where the scope of semantics is restricted
to the processing of (possibly sub-propositional, possibly merely dis-
Note that in this dissertation I am almost exclusively concerned with semantic, not commu-
nicated content.
More details in ch. 3.
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quotational) minimally conceived content.
I will end up endorsing a radically minimalist version of the last
strategy. My task in the chapters to follow, then, will largely be aimed
at undermining the other two positions (and most varieties of the
Retreatist strategy too).
Before giving the broad plan for my dissertation, let me point out
two more puzzles.
All semanticist views (and some pragmaticist views as well) assume
that we can somehow discipline the transition not just from atoms to
complexes, but from signs to thoughts as well.
Signs, it would seem, can point in indeĕnitely many directions
(that’s what they do, that’s what they are), and any system of signs
(no matter how rigorously formulated) will inherit that essential in-
stability. Indeed, it is in virtue of their expressive and adaptive power
that signs are able to be bearers of content.
But concepts, and thoughtsmore generally, seem to be individuated
as the thoughts they are in virtue of their univocity: there must be no
doubt as to which thought I am entertaining for the thought to be the
thought it is.
And so we face the problem of providing a mapping from consti-
tutively ambiguous entities (our signs) to constitutively unambiguous
ones (our thoughts).
is puzzle, I think, adds yet more pressure on the idea that there
is a solution to the Extension Problem, and that it goes via appeal to
compositionality, for the Ęight from context seems to rely on the very
possibility that determinacy of content could be secured for our signs
(if we can’t determine which thought-in-context an occurrence of an
ambiguous sign points to, it seems unclear that we have succeeded in
doing semantics).
e ĕnal large puzzle I will consider centres on the issue of the nor-
mativity ofmeaning. is is in fact where all the considerations above
converge. For it seems as if the normative constraints that supposedly
attach to our use of expressions Ęow both from claims about concep-
tual structure and about the (highly privileged) status of the deliver-
ances of the compositional machinery.
Given certain beliefs about the atoms (presumably reĘecting cer-
tain beliefs about the structure of our concepts), the corresponding
Recall that truth-conditional semantics is supposed to give an account of how complex mean-
ings functionally depend on constituent meanings. Without an answer to concerns about global
indeterminacy, it remains however unclear whether the compositional machinery is operating in
the manner assumed by the semanticist; it is unclear, that is, whether the argument-value pairings
have been properly primed.
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beliefs concerning the complex meanings thereby derived will be ra-
tionallymandated. at’s what grounds the authority of language over
us, that’s what guarantees the objectivity of meaning, or so it seems.
But if so, the question arises as to why we should abide by the ver-
dicts of the compositional machinery: if facts about competence de-
rive from biological constraints, as the linguist insists, it is unclear that
those constraints could ever acquire normative weight for us; if they
are grounded in facts about extension (as the semanticist-philosopher
seems to assume, given her insistence on a robustly construed notion
of reference), then it is equally unclear how they could be imple-
mented ahead of use—it is at the very least implausible that in ĕxing
the atoms we have thereby deĕnitively ĕxed the extension of all ex-
pressions containing them.
ese are all rather large questions, of course, but it seems to me
that before we can seriously engage in semantics we have to address
them, at least so as to become clear on what we are doing when we
formulate meaning-theories for a fragment of the vernacular.
In that respect, I think it is fair to say that broadly speaking this
study is a reĘection on what meanings could not be. It is for another
day to say something more precise about what they actually are. And
towards that goal, I’ll be in fact perfectly satisĕed if, to borrow from a
rather wonderful passage in Russell (: ), the reader will judge
that in these pages I’vemanaged nomore than to substitute “articulate
hesitation for inarticulate certainty” over these matters.
One further point: I heard it reported that TimothyWilliamson has
said in conversation that the good thing about formal models is that
they keep us honest. If there is a lesson to be drawn from the pages
ahead is that this is the case only if those models are themselves hon-
est—if they are, that is, accurate representations of what they purport
tomodel. In some cases, honesty demands that we abstain frommod-
elling for a little while yet. Or rather: that we are clear as to what
we are modelling.
e question before us then is not why the theory of meaning is
so hard, but rather what a theory of meaning should be a theory of.
Speciĕcally, what features of competence are we modelling when we
insist that the only empirically adequate theory is a structure-reĘecting
one? Andwhat normative force do those features really have for us?
In the pages ahead I try to provide the beginning of an answer to
See e.g. Peacocke (2008).
Whatwemust beware, that is, is the appearance of exactitude thatmodels all too readily provide
(Wittgenstein 1931-34/1974: II.I.7).
Wright (2001c: 45-6).
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questions such as these.
1.5.e Plan
Here, then, is the plan for the chapters to follow.
In chapter  I state a number of theses which I take to be the deĕn-
ing ones for semanticism. I show that they form a class of jointly
incompatible commitments. I choose nonsense as a problem case for
compositionality and I argue that it forces the semanticist to aban-
don either the learnability or the compositionality constraint. e
escape route I adopt, going radically minimalist about content, is in-
compatible with another key semanticist thesis, namely, that grasp of
meaning is grasp of truth-conditions (robustly conceived).
In chapter , I consider the account of atomic meanings given by
both the semanticist and the pragmaticist and I conclude that on nei-
ther account does interpretation come out as a process of rational
choice between candidate bearers of content. Again, I suggest the les-
son from indeterminacy is that we ought to embrace an ineradicably
minimal conception of content.
In chapter  I turn my attention to the meaning of the logical con-
stants and I argue that indeterminacy worries extend to the very heart
of the compositional machinery.
Chapter  examines the view that logic is the science of reasoning.
Unsurprisingly, I conclude that a defence of this claim requires en-
dorsing content-minimalism.
In chapter  I conclude my dissertation by sketching a radical view
of content minimalism and I try to show how it can solve the puzzles
I had been considering over the course of the previous chapters.

Chapter 
What Compositionality Could Not Be
2.1. Introduction
In mathematics, you don’t understand things.
You just get used to them.
John von Neumann
Disputes in metasemantics do run deep. So much so that there is
little prospect of a minimal theory of meaning that could isolate the
(platitudinous) common ground among participants—the intersec-
tion of opinion in the theory of meaning may well be empty, that is.
For all that, here’s a prime candidate for the role of Platitude-in-
Chief in the area:
Creativity Considerations (CC): Speakers possess an un-
bounded ability to understand novel sentences eﬀortlessly
e idea of a minimal theory for a given subject matter seems to have originated with Gree-
nough (2003: 237). See also Johnston (1988: 38), Wright (1992: 34) and Smith (1994: §2.8).
See e.g. Husserl (1900-01/2001: 70), Tractatus §4.024 and 4.03, Frege (1980: 79) and (1914:
210, 225), Chomsky (1955-56/1975: 131), (1965: 6, 161-2) and (1966: 59), Davidson (1967: 17)
and (2004: 8), Pustejovsky (1995: 1), Szabó (2000: 80), McGilvray (2001: 6), Lepore and Ludwig
(2005: 7), Pietroski (2005a: 13-14), Moro (2008: 40), Hornstein (2009: 1). Other labels for (nearly
enough) the same phenomenon are ‘productivity’ and ‘systematicity’ (something that Evans’ (1982:
§4.3) Generality Constraint and Davies’ (1981: 53-55)Mirror Constraint had aimed to capture); see
Johnson (2004) for discussion. For Fodor (1997) and Kamp and Reyle (1993: 7), systematicity is
what explains linguistic creativity. As Evans (1981a: 327) notes, what requires theoretical explana-
tion is our ability to track any extension (however minimal) of the semantics (the standardly drawn
ĕnite/inĕnite contrast is bogus). Fricker (1982: 65) is refreshingly explicit that CC provides “the
justifying basis” for attributions of a rich semantic structure toNL (that claim ismy target here). She
also makes a tidy connection between the Extension Problem and CC—it is speakers’ ability to un-
derstand sentences in an expanded language that shows the original language to be (appropriately)
structured.

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CC is not just taken to be centrally platitudinous—a brute piece of
data from which we must somehow start in our theory-building ef-
forts. It is, rather, deemed to be both the phenomenon to be explained
and (hence) the keymotivation for the positing of certain constraints
on the structure of our theory, most notably that it be compositional.
CC is, in short, the crucial touchstone against which the empirical
adequacy of one’s semantics has got to be assessed.
My purpose in this chapter is to challenge its alleged platitudinous
status and to question the claimed explanatory connection between
CC and the principle of compositionality.
I shall argue that compositionality and CC are in fact incompatible.
My weapon of choice is nonsense—I’ll say why in a moment. Before
I can fully unravel the plot, however, I need to do a bit of preparatory
work.
2.2. Creativity and Compositionality
CC is fairly obviously a claim about the epistemology of meaning.
For competent practitioners, coming to understand complex mean-
ings (even previously unencountered ones) is an immediate, eﬀortless
aﬀair. We unreĘectively know what a novel sentence means; how is
that possible—it is then asked.
While it leaves the precise shape of that epistemology rather un-
clear, CC assigns a central role to the notion of understanding within
a theory of language (the phenomenon crying for explanation is that
what is unbound is our understanding of indeĕnitely many novel
meanings), and something needs to be said about that notion right
at the outset.
So here’s another thesis, which is far from uncontroversial (at this
point, we’re already leaving the domain of platitudes in this area), but
still something of a majority view:
Epistemic Conception of Understanding (EPU): To under-
stand an expression e is to know the meaning of e.
e literature is fairly unanimous in its defence of (the centrality of) CC. I can think of two
exceptions: the abrasive, book-length attack on the very idea of CC contained in Baker and Hacker
(1984) and the rather more restrained Margalit (1978).
e Kantian overtones of this sort of question (dutifully noted in Baker and Hacker 1984:
346) typically prompt a transcendental reply. I’m sliding between ‘understanding’ (some sort of
state/ability) and ‘coming to understand’ (some sort of process) here. e slide is fairly common in
the literature—again a lone exception is Baker and Hacker (1980/2005: ch. 17, §3). I’m not sure
how harmful the slide might be.
Read this as a conditional: (U(S )! K((S ))). As Williamson (2000: 110, fn. 4) notes, the
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EPU makes the notion of understanding more precise and by so do-
ing, it gives us a reading of CC whereby the alleged truism becomes
the slightly more controversial (but still prima facie plausible) claim
that what requires theoretical explanation is howwe come to know the
meaning of novel sentences.
ere is another way of bringing out the puzzle that CC highlights,
and it doesn’t involve appeal to speakers’ understanding. So here’s
another deĕnition:
Extension Problem (EP):emain technical problem a seman-
tic theory faces is how to extend a given semantics for a certain
class of expressions in a language to a semantics for either a) a
suitably related class of expressions in the same language or b)
a class of expressions in a (conservatively) expanded language.
Patently, EP involves no appeal (not even covertly) to understanding
or indeed to speakers. On the face of it, there is no epistemic reading
available for EP, and yet one feels that what CC is about is prettymuch
continuous with (one form of) the technical problem that EP brings
to the fore.
Both statements, that is, seem to involve an important structural
fact about language: assignments of semantic values are not (and
must not be) random, or stipulated on a case-by-case basis, and it
is precisely their systematicity that allows us to achieve competence
converse does not have to hold. e label probably originates with Pettit (2002a) who argues at
length against EPU. Dummett is committed to EPU and anticipates Pettit’s objection in his (1981:
308). For a classic statement of EPU see Platts (1979/1997: ch. II).
One example of this gloss is Tennant (1987: 10). Alternatively, one may appeal to belief rather
than knowledge, as Pettit (2002a) does—see also Gross (2005) and Pettit (2005). For other con-
ceptions of linguistic understanding see Peacocke (2008), the ability-based accounts in Baker and
Hacker (1980/2005: ch. 17), Devitt (1997: 268-9), Johnston (1988: 38-9) and the quasi-perceptual
ones in Ziﬀ (1972: 3), Fricker (1982: 56) and (2003), McDowell (1987: 99) and (1997: 114-17).
e term comes from Hodges (1998: 16) and Westerståhl (2004); see also Hodges (2005: 42-
3). Katz and Fodor (1963: §2) call it the Projection Problem. e problem is to give a (systematic)
solution that respects (in roughly the same way in which the term is used in formal logic, e.g. Hin-
man 2005: 17) the meaning—i.e. the categorial status—of the lexical items and of the connectives
(informally: the semantics must appropriately deliver the intuitive truth-conditions for sentences).
See Westerståhl (1998: 638-9) and Lasnik and Uriagereka (2005: §1.2) for discussion. Chomsky
(1957: 14-5) argued that a grammar ought to mirror a speaker’s competence in understanding “an
indeĕnite number of new sentences”—see also Chomsky (1965: 4-5). is is as clear a statement of
the connection between CC and EP as you can hope to ĕnd.
One may of course wonder what would be the point of insisting that we solve the EP if it were
not for the need to make the semantics computationally viable for beings such as ourselves. So,
appearances to the contrary, even EP has an epistemic Ęavour aer all.
Frege (1980: 79) motivated his insistence on PoC by pointing out that the principle removes
the need to stipulate case-by-case conventions for each complex meaning.
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in the language.
Solve EP tidily, one wants to say, and you go some way towards giv-
ing an answer to CC too—it is because of the disciplined connections
holding between the meanings of the atoms and those of complex
expressions that we are able competently to move between the two
classes of expressions, the suggestion goes.
Indeed, here are two o-given replies to the questions posed by CC
and EP:
Principle of Compositionality (PoC): e meaning of a com-
plex expression is solely a function of the meanings of its parts
and their syntactic mode of combination.
and
Generative Principle (GP):ere is an unbound recursive syn-
tactic operation (Merge) that given any two already formed
strings of lower complexity generates a new expression bymerg-
ing them into one syntactic unit.
It seems obvious that PoC provides a fairly precise answer to one form
of the EP, namely, that of extending a semantics for the atoms and
the compositional operations to a semantics for all sentences in the
language.
And while it is not immediately clear how to get an answer to CC
from GP (we’ll deal with this a little later), there’s a near-immediate
connection between PoC and CC—so immediate, in fact, that few
bother to make it explicit.
For it is a straightforwardmatter to state an explicitly epistemic (and
fairly plausible) formulation of PoC:
Epistemic Principle of Compositionality (EPoC): A speaker s
knows themeaning of a complex expression just in case s knows
the meanings of its parts and of their syntactic mode of combi-
nation.
Even the iconoclastic Davidson (1986: 436) insists on this.
at compositionality provides the most natural explanation of linguistic productivity is ar-
gued for even by critics of the post-Fregean project in semantics such as Barwise and Perry (1983:
127).
For just one example see Chomsky (1995b: 226).
Note this is in eﬀect a closure principle: (tacit) knowledge of meaning is closed under the
compositional operations. For discussion of the notion of tacit knowledge see Davies (1981: 74,
84), Evans (1981a: 336-7) andWright (1986c). It seems fairly uncontentious that Davidsonians are
committed to EPoC. Notoriously, Davidson’s claim was that knowledge of an appropriate theory
of meaning would suﬃce for (compositionally-based) understanding of a language. See Lepore
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With EPU in place, it is then even more straightforward to derive a
version of PoC that directly answers the question posed by CC:
Principle of the Compositionality of Understanding (PoCU):
a speaker s understands the meaning of a complex expression
just in case s understands the meanings of its parts and of their
syntactic mode of combination.
PoCU gives a precise answer to the puzzle stated in CC: we under-
stand novelmeanings because of our antecedent familiarity with their
parts and their mode of composition. If we remove its epistemic
layers and work our way back to PoC we ĕnd a precise answer to EP
too, as we just saw above.
is also gives us a handle on a more general answer to CC. ere
are structural facts about language (language has a certain syntactico-
semantic structure whereby semantics is a function of syntax) which
PoC identiĕes, and there are (parallel) structural facts about speakers’
competence such that by (tacitly) knowing the structural facts about
language (more weakly: by understanding them), speakers are able to
secure immediate understanding of inĕnitely many complex mean-
ings. e way they do this is neatly modelled by the equation EPU +
EPoC = PoCU.
If so, we are justiĕed in attributing just as much structure to mean-
ing as suﬃces to model speakers’ competence in interpreting novel
and Ludwig (2005: 23-7) for a formal statement of the Davidsonian position. Searle (1994: 644)
explicitly speaks of PoC as a principle concerning understanding.
is is the philosopher’s view of compositionality. See for instance Quine (1966: 75-6) (who
considered the principle necessary—no less!—and tied it directly to CC), Tennant (1987: 31), Hor-
wich (1990/1998: 35) and (1998: 155), Devitt (1997: 282), Heim and Kratzer (1998: 2), Collins
(2003: 403) and Borg (2004: 21). By contrast, Fodor and Lepore (2001: 45) argue that understand-
ing need not be compositional. Davidson (1967: 21) seems to deny EPoC, but all that needs adding
is his holism. Dummett is the author most clearly committed to EPU and PoCU and to the related
contention that a theory of meaning must be a theory of understanding, see e.g. his (1973: 92),
(1976: 288), (1981: 308). For Wright (1976: 224) the distinctive feature of a theory of meaning is
precisely that it purports to illuminate “the epistemology of the transition from understanding of
subsentential components of a new sentence to recognition of the sense of the whole”. Chomsky
(1966: 121, fn. 9) quotes approvingly from Juan Huarte’s 1575 Examen de Ingenios where it is said
that “Understanding is a generative faculty”.
Conditional on the notion of the understanding of the atoms being made clear, of course.
Typically, this is something semanticists will refuse to do—see e.g. Lepore and Ludwig (2007: 4).
Tennant (1987: 31) claims that we derive the meaning of the atoms from their embedment into
complex expressions and then re-combine them into further, possibly new complexes. ere is a
characteristic tension here between the fact that meanings are learnt in context (under embedment)
and the CC-claim that our understanding of the complex is parasitic (and posterior to!) our under-
standing of its components. See Janssen (2001) for a discussion of this issue in relation to Frege’s
Context Principle.
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sentences (the slogan: structure is a model of competence). Let’s
call the theorist who advocates a picture of this kind a semanticist
In fact, this answer to theCCpuzzle establishes an intriguing (albeit
entirely to be expected) connection with Tarski’s work on truth. Re-
call that for him the deĕningmark of a formal languageLwas that the
sense of every L-expression was uniquely determined by its form.
We can then say that, on the picture of language proposed by the
semanticist, grasp of the sense of a NL expression is achieved (solely)
via grasp of its form. As long as we understand the form of an expres-
sion, we are in a position to understand its meaning.
Call this the Understanding-as-Grasp-of-Structure (UaGS) concep-
tion.
PoCUandUaGS thus neatly encapsulate the semanticist’s optimism
about the prospects for accurately capturing our competence within
a formal network.
We also have a reciprocal (and just as neat) relation holding be-
tween CC and PoC. Compositionality gives one (intuitively correct)
answer to the CC puzzle (the existence claim); CC, it is then argued, is
only (plausibly) explained by PoC (the required uniqueness claim).
eupshot is: NL semanticsmust be compositional on fully a priori
grounds—and this is another claim that I’m challenging in this chap-
ter.
Two more things to note. I’ve just said that it has been routinely
A thesis defended in e.g. Davidson (1967: 25) (and Lepore and Ludwig 2007: 19), Fricker
(1982: 49, 65) and Sainsbury (2005: 49).
A semanticist will typically be committed to more; for instance, she will insist that semantic
content is fully determined by the structural facts discussed in the text (Stanley 2007), and that
linguistic competence is (very nearly) entirely the province of the language faculty (Borg 2004).
Chomsky’s position is more subtle (and highly elusive: see e.g. Chomsky (1975b: ch. 2) and the
rejection of PoC in his 1975a) and has changed substantially over the years. Chomsky (1965: 136)
was staunchly semanticist—semantic interpretation depends only on lexical items and composi-
tional principles (but see the qualiĕcations in fn. 9 therein). Already Chomsky (1970a: 67-8) and
(1972a: 134) were more guarded. Chomsky (2007) is altogether more cautious on this issue.
Tarski (1935: 166). I read ‘uniquely’ as including ‘solely’ too: nothing but the form of an
expression determines its sense.
Locus classicus: Russell (1914/1993: 53). See also Davidson (1967: 26), Evans (1976: 57) and
(1981a: 324-25), Davies (1981: 80), Dummett (1981: 310), Wright (1981: 44), Fricker (1982: 50,
52), Hinzen (2006: ix). To motivate UaGS, Davies (2000) (and 2003: 40) invokes two problems,
that of meaning despite use (sentences which have a diﬀerent meaning to the one speakers stan-
dardly employ) and that of meaning without use (the intuition that unused sentences nevertheless
do possess a determinate meaning which we somehow uncover) and claims that the only solution
is positing tacit knowledge of a structurally-rich system of rules—and so does Fricker (1982: 59).
at CC motivates a commitment to PoC is stated in e.g. Tennant (1987: 37), Grandy (1990),
Dever (2006: 633), Borg (2007: 355, fn. 36) and Cohnitz (2005: 54-55).
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argued that ) only PoC (or GP) could explain CC.e claim is thus a
transcendental one regarding the very possibility of language—non-
compositional languages (and knowledge thereof) would not be ex-
pandable (with the obvious modus tollens back to PoC in the vicin-
ity).
In response to objections from pragmaticists, it has also been rou-
tinely argued that ) we should keep distinct the formal constraints on
a semantics (PoC) or on a syntax (GP), which are intended to address
the EP, from epistemic principles such as PoCU and EPU which in-
stead apply to a diﬀerent branch of semantics (psychological seman-
tics, or some such label).
My ĕrst point in this chapter is that these two claims cannot co-
herently be defended together. PoC only explains CC if it has some
demonstrable connection with the epistemic (note: not the psycho-
logical) aspects of meaning and meaning computation.
Patently, EPoC and PoCU make no claim as to the psychological
reality of the (explanatory) recursive mechanisms they posit. ose
mechanisms are merely models of competence, a competence how-
ever that is essentially epistemic in character—linguistic competence,
it is claimed by the Chomskyan and the Fregean alike, is knowledge
(or cognisance) of rules (and recursive ones at that).
In turn, CC sustains the compositional constraint on a semantics
only if we can establish the appropriate connection between syntac-
tic structure and the epistemic properties of expressions in virtue of
which we acquire competence in their use, properties that themselves
arise in virtue of that very structure.
In otherwords, a priori reasoning can only impose PoCon a seman-
tics via its connections to PoCU—no other (epistemically depleted)
version of PoC can fully explain CC (given its essentially epistemic
character) and be justiĕed by it. I’m sticking my neck out on this
See e.g. Ziﬀ (1960: 60), Davidson (1967: 17). I entirely shareWedgwood’s (2005: 22-7) doubts
as to this move. A weaker form of the argument would be to say that PoC is the best explanation of
CC, as (Lasersohn 2009) suggests.
Partee (1988), Borg (2004), Soames (1984, 1985, 1989), Janssen (1997: 446), Hodges (1998:
24).
A point duly noted in Bonnay (2005: 43).
Chomsky (1986: 265ﬀ.).
e only way for a semanticist (e.g. Westerståhl 1998: 641) to reject claims that PoC is an en-
tirely trivial principle (e.g. Zadrozny 1994) requires precisely an appeal to the fact that the undesir-
able, trivially compositional meaning functions bear no “correspondence” to intuitively acceptable
(i.e. epistemically plausible) ones.
Even an a posteriori justiĕcation of the claim that NL has a compositional semantics would
have to appeal to facts to do with interpretation, i.e. with ways in which we actually compute
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one, so it deserves yet another label:
Epistemic Constraint on Explanation (ECE): Only PoCU can
provide an a priori explanation of CC and be motivated by it.
And semanticism without ECE is blind—jettisoning this constraint
is no way out of the diﬃculties I will raise for the semanticist.
We need one more principle on the table:
Meaning Determination Principle (MDP): the meaning of an
expression is entirely determined (controlled) by the syntactic
structure of the expression.
We thus have another equation: GP +MDP = PoC. Bracket that aside
for a while yet—its role should be clear anyway, given what I’ve been
saying above (the equationwill be needed tomake sense of theChom-
skyan linguist appeal to CC to motivate claims about the role of GP).
We are now almost ready to state the main line of this chapter—just
a little more work, and we’ll be there.
2.2.1. Towards Nonsense
Let’s now recall the standard semanticist claim that semantic theo-
ries are taken to be stating the connections in virtue of which certain
(systematic) relations among assignments of semantic values to sen-
meanings. Lasersohn (2009) has argued otherwise (unconvincingly). Kempson et al. (2001: §1.1),
Stokhof (2002) and Cann et al. (2005: §1.3) argue for the opposite. Chomsky (2000: 12) himself
has deĕned e.g. the displacement property in terms of interpretation; and so a fact about how we
interpret sentences (i.e. we treat expressions as if they were in a diﬀerent position from the one
occupied at surface structure) becomes a fact about competence (as noted in Cook and Newson
2007: 33) and hence about linguistic structure itself. Incidentally, as Evans (1976: 51) pointed out,
the only theory-neutral way to deĕne semantically complex expressions is in terms of speakers’
understanding (non-atomic expressions are those that require grasp of structure to be understood).
‘Justiĕed’ might be a more apt term here. Hodges (1998: 10), Szabó (2000: ch. 3) and Fodor
and Lepore (2001: 45) reject ECE. I ĕnd their claim (and arguments) puzzling.
MDP is the key dogma of semanticism, from Carnap (1942: §7), Chomsky (1965: 75, 136,
162), (1966: 93) and (1972a: 131-134, 178), all the way up to Fodor and Lepore (1991: 333), Cap-
pelen and Lepore (2005a: 2) and Stanley (2007). For Janssen (1997: 427) and Stanley (2000: 34)
MDP is entailed by PoC (recall the ‘solely’ qualiĕer in its formulation). Collins (2007) reminds
us that modern thinking in syntactic theory lends little support to MDP. Syntax both under- and
over-determines content (there isn’t enough structure in the syntax to pin down semantically ex-
pressed propositional content but there is also redundancy created by the Copy operation). For all
that, Chomskyans routinely claim that Universal Grammar is a system for pairing sounds/signs and
meanings—see e.g. Chomsky (1970b: 12,14) and (1981: 17), Hinzen (2006: 154, fn. 4), (2006: 111),
(2009: 16, 19), Webelhuth (1995: 3), Bošković and Lasnik (2007: 1), Boeckx (2008b: 2).
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tences (and expressions more generally) hold (e.g. entailment, syn-
onymy and so forth).
Relatedly, they are also expected to be making predictions as to
the truth-conditions of sentences (or the propositions associatedwith
them) and, crucially, as to which meanings will be impossible (what-
ever that means).
In other words, semantic theories have got to encase what Katz and
Fodor (: ) called projection rules from the lexicon to the set
of complex expressions.
It is those rules that discipline the semantic behaviour of expres-
sions under embedment. It is those rules that impose normative con-
straints on usage (to be a rational language user is to abide by those
rules). It is (tacit) grasp (or internal representation) of those rules
that constitutes our linguistic competence (our competence has ex-
actly the same structure as our language). Indeed, it is those rules
that make our vernacular learnable.
And if the semanticist picture of the language machinery is cor-
rect, it is those rules that correctly predict the emergence of nonsense
when words are combined in certain (presumably illicit) ways.
e semanticist’s commitment to some version of PoC controlling
the projection rules and to a PoCU-explanation of CC will therefore
entail a corresponding commitment to the preservation by the com-
positional operations of a certain range of properties.
Above all, meaningfulness and understanding must be preserved
is view of semantics stems from (at least) Katz and Fodor (1963) and is fairly widely en-
dorsed, e.g. Katz (1981: 207), Soames (1985: 159), Larson and Segal (1995: 3), Szabó (2000: 51).
For a recent contrary voice, see Horwich (2010: ch. 8).
See Husserl (1900-01/2001: IV, §10), Katz and Fodor (1963: 175), Chomsky (1965: 3, 157),
Routley (1966: 178), Davidson (1967: 21) and (1984: xiii), Katz (1981: 207), Pustejovsky (1995:
40-41), Webelhuth (1995: 4), Barker and Jacobson (2007: 2-3), Hendriks et al. (2010: 21).
See also Chomsky (1957: 15) and (1965: 154). I’m also targeting the more speciĕc Projection
Principle in e.g. Chomsky (1981: 29), (1982: 4-9) and (1986: 82) that the -marking properties of
lexical items (i.e. the properties that type the thematic roles of lexemes) are “represented categorially
at each syntactic level”. In fact the motivation for the principle in his (1981: 31) is virtually the
same acquisition-argument given in support of PoC. See also Culicover (1997: 99). e Projection
Principle is now no more (see Chomsky 1981: 187-9 and 1995a: 390), its role taken over by the
Merge operation (Chomsky 1995a: 396-8). Geeraerts (2010: §3.2) has a good discussion of the
history of projection rules within the generative enterprise.
Aswe shall see, the trouble for the semanticist comes from theneed to discipline the interaction
between lexicon and compositional rules in such a way that nonsense can be predicted in advance
(assuming semanticism, the EP for NL has no solution, I’ll claim).
As Williamson (2003b: 264, fn. 17) points out, some properties, e.g. pragmatic ones such as
presupposition, won’t generally be preserved.
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under composition. And here’s where trouble awaits the semanti-
cist, I contend. In order to carry out the explanatory task required
by the CC truism, the semanticist needs to show that meaningfulness
and understanding are preserved (or provide a systematic explana-
tion of why and how they fail to be so preserved) and, more impor-
tantly, that their preservation is ultimately dependent on the (formal)
compositional constraints on the semantics (and thus that the correct
rules—presumably some version of the traditional Tarskian ones ex-
tended to deal with some version of possible worlds semantics—are
those that preserve the relevant properties).
Speciĕcally, I shall argue that nonsense poses a problem for this
view, because nonsensical sentences are such that themeaningfulness
of the components (and our knowledge/understanding of what that
meaningfulness consists in) is not preserved by the compositional op-
erations.
Nonsense, that is, is a failure of closure: the meaningfulness of the
components does not add up to a meaningful whole (i.e. even min-
imal increases in syntactic complexity may engender loss of under-
standing).
Conversely, EPoCU implausibly attributes semantic omniscience to
speakers (knowledge of the atoms is taken to guarantee knowledge of
any combination thereof).
In short, contra the obvious reading of CC, the set of meaningful
sentences is not closed under the (unrestricted) compositional oper-
ations.
My main contention, then, is that this puts the semanticist in a
dilemma—the ĕrst of four that I raise for her in this chapter—since
either she has to radically disconnect epistemic versions of PoC from
the version adopted in her theory of meaning (thus severely weak-
ening the force of CC as the main motivation for insisting on the
Obviously, it is an interesting question which level of meaningfulness (and of understanding)
needs to be preserved for the truth of CC (and of semanticism). See fn. 157, p. 50, for discussion.
e idea of closure/property preservation is fairly clear in Fodor and Lepore (2002: 1), where
PoC is glossed as the idea that complex expressions inherit the syntactico-semantic properties of
their constituents. Clearly, closure is another way of saying that the rules do genuinely project.
Wecould also say thatNL is not compositionally conservative (adding novel complexmeanings
changes the meaning of the atoms). For just one example of the semanticist commitment to the
preservation ofmeaningfulness/understanding under composition see e.g. Fricker (1982: 64). Note
that the problem for EPoCU is highly general and not restricted to nonsense. Replies along the lines
of Dowty (2007: 27) or Everaert (2010: 83) would be wide of the mark.
Contra, in particular, Katz and Fodor (1963: 171). e failure of closure may not worry those,
like Chomsky, who do not deem the set to be i) recursively enumerable anyway; ii) of much rele-
vance to the formal enterprise. More later.
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compositional constraint) or she is obliged to increase the amount
of information contained in the lexicon so that illicit combinations
can be correctly predicted (and disqualiĕed) ahead of use—PoC, that
is, must also explain the contrapositive of CC (why speakers do not
understand nonsense).
e required increase to every lexeme’s information content will
however be such as to make the lexicon itself unlearnable:
Semanticist Dilemma (SD) I: To deĕne the characteristic func-
tion for the set of meaningful expressions, the semanticist will
either have to ) inĘate the lexicon and compositional rules
beyond learnability so as to regulate all possible meaning-
combinations in advance of use or ) abandon PoCU, and thus
lose the main motivation for insisting that a semantics be com-
positional.
In an attempt to save compositionality as the only explanation of
our linguistic creativity and of the learnability of our languages, the
semanticist is forced to inĘate the lexicon (and/or the compositional
rules) to the point where the learnability constraint is violated.
e semanticist view thus contains a fatal tension between learn-
ability and creativity, and the commitment to PoC makes it impos-
sible to satisfy both requirements. Accordingly, the allegedly truistic
connection between CC and PoC turns out to be an illusion, or so I
shall argue.
is should suﬃce by way of stage-setting.
In the next section I examine the phenomenon of nonsense. In sec-
tion  and  I move on to examine possible exit points for the seman-
ticist. I conclude that the supposedly platitudinous status of CC is
For a recent discussion of the inexhaustible variety of contextual sense-modulation and the
diﬃculties it creates for the lexicon see Wilson and Carston (2007: §2).
As Uriagereka (2008: xvii) notes, it is oen assumed that questions of memory limitations
only aﬀect performance. is is not so; they do signiĕcantly aﬀect competence too (as Uriagereka
eloquently shows).
(1) seems obvious (or will become so during the course of the chapter); the point about (2) is
that the semanticist may choose to go epistemicist and insist that the function delivers a verdict in
all cases but that (like e.g. the Ackermann function) it may in general outrun our ability to compute
its values. If so, CC must be given a diﬀerent explanation.
On the learnability requirement, see e.g. the classic statement in Davidson (1964: 3, 8). e
requirement persists, see e.g. Stanley (2000: 34), who thinks that admitting violations to PoC due
to extra-linguistic context would make language unlearnable.
If my line of reasoning is sustained, we then face the further questions of a) explaining away
the plausibility of the semanticist’s insistence on the compositionality constraint; b) sketching out a
role for systematicity and grasp of structure within a non-compositional framework, both tasks for
another day, I fear.
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unwarranted and that CC, in and of itself, does not provide support
for the insistence that NL semantics respect PoC.
Before all that, there is one more issue I need to deal with.
2.2.2.Why Nonsense?
One might question the choice of nonsense. Why should we (and
the semanticist in particular) worry about nonsense? Aren’t nonsen-
sical sentences (NS) peripheral, if not outright exotic cases anyway?
Aer all, CC can be taken to require that we explain how we under-
stand novel sentences when we do understand them—it wasn’t meant
to cover all sentences at all. Can’t we therefore simply rule out NS
as outlandish cases of no import to the standard processing of well-
behaved meanings? Couldn’t we for instance just stipulate that the
meaning function is not deĕned forNS? I’ll deal with this last strategy
in the next section. Let me address the ĕrst point right away instead.
I contend that nonsense cases are absolutely central to composi-
tionality, that they are in fact the litmus test for the principle. Here’s
why.
First, with nonsense there is no interference from the haze of
use—there is no noise from distracting use-familiarity to hide the
workings of the machinery, that is. Moreover, and for the same rea-
son, NS are genuinely novel cases, and thus precisely the ones at the
heart of CC, the ones we are under theoretical obligation to explain.
In contrast, the classic textbook examples that are supposed to pro-
vide intuitive support for PoC are at most unusual, rather than starkly
novel, in that they combine familiar words in familiar patterns: the
oddity is purely in the startling juxtaposition of perfectly familiar ker-
nels that give only a mild rattle to our conceptual scheme—the nov-
elty is subdued, the trick these examples pull but a cheap one.
Not so with echt cases of nonsense, cases where meanings do clang
together, where categories clash and derivations crash—the failure of
Patrick Greenough has urged me to address this issue.
is remark is indeed oenmade, but it is nonetheless curious. AsDummett (1974: 22) points
out, it is precisely disputed cases of applicability that make perspicuous the precise speciĕcations
of the rules that supposedly determine the meaning of an expression (that’s why Zettel §440 is so
unsettling, for the very possibility that we could always construct awkward cases obviously threatens
the general decidability of our predicates).
To claim that we understand indeĕnitely many sentences leaves it open that there may be
indeĕnitely many we don’t understand. I’m being charitable here. Although this option is logically
possible, standard statements of CC are clearly not meant to leave this particular loophole open.
See e.g. Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet’s (1990/2000: 6) “I saw a pink whale in the parking
lot” and the similar examples in Lycan (2000: 3) and Dever (2006: 633-4).
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understanding in such cases is truly catastrophic, not just an oddity
to be dismissed away as purely peripheral.
e fact is that it is in the face of authentic novelty, and only then,
that we can hear the cogs in the compositional machinery being laid
bare as they grind to an embarrassing halt (or at least it seems as if
they do).
Suddenly, in the face of nonsense, the normally non-overtly infer-
ential mechanisms that (supposedly) deliver meanings to us are de-
manding additional input from speakers, for they appear impotent
to construct a meaning for the troublesome sentence unless supple-
mented by additional input from the speaker/hearer.
Ultimately, the idea challenged by nonsense is that there are canon-
ical grounds for acceptance for sentences and that those grounds are
presented to us on a plate by the compositional machinery (that’s
what talk of the objectivity of meaning boils down to; that’s, allegedly,
the source of whatever normativity meaning has for us).
It seems instead obvious that NS do not have canonical grounds
attached to them by the compositional machinery; and if so, I can see
no reason why we should think that the machinery does succeed in
attaching canonical grounds to run-of-the-mill cases either.
And this is indeed why NS also challenge one other key commit-
ment behind truth-conditional semantics, namely its representational
stance, its distinctive claim that to know the meaning of a sentence is
to know what the world would have to be like for the sentence to be
true.
On the semanticist picture, a sentence provides us with a purported
representation of reality that we may then compare to the world;
our assertoric practices with that particular sentence are thus a func-
tion of the particular sentence-world connection determined by its
syntactico-semantic structure.
But for us to be able to judge whether or not a sentence is assertible
in a context it is necessary that we can make sense of the purported
claim made by sentence before we look out to the world.
Nonsense puts pressure on this idea, as we shall see, for we don’t
even know what a NS says, and if so, we lack the means for com-
Am I conceding that there is a compositional machinery? Perhaps. But even imaginary ma-
chines can make imaginary noises.
Chomsky (1965: 76, 149). Similarly, Horwich (1998: 155) states that, given an understanding
of the constituents, no further work is needed to gain understanding of the complex.
See e.g. Heim and Kratzer (1998: 1). roughout, my use of ‘representationalist’ and its cog-
nates is to be taken in Taylor’s (1980) and Brandom’s (2000) sense. A concise critique of represen-
tationalism is in Read (2010: 558).
As Wittgenstein (1914-16/1998: 23) noted.
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paring sentence and world—the most basic test, it would seem, for
establishing whether or not one is competent in a language.
We see here another facet ofUaGS: on that view, grasping themean-
ing of a complex expression is grasping a deĕnite representational
claim about some portion of reality, which is then used for truth-value
assessment. And the idea is that the structure of that claim is compo-
sitionally determined (and solely so).
Nonsense challenges this idea, for it is conceded on all hands that
NS require further input from speakers (that is indeed the mark of
nonsense)—le on their own, as it were, NS provide at most sub-
skeletal components for truth-value assessment.
ere is therefore another, closely related target that needs men-
tioning, and it’s the idea, still current in much contemporary seman-
tics, that we give the meaning of a sentence by stating its truth con-
ditions (the fact that those conditions are worldly is what makes se-
manticism a representationalist enterprise).
Given this (more or less straightforward) equation of meaning and
truth-conditions, EPU entails our last deĕnition in this chapter:
UaKTC: To understand a sentence is to know its truth-
conditions.
I shall argue that nonsense puts pressure on the claim that under-
standing is grasp (indeed, knowledge) of truth conditions (note the
connection with UaGS: grasping the form of an expression is grasp-
ing its truth-conditional contribution under embedment).
Indeed, a commitment to UaKTC gives rise to the second dilemma
for the semanticist, which I shall discuss at greater length later in the
chapter:
SD II: Given UaKTC, the semanticist will have to say either that
we understand nonsense or that we do not. In the ĕrst case, she
will have to weaken the classic conception of truth-conditions,
in the second case she will have to reject CC. Neither horn is
On many views, the representational aspect of language is its central semantic fact (Soames
1989: 182). See Chomsky (2000: 132) and (2003: 292) for a contrary view. My own view is fairly
close to Chomsky’s (minus his baﬄing insistence on nativism): the representational structures pro-
vided by language are radicallyminimal (but that’s becausemental content is radicallyminimal too).
Representationalism needs not be committed to what Ludlow (2003: 145) and (2011: 134) called
the Language/World Isomorphism. A much weaker assumption will do just as well.
Chomsky (1965: §4.1).
Again, read this as a conditional (U(S )!KTC(S ))—see fn. 5. A more general version would
have it that to understand an expression is to know its truth-conditional contribution under em-
bedment. See Carnap (1942: §7) for a classic statement of UaKTC.
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compatible with full-blown semanticism.
And if all this is not enough, nonsense matters for yet another, ab-
solutely fundamental reason.
Supposewe think that it is unreasonable to demand that a semantics
give an account of the grasp/possession of satisfaction conditions for
predicates and atomic sentences more generally. e task of a com-
positional semantics, we have been told time and time again (perhaps
at least since Stalnaker (: ), perhaps since long before that),
is to give an account of the functional relations holding between ex-
pressions under embedment.
Nonsense, I shall argue, puts pressure on that more modest claim
too. In fact, I think it shows that claim to be either an utterly trivial
one or outright empty.
Lastly, nonsense puts pressure on the idea that a theory of meaning
could be modest (in the sense made familiar and defended by Mc-
Dowell), that it could, that is, be piggy-backed on an antecedent
understanding of the meta-language. For with nonsense there is no
help forthcoming from themeta-language: the semanticist cannot in-
voke a prior understanding of the metalanguage as is routinely done
in cases of ambiguity, indeterminacy, vagueness or ourmastery of the
logical connectives.
With nonsense, that is, understanding, if absent from the object
language, also breaks down across the hierarchy of languages. And
once again this lays bare the actual scope of the recursivemechanisms
posited by the semanticist.
My conclusion will therefore be that the meaning stipulations for
the lexicon and the grammar do not reach out as far as the semanticist
claims; they are largely provisional on further intervention by speak-
ers—a fact obscured, with “normal” sentences, by the haze of use,
which hides the true extent of the contribution by speakers’ judge-
ments to the determination of complex meanings.
I trust this suﬃces to motivate my choice of nonsense as the means
And those relations must have epistemic import: Lepore and Ludwig (2005: 139) state that
“the aim of a compositional meaning theory [is] to put us in a position to understand any sentence
[…] on the basis of understanding its elements and their arrangement”—as clear a proof of the
semanticist commitment to EPoCU as you can wish to get.
McDowell (1987, 1997). e term was introduced in Dummett (1974: 5).
McDowell would resist this argument, for thewhole point about his notion ofmodestywas that
robust theories of meaning presuppose a mythical standpoint situated outside our practices—see
his (1981a: 342). I agree but again I draw diﬀerent conclusions from this (perfectly sound) remark.
ere is a further reason why becoming clear about nonsense is crucial to our theories. As Russell
(1940: 216) noted, if we take sentences, rather than propositions, to be the truth-bearers, then before
we can assert e.g. the Law of Excluded Middle we need to know which sentences are signiĕcant.
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by which to raise diﬃculties for some of the deĕning theses of seman-
ticism. It is now time to get my argument going in greater detail.
2.3. Varieties of Nonsense
So far, we have beenworkingwith a relatively informal notion of PoC.
Interestingly, formal statements of PoC nearly always make a fun-
damental assumption, namely, that the expressions involved are al-
readymeaningful (for complex expressions, the domain of the mean-
ing function is restricted to the class, or algebra, of those grammat-
ical constituent terms that are already mapped to some elements in
the class, or algebra, of meanings). Indeed, another way of looking
at PoC is to say that it ensures that the class of grammatical (well-
formed) statements is exactly the class of meaningful expressions.
Arguably, this assumption reĘects the fact that analytic philoso-
phers tend to view language through (ĕrst-order) logic-tinted glasses,
as it were, with the completeness theorem forcing on them a com-
mitment to an analogous and equally neat correspondence be-
tween grammaticalness andmeaningfulness—the (unoﬃcial) slogan:
grammars do not leak.
ere is a rather awkward problemwith this requirement, however,
for, as a matter of fact, grammaticalness and meaningfulness may
(and do) come apart in NL. Moreover, NL lacks well-deĕned cri-
teria for well-formedness, grammaticalness andmeaningfulness any-
way.
Consequently, this puts pressure on the semanticist’s commitment
to forward (or bottom-up) compositionality, that is, on the idea that
Montague (1970c: 225-7), Dowty et al. (1981: 42-43), Janssen (1997: §8), Hodges (1998: 10)
and (2001: §5), Westerståhl (1998: 636), Westerståhl (2002: 248), Pagin (2005: 307), Dever (2006:
635).
Emmon Bach’s (1976) gloss on PoC as a rule-to-rule hypothesis in eﬀect conjectures that to
every syntactic rule there corresponds a semantic rule that delivers a meaning for any expression.
Contra Edward Sapir’s famous dictum that all grammars leak (inmore ways than one). Russell
(1940: 209) was clear that NL leaks but also argued that we should (and could) construct a language
where all and only legitimately constructed sentences do have ameaning, just like Frege (1893/1998:
I.§32) had insisted—Russell (1923: 65) however candidly admits this is a chimera. As far as formal
languages are concerned, unique readability and the truth-deĕnition (rather than completeness)
guarantee that every well-formed expression is assigned a meaning.
Chomsky (1957: 15).
Wilks (1971, 1975), Chomsky (1972a: 121), (1980: 127-8) and (2003: 288). AsChomsky (2009:
15) notes, his (1955-56/1975: ch. 4) had raised diﬃculties for a commitment towell-formedness that
were not given due prominence in his (1957).
e term ‘forward compositionality’ comes from Patterson (2005: 328).
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constituent meanings determine the meaning of embedding com-
plexes in full generality, and hence that, given EPoC, an understand-
ing of the atoms suﬃces for an understanding of an unbound (and
fully unrestricted) range of complex meanings.
Furthermore, the vagueness in the notion of well-formedness also
has a serious impact on the referential/representational commit-
ments of the semanticist, as I shall argue a couple of sub-sections
down the line.
Before worrying about that, though, let me stress that the gap be-
tween grammaticalness and well-formedness already puts pressure
on the linguist’s attempts to discipline syntactic behaviour so as to
mark out as licit those derivations that do not result in nonsense.
So, prior to turning my attention to the semanticist’s claims regard-
ing the semantic reach of expressions, in the next sub-section I shall
ĕrst take issue with the Chomskyan syntactocentric view of nonsense.
Much of what I say here will apply to the semanticist as well and it is
helpful, I think, to separate my attack in this way.
2.3.1. Degrees of Nonsense
Now, the absence of a precise criterion to demarcate well-formed sen-
tences from defective ones does not of course mean that we do not
have a robust handle on well-formedness issues regarding unques-
tionably un-/acceptable sentences.
And so at a ĕrst approximation we can endorse Chomsky’s sugges-
tion that the class of sentences be divided into
Completely ungrammatical sentences: Pure nonsense, as it
were, strings that are not recognisable as belonging to any lan-
guage or that are clearly ungrammatical by the standards of
a recognised language: e.g. ‘ab sur ah’, (Wittgenstein -
/: ) or ‘brought admires Tom’ (Chomsky -
/: -).
Partially grammatical sentences: e ones of most interest
to us, that is, cases where we have “perfectly grammatical
strings that are incongruous on nonsyntactic grounds” (Chom-
sky : ): paradigm case, the Chomsky-sentence ‘colorless
green ideas sleep furiously’.
Searle (1983b: 78) and (1994: 638) argued against Derrida that we can draw a distinction even
if we lack the means of drawing it rigorously and precisely. e point is sound, if intriguing, but it
is certainly inimical to the Fregean project (Frege 1906: 303) and to those mathematically-minded
theorists committed to an ideal of underlying exactitude for our meanings, see for instance Carnap
(1936: 424). See Glendinning (1998: ch. 5) for a critique of this ideal.
Chomsky (1955-56/1975: 145), (1957: 15). One might detect a tension between a diagnosis
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Fully grammatical sentences: “Normal”, non-aberrant sen-
tences, posing nodiﬃculty to syntactico-semantic processing.
So, the proposal, from Chomsky and others, is that we rank defec-
tive sentences along a degree of grammaticalness scale in terms of their
departure from uncontroversial cases of grammaticality (or equiva-
lently, the amount of “repair” needed tomake the oﬀending sentences
acceptable).
We thus have a new version of the requirement that linguistic the-
ory generate sound-meaning relations: the requirement is now taken
to be fully general, that is, all expressions, whatever their status, will
be assigned a pairing.
In addition, what the theory also needs to do is explain (by ap-
propriate modelling) speakers’ ability immediately to rank sentences
along the grammaticalness scale.
More speciĕcally, and as Chomsky (-/: ) had in-
sisted, it is of crucial importance that the theory be able to provide a
clear demarcation between all-out deviancy and semantic deviancy.
In less charged vocabulary, we want an explanation of what distin-
guishes grammatical from ungrammatical nonsense.
Note that we are thus adding to CC: what we now have to elucidate
of deviancy formulated, at least occasionally, in nonsyntactic terms and Chomsky’s implementa-
tion of a purely syntactic remedy (note also the two senses of ‘grammatical’ involved in Chomsky’s
taxonomy and in his own description of the Chomsky-sentence). As the next few footnotes make
clear, Chomsky is well aware of the Ęuidity of the notions involved. Aarts (2007: 46-52) has a useful
discussion of Chomsky’s position on these matters.
e taxonomy is proposed in Chomsky (1955-56/1975: 131). See also Chomsky (1965: 76-7).
Note that Chomsky (1957: 23) Ęirts very brieĘy and uncharacteristically with the idea that for fully
grammatical sentences we can state the conditions under which they are true.
See Cruse (1986: §1.2): syntactically-challenged sentences, as it were, can be patched up by
sorting out constituents that belong to the closed set of expressions (those that are fully grammati-
calised, i.e. relatively immutable over time and in function) while semantic defectiveness will typ-
ically require substitution of open set items (i.e. items from the lexicon). A similar distinction is
invoked in Brinton and Traugott (2005: 1ﬀ.). e trouble for this proposal is that, as Cruse himself
recognises (20, fn. 4), the distinction between open and closed set elements is not an absolute one.
is analysis of deviancy simply pushes the problem one step deeper.
See e.g. Chomsky (2003: 288) and (2009: 15). And the question, on the semanticist side, will
be: does understanding get preserved across all such pairings?
Chomsky (1955-56/1975: 132, 142). Note also that establishing the correct combinatorial rules
would give us a unique insight into “the nature and source” of speakers’ productivity (p. 135). Once
again, nonsense is not an exotic component in the theory of meaning, but one of its central features.
As usual, semi-medical terminology is invoked to castigate departures from “normality” as in
various ways defective: the unruly sentences are ‘deviant’, ‘aberrant’ and ‘anomalous’, see Chomsky
(1965: 76-7), Larson and Segal (1995: 46-7), Buekens (2005) and Jackendoﬀ (1990: 53).
Chomsky (1955-56/1975: 146).
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is not just the unbound productivity of the language faculty but also
our capacity to discern (and account for) diﬀerences in its output.
2.3.2. (De-)selecting Nonsense
At ĕrst blush, Chomsky’s suggestion with regard to nonsense is en-
tirely aligned with the philosophical tradition on the matter: once we
have established the (possibly a bit leaky) trichotomy above, we need
selectional rules that restrict derivations and classify output accord-
ingly.
e basic idea is that the Chomsky sentence, like the familiar old
chestnuts (e.g. Russell’s “Quadruplicity drinks procrastination” and
Carnap’s “Caesar is a prime number”), violates categorial restric-
tions—it oﬀends, that is, against the logical syntax of language.
erefore, the theorist’s task is to devise projection rules that explain
and predict the emergence of nonsense.
Very roughly, here is the general shape of this strategy.
Lexical entries are assigned (in fact: they are) a set of syntactic fea-
tures (e.g. for nouns, these include Common, Count, Animate, Ab-
stract). In eﬀect, we are typing expressions by specifying features
that dictate which contexts the expressions can occur in and intro-
duce a further constraint on complex strings: they have to be not just
well-formed, but well-typed too.
Broad category violations will produce ungrammatical nonsense
(e.g. in ‘brought admired Tom’ a verb occupies a position normally
assigned to a nominal). Violations at the sub-categorical level (partic-
ularlywith regard to the thematic roles assignments attached to verbs)
will in general produce grammatical nonsense (e.g. the Chomsky sen-
tence, where several such restrictions are broken).
Actually, Chomsky considers two possible strategies: restrict syntactic derivations by selec-
tional rules, or delegate the marking of deviance to the semantic module. Roughly, it is the dis-
tinction between direct and derivative generation of the deviant sentences. See (Chomsky 1955-
56/1975: 131) and (1965: 227).
Russell (1940: 209, 213), Carnap (1932: 67). e diagnosis of a clash of categories is venerable
(recall Aristotle’s ‘justice is not a square number’ in Magna Moralia, I, 1182a14). See the compre-
hensive resumé in Horn (1989/2001: §2.3). Jackendoﬀ (1990: 54) spells out the idea nicely from a
generativist perspective. A more recent discussion is in Magidor (2009).
For the details, see Chomsky (1955-56/1975: ch. 4) and (1965: ch. 2, 4.1).
More precisely, they are sets of syntactic, phonological and semantic features—Chomsky
(1965: 214). e selectional features, however, are generally taken to be syntactic. Note that, ob-
viously enough, we are relying on a ĕxed understanding of what counts as abstract and animate
here. One might well wonder how the syntax would be able to do that independently of a given
conceptual scheme that will have strong semantic (and indeed ontological) features.
For Chomsky (1965: 87), the lexicon is the repository of idiosyncratic properties (this includes
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e explanation is neat, and the syntactic machinery gives a fairly
solid implementation of the intuitive reaction to nonsense, e.g. being
a prime number is not the kind of thing that can happen to the con-
queror of Gaul, whilst having a particularly bad day in mid-March
is.
e strategy also seems to provide a nice response to the worries
about the CC-PoC connection. With the appropriate selectional re-
strictions in place, there is no reason to worry unduly over nonsense.
We cannot understand NS simply because the illicit combinations of
meanings arising therein already oﬀend against syntax, let alone se-
mantics.
Our incomprehension is actually evidence (as good as it gets, in fact)
that we are competent: we, and the compositional machinery, can
spot nonsense a mile ahead—there’s no fooling us.
2.3.3.e Autonomy of Syntax
Note that Chomsky is insistent throughout that selectional rules are
operating on syntactic features—that’s why it is a question of compe-
tence (and not of performance) that we be able to rank grammatical-
ness andmeaningfulness precisely as we do. is is, in fact, one way in
which themuch-discussed autonomy of syntax thesis gets to do some
interesting work (the selectional features work independently of se-
mantic constraints: they are already primed at the syntactic level).
Recall also that for Chomsky (-/: ) the ability to
classify sentences on the grammaticalness/meaningfulness scale is
one of the keymanifestations of our competence: that’s why it doesn’t
much matter that NL doesn’t have a clear-cut criterion for well-
formedness in general.
All’s not well, however. Consider the rather extraordinary—to
properties relevant to semantic interpretation!). Moreover (p. 88), the lexicon carries the burden of
providing information that determines “the degree and manner of deviation” of strings not directly
generated.
See for instance the claim in Chomsky (1955-56/1975: 87) that “semantic notions are of no
assistance in the determination of formal structure” (my emphasis). Characteristically, elsewhere
(e.g. 1965: 77) Chomsky is less intransigent. Later still, (1975b: 54-5), he defends the autonomy of
syntax view as the idea that “the language faculty constructs an abstract formal skeleton invested
with meaning by the interpretive rules”. I question the claim that there is a strict connection be-
tween interpretive rules and the syntactico-semantic structure posited by the formalist. Speciĕcally,
interpretive rules (and I doubt the use of the term ‘rule’ is appropriate here) impinge on syntax in
deeperways thanChomsky concedes (or conceded before ca. 2006). Hinzen (2006: 154, fn. 4) is still
adamant that the task of a Chomskyan grammar is to derive “expressions-under-an-interpretation”
in a manner that fully respects MDP.
e usual tack here is to provide an interpretation that makes (some) sense of the C-sentence.
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my mind at least—claim in Chomsky (-/: ) that
the Chomsky sentence (C-sentence) is grammatical (if defective) by
virtue of being an instance of the same sentence-form as the “perfectly
normal”:
) Revolutionary new ideas appear infrequently
In fact, Chomsky calls the C-sentence “an absurd semi-English sen-
tence” (presumably because ideas cannot be green, and sleeping furi-
ously is something no-one can engage in).
But what of () itself? ‘Revolution’ is a term introduced in the th
century to denote a property of the motion of celestial bodies. It
was ĕrst applied to political upheavals in the mid-ĕeenth century.
Only much later did it apply to abstract terms such as ideas. And
the same, mutatis mutandis, is true of ‘appear’—abstract notions are
by deĕnition not part of the phenomenal realm.
at () counts, in Chomsky’s I-language, as ‘normal’, then, seems
hardly a matter of syntax, especially if we think of it in terms of uni-
versal grammar (presumably, broad verb subcategorization belongs
But Chomsky (1965: 76, 149) had anticipated this move and would simply retort that the distinc-
tion he’s aer is still in place: deviant sentences demand rather than impose an interpretation. My
strategy is diﬀerent: I attack the idea that “normal” sentences have, in general, an interpretation
imposed on them by the machinery in virtue of deep facts about our mind (or anything else, in fact).
For I’d reverse Foucault’s (1969: 101-02) judgement regarding the C-sentence and argue that with-
out a context “normal” sentences cannot be considered meaningful either. See also Searle (1980),
Ross (1981: 55-6) and Glendinning (2007: 86).
ere is a curious tension between this claim and Chomsky’s (1966: 65) attack on exactly the
same view as held by Bloomĕeld. In fn. 22 on p. 124, Chomsky also defends MDP with respect to
“quite novel” sentences.
And of course as Chesterton wryly noted, the application to politics had a deeper meaning
than intended: strictly speaking, it amounts to a plus ça change verdict, rather than recognition of
a genuine change of trajectory.
According to the OED, one of the earliest such uses is due to Burke in 1796 but the ‘revolution-
ary ideas’ pairing only appears with G.B. Shaw in 1919. Tracing earliest occurrences of a particular
usage is a dangerous game to play, but all I need is the undoubted gap between the astronomical
use and its (mis-)application to abstract ideas (and similarly for ‘appear’). See Hacking (1983: 8-9)
for some other early examples of the “abstract” use of ‘revolutionary’.
e point generalises to other cases discussed in Chomsky (1965: 149) such as ‘Sincerity ad-
mires John’ and ‘Golf plays John’. Both sentences can easily be given not just interpretations (Chom-
sky countenanced that circumstance) but can also be taken to be part of ‘normal’ (self-interpreting,
as it were) English given enough currency within a speciĕc conceptual scheme: the Medieval an-
thropomorphisation of virtues made Sincerity a perfectly suitable entity to ĕgure as the subject of a
verb such as ‘admire’; an admiring “new-age” coachmay well conĕde to a friend that John is not just
very good at golf, he’s become so good that golf plays John and not viceversa. ese cases seem to
me perfectly good, perfectly normal and liable to immediate interpretations by speakers who have
become familiar with their changed grammatical status.
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to the principles and not to the parameters-setting function of gram-
mar).
In all likelihood, the Chomskyan will reply that the setting of sub-
categories is a question of the “proper description for a ĕxed linguistic
corpus”, where a measure of idealisation is invoked in the corpus-
ĕxing move: once the subcategorisation parameters are (re-)set, the
machine will churn along happily.
But this is not good enough. CC poses a puzzle about our unbound
understanding. It now turns out that our understanding is actually
constrained not by syntax but rather by the conceptual scheme which
happens to be in force at a given point in time (and is exempliĕed in
a given linguistic corpus)—e.g. there was a time (between the th
and the th century) when the now “normal” (i.e. norms-compliant)
() would too have counted as absurd semi-English (so much for the
presumed inviolable status of selectional rules, then).
And it is the speakers’ (and the machinery’s) forgetfulness of ()’s
rather murky past history that now enables it to have gained re-
spectability as a fully normal, no longer deviant, member of the class
of grammatical sentences—curiously enough, it is that very same for-
getfulness that supposedly mandates the ‘normal’ interpretation for
() rather than sending us oﬀ on a quest for an interpretation (as was
the case with the C-sentence in ).
If my critique of Chomsky’s view of nonsense is on the right track,
it therefore seems as if our competence in detecting degrees of gram-
maticalnesswouldmore properly be described as an exercise of imagi-
native rationality, to adapt Lakoﬀ and Johnson’s (: ) apt label
I.e., that verbs are subcategorised may well be a universal feature of language and that a par-
ticular subcategorisation will establish a necessary connection between theta-role assignments and
the suitability of lexical items to ĕgure as arguments in the derivation is also taken to be a universal
feature of languages. See e.g. (Lasnik and Uriagereka 2005: 6)—note though how their fn. 5 on
p. 29 ĕrst concedes that ergative languages may represent an exception, only to explain it away in
the next breath because of the claimed availability of an analysis in transformational terms. For the
Principles & Parameters phase in Chomsky’s thought, see his (1995b: ch. 1) and Culicover (1997).
Chomsky (1955-56/1975: 147), my emphasis.
Perhaps something like this lies behind Chomsky’s (1965: 75-9, 111, 153) discussion of the
possible division of labour between the syntactic and the semantic module with respect to the
implementation of selectional restrictions on derivations. Or perhaps the Chomskyan would be
content with the claim that our theory is modelling our intuitive grasp of the order of deviance of
sentences (Chomsky 1965: 152).
I decided to concentrate on (1) as a target, but similar considerations would apply to our ever-
evolving understanding of scientiĕc terms and even to natural kinds terms, as is familiar from dis-
cussions of these issues by e.g. Austin (1946: 88) and Putnam (1962: 239). Indeed Searle (1980:
230-1) made the very same point with respect to the hallowed ‘Snow is white’.
For that strong claim, see Chomsky (1965: 150).
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for our ability to see structural similarities holding across diﬀerent
domains, rather than of syntax-led competence—we do not blindly
follow the verdicts of the machine: we set its parameters and judge
which categorial restrictions ought to be in place, given the state of
our knowledge.
Indeed, even if the Chomskyan were to retreat to a view whereby
syntax merely implements time-indexed conceptual constraints, we
would still be a long way away from having established the virtually
necessary connection between the question posed by CC and the an-
swer given by GP (or, as we shall see in a moment, PoC), for facts
about competence were supposed to show deep facts about ourmind,
not about the history-bound vagaries of our conceptual schemes.
Now, Jackendoﬀ (: ) has contended that behind the con-
ception of selectional rules in Chomsky () there is the assump-
tion that a neat correspondence exists between conceptual structure
and syntax.
e point is, however, that that is precisely what a linguistic the-
ory ought to establish, and not just take for granted, or delegate to
some other branch of enquiry. Aer all, it has been claimed time
and time again that linguistics is an empirical discipline accountable
to the facts; that it is best construed as bio-linguistics, and that its
proper object of enquiry is the internal representations of the com-
petent speaker—language is a natural object on this view.
If so, we should be making claims about its actual features, and my
main contention throughout this dissertation is precisely that the facts
Note that in some way a view of this kind is perfectly in keeping with one aspect of Chom-
sky’s conception of linguistic creativity, namely, our ability to adapt words to context. What I’m
questioning is whether Chomsky has accurately located the source of that ability (i.e. whether he
has succeeded in identifying what kind of rules genuinely govern our language mastery: and this, as
stated in e.g. Chomsky (1972a: 141) is indeed “the fundamental problem” of linguistic theory).
See Chomsky (1995a: 385), Boeckx (2006: 10), Hinzen (2007: 27), Hornstein (2009).
Chomsky (1965: 77) openly, but noncommittally, considers this assumption. It seems clear
that his oﬃcial position is strongly opposed to such a view, however, e.g. (2003: 292). Elsewhere,
however, Chomsky has appeared to defend a nativist view of conceptual structure with regard to
lexical items, e.g. Chomsky (2000: 62). I think this is onemore example of his characteristic oscilla-
tion between apparently incompatible positions. In any case, it is absurd to think that our concepts
could everywhere be constrained by the language faculty with respect to features such as “intending,
causation, goal of action, event, and so on”, for these notions are themselves subject to revision.
Chomsky (1965: 75) draws a distinction between questions of presentations (how to state a
theory) and justiĕcation (how to justify a given choice of presentation). My point is: the distinction
is a good one, but without an answer to the justiĕcation question, one’s claim that the privileged
form of presentation properly models (let alone represents) our competence may well lose much of
its cogency.
See e.g. Chomsky (2000: ch. 2) and (2009: 13, 16).
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about our competence mandate a view of content as radically mini-
mal (even more minimal than Chomsky’s already deĘationary con-
ception) and that even the sub-categorization principles that we at-
tribute to syntax are provisional and do not necessarily point to ĕxed
structures in the mind and certainly not, as the semanticist (but not
Chomsky) would have it, to facts about reality.
In short, I shall claim that syntax is indeed autonomous, and in
much bolder ways than even Chomsky countenanced: all (gram-
matically well-formed) sentences, precisely as Tractatus §.
had warned, are legitimately constructed. Accordingly, and contra
Chomsky, my main conclusion in this section is that grammatical
nonsense is a nonsensical notion.
I will return later to the Chomskyan framework, and from a much
more sympathetic perspective. For now, mention of a claimed cor-
respondence between conceptual structure and syntax gives me a
good transition point for moving the spotlight back on the seman-
ticist.
2.4. Categories and the Laws of Meaning
Let’s brieĘy take stock. We started from the claim that CC is the key
fact to be explained and that PoC is the only (or the best) explana-
tion available. Our problemwas that nonsense seems to threaten that
claim, for by deĕnitionwe cannotmake sense of nonsense (and so con-
tra CC, understanding is not unbound). To address that, we needed
some way to screen oﬀ nonsense, but when we tested Chomsky’s syn-
tactocentric version of UaGS, we found it wanting: the relevant sub-
categorization features do not appear to be suﬃciently independent
of context-relative (perhaps even interest-relative) conceptual stric-
tures.
Suppose now that we set aside the claim that syntax alone can dis-
cipline nonsense. We could, that is, counter the argument of the
last sub-section somewhere along these lines. My critique of Chom-
sky focused on the C-sentence and its formerly-roguish-and-now-
reformed counterpart (). But in both cases the category clash was
not as severe as, say, in the Carnap sentence ‘Caesar is a prime num-
ber’—a patch was all too easily available (and indeed successfully im-
See e.g. Chomsky (2000: 126-7).
If anything, the lesson from this section is that Chomsky’s view of grammatical nonsense is in
tension with his views regarding reference and representationalism.
I’m taking into account the fact that the notion of syntax at stake here is wider than the philoso-
pher’s standard view of the matter, as e.g. Chomsky (2003: 287) makes clear.
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plemented and then forgotten about) in the case of ().
However, no amount of shiing in our conceptual scheme will ever
alter the status of the Carnap sentence, since if we tried that we’d be
banging our head against the wall of conceptual necessity. erefore,
the objector might conclude, grammatical nonsense does exist and
some selectional rules are cast in (conceptual-ontological) stone.
Moreover, we can know those rules a priori and consequently predict
terminal nonsense ahead of embedment and in complete innocence
of the current state of our conceptual scheme.
is, or something like this, is in eﬀect Husserl’s position. It de-
serves consideration.
2.4.1.Husserlian Meanings
In discussing the C-sentence, I ended up suggesting that meaning
stipulations are provisional, and that selectional rules are (by and
large) indexed to a conceptual scheme. e objection we are con-
sidering would also argue that this gets things back to front, that my
suggestion would weaken any claims we might make as to the ob-
jectivity of meaning—and if meanings were really up for grabs in the
manner I seem to suggest,what could possibly explain our agreement
in judgements and the day-to-day (ostensibly unimpeded) commu-
nicability of content?
Surely, the objection goes, at best all that I have established is that
our epistemic access to facts about meaning is fraught with diﬃcul-
ties. We do get things wrong, no doubt about that. But concep-
tual analysis is precisely the task of getting clearer about the ultimate
(and immutable) nature of concepts and our semantics parallels that
(ever-evolving) process. It doesn’t follow frommy discussion of ()
And, if rather lively cases of synesthesia are contemplated, this is so even for green ideas. As
for the ‘colorless green’ clash (on the face of it, a conceptual impossibility), reĘect that ‘revolutionary
new’ is equally ‘impossible’ (“properly speaking”, ‘revolution’ means a kind of motion that doubles
back on itself: ‘revolutionary new’ would thus be a contradiction in terms by the formalist’s own
lights, one would have thought).
I actually think the C-sentence was meant to capture fundamental selectional rules, but that’s
by-the-by.
Jackendoﬀ (1997: 31) reads Chomsky as diagnosing the deviancy of the C-sentence in terms
of conceptual structure violations. I can ĕnd no evidence to support that claim, apart from the
“wondering aloud” kind of remarks that I have copiously cited. e main point Chomksy intended
to derive from the example, as I stressed repeatedly, was that the relative diﬀerence of the sets of
grammatical and meaningful sentences is non-empty and that “any search for a semantically based
deĕnition of “grammaticalness”will be futile” (1957: 15). Equally importantly, he used that sentence
to attack probabilistic explanations of competence (1955-56/1975: 145).
at is Frege’s view, as usefully discussed in the already cited Burge (2005: 55ﬀ.).
 | Chapter 
that meanings are everywhere provisional, that is. All that follows is
that it might take us a while to pin down fully complete meaning-
speciĕcations.
I’ll defend my view against objections of this kind in greater detail
in the chapters ahead. For now, I want to give this objection as good
a chance as I can, although I should also note in passing that I think
that the Carnap sentence can be dealt with in the samemanner as the
C-sentence.
I grant that on one intuitively attractive reading PoC is the principle
that can best enforce the contractual view of meaning, which in turn
exempliĕes in a very natural way the idea that meaning is (and must
be) objective.
PoC, that is, plays a dual theoretical role, since it provides not just a
neat answer to EP and CC, but it also does normative duty, in that it
stipulates that a commitment to the atomic meanings binds speakers
to accepting unconditionally the complex ones delivered by the com-
positional machinery (the grounds for one’s beliefs about constituent
meanings are eo ipso grounds for speciĕc, and rationally mandated,
beliefs about the complex meanings).
Meaning derivations, on this picture, do not determine gen-
uinely new concepts. ey are not, then, instruments of concep-
tual change. Rather, they merely unveil, by means of word-
recombination, previously constituted ones.
From this perspective, no sentence is genuinely novel—all possible
sentential meanings are already contained in the atoms: you couldn’t
understand the atoms without already understanding the sentences
in which they get embedded.
e crucial claim for our purposes, then, is that the range of all
possible combinations is alreadywritten into the atoms ahead of use.
ere is in any case a further point to note here, namely, that CCmakes a universal claim about
the absolutely unbounded character of our linguistic understanding. My argument against Chom-
sky’s conception of nonsense in the previous section is all that was needed to challenge that claim.
What the current objection threatens is my further claim that the class of grammatical nonsense is
empty. I think we can always expand the argument in the text to deal with the Carnap sentence and
its cognates in the same way I dealt with the Chomsky sentence, but I won’t argue for that here.
Wright (1980: 19), McDowell (1984: 221).
What I am questioning bymy appeal to nonsense is above all the thought that PoC can enforce
norms of rationality of this kind in relation to linguistic competence.
Wright’s (1980: 5) useful gloss on the Wittgenstenian conception of proof. See Dummett’s
(1959: 177) for a contrary view.
is, again, shows why any non-epistemic version of PoC just won’t make the needed explana-
tory work with respect to the CC puzzle.
See e.g. Evans (1976: 325). Note the analogy—once again a legacy of the logic-led view of
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It is this that gives PoC its bite—no other principle could succeed in
combining explanatory adequacy and normative import so neatly.
In short, and to paraphrase Wittgenstein: the semanticist’s (unspo-
ken) motto is that compositionality ensures that there are no surprises
in semantics.
e objection under scrutiny now faces a crucial question. To se-
cure the objectivity of meaning in this manner, and in accordance
with MDP, the lexicon must incorporate all possible future use in
its speciĕcations. If so, we have to ask: How can we prime the
(sub-)categorial status of the atoms ahead of their embedment in a
range of (linguistic and non-linguistic) contexts that is, ex hypothesi,
unbound (and whose cardinality is in fact uncountable)?
More importantly still, what justiĕcation can we oﬀer for a given
choice of nonsense-busting categorial restrictions?
NL—between this view of the role of PoC and the idea that the class of consequences of a given set of
axioms is already contained in the generating base. However, strictly speaking, the theorems cannot
properly be said to be contained in the axioms alone, but rather in the axioms and the structures
that satisfy them. Properly unpacked, that is, the claim is a (ternarily) relational one. And in the
case of NL the tricky question is of course: what are the structures the lexical base is true of?
And as anticipated: it is precisely the plausibility (and “naturalness”) of this claim to fulĕl a
double role that gives it so much grief.
Tractatus §6.1251. e role of PoC in guaranteeing objectivity of meaning goes hand in hand
(rather uncomfortably) with a purely contingent fact about learnability: case-by-case convention-
making, we are told by Frege and today’s semanticists, would make language unlearnable. ere is
claimed to be an a priori link between our speciĕc contingent cognitive capacities and the structure
of the languages accessible to us. However, a) there exist perfectly coherent non-compositional,
connectivist-based accounts of language structure and non-rule-based learning patterns, and b)
there is ample (although by no means incontrovertible) empirical evidence that meaning compu-
tation is in fact oen non-compositional and that we do negotiate complex meanings pretty much
on a case-by-case basis, especially in the case of compound noun phrases, see Dąbrowska (2004:
ch. 2 §3.1), Costello and Keane (2005) and Dunbar (2005). On compound nouns, see also Patter-
son (2005) and Partee’s (1984a: 165) classic attempt to save PoC by going idiomatic. For his part,
Chomsky (1972a: 169, fn. 40) argues that compound noun phrases require ad hoc semantic rules.
Given their ubiquity, this seems hardly conducive to the generality claims invariably made about
the compositionalmachinery—Dunbar (2005) convincingly shows that the selection of the relevant
constituent semantic features essentially relies on speakers’ decisions.
Chomsky (1965: 161) himself had noted the “crucial but […] relatively unexplored” question
of the need for the semantic component to characterise “ĕeld properties” (semantic relations hold-
ing across lexical entries, such as antonymy) that cannot be given in the individual lexical entries
and yet robustly discipline sentence-formation rules. He was, that is, acutely aware of the essen-
tially holistic character of lexical properties. One might object to the claim that the class of relevant
contexts is uncountable. e class of linguistic contexts is certainly (denumerably) countable. Well,
the fact is we are dealing with semantic acceptability and, as we shall see, scenarios play a crucial
part in acceptability judgements. Assuming (at least) a ĕrst-order formalisation for NL, there are
uncountably many interpretations available.
Something like this point is made in Russell (1940: 228); see also Chomsky (1972a: 133).
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On the syntactocentric view we just examined, the derivational
constraints were the result of the syntax-led interaction between the
various lexical entries involved in the construction. Apart from the
usual hand-waving towards the innate powers of the language fac-
ulty, the precise character (and rational source) of those constraints
was le unspeciĕed. e only forthright claim in this respect was
that competencemust include the ability to rank sentences according
to grammaticalness/meaningfulness (despite the vagueness of these
notions) and that the two notions can come apart.
I have argued that there are good grounds to think that, on the
contrary, grammaticalness and meaningfulness are co-extensive no-
tions. I now add the further claim that there are no ĕxed boundaries
to our semantic categories (and certainly no innate ones).
We could however resist this conclusion from a diﬀerent perspec-
tive than Chomsky’s. We could, that is, defend the view that the
boundaries of the semantical categories operative in NL are not just
inviolable by (some sort of) stipulation, but rather that they are ĕxed
by a priori laws of meaning that discipline derivations and rule out
NS ahead of their construction.
is is, as I announced already, pretty much Husserl’s view, which
could rightly be called essentialism about meanings. On this view,
the lexicon is formed of basic building-blocks, and the combinatorial
laws are written into their essence and normatively constrain usage
Clearly, it is easy enough to concoct any old rule to call out nonsense. What we want is good grounds
in favour of our speciĕc choice.
Although Chomsky, as we have seen in previous footnotes, toyed with various ideas.
I think it is fair to say that Chomsky did not have any broader aim than establishing these two
claims as characteristic of the cognitive proĕle of our competence.
Magidor (2009) makes the claim that even strings that we would normally class as ungram-
maticall aremeaningful, in the sense of: eligible formeaning-assignments. I have no great objection
to the view. Unlike Magidor, however, my interest is not (just) in defeating a dogma but rather in
ĕnding out a) why the dogma has been so resilient and b) what the facts about nonsense can teach
us with regard to facts about (entertained) content.
Husserl (1900-01/2001: 71) introduced his notion of combinatorial laws of meaning as laws
of nonsense avoidance, proof, if any was needed, of the crucial role of nonsense in the foundations
of semantics.
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in virtue of that connection.
Husserl gave no details as to how to implement his suggestion but
his view (largely via Tarski : §) became the building-blocks
view that underlies (whether or not in full explicitness) much of con-
temporary semanticism. In fact, PoC presupposes something like
Husserl’s view, or else there’d be no properly grounded base class of
meanings to feed into (bottom-up) compositionality, and thus ex-
plain CC as required.
e idea then is that we can answer the two questions I raised above
in one fell swoop: we prime the atoms by appeal to combinatorial
laws grounded in the “nature of things” that ĕx their properties for all
occasions of use; moreover, themove is self-justifying (the essentialist
priming provides appropriate normative guidance both on our choice
of selectional rules and on competent use).
Essentialism about meanings is just one possible strategy, however,
and likely to ruﬄe any remaining traces of Quinianism in one’s phi-
losophy. Let me therefore brieĘy review some alternatives before I
move on to discuss boundary-implementation issues.
See in particular Husserl (1900-01/2001: 62-68). In the same passages Husserl was insistent
that meaning categories were not (merely) psychological but fully objective; elsewhere (ibid. p. 11),
he had also insisted that conceptual categories are in no way hostage to “mere contingencies of our
thinking”. Rather, they reĘect (and track) “real diﬀerences, grounded in the pure essence of things”.
For Husserl, there is a strict correspondence between conceivability and (ontological) possibility
(although there is no language/world isomorphism, p. 50). Nonsense is ruled out “by the very nature
of the constituents” which can only enter into “deĕnitely constituted meaning-patterns” (p. 63, my
emphases). A good account of Husserl’s theory of meaning is Simons (1995).
e building-blocks view (e.g. Frege 1885: 113) is not to be confused with the (Augustinian)
building-blocks theory criticised in e.g. Davidson (1964: 4). In the model-theoretic tradition, the
crucial fact in this respect is the assumption that the interpretation function matches the intended
model for NL: quite what that model is (speciĕcally: with respect to the precise contours of the
extension of its predicates) is precisely the point at issue; the building-blocks perspective, however,
is assuming sharply determined boundaries set in advance of enquiry.
Mere stipulation with respect to that class wouldn’t do. To guarantee that complex meanings
are properly determined from the base (that they match our intuitive but well-considered judge-
ments) we require a stronger anchoring than that—indeed, the semanticist thinks we got the basic
categories right. e Chomskyan framework too presupposes a pre-formed basis for derivational
structure, see e.g. Cook and Newson (2007: 250) and the discussion of projection principles in
Chomsky (1981: 31).
As Cook and Newson (2007: 65) note, making the grammar sensitive to the way in which
subcategories connect to speciĕc constructions is a crucial part of the linguistic project (and not
just the semanticist’s).
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2.4.2. Justifying Boundaries
As I said, Husserl, apart from a programmatic appeal to laws ofmean-
ing (that were le unspeciĕed) and to some mereological principles
(that suggested a meaning-containment view), didn’t say much about
justiĕcation. At any rate, the available options seem fairly clear
(and in one form or another they form the basis for most treatments
of nonsense).
Firstly, we could appeal to ontology; we could think, that is, that ob-
jects come naturally typed. e correct semantic categories, then, are
those that respect (or approximate more closely) the natural ones.
e view is not unattractive, but let me register the following con-
cerns: i) it is not clear that it can succeed in justifying CC, since we
can always raise doubts about the actual choice of categories (in fact,
the semantic categories themselves have changed over time andwords
have shied across categories); ii) the viewwould still fail rationally
to justify the transition from observed (or presumed) ontological cat-
egories to their permanent characterwith respect to unobserved cases
(we can always attack the PoC solution to EP fromaHumean perspec-
tive, that is, for it is unclear that we can rationally read oﬀ all future
use from any feature that we could detect in the building-blocks).
A second strategy would appeal to imagination. Nonsense is
inconceivable, on this diagnosis, and hence we justify the choice
Husserl (1900-01/2001: Investigation III) draws an ontological distinction between dependent
and independent objects which has a precise correlate in the one between dependent and indepen-
dent meanings drawn in Investigation IV. Husserl (1900-01/2001: 74) also gives transcendental
reasons for assuming a priori laws of meaning that would avoid the dangers of psychologism (recall
that the Investigations are largely a reaction to Frege’s anti-psychologist critique of Husserl’s early
work in the philosophy of mathematics). e account however remains rather short on detail.
Perhaps this is David Lewis’ view, perhaps not. It is a view that stands behind every type-
theoretic approach toNL semantics, for obvious reasons. A particularly strong statement of the view
by Martin Joos is quoted in Aarts (2007: 18). Surprisingly, at least to me, the view is endorsed even
within pragmaticist frameworks that adopt type coercion techniques to “reinterpret” the (alleged)
selectional constraints “forced” by verbs (e.g. Egg 2005: viii).
On language change phenomena, see Chambers et al. (2002), Brinton and Traugott (2005),
Traugott and Dasher (2005), Eckardt (2006) and Cooper and Kempson (2008). e historical in-
teraction between grammaticalisation processes and compositionality is highly instructive.
ere are very general worries in this area, of the kind raised by the already mentioned Austin
and Putnam, as well as e.g. Field (1973). I think it would be fairly easy to show that arguments about
the indeterminacy of theoretical terms can easily be generalised to most (all) terms in the language.
But unlike Field (1973: 193), I don’t think this is without consequence for standard conceptions of
the objectivity of meaning. Speciĕcally, the claim that semantic categories could ever be taken to
be absolutely ĕxed in the manner required by PoCU would become hard to sustain.
An account of this kind is discussed (but dismissed) in Russell’s (1940: 230). His preferred
account is a non-cognitivist one given in terms of action-guiding potential (ibid. 230-1; 237-9).
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of syntactico-semantic categories by aligning them with categorial
restrictions on thoughts. Accordingly, meaningfulness is taken to
be co-extensive with thinkability, while grammaticality outstrips
both. Again, the obvious concerns with this strategy relate to fa-
miliar ones about taking conceivability as a general guide to possi-
bility, as well as to the fairly similar concerns in connection with,
say, analyticity (with the spectre of the analogue of non-Euclidean ge-
ometries looming in the background). We would therefore still lack
an epistemic guarantee that our choice of categories is appropriately
(and timelessly) anchored.
irdly, we could adopt a hybrid strategy incorporating strands
from the ĕrst two proposals. at is, we could say that NS are not as-
sessable against any possible situation/scenario: the representational
claim they (appear) tomake is (literally) incomparable—there is noth-
ing (no thing, however construed) quite like what they say there is
(their content, presumably, is however not ineﬀable, for the kind
of nonsense we are interested in is of the kind that respects overt
grammaticality; furthermore, the claim made by NS is determinate
enough for us to conclude nothing could match it). It’s not, however,
that NS are necessarily false: rather, they are simply not eligible
for confrontation with reality (or with the standards regulating our
“What cannot be thought, cannot be, what cannot be, cannot be thought”—Husserl (1900-
01/2001: 11). In discussing tonk, Boghossian (2001: 32) endorses (at least) the latter direction. He
also takes meaningfulness to require the existence of a determinate way the world could be.
See Gendler and Hawthorne (2002).
In conversation (and in that order), Andreas Stokke, Hartry Field and Derek Ball have sug-
gested that they are. e proposal seems to be that nonsense qua representational failure is counter-
sense, or false in virtue of meaning, as Quine (1960: 229) put it. To this I have two retorts: ĕrst, as
Russell (1905: 484) grumbled against Frege’s treatment of empty terms, I say that this would give
no “exact analysis of the matter” (see Kripke 2005: 1017 for discussion). e sense in which NS
are necessarily false (if they are so) is clearly diﬀerent from the sense in which ‘2 is not a prime
number’ is necessarily false. And we want our semantics to explain that diﬀerence (to paraphrase
Davidson (1969: 49), we want to know how NS come to be false-in-virtue-of-meaning). Which in
all likelihood would bring us back to a category-mistake analysis. Secondly, the proposal faces a
serious problem with negation. To see why, compare the pairs ‘Carnap is interested in metaphysics’
and ‘Carnap is not interested in metaphysics’. vs. ‘e number 3 is interested in metaphysics’ and
‘e number 3 is not interested in metaphysics’. e sentences in the ĕrst pair come out as contra-
dictories, those in the second as contraries. But on this proposal their logical form is the same. And
to say that we need external negation for the second pair whereas clearly there is no need for that in
the ĕrst pair would represent a breach of PoC with no syntactic justiĕcation (why should negation
behave diﬀerently when embedded in NS?). Quine (1960: 182; 229) is a prominent example of this
(ill-fated) strategy. See Lambert (1968), Routley (1969), Haack (1971), omason (1972), Brady
and Routley (1973), Bergmann (1977) for discussion. It seems clear that if we think there is a class
of NS we need a three-valued semantics and also, as Chomsky (1965: 158) has noted, a nonsense
operator that should display sensitivity to an ‘undeĕned’ or ‘meaningless’ third value.
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thought). Nonsense, on this third approach, is thus a failure not
just of imagination but of representationality. It is a case where lan-
guage misĕres (words fail to fulĕl their expressive function).
e problems with this suggestion are, it seems to me, two-fold:
a) it ĕrst acknowledges that there is something that NS express (they
do have a sense), but then b) it says that it is a sense that we are un-
able to make sense of, one for which we lack any criteria for assess-
ment/evaluation. It thus seems as if NS do have a sense (a sense
which suﬃces for the expression of a thought) and yet their sense is
one that is unthinkable (on this diagnosis, it is not that nonsensical
sentences are devoid of sense (sense-less): it is that the sense they do
possess is a non-sense).
Language, on this view, seems therefore to possess the remarkable
(indeed, paradoxical) capability of actually expressing the unthinkable
(expressing some thing which is unthinkable). It thus seems able
both to reach beyond the bounds of (linguistic) sense while still re-
maining within it—on the face of it, a rather contradictory state of
aﬀairs.
Fourthly, there is the optionwe have discussed already, the idea that
semantic categories are grounded in conceptual structure (regardless
of the grounding of that structure). Nonsense attempts to combine
incompatible concepts into an unacceptable whole; to rule that out
As Camp (2004: §4) notes, we don’t want to equate lack of empirical scenarios for truth-value
assessment with nonsensicality tout court or else far too many sentences would count as meaning-
less.
e discussion of the C-sentence in Sorensen (2002: §2) seems to favour an approach along
these lines.
Witherspoon (2000: 342) raises this diﬃculty for the Carnapian position on nonsense. e
issue of the proper analysis of nonsense has beenmuch debated in the recent confrontation between
two interpretive schools in Wittgensteinian exegesis, the British and the American. Key texts in
the discussion are Diamond (1991: ch. 2, 3), Witherspoon (2000), Hacker (2000), Conant (2002),
Hacker (2003) and Diamond (2005).
See the Schlegel passage quoted inChomsky (1966: 68). On the notion of impossiblemeanings
see Fodor and Lepore (1999) and Johnson (2004).
I am not discounting the tenability of such a view—much of the interpretive discussion re-
garding the Tractatus agonises precisely over this issue. To label something as ‘unthinkable’ is nev-
ertheless something that should give greater pause than has been the case (the discussion in Priest
(2002: §9.4) is useful). Consider a classic case in mathematics: division by zero. Most textbooks
will explain the artiĕcial stipulation for that case by saying “if we try to divide n objects zero times,
we have an operation that makes no sense”. e question is: what exactly are we describing here?
Which operation makes no sense?
Jackendoﬀ (1990: 52).
I’m thinking here of e.g. Peacocke’s (1986: 181) notion of acceptance condition for a given piece
of content.
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we are entitled to choose those semantic categories that reĘect our in-
tuitive grasp of concepts (those whose possession conditions match
our settled judgements on the matter). As for the metaphysical is-
sues underlying our intuitions on this matter, we can leave that to a
diﬀerent branch of enquiry.
In and of itself, this proposal is hard to object to. e critical mov-
ing part, however, is how we conceive of conceptual structure (how
much rigidity we build into it, both in terms of internal and external
boundaries). And I contend that there are two consequences stem-
ming from this view that the semanticist ought to consider, neither
entirely friendly to her project.
First, that the concerns raised so far would aﬄict any realistically
inclined view of conceptual structure. Secondly, and more impor-
tantly, that a commitment to the enforcement of semantic categories
by conceptual structure considerations will make the semanticist an-
swerable to the actual boundaries of our concepts as embodied in our
practice. Should those boundaries turn out to be ineradicably Ęuid,
the semanticist would have to abide by that ĕnding.
In other words, if our concepts evolve over time and their time-
indexed boundaries are not completely ĕxed anyway, the nonsense-
predicting powers of conceptual strictures will be again limited in
their reach and will indeed be largely ex post facto. And the point
is (although I have no space to argue at length for that): it is a matter
of record that our concepts do so change.
Clearly, there is a lot of overlap among the suggestions above. And
they all suﬀer, or so I’d argue, from the same diﬃculties (i.e. substan-
tially the same diﬃculties emerge in diﬀerent guises, hitting the dif-
ferent proposals in relevantly similar places), namely, that i) reĘection
on past practice shows that conceptual/ontological categories have
is move however would amount to a denial of ECE, with the consequent loss of purchase
on the CC/PoC connection.
I.e. of how much play (Derridean jeu) we allow those boundaries to have—I’m thinking here
of the notions of concept narrowing and concept broadening discussed in e.g. Wilson and Carston
(2007). Bartsch (1998) defends a constructivist view of conceptual structure with which I’ve much
sympathy. e classic, and strongly realist, Peacocke (1992), in contrast, defends a view that suﬀers,
I think, from many of the problems I raise in the text. Burge (2005: 55ﬀ.) usefully sketches the
contrast between opposing views of concepts (and understanding) by discussing the mathematical
example of the concept of ‘limit’.
It seems clear that for any given conceptual scheme we can provide a diagnosis of nonsense in
terms of conceptual clash. e point is whether we can do so in the forward-looking manner that
is required by CC.
Again, the case of theoretical terms is particularly telling in this regard. For some of the prob-
lems that they pose for compositionality, see Schurz (2005).
 | Chapter 
changed and that therefore semantic categorisation principles based
on those categories would only be relative to a conceptual scheme
(and in any case more Ęuid than what is needed by semanticism) and
that ii) even if theywere ĕxed for all time, tracking them appropriately
would inĘate the lexicon beyond learnability.
Indeed, I’d argue that all attempts to deĕne meaning-categories in
terms of basic building-blocks have to face our third dilemma for the
semanticist:
SD III: e basic building-blocks can either be rigidly ĕxed
ahead of use or Ęexible enough to accommodate future use, but
they cannot be both, for too much Ęexibility will deprive them
of their ability to rule out NS in advance, whilst toomuch rigid-
ity will render them unable to adapt to fresh contexts. However,
a PoC-based explanation of CC requires that they be rigidly
ĕxed, whereas CC itself states that what is remarkable is words’
ability to adapt to contexts and our capacity to make sense of
that Ęexibility.
In short, the dilemma is that the conĘicting commitments of se-
manticism require the building-blocks to have contradictory features:
nonsense-busting properties (which require rigidity) and context-
adapting ones (which require Ęexibility). I submit that no entity
could possess both properties at once and that neither horn of the
dilemma would allow the semanticist to respect the constraints im-
posed by PoC and CC—which does show, it seems to me, that the
two principles are indeed incompatible.
2.4.3. Implementing Boundaries
Letme now give somemore speciĕc, albeit still rather general reasons
to think that none of the proposals can be made to work in a way
that is compatible with the key tenets of semanticism. In this sub-
section, that is, I am going to assume that some sort of case has been
With regard to i), the semanticist might be tempted to appeal to some weaker notion of cat-
egory, perhaps deĕned by means of the ‘partial signiĕcation’ relations suggested in Field (1973:
202)—items in each category would refer to tokens of a range of candidate types, rather than of a
unique type. is would amount to a species of sense-enumeration strategy (type-enumeration, in
this case), and it would suﬀer from the problems which I discuss in the next two chapters. Nor
would it help to appeal to the notion of arbitrary object for the type, as per Fine (1983), for again
we lack criteria for associating a given range of objects with each type. As for ii), see fn. 144, p. 46,
and the last bullet point on the same page.
is aspect of CC is explicitly spelled out in Chomsky (1966: 59).
To reiterate: those tenets include a commitment to CC, EPoCU, MDP and UaKTC, plus the
learnability constraint.
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made to justify a speciĕc choice of categories. I argue that no such
choice would be implementable.
Here’s why:
• emost natural way to think of semantic categories is in terms
of equivalence classes closed under substitution. is how-
ever gets things intuitively wrong. First, expressions can be
very unstable under language expansion (new expressions cre-
ate new contexts where substitutivity for the old categories may
fail). Secondly, the intersubstitutivity criterion would sep-
arate expressions that intuitively belong to the same category
(classic case: the ‘eat/devour’ pair). Semantic categories de-
ĕned by closure under substitution, then, whatever their prove-
nance and grounding, would end up being either impossibly
ĕne-grained (in all likelihood: singleton classes, for we could
always come up with a linguistic context in which intersubsti-
tutivity fails) or drawn only relative to a given language strictly
conceived (language expansion would not be conservative with
respect to the class of semantic categories, that is). is of
course would make CC completely uninteresting since catego-
rial features would only be determined aer observing an ex-
pression’s behaviour under all possible embedments, including
those generated by newwords added to the original language.
• It is impossible to draw the boundaries of semantic categories
without robust appeal to metaphysics, for we need identity cri-
teria for what counts as e.g. an individual (and pari passu for all
other categories) before we can specify the range of signiĕcance
of a given predicate. e same is true for all other features
spelling out the various subcategorisation restrictions. In short,
the required separation between semantics and metaphysics is
simply not available. And it would be no escape route for the
semanticist to assume some such drawing of boundaries is pos-
sible. As I have said already: that is precisely the point at issue. If
See Hodges (2005: 54).
Hodges (1998: 11).
Perhaps this was what Quine (1953b: 155) had in mind when criticising Strawson (1952) and
Russell by noting “the obscurity of the notion of category involved” in type theory and the diﬃ-
culties both in settling and implementing categorical restrictions. One might of course accept that
gradience is a feature of categories (see e.g. Muysken 2008: 3ﬀ.), but the problem recurs: what dis-
ciplines the relevant aspects of categorial gradience? It might be objected that I am here taking
‘language’ in too formal a sense (adding new expressions gives rise to new languages). Quite so.
But this is exactly what the semanticist commitment to PoC entails.
A point convincingly argued for in e.g. Strawson (1970).
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it proves to be metaphysically impossible to draw ĕxed bound-
aries for our categories (say, because our concepts are ineradi-
cably vague), then a compositional meaning theory will have to
be a very diﬀerent beast from what is standardly assumed; its
very structure, and the way in which it spells out the normative
constraints on performance (in terms of how the theory mod-
els our competence) would have to be radically re-thought from
the ground up.
• Finally, and most seriously, and even assuming that the two
diﬃculties just listed can be overcome, the need to implement
selectional restrictions to rule out nonsense and thus preserve
PoCU lands the semanticist straight into the jaws of my SD I,
for a lexicon that would be fully equipped to predict the emer-
gence of NS across the board would be unlearnable. It would
be, that is, too complex for us to master, for the simple reason
that the range of contextual embedments that would need to be
considered fully to predict when NS would arise has cardinality
strictly greater than @0. e purported explanation of how
ĕnite minds can encompass inĕnite (linguistic) totalities thus
Ęounders under pressure from nonsense.
I conclude that the only nonsense-busting answer open to the seman-
ticist at this point in the dialectic is one whose implementation would
exceed our computational abilities.
In contrast to my view of these matters, Larson and Segal (1995: 46) argue that a theory of se-
mantic aberrancy lies “outside semantics proper”. ey seem to have forgotten that 43 pages earlier
they’d said that semantics should tell us about nonsensical anomalies and their sources. Szabó (2000:
40) makes the equally astonishing remark that “as far as the semantics is concerned” liar sentences
and Chomsky sentences “do not qualify as genuine sentences” at all. Cappelen and Lepore (2005a:
ch. 11) also argue against conĘating semantics and metaphysics.
Indeed, Tarski (1935: 216) himself had asked whether before drawing categorial boundaries
we need to check all sentential embeddings for substitutivity failure or whether one case would be
enough to determine the proĕle of a given semantic category. Consider now the following startling
admission by two leading Chomskyans: “Ideally, knowing the thematic structure of a given verb
is akin to knowing everything there is to know about the sorts of constructions where this verb
can appear” (Lasnik and Uriagereka 2005: 6-7), my emphasis (see also Chomsky 1981: 31 and
Collins 2003: 428). e point is: how much work can ‘ideally’ be doing in an explanation of our
competence? Chomsky (1972a: 146) had spoken more generically of lexical entries as containing
“a complex account of conceptual structure, nuance, presuppositions.” e computational costs
of such an account were however le unexplored. Note also that Lasnik and Uriagereka (2005:
4) blithely concede that we may discover “a new subcategorization frame” for a verb (roughly, a
sentential embedment where a new thematic role is disclosed); all we need to do in those cases, we
are told, is “add it to the lexicon.” Again, this may preserve ex post facto PoC, but it certainly does
not address the CC puzzle.
Every suggestion in e.g. Chomsky (1965: 111) involves listing theways inwhich lexical features
What Compositionality Could Not Be | 
e upshot is that the attempt to salvage the full generality of
EPoCU from the problems posed by nonsense requires the imposi-
tion of restrictions on meaningful derivations that force the semanti-
cist to sacriĕce learnability (that’s my SD I again, and that shows once
more that PoC and CC are incompatible requirements on a seman-
tics).
If I am right about all this, the only other option for the semanticist
is to argue that we do understand nonsense, that the meaning of NS is
compositionally determined (and compositionally understood) just
as in normal cases. is would clearly preserve the desired CC/PoC
connection. But there are other costs involved (it’s the other horn of
my SD II aer all) and in the next section I try to assess them.
2.5. Understanding Nonsense
It is now time for some more stock-taking as we move towards the
end of the chapter.
We have been testing the joint claims that linguistic understanding
is unbound and that compositionality is the best explanation of this
fact. I have challenged the ĕrst claim using grammatical nonsense as
a class of expressions where understanding breaks down by the lights
of semanticism.
I have then argued that this removes the explanatory connection
between PoC and CC—if the language faculty (or the compositional
module) does not deliver understanding in the case of nonsense, it is
obscure why it should do so in general, given that, as I hope to have
shown, it is wrong to say that it is only with “normal” sentences that
restrict combinatorial possibilities. e idea that we can compile such a list in advance of embed-
ment is of course problematic. at, aer all, was the problem of explaining CC. And PoC only
assumes that we have a solution. It presumes that our rules can provide for all unobserved cases,
that we can rationally project to all unconsidered scenarios, but all of this is precisely what we had
to establish in the ĕrst place. Pustejovsky (1995) and some of the contributions in Copestake and
Briscoe (1996) attempt to provide a more Ęexible implementation of lexical restrictions whereby
the lexicon generates possible combinations co-compositionally. ese proposals however simply
replace lists of features with lists of sets of sub-features. ey thus shi the structural problems
one level up. For criticism of the generative view of the lexicon see e.g. Fodor and Lepore (1998),
Geeraerts (2010: §4.1.4), Kilgarriﬀ (2001), Asher and Lascarides (2001) and Jayez (2001).
Another way of putting it is to say that aer at least Chomsky (1970a) the leading idea is that
lexical items contribute all their information to derivations; this, in fact, entails a massive amount
of idiosyncrasies being pumped into any derivation. We could screen oﬀ redundancies by going
for some kind of default/non-monotonic logic account of meaning, but then normality presump-
tions kick in, completely by-passing the assumed compositionality of meaning: if so, why go via
the detour of compositional computation? Why not say that we simply ‘buy’ the pre-fab units of
interpretation, as discussed in e.g. Dąbrowska (2004: §3.1).
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the compositionalmachinery furnishes uswith pre-formedmeanings
(conversely: that it is only with nonsense that it demands interpretive
contributions from speakers).
I have then examined ways in which the semanticist could explain
failures of closure with respect to understanding by appeal to cat-
egorial restrictions that would predict the emergence of nonsense
(understanding breaks down when illicit meaning-derivations are at-
tempted).
My conclusion in this regard has been two-fold: it is not clear
that a suﬃciently strong justiĕcation (and certainly not one given
on a priori grounds) is available for any particular choice of seman-
tic categorisation (whether led by syntax or by conceptual structure);
moreover, any such choice would entail inĘating the lexicon beyond
learnability.
Saving PoC as the only explanation of CC, then, would lose the se-
manticist her other key thesis, namely, that compositional languages
(and indeed, only compositional languages) are learnable.
roughout, a large dilemma loomed (which I labelled SD II): the
semanticist can either say we understand nonsense or that we don’t.
So far, I have considered the second horn and concluded that it forces
the semanticist to abandon (at least) one of three jointly-incompatible
theses, CC, PoC, and learnability.
I hope I have said enough to show the force of the second horn. I
now want to turn to the ĕrst horn of the dilemma. I will argue that it
makes for equally uncomfortable seating.
2.5.1. Representationalism, Again
Suppose then that the semanticist has conceded that my case against
the ĕrst horn is sound; suppose she has granted that accepting Chom-
sky’s notion of grammatical nonsense and saying that we do not un-
derstand it is not a viable option for her position. Still, the semanticist
will want to resist my conclusion that PoC provides no explanation of
CC.
e obvious (and I think the only) way to do so is to say that we do
understand nonsense (that nonsense is indeed meaningful), and that
Let me be brutally Nietzschean: so-called normal sentences are nonsense about which one has
forgotten that this is what they are.
Here’s another casualty of nonsense: Horwich’s (1998: 154) claim that the compositional ma-
chinery is insensitive to the precise constitution of the lexical properties.
e precise nature of that incompatibility depends on the speciĕc formulation of the three
theses.
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accordingly our understanding is unbound (just as CC says) and best
(only) explained by the compositionality assumption.
Given EPU and UaKTC, to say that we understand NS commits
the semanticist to saying that we know their meaning (by EPU), that
is, that we know their truth-conditions (by UaKTC). And that seems
to encase the representationalist leanings of semanticism quite aptly
(knowing the meaning of a sentence is knowing the representational
claim it makes) and in full generality.
Consider now a much-discussed case of semantic aberrancy:
) Max cut the sun
In introducing the example, Searle commented that it poses a prob-
lem to compositional theories because although we understand the
single words, we don’t understand the sentence as a whole, and hence
we do not really know what the truth conditions determined by the
meaning of the sentence are supposed to be like.
Mirroring Chomsky’s remarks, Searle argued that without the pro-
vision of a context, () all by itself does not provide us with an inter-
pretation (in logic-speak, we would say there is no intended model for
it).
On Searle’s view, there is such a thing as the literalmeaning of a sen-
tence, but it only determines truth conditions against “a set of back-
ground assumptions and practices” (p. ). Two further claims by
Searle are of interest to us: that what conditions a sentence deter-
mines is always relative to a given set of assumptions and practices
(what he calls ‘the background’), and that the background is not part
Couldwe say that the understanding of the complex is precisely a function of the understanding
of the atoms? e idea is: any dark area in our understanding of the atoms will transfer to our
understanding of the complex—e.g. we do not fully understand ‘green’ until we have made sense
of ‘green ideas’. Compositionality is thus fully preserved. I cannot see how this could solve our
diﬃculty though, for it would become unclear how bottom-up compositionality could explain CC.
PoCwould therefore be an ex post facto principle as far as linguistic understanding goes. Williamson
(2003b, 2007) has argued that understanding is a very complex capacity that cannot be reduced to
a uniquely speciĕed set of abilities. Quite. But this is unwelcome news for the semanticist. Another
option is to make recourse to Burge’s (2005: 56) notion of incomplete understanding (see also Ziﬀ
1972: 5, Higginbotham 1989: 156 and Buekens 2005: 71). We could then say that we understand
NS only partially. e diﬃculty here would be that with nonsense there seems to be nothing further
to understand. e understanding is ex hypothesi terminally incomplete.
In fact, it seems a widely assumed claim: meaninglessness is oen deĕned in terms of lack of
representational power. See e.g. Boghossian (2001: 33) for just one example.
Searle (1980: 225).
Strictly speaking, understanding breaks down at the stage in the derivation where the complex
predicate ‘cut the sun’ is formed.
Unlike Chomsky, Searle generalised the remark to all sentences.
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of the semantic content of the sentence.
I think that Searle’s move (which I largely endorse) should be seen
as an attack on the Myth of the Given in its linguistic form, an attack
on the idea, that is, that sentences could self-intimate their meanings,
that, as Chomsky put it, they (can and do) impose an interpretation
on us.
As it happens, the semanticist reply has for the most part con-
centrated on arguing that Searle and his followers conĘate evaluat-
ing sentences with understanding what they say, that the conĘation
obliterates a fundamental distinction between knowledge of truth-
conditions and knowledge of whether those conditions are satis-
ĕed. Knowledge of meaning is knowledge of (and hence under-
standing of) truth-conditions only, and that knowledge does not have
to include knowledge of their veriĕcation procedure, we are told.
To require more than that, the semanticist argues, is “to fall prey
to a kind of creeping Veriĕcationism.” On this line of response,
the semanticist is happy to bite the bullet and claim that in a case
like () it is not clear “that knowledge of the meanings of the parts
of the sentence and their mode of composition does fail to add up to
knowledge of the condition under which […] an utterance [of ()]
would be true.” Competent speakers, that is, will know that () is
Note how the very way in which Chomsky puts it violates selectional restrictions! Sentences,
inanimate objects, imposing interpretations on sentient subjects? Whoever heard of such deviancy!
For his part, Searle (1980: 231 and 1983a) includes intentionality within the scope of his argu-
ment: contextual dependency is ineliminable for content in general, not just semantic content. I
agree entirely. I depart from him in denying that the background can play the sole role of meaning-
determiner. Frame semantics in the Fillmore tradition and meaning-constructivism more gener-
ally include further factors, such as speakers’ ‘creative’ input in selecting interpretations. See for
instance Coulson (2001: 81). One could of course include speakers’ input in the background, but
then Schiﬀer’s (2003: 122) objection against the inclusion of intentions in semantic clauses kicks in
(intentions make everything else in the clauses redundant).
According to Recanati (2004a: 92, fn. 22), appeal to this distinction seems to originate with
Marcelo Dascal in a 1981 paper.
Borg (2004: 238). e same accusation is made in Cappelen and Lepore (2005b: 57). Jackson
(1998: 74) argues that “understanding does not require knowing the proposition expressed”. His
main thought (p. 72, fn. 26) seems to be that, in Stalnaker’s terminology, “understanding requires
knowing the propositional concept associated with a sentence, though not necessarily the propo-
sition expressed” or, in Kaplan’s terminology, “understanding requires knowing character but not
necessarily content.” I think this move, though obvious, is hopeless when applied to NS, for it is
utterly obscure how we could properly be said to know a function-like entity (character) that sup-
posedly determines a value-at-a-point-of-evaluation (content) without knowing (even in principle)
what that value is (and how we could calculate it)—analogies with the classic cases (“He’s a ĕne
fellow”) or the Ackermann function would not help: pace Lasersohn (2009), the meaning function
must be eﬀectively computable by us.
Borg (2004: 236).
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true iﬀ Max cut the sun.
EmmaBorg is a prominent defender of this strategy and her key de-
fensive move is the claim that semantic theories provide liberal truth
conditions—conditions, that is, that unlike their more strict Fregean
counterparts “admit satisfaction by a range of more speciĕc states of
aﬀairs.”
Grasp of meaning, on her view, is thus grasp of liberal, rather than
robustly Fregean, truth-conditions. And we may grasp a condition
without being in a position to grasp what ‘more speciĕc state of aﬀair’
is at play in a given context.
Once this concession is on the table, it is open to the pragmaticist
to reply that it is not at all clearwhat exactly knowledge of a condition
that we are apparently in no position to evaluate can amount to.
As Travis never tires of pointing out, the traditional semantic
project claims to be in the business of establishing a uniquely deter-
mined connection between meaning and truth and yet we are now
told by the semanticist that the one thing T-theorems cannot do is
give conditions for the truth of sentence-tokens, but can at most in-
dicate a (possibly vague) set of such conditions. e fact is, embracing
liberal truth-conditions amounts to jettisoning MDP outright.
Unhappily for her, she adds: “that is, just in case [Max] stands in the cutting relation to the
sun” (my emphasis). Unhappily, for it is completely unclear what that relation would amount to.
Similarly, Buekens (2005: 71) has argued that “it does not follow from the fact that we do not see
in what kind of circumstance a sentence could apply - i.e. could be used as a true sentence - that
we do not understand the sentence”. So much for the semanticist’s core principle that meaning
and truth team up to establish a unique connection between sentence-in-context and world and
that knowledge of meaning is knowledge of that uniquely identiĕed representational claim. e
diﬃculty for the semanticist is familiar from the discussion in Evans and McDowell (1976) and
LePore (1986a): what is required for languagemastery is not knowledge of the truth of themeaning-
conferring bi-conditionals (knowledge-that), but rather knowledge of the truth of the R.H. side
(knowledge-what). See Salmon (2001) for further discussion. Devitt (1997: 271) defends a rather
strange conception of knowledge-what.
Borg (2004: 230). I think the defence of semanticism in Predelli (2004, 2005) is vulnerable
precisely along the same lines discussed in the text.
Borg’s position could be seen as a version of what Levinson (2000: 240-41) has called ‘semantic
retreat’, namely an impoverished view of semantics whereby all that the compositional machinery
outputs is relatively schematic logical forms. On this view, most interpretive matters are le to
pragmatics.
See the essays in Travis (2008). e ĕrst 11 pages of Travis (2006a) will do as an introduction.
I doubt it would be much help to do as Atlas (2007: 218) suggests (possibly tongue-in-cheek)
and maintain that ‘determine’ in MDP is best understood as ‘constrain’ (see also Soames (2005a:
274) for a similar suggestion). at however is something that most pragmaticist would be only too
happy to grant (see also the discussion in Clapp (2007a,b) and Borg’s (2010) reply). e problem
for the semanticist is that liberal truth-conditions are both too strong and too weak: they are too
strong in that they require that a sentence determine a unique such set; and they are too weak in
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Furthermore, it is also unclear why (and how) appealing to the dis-
tinction between knowledge of truth-conditions and knowledge of
veriĕcation methods would help.
Unless I know which conditionMax has to satisfy for () to be true,
I’m in no position to evaluate whether he’s actually done so. at is,
until we are told what cutting the sun amounts to, we are not in a
position to understand not just what would count as satisfying that
condition, but also what that condition is, what it is that we are sup-
posed to cognize when we reach the end of our compositionally-led
meaning computation for the sentence.
More generally, linguistic competence is competence in using
pieces of linguistic lore (deploying them, reacting to them). A
model of that competence that does not provide clear ‘instructions
for use’ looks like a miserable failure, as models go. And although
knowing a condition and knowing that it is satisĕed are two diﬀerent
things, we cannot know a condition without knowing what would
count as satisfying it; that is, there’s no giving a condition without
stating its applicability conditions.
For illustration, consider the case of a speaker put in front of a strik-
ingly novel scenario. Something’s happening to the sun; Max, the
mad scientist, is doing something to it. Does that count as cutting
the sun?
On Borg’s account, it is the semantics that provides the material
that which speciĕc condition applies is le unspeciĕed—see Borg (2004: 245).
e distinction between knowing-what and knowing-whether is well present even to a justi-
ĕcationist such as Dummett (2006: 48-9). By the semanticist’s own lights, however, grasp of sense
is ĕrst and foremost grasp of knowing-what.
e semanticist will insist we must not conĘate competence with performance, meaning with
use—this is in eﬀect the charge made in Katz (1981) against Searle (1980). But the point remains
that if the semanticist insists on too strong a separation between competence and performance,
most of her claims about the (supposedly explanatory) role of the competence-modelling structure
will not be justiĕed.
Could we say that a competent language user will know one thing for sure, namely, that there
are no ‘safe’ conditions for the use of nonsensical sentences? ere’s a problem with this reply: for it
seems to diﬀerentiate between knowledge of meaning for the standard cases and, in aberrant cases,
knowledge that meaningfulness is defective.
To make the problem for Borg’s position even more perspicuous, consider the case of vague-
ness. As Wittgenstein (1932-35/2001: I.III.41 p. 83) notes, it is a criterion for one’s being in a po-
sition to understand the expression ‘red’ that one be able to pick red objects on demand (if one
cannot, then one doesn’t know the semantics for ‘red’; one doesn’t understand what one is talking
about). And similarly for ‘cut the sun’. Incidentally, the substance of my objection to Borg is pretty
much aligned with Wright’s (2002a: 97-8, fn. 2) against epistemicism about vagueness.
Here and elsewhere, use of ‘count-as’-language should not be taken as strictly weaker than use
of ‘is’-language.
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for a full understanding of the expression (recall: Borg states the re-
quirement as a bi-conditional!); what counts as cutting the sun in this
speciĕc (and unprecedented) case is supposedly already part of the set
of liberal truth-conditions.
is, I contend, seems hardly plausible. e intuition (if not the
evidence) seems to be, rather, that a speaker in a genuinely novel case
would have no clue from the semantics as to whether the predicate
does or does not apply to the case.
ere is a possible retort here, and one that Borg (: , fn. )
has made. We could say that e.g. the precise way in which one judges
whether or not a certain event counts as a token of sun-cutting is a
matter ofworldly knowledge, rather than purely linguistic knowledge
(and thus it does not belong to linguistic semantics proper).
e move is inadvisable, however. For it consigns the semanticist
to the jaws of yet another dilemma:
SD IV: If we could neatly divide the worldly and linguistic
knowledge that attaches to expressions and insist that PoC only
governs linguistic knowledge, our semantic theory would no
longer explain CC (for we genuinely understand a sentence only
when we are in possession of the appropriate worldly knowl-
edge). If on the other hand we could not separate worldly
and linguistic knowledge, the lexicon would become unlearn-
Liberal or not, the semanticist picture, asWittgenstein (1914-16/1998: 23) noted, requires that
we know in advance how things ought to be like for a sentence to be true. Remove this requirement,
and the position ceases to be recognisably semanticist (indeed, without it, we couldn’t even eﬀect the
transition from knowledge-what to knowledge-whether). I think recent defences of semanticism,
such asWhiting (2007a: 309), are still fully committed to a requirement of this kind. Borg (2010: 36)
has further retreated to the weaker requirement that liberal truth-conditions determine application
conditions for “clear-cut [!] cases”. My argument re the C-sentence applies just as much to her latest
retrenchment.
Saint-Dizier (2001: 116-17) has suggested that a verb such as ‘cut’ can be characterised in terms
of lexical features that contain domain-dependent predicates in the qualia structure (to cut is to im-
plement a change in some object from a continuous to a discontinuous aggregation ofmatter). Note
that the interpretation of the predicates in the qualia is intended to be context-dependent! As I’ve
argued already this simply adds an additional layer of complexity— why not interpret ‘cut’ directly
without the detour through the additional features which simply duplicate the original problem?
Again, note that it is NS that show this to be the case. Under the proposal we are considering,
we understand NS and yet have (little or) no idea about their worldly import. Am I begging the
question here? I don’t think so, for the very conception of liberal truth conditions encompasses the
range of all possible circumstances in which a sentence would be true. And that is a (rather large)
piece of worldly knowledge if anything is. Besides, the central point about CC is that it claims
that we understand novel sentences robustly, we know exactly what they are talking about. And
by the semanticist’s own lights that means: we know the representational claim they make (or, on
Borg’s view, the range of such claims). Let me stress once again that on the semanticist picture the
representational claim made by a sentence is part of its semantic content (Skorupski 1993: 149).
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able, for reasons already discussed.
Liberal truth-conditions, I conclude, are no friend to the semanticist.
2.5.2. Scenarios
Apart from (or in addition to) appealing to the notion of liberal
truth-conditions, semanticists could also insist that aberrant sen-
tences are meaningful—indeed, that they have precisely the compo-
sitional meaning that they appear to have—by saying that we under-
stand enough of what they say to be able to work out scenarios where
they would be true.
is reply however would be just as unwise. Invoking imaginative
capacities as the way to work out when an aberrant sentence would
be true plays entirely in the hands of the radical contexualist.
e reason is that it seems obvious that an appeal to these capaci-
ties a) could not be contained to nonsense cases but would have to be
extended to all the Travis-like cases (i.e. green leaves and round balls)
because of the (intensional!) instability of (as good as) all predicates
(and thus of all (atomic) sentences); b) the move would make knowl-
edge of meaning insuﬃcient for understanding: we simply wouldn’t
know what the truth conditions given on the R.H. side say in the
absence of a decision about i) which scenarios would count as rele-
vant and about ii) which of those scenarios would count as making
an utterance of the sentence true; and ĕnally c) it would make lin-
guistic competence an ability that perforce invokes cognitive facul-
ties wider than the language faculty (it’s that imaginative rationality
yet again).
Moreover, as stated already, the main motivation for composition-
ality, the CC, would lose any force whatsoever, for on this proposal
we don’t (fully) understand nonsense (or any novel sentences) until
Kaplan (1990) has an instructive take on these matters. My own view is that the purported
separation is unworkable and does violence to semantic facts. Kilgarriﬀ (2007: 38) is useful here, as
are Hudson (2007), Langacker (2008: 37), Taylor (1989: ch. 8) and Green (1996: 18). I think that
what nonsense shows is two (apparently contradictory) things: that what we understand is radically
minimal content; that what we learn when we become competent with an expression is inextricably
linked to world knowledge. Chapter 6 proposes a resolution of the tension.
A point made by Torĕnn Huvenes in discussion. Talk of scenarios and situations is invoked in
Recanati’s (2004a: 15) discussion of intuitions about truth-conditions. Buekens (2005: §6) develops
a semanticist proposal where sentences-in-use are seen as playing the role of epistemic substitutes
for situations.
And again, this would play entirely into the hands of the radical contextualist, as the arguments
contained in Searle (1978) and Putnam (e.g. his 1975b: 243-44) would just be granted full sway.
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we have ĕxed a range of scenarios that would match the metalanguage
description of the truth conditions.
e problem however was precisely that we lack a grasp of those
conditions at the metalanguage level. And the semantics leaves it un-
constrained which range of scenarios is relevant (there is nothing in
the current meaning of ‘cut’ that tells us anything substantive about
what it would be like to cut the sun).
If so, there is then no robust sense in which the range of scenarios
can properly be said to be given in advance of a speciĕc confrontation
with reality; and we are not given a recipe for applicability once faced
with a particular scenario either. e ĕnal decision is le to appropri-
ate exercise of our imaginative rationality (a problem I shall return to
in the last chapter).
In short, if in response to NS the semanticist appeals to scenarios,
she is conceding that we do not fully understand novel sentences aer
all, and if so, she is facing again the other horn of my SD II. It then
becomes unclear why she should insist that NL semantics must be
compositional.
But then, if the creativity considerations drop out of the picture,
if meaning (rather than understanding) is indeed unbound and its
(fairly indeĕnite) extensibility is generated (and controlled) by the
expansion of the range of what we take to be acceptable (because
imaginable) scenarios, what remaining reasons do we have for insist-
ing on the compositionality requirement and, relatedly, on the UaGS
view?
If the considerations in this section are sound, it looks as if the se-
Clearly enough, what would go into that range seems largely a function of time-indexed
worldly knowledge, rather than syntax-governed competence.
And short of believing in rampantly Platonistic meanings, we should grant that if (and only if)
wewere towitness an event of sun-cutting, wewould thereby be determining anew concept (assuming
we live to tell the tale, of course).
ere’s a confusion, or so it seems to me, in some standard views about semantics, even as
stated by the most celebrated and accomplished of commentators. Soames (1989: 591), for in-
stance, concludes that “[t]he central semantic fact about language is that it is used to represent the
world. Sentences do this by systematically encoding information that characterizes the world as be-
ing one way or another. Semantics is the study of this information, and the principles by which it is
encoded.” But this seems to attribute to language powers that no system of sign could possibly have.
ere’s no information that, on its own, can characterize the world as being one way or another.
ere are already arguments against the creativity considerations in the literature that are inde-
pendently motivated, e.g. Baker and Hacker (1984: ch. 9), Schiﬀer (1987: ch. 7) and, less convinc-
ingly, Matthews (1986). I’m arguing here that nonsense provides further grounds for abandoning
this supposedly platitudinous explanation of creativity. In passing, I discount probabilistic accounts
of meaningfulness (such as e.g. Bod 1998: 3). I take Chomsky’s (1955-56/1975: 145) arguments
against statistical approaches to be deĕnitive. Indeed, that was the whole point of his C-sentence!
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manticist is, once again, in a bit of a bind.
If she insists that aberrant sentences are (minimally, or homophon-
ically) meaningful, she is restricting too severely the powers assigned
to what on the semanticist view (and perhaps the common sense view
as well) should count as meaning, with the further consequence that
the sense of understanding at stake becomes etiolated beyond com-
fort.
At a minimum, she is certainly severing the crucial connection
between understanding the meaning of an expression and exploit-
ing that understanding to establish the truth-value of that expres-
sion—there is no way in which the semantics can properly be said
to determine the content of the sentence (the precise stipulations for
the truth condition).
As a consequence, there is also no remaining way of construing
the sentence as representing, in any suﬃciently robust manner, the
worldly conditions that have to be satisĕed for the sentence to be true.
In short: saying that nonsense is meaningful is tantamount to say-
ing that meaning doesn’t fully determine truth-conditions robustly
conceived. Accordingly, one of the hallmarks of semanticism has to
be given up.
If on the other hand the semanticist appeals to the availability of
scenarios (and lack thereof) as the decisive criterion for meaningful-
ness (so that aberrant sentences would count as partiallymeaningful,
but in any case suﬃciently informative to guide judgement should an
appropriately relevant scenario become available), she is then moving
her position too far to the contextualist side of the debate.
For, in her scenario-reliant guise, she cannot sensibly insist that
whatever minimal meaningfulness accrues to the aberrant sentences
from the bare calculation of the semantic values of their parts suﬃces
to determine—in all possible scenarios, including, ex hypothesi com-
pletely unsuspected ones—what would count as the correct (i.e. ratio-
nallymandated) judgement tomake regarding their truth value given
those novel scenarios.
In fact, it even becomes hard to say that (character-level) meaning
constrains the determination of content, because what matters now is
whatwe would judge to be the rational/natural thing to say regarding
the truth value of a sentence given a certain scenario, rather thanwhat
Appeal to ontological constraints of the kind invoked by Lewis (eligibility, naturalness of prop-
erties) would not serve much purpose either. Consider Jakobson’s ‘pigeon’s milk’ example (quoted
in Margalit 1978: 384). Its non-existence does not impinge on the signiĕcance of the expression.
Ontological irreality and senselessness, Jakobson concludes, are not to be conĘated, and it seems
hard to disagree—actually, there is something called ‘pigeon’s milk’. It’s not milk, but is secreted by
pigeons (regurgitated food of some kind); Jakobson’s remark is in any case well-taken.
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the semantics tells us to do.
e last remaining horn is thus just as uncomfortable as all the oth-
ers. I therefore conclude that nonsense does indeed pose terminal
problems to the PoC/CC connection and mandates a revision of our
conception of semantic content. My work in the next chapters will
largely be devoted to preparing the ground for such a revision.
2.6. Conclusion
I have argued that two of the most crucial semanticist commitments
are not jointly satisĕable: a proper explanation of howwe understand
novel sentences is incompatible with the requirement that complex
meanings be functionally determined from below.
I hope to have shown that CC and PoC entangle semanticism in
a web of dilemmas that weaken the position beyond recognition. In
essence, the problem is that the explanatory burden posed by CC sad-
dles semanticismwith epistemic duties that cannot be fulĕlled as long
as the parallel commitment to PoC (and MDP) remains in place.
Before we move on to the next chapter, let me collect a few more
strands from the preceding discussion, so as to give you a Ęavour of
where I am heading.
2.6.1.e Road Ahead
I do not claim to have shown that meaning is everywhere provisional
and judgement-dependent, although I could say (provocatively)
that there actually is a very good sense in which it is—in language, it
is familiarity that breeds content.
e slash here is doing a lot of work. More about this contrast in chapters 3, 5 and 6.
I take it that phenomena such as meaning without use and meaning illusions do show that
certain structural elements are ĕxed independently ofwhatever anyone thinks (see e.g.Hinzen 2006:
153). ere are e.g. familiar cases (oen involving negation) where we are (systematically) deluded
about certain constructions that strain our computing powers. Classic cases: “no head injury is
too small to ignore”; “I cannot stress enough the importance of X”. ere is widespread (but not
universal!) agreement that speakers are commonly mistaken about the meaning of these sentences.
Note however that verbal illusions concern cases where competence and performance come apart.
Nonsense, by contrast, concerns cases where competence and performance go hand in hand in
stretching the boundaries of our conceptual scheme. I would therefore argue that nonsense and verbal
illusions seem to show that a single, fully general account of the mechanisms that generate complex
meanings cannot be given. Compositionality, that is, displays what linguists call semi-productive
features (and the technical diﬃculty is ĕnding ways to implement that notion while saving all the
phenomena).
You could see the bulk of my argument against Chomsky in section 2.3.3 as a challenge against
the allegedly privileged status of “normal” sentences and the related immunity from the persecution
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Here, however, I limit myself to arguing that meaning is not in gen-
eral compositionally determined in the manner assumed by seman-
ticists and that CC provides little reason to insist that a semantics
respect PoC.
Above all, nonsense shows that it is demonstrably false that “syntax
carve[s] a path that interpretation must blindly follow”.
My suggestion, then, is that complex meanings, if conceived à la
semanticist (that is, as something that determines the conditions for
the truth of embedding sentential expressions), are in principle provi-
sional, that compositionally-determinedmeanings require validation
by speakers before the range of situations that would make them true
can be ĕxed.
Similarly, the important lesson from nonsense, I think, is that novel
meaning-derivations issue in genuinely new concepts and that there-
fore PoC cannot provide an empirically adequate explanation of CC
(it is false that we understand novel sentences in the immediate fash-
ion posited by the semanticist and the way we do robustly under-
stand them—eventually—is mediated through processes that exceed
the powers of the language faculty).
In fact, when a genuinely new complex meaning is formed, a new
meaning for the constituent senses involved is thereby determined.
It is our grasping a new proposition that determines the new atomic
meanings that we obtain via de-composition. In this respect,
of use that Chomsky seems to grant them.
By analogy with the notions of degrees of grammaticalness and degrees of nonsense, one could
perhaps retreat to a notion of degrees of compositionality, and indeed there are various proposals
of this kind in the literature (e.g. Costello and Keane 2005). However, I doubt that a semanticist
could make this concession while holding on to the MDP, for espousing a view where PoC has
only partial applicability usually entails a commitment to weaker claims with respect to meaning
determination—see e.g. Langacker’s (2008: 245) talk of compositional prompting.
As Uriagereka (2002: 275) put it (my emphasis), cited approvingly in Hinzen (2006: 250),
Chomsky (2006: 15) and Uriagereka (2008: xxii) himself. is is one point on which Chomskyan
minimalism misspeaks itself.
I ĕnd much of the discussion in Williamson (2007: ch. 4) congenial to my aims, in particular
the contention that there are no ĕrm criteria for applicability conditions (p. 123-24), that even so-
called analytic truthsmay later be called into question (p. 126) and that the notion of understanding
is too unstable to do much explanatory work. What I ĕnd puzzling is Williamson’s continuing en-
thusiasm for the achievements of truth-conditional semantics (pp. 281, 285). Just as Williamson
notes (p. 133), thin conceptions of understanding aﬀord very limited explanatory powers. Accord-
ingly, it is time we severely toned down the claims as to the reach of semantics standardly made.
Am I granting some form of reverse compositionality then? Yes and no. For what I am chal-
lenging is the requirement that the base class of atomicmeanings predate the class of complexmean-
ings. ere are interesting parallels with set-theoretical questions about the explanatory (and on-
tological) priority of elements over their containing sets. Contra Davidson (1967: 26), Goldberg
(1995, 2006) defends the thesis that certain syntactic constructions make a speciĕc contribution to
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PoCU gets things exactly back to front.
Furthermore, I think it would be severely misguided to suggest that
we are merely discovering (or unveiling, of shedding fresh light over,
or whatever other metaphor the realist wants to invoke) an already
pre-formed meaning determined by the “nature of things”.
If you prefer to think of the matter in Fregean terms and say that by
means of conceptual analysis (prompted by our encounter with novel
meaning-combinations) we reĕne old concepts, that we improve our
rational insight into their structure, and that meaning-derivations
therefore disclose a Dritte Reich of independently formed pieces of
content, well, by all means do so.
I think that this however would amount to no more than uttering
a battle-cry, as Zettel § should have taught us long ago—and the
history of mathematical concepts provides plenty of evidence that re-
alism about these things is on Ęimsier ground than expected even in
the most hallowed enclaves of rationality.
For the very same reasons, I have argued that the class of grammat-
ical nonsense is empty. Just as Tractatus §. had warned against
Frege, every grammatical sentence must make sense and reĘection
on nonsense brings to the fore the point that it is impossible to clash
meanings together.
Nonsense as combinatorial catastrophe, that is, is a nonsense posi-
tion to take: try as you may, you cannot form nonsense by clashing
categories, for this assumes that signs can have a referential rigidity
sentential meaning that is not traceable to either the constituents or to standard modes of combi-
nation (see also Millikan 2005: 199). Jackendoﬀ (1990: ch. 10) keeps PoC by speaking of “con-
structional idiom[s]”. If Goldberg is right, however, there is (at least) a third level involved in the
determination of complex meanings and PoC does not tell the whole story with respect to CC.
e idea here is thatwe grasp novelmeanings by ĕrst grasping (in a Ęash) the proposition that a
sentence is expressing. We then de-compose it into its constituents, thereby creating (possibly new)
constituent meanings. e class of complex meanings is however not closed under recombination,
as far as our understanding goes—recombination is in general non-conservative. It was aer all
Frege (1919: 25) himself who said that we “come by the parts of a thought by analysing the thought”
and not viceversa. Quite howwe should reconcile that with Frege (1914: 225) is amatter for another
discussion.
See the discussion in Burge (1990: 259).
Gauss’ view about the notion of function is illuminating: “One should never forget that […]
functions […], like all mathematical constructions, are only our own creations, and that when the
deĕnition with which one begins ceases to make sense, one should not ask ‘What is it?’ but ‘What
is it convenient to assume in order that it remain signiĕcant?”—cited in Kline (1972: 1032), my
emphases. I think that is exactly the right attitude to have concerning NS. And the very concept of
number, as againWittgenstein has extensively argued, is similarly hard to construe realistically. Did
the acceptance of the notion of complex number notmodify our concept of number and determine
a radically new one? I cannot see any sane way of arguing otherwise.
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that no sign could possibly possess. In the next chapter I shall re-
turn to this issue too.
2.6.2.What Role for Structure?
Are there then no remaining reasons to insist on structural (speciĕ-
cally: compositional) constraints on linguistic competence? Well,
yes, of course there are. ey do not however concern the need to
avoid case-by-case meaning stipulations, or the (supposedly tran-
scendental) point about making sense of the phenomenon of shared
content.
Rather, (some form of) compositionality (and UaGS) is needed to
ensure that our system of signs is a language and not a code, that
expressions express content and not merely point towards it (or are
paired to it).
at’s no small concession, of course, and by acknowledging the le-
gitimacy of this theoretical demand itmay seem that I am committing
myself to an enormous explanatory task, namely, that of reconciling
a distrust in strict compositionality with the recognition of its indis-
pensability in ensuring that our signs function as parts of a language
If this leaves you unconvinced, go back to my discussion in section 2.4.2. e idea that we
could form a sense that expresses unthinkable thoughts is the one we are asked to make sense of.
I think this idea is nonsense. One could retort that the very idea of language change requires that
categories can clash—or else, how could we account for the current acceptability of (1)? Again, I
think this is a misunderstanding of the facts. At no point were we entertaining the thought of (a
putatively literal, and thus still abhorrent reading of) ‘revolutionary’ combined with ‘ideas’. As soon
as the pairing was coined, we saw the intended meaning (our imaginative rationality delivered us
the “new”meaning). One could still complain that I am Ęattening useful distinctions here: children
delight in Alice-type nonsense because it is nonsense, don’t they? On the contrary: their delight
(and ours too) comes from the fact that syntax does outstrip reality and that their conceptual struc-
ture is still (mercifully) Ęuid. But throughout, we (and they) remain ĕrmly within the bounds of
sense.
Here I echo again Wright’s (1981: 52) question. My thesis is a long (possibly overlong) re-
Ęection on that query. In a nutshell: I take this chapter to have given reasons to endorse—via
other means—Pietroski’s (2003: 245) (and the Chomskyan’s) view that we can retain structural as-
pects to our theories while throwing out the idea that they explain (and provide support to) the
meaning/truth-conditions connection. What worries me however is something the Chomskyan
seems relatively uninterested in: how can we give an account of competence on which our language
use comes out as fully rational once that connection is renounced?
e point has been made by e.g. Dummett (1991: 13) and more forcefully still in his (1989:
172-73). Partee (1988: 49) argued that rather than CC, what PoC explains is indeĕnitely many
semantic facts. Perhaps this is one of them. I am less sure about the o-made claim (e.g. Janssen
1997: 457) that PoC is not an empirical principle but a methodological one—a claim oen wielded
to assess the plausibility of a particular meaning-theory (e.g. Wright (2001a: 344) and Chrisman
(2011) with regard to Brandom’s assertibilism and metaethical expressivism respectively).
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properly so called.
I am aware the size of the task is a forbidding one. What I will argue
though is that I can go some way towards bridging the gap between
these two commitments of mine by proposing that our conception of
content (both mental and semantic) ought to be revised downwards,
as it were.
at is, I agree with Borg et al. that semantic content is minimal
(and so is semantics). But I think content is a lot more minimal
than even they think. It is radically, ineliminably minimal, that is,
and consequently the compositional machinery operates on radically
minimal pieces of content.
It would however be a mistake to think that semantic content mini-
mally construed is either amenable to completion (it is not: it remains
ĕrmly minimal throughout; it is not a skeleton awaiting Ęeshing out)
or to pragmatic enrichment (I don’t think it pragmatically expresses
indeĕnitely many propositions at all) or that it is propositionallymin-
imal. And it would therefore be just as wrong to continue to insist on
MDP (at least as long as meaning is conceived in customarily robust
terms) and UaKTC.
I am thus fully with Chomsky (b: ) when he says that the
language faculty (including the compositional module) outputs ab-
stract structures. I just happen to think that those structures are a
lot more abstract than anyone thinks and that they remain wholly
abstract throughout (semantic content is not incomplete: it is as com-
plete as content can ever get).
Clearly, I am running wildly ahead of myself here. All that I wanted
to accomplish in this chapter was breaking oﬀ the CC/PoC connec-
tion and sow the seeds for the idea that content must be radically
minimal (i.e. radically disconnected from the determination of truth-
conditions). With any luck, I have done enough to convince you of
that (or at least to give you some pause for thought).
ere remains a rather large puzzle aboutwhat rationally constrains
interpretation. I take up the challenge fully in the last chapter. By
way of anticipation, my position is (initially, at least) fairly standard:
we are rational to the extent that we are sensitive to reasons of the
appropriate kind, given a speciĕc ĕeld of enquiry.
e semanticist answer to the question regarding linguistic com-
Explaining why some judgements as to grammaticality and meaningfulness are less inexpli-
cable than others was, more or less, the challenge thrown by Evans (1981a: 341-2) to the (Wittgen-
steinian) opponents of systematicity (the fanatics wrecking the machines, as he colourfully put it
on p. 326). at a theory of meaning should make sense of language mastery as a rational activity
has also been argued for by e.g. Dummett (1987: 260) and (1991: 91).
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petence was that we ought to be sensitive to the reasons provided by
the atomic meanings. e complex meanings inherit exactly those
reasons, and our competence is merely a question of tracking their
transmission from below (via the compositional operations), with no
additional work required.
By contrast, I shall end up arguing that we are rational language
users to the extent that we are sensitive to a much wider class of rea-
sons. We thus require a rationality that is ineradicably situated, one
that is sensitive to situated reasons.
e task in this chapter was to try and show what compositionality
could not be (i.e. the sole guarantor of the objectivity of meaning). In
the next chapter my task is showing what semantic content could not
be.
Chapter 
e Roots of Sense
How Deep Polysemy?
3.1. Introduction
In the previous chapter, I have considered (and given plenty of lati-
tude to) reasons to distrust the idea that complex meanings are com-
positionally determined solely on the basis of constituent meanings
and their mode of syntactic combination.
If sound, such reasons do appear to throw the entire semanticist en-
terprise into doubt, since they appear to force a considerable theoret-
ical downgrading for the role of the compositional engine at its heart:
its deliverances, I have argued, are essentially provisional in charac-
ter (they await validation from speakers’ judgements before complex
meanings can properly be said to be compositionally determined).
A crucial part of my argument relied on the centrality of the notion
of understanding to a proper conception of semantics (and indeed
nonsense caused whatever trouble it did for the semanticist precisely
because of her insistence on the CC/PoC explanatory connection).
In this chapter, I want to examine the question of what we should
say about our understanding of atomic meanings, that is, our under-
standing of the base clauses that get fed to the compositional opera-
tions (remember: the semanticist needs a bottom-up version of PoC;
without a base, there ain’t going to be anything for the operators to
operate upon).
Janssen (1997: 441) is refreshingly explicit about this. A central question here is what the
aims of semantics ought to be. Some, like Davidson (1967: 32-3), have insisted that semantics
does not have to say anything at all regarding (our grasp of) satisfaction conditions for predi-
cates—linguistic semantics will leave that to conceptual semantics and take for granted that we
have a story to tell about our apprehension of the base. Some neo-Davidsonians have embraced
this (anti-“metaphysical”) stance—see the (brilliantly Fodorian) chapter 11 of Cappelen and Lep-

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So, here’s the plan for the chapter.
I start by reviewing, in section , theMeaning Determination Prin-
ciple. In section , I move on to examining the semanticist’s view of
meaning for atomic sentences, with particular regard to the Content
Expansionesis (the thesis that any eﬀect of context can be seman-
ticised by appropriate expansion of context-sensitive sentences).
Section  is devoted to the pragmaticist’s criticism of that view; the
claim to be assessed is that the disambiguating/de-contextualising
process could never terminate (I also pose yet another dilemma for
the semanticist).
In section  I turn on the heat for the pragmaticist by sketching a
(more vicious) version of Grice’s Circle in the form of a dilemma.
I argue that my dilemma shows the pragmaticist position to be (at
least) as incoherent as the semanticist one.
My bleak conclusion is that on neither account does meaning in-
dividuation come out as a rational activity. ere is a basic diﬃculty
with securing determinacy of content, a diﬃculty that, whenever it
has been raised, has routinely been swept aside—once again on (mis-
guided) transcendental grounds—by a familiar modus tollens move
(without determinacy, we could not exchange content; but we can, so
content is determinate).
I reject this move and I argue that we should instead take a hard
look at the proverbial elephant in the room and revise our favoured
accounts of rationality and normativity to accommodate a diﬀerent
notion of content (I discuss these questions in greater depth in chap-
ter ).
3.2.Meaning Determination and Content
Semanticist theories are committed to the thesis that the semantic
content of a sentence is fully determinate (that is what distinguishes
their view from the pragmaticist insistence on semantic underdeter-
mination).
ore (2005a). I think I have said enough in the previous two chapters to indicate my dissatisfaction
with a position of this kind. Other neo-Davidsonians have been less demure. In e.g. Larson and
Segal (1995: 127) we are told that predicates are associated “with general conditions of application”.
Accordingly, the rules given in the semantic clauses are “rules for determining when a given word
can be applied to a given thing” (ibid.: 126—my emphasis).
Levinson (2000: 186; see also p. 399, fn.16).
We have already seen this move mobilised in defence of PoC. In chapter 5, we’ll see it again in
defence of the standard conception of logic as the science of reasoning.
ere is a good account of the distance between the two views in Carston (2002: ch. 1)
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e determinacy claim is intended to apply to sentences that are
closed in a very strong sense: all possible assignments of variables
(overt and covert) have been taken care of; all disambiguation has
been carried out.
ere is an old quote from Carnap that might help us setting up the
stall for the semanticist:
By a semantical system (or interpreted system) we understand
a system of rules, formulated in a metalanguage and referring
to an object language, of such a kind that the rules determine a
truth-condition for every sentence of the object language, i.e. a
suﬃcient and necessary condition for its truth. In this way the
sentences are interpreted by the rules, i.e. made understandable,
because to understand a sentence, to knowwhat is asserted by it,
is the same as to know under what conditions it would be true.
To formulate it in still another way: the rules determine the
meaning or sense of the sentences. Truth and falsity are called
the truth-values of sentences. To know the truth-condition of
a sentence is (in most cases) much less than to know its truth-
value, but it is the necessary starting point for ĕnding its truth-
value.
is remarkably crystalline (and exhaustive) quote is from . It
nicely encapsulates a conception of meaning that is still fully opera-
tive in most semanticist frameworks today—and one that is certainly
mandated within any broadly neo-Fregean account of content.
Note the remark at the end: knowing the truth-condition for a sen-
tence means knowing the starting point for its evaluation. And the
ĕrst question before us is: how thin (narrow) can that point be for
the semantics to count as a faithful mirror of our competence?—how
much information do we need to pack into it, how much representa-
tional power do we need to posit for our sentences in order for the
MDP to be adhered to (and for it to be workable)?
Broadly speaking, the question is the one I already considered in
the previous chapter, the one asking whether (or the extent to which)
Carnap (1942: §7). ere is a lot going on in this quotation; one thing worth noting is the
straightforward equation being made between understanding a sentence, knowing the content as-
serted by its means and knowing its truth conditions which neatly exempliĕes the EPU andUaKTC
view.
Of the kind defended in e.g. Peacocke (1986, 1992, 2008).
ere may appear to be lots of wriggle-room here. On the other side of the divide, Strawson
(1950: 7) had aer all said that “to give the meaning of a sentence is to give general directions for
its use in making true or false assertions”. More recently, Neale (1999), Bach (1999a), Blakemore
(2002: 30) and Dancy (2004: 196) have said similar things from very diﬀerent perspectives. e
point is however that the semanticist project is deĕned by its commitment to strict versions ofMDP.
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we can carve away semantic and worldly knowledge when we try to
model our competence; whether, that is, we can properly model lin-
guistic competence without ending up giving a theory of everything.
Consider the case of vagueness: to be competent with colour terms
is no more and no less than to know certain things about their be-
haviour (their conditions of applicability): for instance, that they are
e.g. tolerant, in Wright’s () sense. But that means knowing cer-
tain things about the world, namely, that tolerance (a semantic prop-
erty) is forced on us by precise limits on our ability for colour dis-
crimination (a worldly condition)—that’s why semantic competence
requires us to treat those predicates as tolerant.
If so, and if vagueness is as widespread as philosophers since at least
Russell () have thought, there seems to be little chance of drawing
a clear line between worldly and semantic knowledge (when I learn
that ‘red’ is tolerant, I learn facts both about its semantics and the
world—that’s what a colour is, namely, something denoted by toler-
ant terms).
So, the question really is: howminimal, that is, how non-wordly can
content be for it to carry out the job of determining, in a suﬃciently
robust sense, workable applicability conditions?
Generally speaking, expressions have epistemological and cogni-
tive properties—or else they would not play the normative role that
they do in our lives (semantic properties provide reasons for holding
certain beliefs and acting in certain ways).
And for a theory to be both systematic and wide-reaching, the con-
nection between these properties and the strictly semantic ones must
be functionally determined.
Indeed, I’d argue that expressions carry epistemological and cogni-
tive valence in virtue of their possessing semantic properties: it is qua
bearers of content that they also have those “additional” properties.
As Chomsky (2000: ch. 2) famously complained against the opponents of I-linguistics. See
also Neale (2005: 166, 178-79, fn.25) and Borg (2004: 80). Williamson (2007: 85ﬀ.) attacks stan-
dard views of analyticity by giving cases where deviant speakers entertain wild beliefs about the
world while still retaining linguistic competence—the cases resemble the ones discussed in Putnam
(1962). e very intelligibility of these cases seems to suggest I’m wrong in insisting that we cannot
partition worldly and linguistic knowledge with impunity. I reply that these cases do not concern
matters of how sense determines reference, but only eccentric beliefs about reference. It is the se-
manticist, not I, who is committed to explainingmeaning in terms of reference-determination. And
my contention is: whenever ignorance of worldlymatters aﬀects reference-determination, then it eo
ipso aﬀects linguistic competence construed à la semanticist. In fact, the plausibility ofWilliamson’s
examples of competent deviancy, as it were, is evidence that I am right in arguing for the radical inde-
terminacy of ourmeaning stipulations (by the lights of semanticism, we are one and all competently
deviant).
is would need ĕnessing, but my claim, roughly, is that epistemic/cognitive and semantic
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In identifying the semantic content of an expression as the content
it is, that is, I thereby apprehend that expression’s position in the net-
work of epistemological and cognitive nodes that structure my intel-
lection of content. To echo Sellars’ famous turn of phrase: we place
expressions in the space of reasons in virtue of their content.
Hence, getting clear about the precise character of that content goes
hand in handwith becoming clearer about how best to conceive of the
space of reasons itself (and thus of our rationality).
Accordingly, the burning questions in this chapter are: how de-
terminate can semantic content be (can intensions really do the
extension-ĕxing job that the Fregean requires?); and how thick can
content get before it becomes computationally unmanageable?
In short, our task is to establish the correct computational proĕle
for semantic content (neither too thin, nor too thick) so that our
linguistic practice may count as genuinely rational—on the seman-
ticist story, we are rational to the extent that we are competent rule-
followers with respect to the dictates of the meaning functions indi-
viduated by our best linguistic theory.
I do not think there is any question that semanticists are (and must
be) committed to content determinacy (and MDP). Nevertheless, I
think it is useful to try and motivate this commitment a little more.
Consider what is involved in the idea that sense provides a cog-
nitive ĕx on reference. Fregean thoughts are senses of declarative
sentences, but their expression is not separable from the (attempted)
identiĕcation of a referent (more generally: its contribution under
embedment to that general task). And so, it is part of the thought
properties are strongly supervenient (in the very strong sense of e.g. Kim 2003: 561). We could not
have schmpeakerswho are sensitive to one class of properties but not to the other. It was Frege, aer
all, who deĕned sense as the cognitive value of expressions.
is is why establishing whether a rule-based account of language is viable has implications
for the philosophy of mind. e truth of connectionist accounts of mind goes hand-in-hand with
a corresponding theory of language. Dąbrowska (2004: ch. 8) has a useful sketch of the debate in
this area. Dawson (2005) is a good introduction to connectionism.
See again the references in fn. 28, section 2.2. I hope that my discussion there has provided
enough grounds to distrust one familiar line of resistance, namely, the one that claims that truth-
conditional semantics is merely concerned with establishing systematic connections among assign-
ments of semantic values. Additionally, without determinacy of sense it is not even clear how we
can separate logical from non-logical vocabulary. I return to this question in chapter 5.
I borrow this happy label fromWettstein (2004: 13).
If you don’t like that idea, think of this as: its contribution under embedment to the deter-
mination of which proposition is associated with the sentence (and modify the chapter’s argument
accordingly; if it is any good, it will still go through). In any case, it is a standard semanticist assump-
tion that what matters about a sentence is how it gets to be true (or false) in virtue of its structure
(see e.g. Davidson 1969: 49). e worry about semantic underdeterminacy is that no sentence can
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being what it is that it (attempt to) identify a certain referent (in a
certain way).
e (purported) act of identifying the referent in a certain manner
is what makes a thought the thought it is (or else we’d have a code
and not a language). If a thought does not succeed in that referent-
determining task (if there isn’t enough to its content to achieve that
task) then it is not that thought.
What we want in our semantic clauses, then, is a way of spelling
out the content of an expression in such a way that all ambiguities are
removed (theremust be no uncertainty as towhich thought a sentence
expresses, which semantic contribution an expression makes under
embedment).
e semanticist’s insistence on systematicity thus requires that lin-
guistic theory give a proper account of determinacy of content for
the atomic clauses and a demonstration that the compositional oper-
ations are determinacy-preserving.
In short, what the semanticist needs to show is that it is possible
to tame the (pretty general) semantic underdetermination of con-
tent—the fact, that is, that economy of conversation (of informa-
tion processing, if you wish) has dictated that languages commonly
employ highly compressed (and therefore highly ambiguous) surface
forms.
Clearly, ineradicable ambiguity and underdetermination (or un-
derspeciĕcation) could not be countenanced by the semanticist be-
cause of her commitment to the thesis that linguistic rules determine
the proposition expressed by an utterance of a sentence.
succeed in determining what it takes for it to be true (or false).
It is not coincidental that compositionality and content determinacy are both essential to
something counting as a language rather than as a code. I grant both requirements. What I am
trying to do in this thesis is showing that we need to revise our conception of both notions to re-
spect the data about language mastery.
e semanticist may or may not insist that the cognitive content of expressions be fully trans-
parent to the language user. In either case, the assumption will be that something ensures deter-
minacy of content. I agree with McDowell (2005: 168-69) that the Fregean notion of sense is best
explained in terms of preserving ascriptions of rationality to speakers caught in Frege’s puzzle situ-
ations. Accordingly, some degree of content transparency is required.
I am not endorsing the ‘therefore’ here.
e notion of what is said by the utterance of a sentence-token-in-context is a highly contro-
versial one. Levinson (2000: 195) has a helpful table of the various views on this issue. See also
Recanati (1989, 2001) and Bach (1999b, 2001, 2004). For Levinson (2000: 186-7), what is “said”
is (linguistic) truth-conditional content, the implicated is pragmatic inference. Carston (2002: 96)
and Recanati deny this (for diﬀerent reasons!). See also the recent discussion in Recanati (2010:
12-14). I won’t enter the controversy here. All I am interested in is purely semantic content, the
ĕrst level of seemingly truth-evaluable content that we can reach. In any case, the argument I am
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e semanticist therefore requires a bridge between ambiguous
surface form and unambiguous logical form. My argument in this
chapter is directed against the very idea that such a bridge could ever
be built.
Indeed, themain burden of this chapter is to remind the semanticist
(and the pragmaticist!) of an issue that is all too oen swept under the
carpet: the threat posed by radical indeterminacy of content to any
account of linguistic competence as an eminently rational capacity.
3.2.1. Individuating Content
How do we individuate content anyway? How can we tell what a sen-
tence says?
ere seem to be two broad answers to this last question: proof-
theoretically, as it were, i.e. by saying how we would use it (two sen-
tences say the same thing if they are indistinguishable in use; they
allow moves from the same grounds to the same conclusions); or
model-theoretically, i.e. by saying that the sentence makes a repre-
sentational claim and that what it says is that things are as it says they
are (the character-level intensional rules determine the extensional
facts described by the sentence’s content).
I’ll assume semanticism is relying on a model-theoretic answer to
the question. So here’s the problem faced by the semanticist: if the
semantic rules are to determine semantic content, then there’d better
not be two sentence-tokens such that, all things deemed relevant by
the semanticist being equal, they nonetheless diﬀer in truth-value.
In broadly Kaplanian terminology: if there is no diﬀerence in (what
the semanticist says we should put in) the (entities assigned to the)
indices and in the circumstances of evaluation and yet there is a dif-
ference in truth-value (and hence in content), then there must be a
diﬀerence in character (we hadn’t individuated the logical form of the
sentence ĕnely enough and the index is incomplete).
rehearsing is directed against the possibility of ever saying anything deĕnite. If sound, it will aﬀect
any conception of what is said and should not fall prey to Salmon’s (1991) pragmatic fallacy.
Actually, it is directed against the idea that there is such a thing as unambiguous logical form.
On this approach, we would be generalising to all expressions the inferentialist account of the
meaning of the logical constants given in the proof-theoretical tradition of Dummett and Prawitz.
ere are other options available of course (e.g. context change potential etc.) but I think I
can stick with the classic, extensional model-theoretic conception of same-saying without loss of
generality.
Actually, the terminology I have in mind is Predelli’s (2004: 14, fn. 2)—minus the choice of
spelling: indices, then, contain everything needed to ĕx content-in-context so that the latter can
then be evaluated.
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is is what it means for (character-level) rules to determine con-
tent. So for the semanticist any variation in content must be traced
back to a rule-governed variation at character level.
e paradigm case is of course sentences containing indexicals: ut-
terances of e.g. ‘I am hungry’ will express diﬀerent contents (and have
diﬀerent values) at diﬀerent points of evaluation. e semanticist will
insist that all contextual inĘuence on content can be dealt with in a
similar rule-governed fashion (that’s what MDP states).
3.2.2. Arguments from Indeterminacy
e line of attack against this view usually involves some manifesta-
tion of the Travis eﬀect, the apparently indeĕnite diachronic vari-
ation in truth-value for sentences involving sublunary predicates,
which is meant to establish their essential occasion-sensitivity (it is
our interests and parochial judgements that determine the truth value
of a sentence predicating, say, roundness of a given ball, not the se-
mantics).
I take it as given that the Travis eﬀect poses a threat to semanticism.
In this section, I want to argue that the need to implement MDP and
thus keep indeterminacy (and Travis) under control commits the se-
manticist to aContent Expansionesis (CET)which I’llmake precise
shortly.
e problem faced by the semanticist actually takes two forms: a
weaker one, which we can call the thesis of the Underdetermination
of Semantic Content (USC); and a stronger one, which we can call
the Radical Pragmaticist Argument (RPA)—it’s stronger because it is
an argument for the radical underdeterminacy of any kind of content.
USC claims that, for a sentence S , linguistic rules only determine S ’s
linguisticmeaning: in (almost all cases) they do not reach far enough
I’m being a bit sloppy here, but I hope it’s clear what I’m up to. e point is that the character
level rules will return the same values for the same arguments. So if two sentences intuitively diﬀer
in truth value while the character level rules and the entities assigned to the indices are the same,
then we must have overlooked some elements that should have been included in the indices. For
any variation in truth value must be traced back to the stuﬀ in the indices.
Sainsbury (2001: §4.5).
See the essays in Travis (2008).
is is very rough as it stands. Carston (2002: 19) usefully distinguishes three shapes the
thesis can take. Two are unproblematic and uncontentious: 1) linguistic meaning underdetermines
what is meant (i.e. communicated content is underdetermined by linguistic content); 2) what is said
underdetermines what is meant. e third one is the bone of contention between semanticists and
pragmaticists: linguistic meaning underdetermines what is said (the proposition expressed). See
Neale (2005: 193) for another statement of the thesis.
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to determine the proposition intuitively expressed by an utterance of
S in a given context—the slogan: linguistic content is, properly speak-
ing, propositionally incomplete.
In many cases, adherents to USC seem content with the claim
that we should replace truth-conditional semantics with truth-
conditional pragmatics—while still leaving open the possibility of
giving a (largely systematic) theory of meaning.
All that needs doing is adding a story about pragmatic competence
to integrate the traditional one about semantic competence: the mis-
take of the traditional paradigm was in thinking that we could (and
should) keep the two separate.
e demand then is for a realignment of the theoretical and ex-
planatory priorities: semantics is not the (modularly constrained)
prelude to pragmatics, but rather the two are joint partners—and
in fact, pragmatics can be autonomous of semantics in setting cer-
tain parameters not mandated (or indeed marked for) at the level of
linguistic content.
In any case, on this view we do reach a level of propositionally com-
plete content; the view diﬀers from the semanticist’s in insisting that
without pragmatic intervention right into the fabric of linguistic con-
tent we could have no truth-evaluable content at all.
By contrast, the RPAdoes not just endorseUSC and the consequent
request for theoretical reform: it adds the further claim, not strictly
eUSC thesis in and of itself leaves it open whether the gap between linguistic meaning and
proposition expressed may be bridged by a wider theory of linguistic communication that makes
essential appeal to pragmatic processes.
See e.g. Recanati (1993: ch. 13), Bezuidenhout (2002), Kadmon (2001).
See Recanati (2010) for a book-length defence of this view. Recanati’s position is an intrigu-
ing mix of elements from the two sides of the debate, for he seems to join a belief in the theoretical
tractability of contextual factors (e.g. p. 9) with a view that content may be radically underdeter-
minate (he also seems happy with the contrast literal/metaphorical meaning, see p. 4). Note that
Recanati’s defence of truth-conditional pragmatics (TCP) makes him vulnerable to the arguments
for indeterminacy that I give in the text, for TCP still espouses a version of the MDP. According
to Recanati (2004a: 134-35), compositional operations process not just semantic information but
also what he calls modulated sense, that is, pragmatically enriched semantic content. Recanati is
insistent though that his framework is still grammar-driven, for he wants to resist accusations that
TCP is unsystematic. To an extent, TCP could be seen as an implementation of a view of composi-
tionality as a semi-productive process. While sense-modulation is unsystematic, sense-composition
still retains systematicity. I ĕnd this a curious failure of nerve.
Montague (1970c: 223, fn. 2) famously dismissed syntax as little more than a preliminary to
semantics.
is is the distinctive claim of Recanati (2004a, 2010). e distinction is between satura-
tion (roughly, the ĕlling in of the slots in the index) and free enrichment (there is, the pragmati-
cist claims, no slot at Logical Form (LF) corresponding to the pragmatically-controlled content-
completion procedure).
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entailed by USC, that no semantic theory of the kind envisaged by se-
manticists and formal pragmaticists alike can explain (and/or accu-
rately predict) the variations in truth value above because pragmatic
eﬀects on content cannot be captured in full generality by any the-
ory—they are ineradicably interest-relative and occasion-sensitive.
More seriously still: there can be no notion of stable content. Our
cognitive lives, that is, are immersed in indeterminacy and the se-
manticist project can cover only a very limited part of our cognitive
horizon.
e challenge for the semanticist (and the pragmaticist of formal
leanings), then, is how to secure determinacy of content against USC
and RPA.
3.2.3. Semanticist Responses
Typically, the semanticist will respond to the challenge in either of
three ways: a) treating NL sentences as shorthand for fully speciĕed
sentences (what were once called ‘eternal sentences’); b) going in-
dexicalist so as to absorb asmany contextual elements as possible into
semantic content—truth-conditions aremade determinate by linguis-
tic content, the idea goes, via the incorporation into the LF level of
appropriate tuples of variables that get assigned a value at a context.
In both cases, we preserve a homomorphic mapping from syntax
to semantics either by associating a given ‘occasion’ sentence with a
range of eternal ones, or by taking sentences to be something akin
to (pretty gigantic) Russellian propositional functions made ‘com-
plete’ by the absorption of relevantly salient contextual factors, with
the process of absorption ĕrmly (and crucially) under the control of
linguistic entities (either overt or covert, that is, tucked away at the
LF level).
Note that there is a sense in which the two strategies coincide,
Travis is the main writer I have in mind, along with e.g. Dancy (2004).
I.e. sentences where all ambiguities are resolved, all indexicals assigned a reference, and so on.
e indexicalist label originated with Recanati (2004a), In his (2010), however, Recanati has
now adopted the label ‘minimalist’ for a position like Stanley’s (2007). I prefer to keep the latter
label for positions such as Soames (2002, 2005a), Borg (2004) and Cappelen and Lepore (2005a).
Aweaker variant of this view has it that sentences express skeletal propositions (partial thought
contents) that await pragmatic inĕlls (there is no need to posit hidden indexicality), see e.g. Bach
(1987/1994: 76-7).
With one important distinction: eternalist-theorists will typically be committed to the com-
plete elimination of genuinely indexical expressions in the non-relativised translations of occasion-
sentences. is raises the problems discussed in e.g. Dummett (1973: 384), Perry (1977, 1979),
Evans (1981b) and Dummett (1981).
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in that they both posit a deep level of semantic disambiguation that
is supposed to parry the problem raised by the RPA challenge (they
both want to semanticise context, absorbing into semantics as much
of it as is needed to ĕx content).
Neither approach tells uswhat does the disambiguating on a partic-
ular occasion of use, but the central claim common to both responses
is that (the satisfaction of) any intuitive truth-condition associated
with a speciĕc utterance is linguistically controlled (in context, we
say big things by deceptively small means, that is).
e third and ĕnal option open to the semanticist is c) to go min-
imalist, whittling semantic content down to anodyne proportions:
semantic content is precisely as skeletal (and ‘ambiguous’) as it ap-
pears to be—on this account the multiplicity of meanings associated
with an expression is accounted for by speech-act theoretic consid-
erations or by a broader, more liberal conception of the notion of
truth-conditions (as we discussed in the previous chapter).
Clearly, the ĕrst two options keep semantic content thick—what we
really say has a rich, thick texture; on the ĕrst view, reasons of con-
versational economy dictate that we use the shorthand version, while
on the second, it is an essential feature of language that syntactically
controlled hidden variables get assigned values in context while the
surface structure remains lean and conversationally manageable.
e third version, however, thins down the notion of semantic con-
tent to proportions that some may ĕnd uncomfortable. In this chap-
ter, I’ll concentrate on the ĕrst two views. I return to minimalism in
chapter .
See the already cited Soames (2002, 2005a), Borg (2004), Cappelen and Lepore (2005a). I
take the indexicalist/minimalist contrast from Recanati (2004a: §1.2; §6.2). Unfortunately, as I
have said, Recanati (2010: 5, fn. 3) has somewhat muddled the waters. e contrast I want to
draw is between positions that remain pretty much disquotational (this is what I call minimalism)
and indexicalist positions that either absorb context into content directly and thus make contextual
inĘuence a fully semanticised aﬀair (Stanley) or split content across sentence-index pairs (Predelli).
Recanati (2010: 14, f.11) now call these positions I-Minimalist (semantic content coincides with the
intuitive truth-conditions we assign to sentences without positing top-down pragmatic intrusion).
Recanati (2007a) can be taken to be a variety of indexicalism in this second sense; it diﬀers, however,
in the way in which the determination of the indices is secured. It is also interesting to note that a
position like Travis’ (2006a: 151) is very close to theminimalist one. e divergence is over whether
truth can properly be predicated of sentences. On Travis’ shocking view of semantics, semantics is
somethingwithout a truth deĕnition—and the gap is not ĕlled by giving a proof-theoretic account of
applicability conditions either, at least not in a conventional sense (see Travis’ (2000: 212ﬀ.) notion
of introduction/elimination policies).
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3.2.4.e Flight from Context
In spelling out the CET, I ĕnd it useful to go back to the Begriﬀss-
chri, where Frege drew a contrast between formal languages and NL
that centred on the notion of guesswork. e entire purpose of his
concept-script was to leave nothing to guesswork.
A formal language, that is, is a language such that logical forms can
be read oﬀ its expressions directly (UaGS in its purest form, that is).
Fregean thoughts, the invisible objects captured by the language of
Begriﬀsschri, are the senses of context-free sentences, sentences free
of all indexicality. In contrast, natural language sentences “leave a
good deal to guesswork”—there is some (a lot of) work to be done
to recover the form underlying surface structure.
We could thus take CET to be the thesis that we can eliminate
guesswork from NL semantics, that we can ĕll the gap between
what surface structure seems to express and its context-free content-
speciĕcation.
For Frege, banishing guesswork means implementing the require-
ment of Eindeutigkeit: signs must be made to bear their meanings
univocally, i.e. they can only mean one thing and one thing only, just
like thoughts are supposed to.
In his all-too-brief discussion of the all-pervading role of guess-
work in NL, Frege oﬀered remarks about contextuality that are, de-
spite their brevity, subtle and far reaching. Because of their terseness,
they are open to two diverging interpretations.
Generally speaking, the need for guesswork arises from the fact that
(most) NL sentences are incomplete in the sense that they do not ex-
press a complete (i.e. truth-evaluable) thought. e semantic content
of such sentences is, as we noted, underdetermined and requires com-
pletion via “accompanying circumstances.”
We could then read Frege as suggesting that we can treat the incom-
plete linguistic expression as naming “a single determinate object” by
including the circumstances of utterance into semantic content via ap-
propriate enrichment/completion (Frege speaks of Ergänzung).
On a diﬀerent reading, we could instead think that what Frege had
in mind was that the accompanying circumstances are (literally) part
of the act of expressing/grasping the thought; circumstances, however,
“Nichts wird dem Errathen überlassen”, §3. See also Frege (1880/81: 12-3), (1882: 72/51) and
(1915: 252).
As Carruthers (1984: 1) noted.
Frege (1914: 213).
Frege (1914: 213). See also Frege (1923: 34, fn. 8).
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are not incorporated directly into semantic content.
Semantic content, that is, remains incomplete and is enriched only
metaphorically, as it were. Content, on this second interpretation, is
enriched via situatedness (we take in gestures and circumstances and
thereby secure determinacy), but the circumstances remain external
to semantics properly conceived.
is, I think, is a rather radical reading of Frege as a rather unlikely
ur-pragmaticist. I’ll return later to this second conception of the con-
tent/context interaction (it’s the one that in fact I end up endorsing).
In this chapter I want to concentrate on the ĕrst option and a less
radical version of the second.
3.3.e Content Expansionesis
As I said, I am going to consider two ways of absorbing contextual
inĘuences into semantic content, the eternalist and the indexicalist
strategy.
Both strategies can be subsumed under CET, which we are now
ready to state in full:
Content Expansion esis: Any NL sentence containing un-
derspeciĕed expressions can be expanded to a maximally spe-
ciĕc sentence.
CET looks innocuous enough, but is in fact a highly substantive the-
sis. It asserts that we can regain Eindeutigkeit for our vernacular, that
our sentences can bemade to represent univocally and in amaximally
Where a sentence is maximally speciĕc if none of its constituents is underspeciĕed (adding
further words would not close oﬀ any intepretive nodes)—we could also say it is maximally regi-
mented. Under ‘underspeciĕed’ I’m including here expressions that are polysemic, ambiguous or
indexical in character. A thesis of this kind has been discussed in the literature under diﬀerent la-
bels. Recanati (2007b: 119-120) calls it the Transformabilityesis. A related cluster of theses is that
of various Eﬀability Principles, stated in e.g. Katz and Searle. See Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995:
191-2) and Carston (2002: ch. 1) for discussion. One of the earliest statements of the thesis is in
Carnap (1937: 168). Williamson (1994: 51) has an instructive discussion of Peirce’s conception of
determinacy as absolute speciĕcity of content. Stanley’s (2000: 32) claims that syntax assigns to
each NL expression token a “lexically and […] structurally disambiguated structure” while also ar-
guing that such structures do determine content. Chomsky (1955-56/1975: 309) had also insisted
that the end result of transformations must be unambiguous and as recently as in Boeckx (2008a:
244ﬀ.) we ĕnd the (extraordinary) claim that ambiguity is something the language faculty “seeks to
avoid”. Syntax (and semantics) is thus the elimination (or overcoming) of ambiguity, a conception
of language that as Derrida (1982: 247-48) has noted goes back all the way to Aristotle,Metaphysics,
IV, 1006a34-1006b13. It is also to be found in Frege (1906: 303): “[a] word without a determinate
meaning has no meaning”.
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speciĕc manner.
It is, that is, a claim about content: semantic content can be eter-
nalised (either directly or by indirect mapping), it can be made abso-
lute, entirely independent of circumstances (thus latching on to the
corresponding determinate content in the sphere of concepts).
3.3.1. Implementing CET
CET seems to incorporate the following two claims (the ĕrst is a spe-
cial case of the second, really): that indexicality is eliminable with-
out residue (i.e. without loss of information, as Bar-Hillel : 
put it); that any (context-infected) sentence can be expanded until its
content is fully and exhaustedly speciĕed.
Both claims, as it turns out, are deeply problematic. We should also
note that it seems natural to modify CET by adding the clause: ‘bear-
ing the same meaning’—indeed, that seems to be the point of the the-
sis. We can, that is, read CET as stating a meaning equivalence thesis
between the original sentence and its maximally speciĕc expansion.
As we shall see, this causes some awkwardness, for it hardly seems
plausible that the two sentences will be cognitively equivalent. At
best, the thesis is about extensional equivalence only. But there are
reasons to doubt even that.
I said above that there were two ways of mapping NL sentences to
their fully determinate counterparts. Let me take them in turn now.
3.3.1.1. CET-Eternalism
Arguably themost inĘuential statement of the post-Fregean eternalist
strategy is in Quine (: ):
to specify a proposition without dependence on circumstances
of utterance, we put for the ‘p’ or ‘[p]’ an eternal sentence: a
sentence whose truth value stays ĕxed through time and from
speaker to speaker.
An idea mooted only to be derided by Wittgenstein (1945/1953: §91). e illusory goal being
“a state of complete exactness.” One problem with that view is brought out in (§426): “A picture
is conjured up which seems to ĕx the sense unambiguously. e actual use, compared with that
suggested by the picture, seems like something muddied. Here again we get the same thing as in
set theory: the form of expression we use seems to have been designed by a god, who knows what
we cannot know”. Note that CET presupposes that signs are unstable: or else, how could we shorten
eternal sentences for everyday use?
See Frege (1893/1998: xvii) for its origins.
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e CET-like eternalist claim is that for any NL sentence, there’s an
eternal sentence that is its equivalent in content and that, as Kaplan
(: ) put it, expresses the same proposition in all contexts.
As Quine intended it, the notion of eternal sentence explicitly
aimed to abolish any distinction between type and token—there would
only be tokens of uniquely-instantiated eternal sentences.
Securing absoluteness of truth value for its sentences, then, is the
main requirement for bringing NL nearer to the convenient docility
of formal languages.
Clearly, a language containing only sentence tokens, one for each
possible context of utterance, would be horrendously complex. e
point of course is that by assuming CET we can treat sentence types
(or rather: their tokens) as if they were unique tokenings of eternal
sentences—given enough time and computational resources, it would
always be possible to fully unpack their content.
3.3.1.2. CET-Indexicalism
On theCET-Eternalism approach, we (more or less brutally)map am-
biguous sentences to (allegedly) non-ambiguous ones; we thus stay
within the object language (the fully eternalised sentences are part of
that language).
Under CET-Indexicalism, wemay endeavour to remove guesswork
by two diﬀerent strategies.
We could keep semantic content relatively slim and add indices that
make explicit the content dependence only in the semantic clauses
(thus transferring the disambiguating role to the metalanguage).
Or we could instead posit an array of variables at LF so that dis-
ambiguation is carried out still within the object language but, unlike
with the eternalising strategy, the job is now being done covertly (as
speakers, we are both insensitive and yet responsive to the hidden
inĘections that our utterances add to the sentence types: their mor-
phology is invisible, but no less real for that).
If you like labels, we could call the strategies Clause-Indexicalism
(the variables in search of an assignment are stored in the metalin-
e claim is made in precisely these terms in e.g. Quine (1970: 13) and Soames (1999: 17).
All that is required, Quine thought, was supplying “names and dates and cancelling the tenses of
verbs.” An early statement of this position is in Frege (1904: 286).
It is interesting to note here that Quine (1970: 14) was already aware of two features of eternal
sentences that should have given pause: that even eternal sentences had a degree of relativity, in
that they too had to be indexed to a language and a time; and that somehow those aspects of their
relativity could not be expressed in the language itself but had to be “tacitly understood” as applying
to the telescoped sentences, even in the case of mathematical statements.
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guistic semantic clauses) and LF-Indexicalism (LFI)(the variables re-
side at LF and are part of the object language) respectively.
Each of the three strategies, Eternalism and the two varieties of In-
dexicalism, will be vulnerable to the RPA at diﬀerent places. But they
all share a leading idea, namely, that the maximal regimentation of
NL into a formally treatable language is achievable by some means or
other—and that’s what will allow us to regain the semantic paradise
where polysemy gets no footing.
And on this story it is CET that guarantees that we can make sense
of the fact that we do succeed in communicating thoughts to each
other (the pieces of common content we exchange in conversation
are the fully determinate items posited under CET).
As noted, many contemporary semanticists are seldom explicit
about the CET, but I contend that they are all committed to some
version of it and that there is no way of making sense of their projects
(and claims) without attributing something like it to them—what else
but CET could implement MDP?
ReĘect also that truth-conditional semantics relies on semantic
content making a representational claim about reality that is at
least potentially determinate (even Borg’s liberal notion of truth-
conditions requires that each of the candidate conditions in the set be
determinate enough to admit of satisfaction by some particular state
of aﬀairs).
For the semanticist project to succeed, then, polysemy must be
tamed. CET and its variants bring that requirement into sharp relief.
I commend the thesis to the practising semanticist.
I borrow the ‘indexicalism’ label from Recanati (2004a). As I remarked in footnote 33, his
terminology has somewhat shied in his (2010).
e “argument from communication” is oen (if not regularly) invoked in support of one’s
thesis by many semanticists, see e.g. Cappelen and Lepore (2005a, 2006, 2007). Russell (1919/1993:
195-96) rejects it altogether (for rather idiosyncratic reasons). ere are more recent alternative
proposals regarding ‘shared’ communication, see e.g. Gauker (2003) and Barker (2004).
Goldfarb (1997: 87) brings out this commitment rather nicely. Kaplan (1977: 523)may appear
to deny this when he says that rules determine content without being part of it. is is an impeccable
remark, but it should not hide the fact that a) the rules themselvesmust be stated determinately (they
are one of the objects of our knowledge ofmeaning); b) the content determined by those rules is itself
determinate (it is the value of a function) and ismodelled either by the semantic clauses or the hidden
content at LF. I amhere assuming that semantic rules are determinate iﬀ they determine determinate
content. Given the semanticist’s other commitments I cannot see how she could coherently deny
this.
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3.4.e Radical Pragmaticist Argument
So, what makes trouble for CET?
Usually, anti-semanticist arguments centre on diachronic contex-
tual inĕltration—causing grief to the semanticist requires a compar-
ison across contexts, a pairing of contexts where two tokens of the
same sentence-type intuitively receive diﬀerent truth-values without
a discernible diﬀerence in intension (or in the indices involved), or
without a diﬀerence that could be captured by a systematic theory
(that’s the Travis eﬀect again).
I’m actually interested in a much more fundamental (and much
more insidious) problem for formal accounts of meaning (as I said:
the problem aﬀects truth-conditional pragmaticism as well).
It is synchronic contextual inĕltration that worries me. Our diﬃ-
culty, that is, arises already within single-context cases, and it poses
a headache for any theory of meaning.
3.4.1. Another Halting Problem
eclaimmade byCET is that there is a process, namely, the telescop-
ing of semantic content until all ambiguity is removed, that is deemed
to be a terminating one. What could go wrong with this process?
It seems as if there are two bad things that could happen: the pro-
cess never halts, and sowewould never reach an extensionally equiva-
lentmaximally speciĕc sentence (polysemy is ineliminable); or it does
halt, but its output is neither extensionally, nor intensionally equiva-
lent to the original sentence.
My claim, on behalf of the radical pragmaticist, is that there is actu-
ally no other outcome. ese are the only two things that can happen.
And both are bad. So CET provides no solace to the semanticist. Pol-
ysemy is here to stay.
In fact, I’ll conclude that the only choice for the semanticist is to
stick with minimalist content (and adjust her claims and outlook on
meaning, and perhaps life too, accordingly).
Let’s consider the argument for the non-terminability of the process
ĕrst. Here’s another quote, I’m afraid again fromWittgenstein:
A sentence like “this chair is brown” seems to say something
enormously complicated, for if we wanted to express this sen-
tence in such a way that nobody could raise objections to it on
grounds of ambiguity, it would have to be inĕnitely long.
See the recent arguments to this conclusion in Recanati (2010).
Wittgenstein (1914-16/1998: 5); compare Frege (1906: 301). A fascinating anticipation of this
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Let me stress right away that it is not just the presence of standard
indexicality (the demonstrative ‘this’) that is the source of the prob-
lem here.
e trouble goes further than that and aﬀects, as we shall see, ex-
pressions (such as sublunary predicates of the ‘x is brown’ kind) that
are far less amenable to formal treatment than the familiar class of in-
dexical expressions. In fact, the problem is fully general; it concerns
the very nature of signs.
e Wittgenstenian idea is disarmingly simple: signs point in in-
deĕnitely many directions. ey require an interpretation to specify
their meaning (and note that the worry here is to do with indeter-
minacy of sense, not Quinian indeterminacy of reference). Each oc-
currence of a sign generates indeĕnitely many meanings there for the
taking. Any interpretation would be couched in a sign-like fashion,
and would thus reproduce the problem at a higher level. Hence, de-
terminacy cannot be secured by semantic means.
Now, suppose the point is sound. en CET has got a very basic
design Ęaw, for it states that we can rid ourselves of the essential pol-
ysemy of sign by adding more signs.
And the objector will complain that it is obscure that by adding ever
more words as the sentence gets expanded we would be able to close
oﬀ all underdeterminacy. Would not each additional word introduce
more underdeterminacy in turn? Aer all, as Putnam would put
sort of argument is found in Reid (1764: Ch. 6 §24). anks to Katherine Hawley for indirectly
drawing my attention to this proto-pragmaticist line. For more recent examples, see Searle (1978:
212), Travis (1985: 200, 207), (1997: 112-113), (2000: 91), (2006b: 28-9), (2006a: 40) and (2008: 2,
6), Wheeler (2000: 24), Recanati (2004a: 54, 58, 95) and Bezuidenhout (2002: 105, 108, 113).
I am saying two things here. at there is a speciĕc diﬃculty hiding behind the most mundane
of predicates—it’s not clear e.g. howwe could specify the sense of ‘brown’ in away thatwould provide
for all cases (as Zettel §440 put it, we can always construct doubtful cases where our stipulations
regarding applicability would be silent). In short, sublunary predicates are deeply undecidable.
Secondly, there is a general diﬃculty due to the nature of signs: signs, qua signs, can and do point
in indeĕnitely many directions. Again, no stipulation can ensure univocality in a given case.
ere ismore than awhiﬀ of the Tortoise Regress fromCarroll (1895) here. So onemight think
that I am saddling the semanticist with a view similar to the one Dummett (1973: 596) attributes
to Quine (and criticises along anti-CET lines). e lesson seems to be that there must be rules of
representation that cannot be part of a theory, that cannot be accessed in consciousness on pain of
inĕnite regress. One could then protest that the semanticist is not committed to Quinian theoretical
holism anyway. Sure. But as long as MDP is in place, a commitment to CET will also be in force.
See Putnam (1970: 140-42), Ziﬀ (1972: 131), Searle (1980: 228) andBeaney (1997: 32). Posner
(1980: 186-87) raises the issue of the resurgence of ambiguity in the clauses used to precisify the
original meaning. Slightly diﬀerent but related worries are forcefully argued for in Gross (2001:
ch. 3). Yet another anti-expansion argument is in Dancy (2004: 196-197). Horwich (1990/1998:
100) also declares himself impressed with the anti-CET RPA. Carston (2002: ch. 1) is again a good
guide here.
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it, at any further step in the expansion process we are simply adding
just more theory, as we attempt to close oﬀ all available readings bar
one.
It seems then as if the semanticist, by conceding that there is a prob-
lem at the ĕrst stage (i.e. by admitting that NL sentences are infected
with polysemy) has barred herself from a solution (her claim that we
can do something about polysemy by regimenting NL is weakened by
the fact that she is simply helping herself to more of the same stuﬀ:
signs).
ere is a temptation to say that the problem only aﬀects the
Quinian formulation, that the problem is internal to the object lan-
guage. Granted, expanding the sentence in the object language won’t
secure determinacy of sense, but if we go the Clause-Indexicalist way
instead and specify senses in our semantic clauses, formulated in
a quasi-formal metalanguage where ambiguity is banned, then the
problem cannot even arise.
Or can it? Why should we think that the metalanguage, whether
formal, semi-formal or informal, should be exempt from what seems
to be an essentialmark of the sign, i.e. its inability to self-authenticate
its interpretation?
Any formal language, by deĕnition, will need setting up, and the
stating of its vocabulary, signature and rules of inference will itself be
a linguistic act carried out by linguistic means (that’s why Brouwer
was so insistent that mathematics is a purelymental act).
Much as I wish it’d go away, I think the problem is stubbornly gen-
uine, and genuinely general (it aﬀects any language, whether natural
or formal, ordinary or extra-ordinary).
3.4.1.1. Rescuing CET
One could take two views regarding this stumbling block for seman-
ticism.
We could think that it is in principle impossible to eternalise away
context-dependence because of our inability to articulate clauses that
can specify the precise content of context-dependent thoughts.
Or we could say that the limitative result is deeper, that even godly
powers could not pin down a thought with the required amount of
precision. We could think, that is, that the indeterminacy phenom-
Putnam (1977: 18).
A diagnosis of the rule-following issue along these lines is in Luntley (2003: 25). Although
structurally similar, the two problems remain however distinct.
van Dalen (2002: 2).
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ena aﬀect not just linguistic content, but content tout court, and thus
intentionality as a whole.
I happen to think the latter is the case and that this requires a revi-
sion of mainstream views of rationality. I’ll take up these issues again
in chapter  and . In the remainder of this chapter, however, I re-
strict my discussion to the case of semantic content and our ability to
capture it theoretically.
We have seen that the RPA attack on the determinacy of meaning
centres on the claim that meaning is inherently unstable. And if so,
CET is false, because no sentence (no string of signs) could ever be
eternal.
But what reason do we have for thinking that the expansion process
would never terminate? We’ve not really been given a proof that it
cannot be done, at best a sketch of a proof that we are supposed to
accept as deĕnitive.
Or better: the radical pragmaticist has thrown up a challenge. Fix
everything that your semantics allows you to ĕx, we are told, and I’ll
show you that your interpretation still admits of indeĕnitely many
understandings (ways for the world to be such that the sentence would
be judged, by competent speakers, to be true, or false).
What the semanticist assumed when she formulated the CET was
that expressions could somehow be imbued with the magical powers
to determine not just their referents but their senses too, thus block-
ing the slide into indeterminacy.
In short, the expansion process could terminate only on the assump-
tion that the expressions in the expanded sentence could not be misun-
derstood. But that’s not what words are, the argument goes. Guess-
work, that is, is not an incidental feature of NL, but rather it is an
essential property of any sign-like (content-bearing) entity.
In contrast to this, Frege’s (: /) idea was that “the
word ‘interpretation’ is objectionable, for when properly expressed, a
thought leaves no room for diﬀerent interpretations” (my emphasis).
e idea embodied in CET, then, was that whenwe ĕnally get a sen-
tence expressing a complete thought we have reached the end stage of
interpretation. oughts, on this view, cannot be interpreted, be-
As Searle (1980: 231) concluded.
See e.g. Travis (2006b: 114) and my remarks in note 51.
Wheeler (2000: 59-60) has an insightful discussion of this misguided conception of meaning.
A rather extreme form of this view can be found in the Cratylus. Kevin Van Anglen informed me
that the Platonic conception of naming was taken up by the American transcendentalists.
For a conclusion along these lines see Carston (2002: 42).
Rorty (1989b: 65) is a good antidote to this Fregean idea.
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cause they are the outcome of interpretation.
And yet if semantic underdeterminacy is indeed a constitutive phe-
nomenon of our system of signs, that Fregean idea seems deeply inco-
herent. In Derridean terminology, signs are essentially iterable; that
is, they allow for (and indeed demand) cross-contextual projection
(curiously enough, that was in fact one key component in the Chom-
skyan view of the CC), they cannot be kept conĕned to univocal sig-
niĕcance even within a single context.
With this in mind, the attempted Ęight from context embodied in
the CET can then be seen as a self-defeating eﬀort to neutralise it-
erability (if you try to do that, you destroy the very essence of the
sign).
And it’s not even clear that at any stage in the expansion process
the sentence is any less ambiguous that at any previous stage (at best,
it might be so only with respect to a speciĕc word, but the form of
words used to reduce that ambiguity will generate new branches and
as the sentence grows in complexity, so does ambiguity).
For these reasons, I will assume that the sketch of the proof against
the CET is along the right lines.
In any case, even if the terminating process could be completed,
there are reasons to think this would provide little comfort to the se-
manticist. Let’s see why.
3.4.2. Essential Indexicality
Let’s now suppose that the expansion process can terminate. It seems
clear from the preceding considerations that if it did terminate, it
would do so only aer a considerable level of complexity had been
reached.
Intuitively, if Wittgenstein is wrong and we can instead inĘate ‘this
chair is brown’ to obtain a sentence where no-one could raise issues
of ambiguity, the number of interpretive possibilities that need to be
See e.g. the perceptive remarks in Wheeler (2000: 19), where it is convincingly argued that
Davidson, Quine and Derrida are best seen as having attacked the same problem from diﬀerent
directions.
See my discussion on p. 199.
Let me note here that I’m nevertheless impressed by Dummett’s (2004: 7) (and Williamson’s
1994: 54) idea of a stiﬀening of senses aswords are combined together to obtain ever greater precision
(or at least: a reduction in the Ęexibility of the atomic senses). A similar line of thought, from a
completely diﬀerent perspective, is to be found in Borer (2005). e idea here is that contrary to
the RPA assumption, as we join up words into complex expressions, the additional (grammatical)
structure does not increase polysemy, but rather it constrains interpretation. See the text for reasons
to question this move.
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ruled out for this to occur is very great indeed. It seems clear that
we would need to add a further clause for each open possibility until
they are all closed oﬀ.
And so it seems as if the outcome of the successful process of expan-
sion would be a sentence of such complexity that:
i) wemight well have diﬃculty in parsing it, let alone interpreting
it (remember: the purpose of the CET claim was to show that
in uttering an NL sentence we are really knowingly expressing
the fully telescoped content);
ii) we might have diﬃculty in establishing that it means the same
as the original sentence (aer all, wasn’t the initial problem an
interpretive one? how can we know that the expanded sentence
means the same as the original one if we were having trouble
ĕnding out what that meant?);
iii) we might have diﬃculty in establishing the needed cognitive
equivalence of the two sentences if the content being elucidated
via the expansion process is to play the needed role in our rea-
soning (recall the Fregean admonition: no piece of content can
serve as an item in our thinking unless it is fully determinate).
One particularly acute aspect of the problem is the essential egocen-
tricity of much of our thinking. On the face of it, indexicality seems
to be ineliminable. e expanded sentence would have removed not
just any trace of contextual dependency but also any trace of recog-
Quine (1960: 227) raises an interesting possibility: that we do not need a full expansion for the
purposes of logic and reasoning (eternal sentences are only required for science to state its laws).
All we require is enough expansion to secure validity. Shapiro (1991: 210) takes a similar line on
the question of the intended interpretation for ĕrst- and second-order logic. Disputes are stopped
when we realise there is no point in taking sharpening procedures any further. I discuss a strategy
of this kind in chapter 5. One obvious immediate worry concerns the vagueness of the ‘enough’
qualiĕer. A second worry is deeper: of course we routinely agree that no further disambiguation
is needed at a given context. But our diﬃculty is explaining why we think so and whether we are
justiĕed in so doing.
ink of all the (non-trivial) ways for something to be appropriately referred to by means of
a token of ‘this’, all the ways for a thing to be (note: not to count as) a chair, for things to be brown
chairs and so on. Of course, Chomsky (2000: 20) denies that these matters are “appropriate for
naturalistic inquiry”, and I agree. I think we should however draw the appropriate conclusions with
regard to the nature of content and linguistic structure (I try to do that in chapter 6).
is is so because it is an essential part of themodus tollens I mentioned at the start that CET
explain the phenomenon of shared content. Communication is made possible by our sharing fully
disambiguated content.
Note that talk of intended interpretation here serves no purpose: the diﬃculty lies precisely in
making clear which interpretation we meant.
I’m not entering into the question of whether same-meaning, same-saying and cognitive
equivalence are co-extensional notions. Perhaps ii) and iii) come to the same thing, perhaps not.
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nisably indexical content.
Familiar considerations from the literature that followed Dummett
(: ) and Perry (: ) suggest that removing indexicality
(de-centering our thought, so to speak) would alter the cognitive con-
tent (and the causal properties) of the original sentence to the point
that a theory of meaning that relied on the CET would not be a the-
ory of our meaning at all (once the indexical-laden sentence is de-
indexicalised, we may no longer recognise its informational content
as relating to us), but of a (magical, non-iterable, non-polysemic) lan-
guage for gods; and what use would that be to us?
e semanticist will again complain that we are confusing the tool
and concepts needed by the theorist to model competence with those
actually employed by the practitioner—the expanded sentence be-
longs to the theoretical apparatus only and any worries about its cog-
nitive content are misguided.
is reply however won’t do. e problem we started from was an
interpretive one, the problemof howwe can secure a determinate con-
tent for the sentences we use in our everyday exchanges in the face of
all-pervasive polysemic phenomena.
CET was meant to address that problem by positing hidden struc-
tural complexity that we were somehow tacitly exploiting to secure
an interpretation—and remember: the all-too-common reply to the
RPA is that without an assumption of determinacy for the pieces of
content we actually exchange in conversation it would be a miracle
that communication can occur at all, and only the truth of CET can
ensure the semanticist’smodus tollensmove will go through.
e CET-semanticist however is simply replacing one miracle with
another (the incredible idea that we can implement the expansion
process and that we could understand the fully telescoped translation
is is a point that Russell (1957: 120) spectacularly missed in his caustic CET-based reply to
Strawson (1950). An early version of the CET with respect to indexicality is in Frege (1897a: 135):
“A thought can be clothed in a sentence that is more in keeping with its being independent of the
person thinking it”—my emphasis, for that seems to suggest some hesitation on Frege’s part that the
job can be carried out; indeed, in Frege (1882: 72/51) he speaks of the “unbearable [unerträglichen]
prolixity” of the expanded version (no sign could carry the weight of the fully expanded material).
Something like this reply is at play in Quine’s (1960: 227) demarcation between the language
of science and that of the vernacular. See also Russell (1957: 125) and Stalnaker (1984: 41, 63). In
discussing Stalnaker’s diagonal proposition, Perry (1979: 43) draws a distinction between classiĕ-
catory purposes with respect to propositions and beliefs versus content-ĕxing notions. One could
use that distinction to argue that CET is a claim about classiĕcatory eﬀorts (the language of science)
and not about content strictly taken (and as expressed in the vernacular). e point remains: CET
makes a false claim even with respect to the descriptive needs of the theorist, since the theorist too
speaks in a language.
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expressing the thought encoded by the sentence).
Securing determinacy was supposed to be a real fact about our lin-
guistic practices, not something that only belongs in the theoretician’s
laboratory.
And the fact is: if the expansion process could terminate, the cogni-
tive proĕle of the resulting content would be such as to make it unĕt
for purpose. It couldn’t serve as the object of the attitudes; it couldn’t
serve as the stuﬀ we reason with; it couldn’t preserve the egocentric
informational content that is essential to our thinking.
My conclusion is thus that CET lands the semanticist with yet an-
other dilemma:
SD V: Either the process of semantic expansion to secure
content-determinacy terminates or it doesn’t. If it does, the
content will be cognitively unmanageable; if it doesn’t, determi-
nacy is never secured at any of the intermediate stages. Either
way, determinate semantic content is not available formeaning-
computation.
Despite its initial appeal, then, I think we must conclude that CET
is a non-starter. A diﬀerent conception of semantic content is needed,
and I’ll return to the issue in chapter  and . It’s now time to get the
pragmaticist sweating a bit.
3.5. Grice’s Circle: A New Dilemma for Pragmaticism
CET was the semanticist’s attempt to ensure determinacy of content.
Now, what is the story told by the pragmaticist? Well, there are
many such stories, but here’s one to get us started: a sentence ex-
presses “a sort of common core of meaning shared by every utterance
of it.” Linguistic competence allows us to decode that coremeaning,
but what we get at that stage is merely sub-propositional (i.e. non-
truth-evaluable) content.
ose impressed by anti-pragmaticist replies of the sort given in e.g. Bach (2004: 38) will insist
that I am confusing semantic and communicated content; indeterminacy, though, begins already
with semantic content, however minimally conceived. Unless we understand what one is saying
semantically, we cannot understand what one is communicating pragmatically (however broadly
we take this latter notion).
Could the semanticist retort thatwhatwe understand at a context of utterance is the character-
level material? Obviously not. If you tell me you’re cold, that is what I understand, not that the
speaker is cold at the time of utterance and so on. It is essential to semanticism that it claim that NL
sentences go proxy for fully expanded content.
Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995: 9).
Note the diﬀerence to Cappelen and Lepore’s (2005a) fully propositional conception of mini-
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To get to a fully truth-evaluable interpretation of the utterance, we
need to mobilise pragmatic competence, i.e. the ability to perform
inferences, on the basis of semantic content and contextual factors, to
the speaker’s intentions. Semantic content is (nothing but) evidence
for those intentions.
Language mastery, on this picture, is a hybrid skill whose domi-
nant feature is the ability to infer to determinate content from an in-
determinate basis. e (partial) basis for such inference is the (sub-
propositional) semantic content expressed by the tokening of the sen-
tence (so, decoding linguistic material is, generally, subservient to
inferentially-driven interpretation).
is is, very roughly, the (naturalistic) picture given by Relevance
eorists (and, with substantial diﬀerences, by other pragmaticists
too—the representational scope of semantics is severely thwarted and
substantial pragmatic intrusion into semantic content is also argued
for).
I hope the sketch above suﬃces to give a sense of the contrast. On
the semanticist picture, language mastery is essentially a question
of internalisation of rules that determine a semantic representation
which is either fully propositional or suﬃciently precise to determine
propositional content.
e semanticist is happy to concede that there are inferential pro-
cesses involved in the interpretation of utterances, but these typically
occur aer we’re done with the processing of semantic content—they
do not threaten the autonomy of syntactico-semantic devices in the
representation of content (to think otherwise is to blur an important
boundary between semantics and pragmatics, they add).
Let’s note a few more points of contrast: the pragmaticist rejects
LF-indexicalism and CET more generally (semantic representations
do not correspond “very closely” to thoughts)—contra Kaplan (:
mal semantic content here (but see the remarks inCappelen 2008: 269-70). Note also that according
to the pragmaticist, the Carnapian starting point for evaluation has not yet been reached when lin-
guistic content is decoded: semantics is a prelude to pragmatics in a very strong sense on this view
(Turner 1999b: 15).
Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995: 23, 189).
For all the frequent talk of psychological rooting of the communicative process in Sperber and
Wilson (1986/1995), it seems to me that their picture is not (directly) vulnerable to Salmon’s (1991)
pragmatic fallacy accusation. For they make a very clear separation between semantic content and
communicated content. Where the semanticist and the relevant pragmaticist part company is with
regard to what counts as semantic content: the latter will treat cases of content expansion (such as
the transition from ‘I’ve eaten’ to ‘I’ve eaten today’) as inferences, whereas the former will insist it is
still a case of syntactically constrained decoding (to use Sperber andWilson’s favourite terminology).
See for instance Bach (2004).
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), the semantic content of a sentence(-type) does not suﬃce to
determine which thought its tokenings express; for the semanticist
(and the Chomskyan), there are instead intrinsic properties of ex-
pressions (and of linguistic structures) that guide our apprehension
of how to use language to represent the world and these properties
are fully formal.
And these are the crucial features of our connection with the world
as we represent it in language (language is not a mere stepping stone
towards a cognitive commerce with the world that is dominated by
inference).
Not so for the pragmaticist: what is truly peculiar to human lan-
guage (and communication) is not the unbounded generation of
(sub-propositional) strings but rather the inferentially guided recog-
nition of intentions. And that can happen even in the absence of
an underlying code. It is pragmatic competence, not syntactico-
semantic competence, that deĕnes us quamasters of a language, then.
In short, on the pragmaticist view, what cries out for explanation
is not the CC as viewed through compositional glasses (it’s not grasp
of structure that explains our grasp of novel thoughts) but rather the
fact that, to put it in Churchillian terms, so many thoughts owe their
communicability to so few sentences.
On this picture, it is indeed the independence of thought from its
expressibility in language that is striking (compare that to Chomsky’s
fascination with the independence of language from context!).
What should give pause to the theorist, the pragmaticist seems to
tell us, is the hiatus between the unboundedness of thought and the
paucity of available sentences. And how we succeed in communica-
Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995: 9-10). Note that their claim is not (exclusively) about com-
municated content: on their view, semantic content is never thought-like. e same claim is made
in Carston (2002: 20, 83).
See e.g. Lasnik and Uriagereka (2005: §1.4). Indeed, for the Chomskyan minimalist, the link-
ages between expressions and their meanings are “perfect” (language is optimised towards that
purpose).
Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995: 25). Pragmaticists are deeply divided on the issue of the role
of inference. On the Relevance eory view, all meaning is inferentially derived. For Recanati, by
contrast, there is non-inferential pragmatic encroachment on semantic content.
Sperber and Wilson’s highly questionable term for language. Terminology aside, note the
points of contact with Davidson (1986) here.
For Carston (2002: 76), “mentalesemust have a large stock of concepts that are not encoded by
any element of natural-language form”. e discussion in Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995: 192-3)
makes it clear that on the RT account we do not think using sentential semantic representations. We
think using fully-Ęedged (ego-centric) thoughts, automatically enriching the assumption schemas
encoded in sentences. We are not even aware of the linguistic material employed in the exteriori-
sation of thought—note how CET is at work even in the (non-radical) pragmaticist camp.
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tion despite that (radical) independence is the fact that we ought to
ĕnd puzzling.
e pragmaticist answer is that we do so by inferring to intentions
via the broad maxim of relevance (we home in on intentions through
considerations of optimal relevance).
is is the claim I want to test in the remainder of this chapter.
3.5.1. Narrowing Down Interpretation
My thumbnail sketch hardly does justice to the many Ęavours of the
pragmaticist position, but it should do as the groundwork for my
dilemma.
Whatever the speciĕc implementation, the basic idea behind the
non-semanticist approach to interpretation is that the process of de-
termining which thought a sentence expresses is generally uncon-
strained by semantic content.
As is clear from the recent Wilson and Carston (: §), on this
view lexical pragmatics always involves inference (no matter how fa-
miliar the semantic input), and the overall interpretive process is one
whereby we are progressively narrowing down denotation.
Inference, however, treats semantic content as onemore piece of ev-
idence, not as a premise in a deductively disciplined meaning deriva-
tion; not, that is, as the determinant of truth-evaluable content.
e basic conception of semantics, then, is at bottom the same as
the semanticist one—the aim is to nail down denotation. But for the
pragmaticist the job cannot be carried out within semantics (or the
language faculty): and, crucially, as we move beyond the resources of
that faculty we lose MDP.
Here’s the question that worries me: is this view of content individ-
uation internally coherent?
And I now want to put pressure on the pragmaticist conception of
content individuation from, I think, a diﬀerent perspective than is
usual in the literature.
Roughly speaking, the charges against pragmaticism centre on
three broad lines: that the account overgenerates (it predicts a range of
completely unrestricted interpretations that are in fact unavailable);
e details are in e.g. Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995: ch. 3) and Wilson and Sperber (1993).
I focus on Relevanceeory, but my argument, if it is any good, will apply to pragmaticist positions
more generally. Truth-conditional pragmaticism is in any case aﬀected by my anti-semanticism
argument as well.
ere is also amore radical version of pragmaticism, namely Travis’, where semantic content is
again very minimal and what settles questions of truth or falsity for sentences is the understanding
that competent speakers consider reasonable to attach to the expressions therein.
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that it is hopelessly circular, and that it is, as we may put it, externally
incoherent (pragmaticists could not even state their own thesis).
My worry is diﬀerent. It concerns the architecture of the pragmati-
cist account of interpretation. We are told that semantic content does
not determine a fully truth-evaluable proposition. It just instigates
a search for the most relevant (or most reasonable) interpretation
among a range of candidates that are ranked according to their rele-
vance (or reasonableness).
And that’s precisely where my worry originates: the pragmaticist
tells us that we need inference to make content precise (before prag-
matics steps in, there is no determinacy; semantics all on its own can-
not ĕx content uniquely).
We are also told that speakers assess and, crucially, identify assump-
tions, conversational interests and any other contextual factor that
may help rank interpretations according to their relevance.
Presumably, the content of these assumptions, interests and so forth
is itself determinate—or else: how could we identify and rank them?
If the pragmaticist is right, however, it is obscure how identiĕcation
(and consequent ranking) of assumptions and interpretive hypothe-
ses can so much as take place. ere are, ex hypothesi, no candidate
pieces of content to be individuated prior to extra-semantic reasoning
being carried out.
But inference is an eminently rational activity. Inferential moves,
whether deductive or inductive, are regulated by standards of ra-
tionality (given certain grounds, certain steps are licensed by those
grounds under the rules currently in force). Moreover, good infer-
ence is truth-preserving. Without determinacy of content, though,
Aclaimmade in e.g. Cappelen andLepore (2005a: ch. 9). I amgoing against their terminology:
for them, pragmaticists are internally incoherent in that they can’t state their own thesis. For me
that’s ameta-theoretic, and thus external, problem. Incidentally, I do ĕnd their critique of pragmati-
cism slightly oﬀ-target. For one thing, they appear to misread Travis. On Travis’ view there aren’t
many diﬀerent properties picked out in context. Rather, for every predicate-expression there is a
single, minimal property denoted by it. What varies with context is what it takes to satisfy that single
property (compare truth relativism v. truth pluralism, or versions of pluralism according to which
there is a single property of truth whose satisfaction criteria are domain-speciĕc: Travis-properties
are non-domain relative with domain-relative satisfaction conditions). Secondly, pragmaticists can
respond that the Background against which their theories are examined will make their claims ex-
pressible (and determinate). I see no incoherence in that claim. For criticism of the RPA along the
ĕrst two lines, see e.g. Dummett (1989), Kamp and Reyle (1993: 9-11), Bach (1999b: 80), Levinson
(2000: 257-58) and Salmon (2004b: 346).
See Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995: 118, 165-7, 183, 189, 257) and Carston (1988: 169).
Levinson’s (2000) account gives great prominence to the notion of default rankings among can-
didate interpretations.
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there is no assessing for truth-value.
It is therefore completely obscure, and indeed I maintain: it is
deeply incoherent to describe the interpretive process as a rationally
constrained choice among previously ranked possible interpretations
where, by the pragmaticist’s own lights,we cannot individuate content
until pragmatics kicks in.
At best, what we have here is a cognitive leap of faith from inde-
terminate (and indeed unindividuated!) premises to a (mysteriously)
determinate conclusion (an abrupt transition from reasoning about
variables to reasoning about a constant without any justiĕcation for
the instantiating move).
For Levinson (and Dummett), the circle facing the Gricean was
to do with the fact that the mechanisms that individuate proposi-
tional content were substantially the same as those required to ĕx
post-semantic content—and this threatened the tenability of Grice’s
distinction between semantically and pragmatically determined con-
tent.
My worry is however not about procedural circularity, but rather
about the possibility of securing determinacy of content by pragmatic
means—the worry kicks in because of the (no doubt plausible) claim
that (contra Grice’s own view of these matters) pragmatic input is not
limited to the calculation of post-semantic implicatures but it is rather
essentially involved in the generation of content (and formy purposes
it doesn’t muchmatter whether this is claimed to take place in parallel
with or prior to the semantic module doing its job).
As I see matters, the trouble for the (neo-)Gricean is that she lacks
the very materials needed to carry out the interpretive tasks: if her
story is right, she has no material for even stating her rules of in-
ference, individuate interpretive candidates as given in thought, and
carry out the inferential process as a whole.
Note that the familiar technical amendments (e.g. supervaluationism) to classical semantics
are of no use here: we are dealing with indeterminacy of sense not of reference here.
See Evans (2009: 106-07) for a move of this kind. Note that for the pragmaticist, we move
from non-truth-evaluable content (the linguistic representation) to truth-evaluable content (to in-
terpretations, that is, to “conceptual representations of thoughts”—Blakemore 1992: 30) without
suﬃciently precise linguistic constraints. e only thing that disciplines the transition is further
representations in thoughts, co-operative principles and laws of inference. But can any of these
notions be made stable purely by communicative means?.
e truly groundbreaking pragmaticist turn took place in Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995:
ch. 4, §2), where the notion of explicature is ĕrst introduced. Care is required here: Sperber andWil-
son (1986/1995: 257-8)make clear that for them linguistic semantics operates on sub-propositional
content and so they can legitimately view their conception of pragmatic input as applying to post-
semantic content. e crucial point formy purposes is that on their story there is no truth-evaluable
content until pragmatics enters the scene.
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Just reĘect on the crucial notion of inconsistency that she requires:
to rank candidate interpretations we have to test for inconsistency
(so as to screen oﬀ interpretive choices incompatible with established
facts about the context), and we cannot do that if we haven’t got fully
determinate propositional content given that the process of content
completion is essential to the consistency test.
Note that while the problem for the CET view was that the inter-
pretive procedure could never terminate (for familiarWittgensteinian
considerations), the diﬃculty confronting the pragmaticist is that the
procedure could never get started.
And if the pragmaticist replies that we can secure ad interim de-
terminacy of content to get the game started (with the procedure it-
self narrowing down content as it computes the pragmatically derived
values), the semanticist can retort that if that is at all possible then it’s
unclear why she was supposed to be any worse oﬀ than the pragmati-
cist—if we can take for granted that there is a level of content which
is determinate enough to individuate candidate interpretations, why
should we despair that linguistic content could not be made at least
as determinate?
e pragmaticist oen appeals to mental content (and some form
of the language of thought hypothesis) as what guides our inferences,
but surely we have no more secure way to nail down mental content
(of any non-basic kind) than by giving a linguistic description of it.
e thing is, while the pragmaticist framework needs determinate
pieces of content waiting in the wings as wemove from linguistic sub-
propositional content to fully truth-evaluable content, the range of
candidate interpretations available in thought could be no more de-
terminate than the sentences used to describe them.
ere are multiple ranking processes in the RT framework: sentences are “sets of semantic
representations” and there are as many such representations as there are ways for the sentence to be
ambiguous (Sperber andWilson 1986/1995: 193). Note already one ĕrst tension here: ambiguity is
ambiguity in the fully expanded content, yet it is identiĕable as the ambiguity it is already at the level
of assumption schemata; the representations themselves are at best “fragmentary” and “incomplete”
representations of thoughts. So in turn each of the (ĕrst-level) disambiguated representations will
then be further enriched (expanded, narrowed) according to the communicative intentions in a
particular context. We thus have at least three layers of listing and ranking according to the principle
of relevance and the various maxims inherited from the Gricean framework. One may reply that
all along we merely identify incomplete logical forms (the notion seems perfectly coherent): but in
the very same page we are told that these forms are never present to consciousness. e rankings
are always done on the fully explicated content. I ĕnd this picture deeply Ęawed for the reasons
discussed in the text.
How else but by means of words could we represent and rationally discipline the inferential
relations holding between thoughts? I am aware externalists about content will complain that I am
over-intellectualising the conditions for grasp of content. Maybe. But I am holding my ground
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And if so, we might just as well concede that language is able to
express deĕnite content even before pragmatic inference steps in.
e dilemma for the pragmaticist, then, is that when donning her
negative, anti-semanticist hat she has to argue for a notion of (termi-
nally underdetermined) linguistic content that cannot serve the pur-
pose she requires of it when it comes to elaborating her alternative
conception of interpretation.
Ultimately, the problem for the pragmaticist originates from her
claim that semantic content is underdeterminate and ambiguous.
e ĕrst claim asserts the essential schematicity of semantic con-
tent. But the second claim, in the reading usually given by the prag-
maticist, is that the sentence as it is could express indeĕnitely many
thoughts which are themselves determinate.
One example may help: for the pragmaticist, a sentence like ‘Ru-
pert bought the Times’ is not yet truth-evaluable, it expresses no de-
terminate content. We are then told whichmeanings it could carry
(which thoughts it could express), and this is done by adding further
expressions that (supposedly) settle the issue. ‘Rupert bought a copy
of the Times’ and ‘Rupert bought the press enterprise that publishes
the Times’ are thus given as two candidate interpretations of the orig-
inal sentence (presumably entertained in thought).
e conclusion, we are told, is that by using Gricean maxims and
inferences, it is possible “to convey an unambiguous thought by ut-
tering an ambiguous sentence.”
What I ĕnd profoundly baﬄing in this account is that the sentences
used to distinguish available interpretations are supposed to be un-
ambiguous (as if, for instance, in the example above we could enter-
tain no doubt as to the meaning of ‘a copy of ’!).
But, as I’ve said already, if there was a genuine problem of semantic
ambiguity at the ĕrst-order level, it is astonishing that the pragmati-
cist should think that by using semantic means (by recourse to more
sentences) we could succeed in ĕxing content.
In eﬀect, the relevance theorist’s account of interpretation is but
a version of CET where it is pragmatic inference (and not semantic
rules) that ensures termination.
anyway.
Here I make contact with a strand in Cappelen and Lepore’s (2005a: 132) critique of radical
contextualism.
Adapted from the example discussed in Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995: 34).
A rather clear conĕrmation that I’m right in this diagnosis comes from Carston (2002: 76)
where we are told that thoughts are “the result of utterance comprehension processes”. Exactly, it
will be remembered, Frege’s own view of thoughts as the outcome of interpretation. e disagree-
ment is purely instrumental here: the Fregean (but possibly not Frege himself!) will insist that the
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So, whereas on the semanticist front semantic underspeciĕcation
is a formal problem, increasingly dealt with by mobilising additional
semantic resources, on the pragmaticist side the theoretical burden
is transferred to the level of thought: “linguistically encoded semantic
representations”, we are told, are “abstract mental structures which
must be inferentially enriched before they can be taken to represent
anything of interest.”
Now, that seems to be a claim about all linguistically encoded
content—anything that is linguistically encoded is representationally
deĕcient, that is, no matter whether it is encoded in a sentence being
interpreted or in a range of sentences in the language of thought being
entertained as its possible interpretation.
Hence what I consider to be the deep incoherence of the position:
it is a sheer fantasy to think that a conception of irreducible semantic
underdetermination could be compatiblewith the claim that there is a
range of candidate interpretations endowedwith determinate content
which are available for (rational) ranking and selection (and which
the original sentence ambiguously denotes and its expanded coun-
terparts make precise) prior to (by the pragmaticist’s own arguments)
any possibility of content determination.
In a nutshell, the incoherence is in the idea that by moving from
linguistic meaning to communicated meaning, the meaning (and
the metaphysics) of ‘meaning’ somehow changes (itmagicallymoves
from incompleteness to completeness).
interpretive process is wholly regulated by syntax, while for the pragmaticist what secures determi-
nacy of content are “powerful pragmatic inferential mechanism[s]”.
See e.g. Reyle (1993), van Deemter and Peters (1996), van Eijck and Jaspars (1996), Crouch
and van Genabith (1999), Jayez (2001), Blackburn and Bos (2005)
Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995: 174). My emphasis.
Note a diﬀerence between Sperber andWilson (1986/1995) and Carston (2002: ch. 5): for the
latter, but not for the former (although seeWilson andCarston 2007), linguistic forms point to items
in mentalese that are themselves, in the ĕrst instance, schematic (although less so than the linguistic
representations that triggered the interpretive process). Pragmatic inference then narrows down the
proĕle of the mentalese sentence until the appropriate representational content is fully constructed
as the interpretation process reaches its terminus. For the purposes of my argument, this only adds
one intermediate step to a picture that remains incoherent for the reasons rehearsed in the text.
Carston (2002: 75) speaks of the polysemy of NL expressions as their having “missing bits”
which a translation into mentalese ĕlls in appropriately. Note that for her (p. 98) it is important that
we preserve the autonomy of (sub-propositional) semantics. And so she insists there is no circle,
contra Levinson, because the division presupposed by Levinson is wrongly drawn: semantics does
not reach as far out as Levinson claims. Once we draw the boundary properly, the circle disappears.
My claim is that even when the boundary is drawn where the pragmaticist wants it, my argument
will still go through. For anything but the most rudimentary of belief-states, we can make no sense
of precisely drawn content other than in linguistic terms, hence the dilemma.
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Where the (non-Travisian) pragmaticist goes astray, then, is in the
idea that defending the determinacy of thought is compatible with
denying the determinacy of semantic content.
e semanticist relied on a magical conception of language to im-
plement CET by openly semantic means; the pragmaticist, however,
relies on no less magical a conception in her view of the language of
thought as something other than what it is, namely, and precisely, a
language.
3.6. Conclusion
We have examined two opposing views of content: on the semanti-
cist view, we seem forced to espouse some form of CET, which in turn
seems to force on us the impossibility of ever expressing content in a
fully determinate manner because to defeat polysemy and underde-
termination the meaning-speciĕcations would need to be inĕnitely
long (or, if ĕnitely speciĕable, computationally unmanageable); the
pragmaticist side, on the other hand, seems to be committed to a vari-
ant of the CET which discloses an internal incoherence in its concep-
tion of meaning individuation.
As we saw, the instability of the pragmaticist view derives from the
odd coupling ofWittgenstenian distrust of ĕrst-order (as it were) lin-
guistic meaning with anti-Wittgenstenian blind faith in i) the pow-
ers of sentences in the language of thought to mean determinately
(Carston : ) and in ii) the idea that we can infer to the mental
states of others with that very same degree of determination (Carston
: ).
at coupling is incoherent: if we buy theWittgenstein/Derrida line
on polysemy, its force will carry over to any linguistically structured
network of content-bearers.
Both semanticism and pragmaticismmake the remarkable move of
saying that while the surface structure of NL lacks the ability to confer
truth-conditions on its expressions, there is a hidden layer of content-
bearing entities (logical forms in one case, Mentalese sentences in the
other) endowed with all the neat, tidy properties of compositional
semantics that are denied to, of all things, our natural language, our
e incoherence in Carston’s (2002: 74) position is brought out by her claim that mentalese
sentences have truth conditions because there is a speciĕable state of aﬀairs that (can) make them
true. Carston (2002: 257) clearly thinks that a truth calculus can only be devised for the language
of thought. e point is: speciĕable in what language? I’m equally unconvinced by the conception
defended in Fodor and Lepore (1999), which Carston cites approvingly.
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trusted and friendly vernacular.
I think that both views, to the extent that they are committed to a
version of CET, end up making a mystery of language mastery. ey
both start from the (presumably disappointing) realisation that or-
dinary language is not magical (in the sense of: able to secure—and
signal—reference unerringly), and then move on to posit a diﬀer-
ent, presumably extra-ordinary language that enjoys the magic pow-
ers that elude NL (a ‘formal’ one for the semanticist, or mentalese for
the pragmaticist).
My own view is that a proper understanding of the routes that con-
nect language and world (the routes to and from linguistic sense) re-
quires the abandonment of the idea that there is any language that is
suitably magical. As should be clear by now, I think proper reĘection
on these issues forces on us a radicallyminimal conception of content
(both linguistic and mental).
I will take up this question again in chapters  and . Aer my ex-
amination of compositionally-determined meanings and the mean-
ing of atomic sentences, I now need to turnmy attention to themean-
ing of the logical constants themselves.
Indeed, that (relevance) pragmaticism is but another implementation of CET is shown by
Carston’s (2002: 75, 82, 93 fn. 39) claim that (non-indexical) mentalese sentences are eternal
(i.e. maximally non-ambiguous). Carston (2002: 83) also claims that even where mentalese sen-
tences display context-sensitivity and underdeterminacy, that is, even when thoughts are incom-
plete, they are not so to the same extent as NL sentences. Why?
‘Magic language’ is Wheeler’s (2000: 3) apt term.
One might object to the main line of this chapter, and indeed of this dissertation, that it relies
essentially on some notion of sense given in terms of possession conditions as opposed to attribu-
tion conditions, and being operative in both the semantics and in our account of competence—see
e.g. Peacocke’s (1992: 29-1) complaint against Schiﬀer (1987). Jettison that notion (or distinguish
sharply between possession and attribution conditions) and all will be well (we can give an account
of basic meaning-practices in e.g. purely causal-deferential terms). I grant the distinction is a good
one, but I think the objection would be misguided. First, we need a notion of sense-as-possession-
conditions to account for competence as a rational activity; secondly, causal-deferential accounts
merely shi the problem: what explains competence in the case of the experts (or of the community
as a whole)?—I assume here that deference is a well-founded relation.
Chapter 
No Buts and Ifs
Pragmatics and the Logical Constants
4.1. Introduction
In the previous two chapters I have argued that complex meanings
are only provisionally projectable from the lexical base and that the
meaning of atomic sentences is ineradicably indeterminate.
In this chapter I shi my attention to the meaning of the composi-
tional operators, the (non-intensional) connectives.
I pose twomain questions: whether theNL connectivesmatch their
logical counterparts and whether they are immune to indeterminacy
worries. My conclusion is broadly negative on both counts. For con-
venience’s sake, and without loss of generality, I choose conjunction
as a case study.
4.1.1. UaGS, the Connectives and Representationality
It was part of the Tractarian framework that logical words were not
representational at all, and the Tarskian clauses standardly employed
in truth-conditional semantics do somehow inherit that emptiness.
Uniquely among expressions, sentential connectives refer to truth-
functions (both their arguments and their values are truth-values)
and not to worldly extensions (or intensions that contribute to the
And to repeat: I take both conclusions to be mandated by standard semanticist assumptions.
Incidentally, I have to confess to a lot of sloppiness regarding the use of ‘meaning’ in this disserta-
tion. More oen than not, I’m using it under semanticist assumptions. My own conception is much
thinner, of course, because I deny MDP. I hope, ahem, context makes clear which sense is being
used on a particular occasion.

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determination of such extensions).
Indeed, the mark of their logicality is that, as e.g. Bell and Ma-
chover (: ) point out, they become “part of the [logical] form”
of expressions. Logical constants are thus ‘taken out’ of language, as
it were, and absorbed right into the form of compound expressions
(and the key idea behind UaGS was precisely that our understanding
of complex expressions was mediated by grasp of the logical compo-
nents embedded into their form).
Apprehension of themeaning of the connectives is thus not separa-
ble from apprehension of the form of the complex expressions whose
main connective they are.
Clearly, it is the representational inertness of the logical constants
that engenders their content- and context-insensitivity, and it is this
feature that makes logic a topic-neutral discipline (the inferences
sanctioned by the rules for the connectives obtain no matter what
we substitute for the non-logical vocabulary involved).
To those trained in the Frege-Tarski-Montague tradition, it has
seemed natural to assume that the Boolean connectives have fairly
close (albeitmessier) counterparts in a pretty obvious class of NL sen-
tential connectives that also inherit their context-inertness.
In that tradition, any divergence between the behaviour of the two
classes is accounted for in pragmatic terms. In particular, any infer-
ence that we might make beyond those licensed by the elimination
and introduction rules for the Boolean connectives (say, to the con-
clusion that a certain worldly relation holds between the conjuncts)
is seen as justiĕed, if soundly drawn, solely on the basis of pragmatic
factors. It is pragmatic noise, then, that makes it look as if NL con-
nectives display, on occasion, non-logical features.
Appeal to pragmatics, however, creates another dilemma for the
semanticist. If we explain departures from the Boolean meaning by
blaming them on the pragmatic content of the expressions involved,
we face the Scope Problem, the apparent phenomenon whereby
pragmatically-determined content gets captured under the scope of
logical operators.
ose operators, however, were supposed to operate on semantic
content alone. Defending the thesis that NL connectives are Boolean
by appeal to pragmatics will therefore bring pragmatic content under
the scope of the connectives. Either way, then, pragmatics intrudes
on semantics, contra one crucial thesis of semanticism.
is may need reĕnement depending on the details of the speciĕc semantics. Broadly speak-
ing, it holds for all accounts, however (it is this feature that gives them invariance under permuta-
tion).
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at is the main problem for this chapter, then: how to keep NL
connectives Boolean without weakening the distinctive semanticist
claim that semantic content cannot be inĕltrated by primary prag-
matic processes (processes that penetrate deep into the workings of
the compositional machinery).
So, here’s the plan for the chapter.
In section  I discuss two theses we might hold about the relation
between NL and the logical connectives. In section  I consider one
response to the suggestion that the meaning of ‘and’ diverges from
that of ‘^’, one that multiplies the senses for the NL conjunction op-
erator.
Section  moves on to examining the opposing strategy. We keep
the sense of ‘and’ univocal and we use pragmatics to explain its non-
Boolean behaviour. is raises the already announced Scope Prob-
lem. I suggest the dilemma posed by the problemmay well force us to
concede that ‘and’ is not immune to indeterminacy arguments either.
In section  I discuss ways in which we might blame the truth-
conditional variations betweenNL and logical connectives not on the
conjunction operator but on the conjuncts themselves.
Despitemy sympathies for an indeterminacy analysis, I nonetheless
propose a friendly amendment to a semanticist proposal to keep ‘and’
Booleanmooted inKing and Stanley () by suggestingwe viewNL
conjunction not as a conjunct-enriching operator (as on their sketchy
proposal) but rather as a deletion operator, one that may license prag-
matic deletion of informationally-redundant semantic material.
4.1.2. One Problem, Twoeses
So, let’s dive straight into the problem. Here’s a pair of troublesome
cases for conjunction, ĕrst mooted by Strawson (: ) and Grice
(: ):
) He set to work and found a job
) He took oﬀ his boots and he got into bed
e (putative) problem these cases pose for the thesis that NL con-
nectives behave like their formal cousins is that they seem to show
that ‘and’ does not in general respect commutativity (switch the order
of the conjuncts in () and (), and the truth conditions of the com-
pound change). If this is a robust enough phenomenon, it seems to
As opposed to the familiar post-semantic inferences posited in the Gricean framework.
I’m ignoring other reasons to think that ‘and’ is not captured by ‘^’: consider the very sen-
tence in brackets in the text; the second occurrence of ‘and’ there does duty as a replacement for
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threaten the postulated inertness of NL connectives.
Now, there are two kinds of questions that we might ask when con-
fronted with these cases.
First, we can ask whether (or to what extent) the semantic clauses
given for ‘and’ in terms of classical Boolean conjunction can do jus-
tice to all uses of ‘and’ (whether, that is, the truth conditions for NL
sentences dominated by ‘and’ are accurately given by the classical
Boolean clauses).
is amounts to asking whether NL conjunction is best modelled
by classical Boolean conjunction.
e question is thus one of empirical adequacy for our meaning-
theory: Is classical logic (CL) the logic true of NL (the one properly
regimenting its workings)?
Call this the
NLBesis: the NL connectives are (classically) Boolean.
Secondly, we could ask whether the Boolean connectives can ade-
quately account for all forms of valid reasoning—are they genuinely
complete or are they leaving out some patterns of inference of high
enough generality to deserve to be called logical?
In this case we are asking whether CL is missing out on crucial in-
ferential processes carried out in NL that ought to be considered gen-
uinely logical.
Here it’s no longer a case of whether CL accurately models NL, that
is, but rather whether the CL connectives are true representors of all
‘if…, then…’. Similarly for cases of co-ordinative ‘and’ (where it connects not sentences but NPs
or adjectives). See Strawson (1952), Quine (1950), Partee and Rooth (1983), Gazdar et al. (1985:
ch. 8) and Kria (1990) for discussion.
It is because of that posited inertness that logicians like to think of connectives as “insulating
each component fromwhatever inĘuences its neighborsmight have upon itsmeaning” (Quine 1950:
57). is, as we shall see, will play a big part in the sequel.
Humberstone (forthcoming: ch. 5) helpfully isolates two ways of looking at conjunction,
namely, ^-classicality (the property of a conjunction operator that determines its set of con-
sequences: Cn(fA ^ Bg) = Cn(fA; Bg)) and ^-booleaness, a property regulating valuations
(HV(A^B) = HV(A)\HV(B)—where ‘HV ’ is the truth-set of a formula). Bymy use of ‘Boolean’
I intend to refer to both properties.
One question in this connection is: are all meaning-inferences (i.e. meaning-analytic entail-
ments holding between expressions) licensed by ‘and’ covered by the Boolean clauses? Speciĕcally,
is the inference that the referent of ‘he’ in (1) found a job aer setting to work warranted by the
meaning of ‘and’ or by a pragmatically communicated temporal-causal presumption? See Chomsky
(2000: 63) and Beaver (2002: 192) for a defence of meaning-inferences other than those licensed by
the Boolean clauses. Note how this question is diﬀerent to the one standardly posed in the literature
regarding the Strawson/Grice cases, for it concerns the set of ^-consequences, not just variations
in truth-value.
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genuinely logical moves in our thinking.
Call this the
LCBesis: the logical connectives are (classically) Boolean.
e question this time is: Is CL the true logic simpliciter? Does it
cover all cases of logical inference? Does it license pieces of seriously
bad reasoning?
We might think that the answers we give to both questions are
closely connected (NL is what we use to carry out our reasoning,
so one might argue that the two theses above amount to making the
same claim—CL is the logic true of our reasoning).
Orwemight think that NL could be governed by a logic that doesn’t
have to be CL, without this having any bearing on our view of which
logic is the appropriate one for logical forms of inference—NL is about
sublunary reasoning, about the gathering of (possibly partial) infor-
mation; logic is about science as the instrument to limn the, ahem,
ultimate structure of reality and it deals with (eternal) truths (that’s
CET at work again).
Wemay, that is, have reasons to revise the logic of NL without hav-
ing to revise (the one true) logic.
For ease of exposition I will split my discussion across two chap-
ters. I’ll deal with the LCB thesis in the next chapter (givenmy doubts
about CET I think it’s clear where I’ll be heading), while limiting my-
self for the most part to a discussion of the NLB in this chapter.
So, here’s our (relatively restricted) question for the rest of the chap-
ter: is classical Boolean conjunction an adequate model of NL con-
junction?
Consider e.g. the relevant logician’s insistence that in order properly to capture the concept of
logical consequence, we require the addition of an intensional conjunction operator (as well as a
revision of the conditional)—see e.g. Read (1988).
By ‘true of ’ I mean: ‘that appropriately models’.
Another option is to go the Quine (1953b: 150) way and dismiss any departures from the
Boolean paradigm as “unwanted vagaries”, mere “rhetorical distinctions” that do not really aﬀect
truth conditions (1950: 53). e job of the logician-translator is to “distill” the appropriate truth
function from the dust raised by rhetorical use. Out of all idiosyncratic uses of ‘and’ we should
therefore extract the “minimal linguistic operation” which might be called “simple conjunction”
(here I am jumping to a suggestion in Strawson 1950: 81). A properly regimented language will
deliver us science, no less, and bymeans of the translation into CLwe have in eﬀect solved a problem
(Quine 1953a: 154)—that of what to do with an unruly, pragmatics-infected connective. As Quine
notes (p.150), the logician never assumes that the NL & formal connectives are synonymous: it is
simply that there is no loss for the purposes of the logician in leaving behind the NL vagaries (they
are, precisely, unwanted).
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() and () seem to suggest it isn’t: there are truth-conditional ef-
fects on content (a simple switch of the conjuncts) that are not picked
up by the Boolean connective (since that connective obeys commu-
tativity and hence is insensitive to the ordering of the conjuncts).
Considerable eﬀort has gone into keeping ‘and’ Boolean. Broadly
speaking, we can partition the proposals into two categories: those
that have given a semantic account of the departures from the
Boolean paradigm (the proposal here is that ‘and’ is polysemic—there
are many related senses of ‘and’) and those that have given a prag-
matic explanation for the non-Boolean behaviour of ‘and’ (on this
proposal, ‘and’ remains univocally Boolean in character).
Now, the question arises: which of these options is friendlier to the
semanticist project? e connectives, it hardly needs saying, are at
the very heart of the compositional machinery. So, a choice has to
be made here—inaction is not an option. e choice will also entail
a commitment to a speciĕc view of the connectives, most notably, a
view about what they can operate upon.
Well, as I have already announced, yet another dilemma is in the
oﬃng for the semanticist, and I’ll be arguing that whichever strategy
she chooses will bring further grief to her position.
Here’s the broad shape of the dilemma. If the semanticist opts for
an ambiguity account, she then faces the same problems we raised in
connection with CET.
If, on the other hand, the semanticist accepts Grice’s (alleged) gi
and goes for a pragmatic account that keeps sense univocal, she then
faces the Scope Problem, which engenders a further dilemma, for as
we shall see supposedly post-semantic pragmatic content seems to get
caught in the scope of the truth-functional operators. Under this new
dilemma, the problem for the semanticist is that in an eﬀort to keep
indeterminacy (i.e. ĕrst-level pragmatic inĕltration) at bay, shemakes
her connectives sensitive to second-level pragmatic inĕltration, thus
admitting that there is such a thing as pragmatically determined se-
mantic content that the connectives can operate upon.
To recap:
SD VI: To account for the non-Boolean behaviour of ‘and’ the
semanticist has two options: either she posits multiple senses
for ‘and’, thus facing the same problems raised in connection
with CET, or she keeps a single, Boolean sense for ‘and’ ĕxed,
explaining all departures from the Boolean clauses in pragmatic
terms. On the second horn, she then faces the Scope Problem,
Curiously enough, much of the recent debate about ‘and’ has been a family dispute among
pragmaticists, most notably between Carston (1988, 2004b) and Recanati (1993, 2004a, 2010).
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which gives rise to another dilemma:
SD VII: On the single-sense account, departures from the
Boolean clauses for ‘and’ are explained pragmatically. e
Scope Problem shows however that the content allegedly gen-
erated via pragmatic inference gets caught in the scope of the
compositional operators. If so, the semanticist has to choose
between i) granting that some pragmatic content gets caught by
the Boolean connectives and ii) granting that the non-Boolean
behaviour of ‘and’ is due to pragmatic inĕltration at the seman-
tic level. Neither option is compatible with the MDP dogma of
semanticism.
In the next section, I’ll deal with the ĕrst horn of the ĕrst dilemma.
4.2. Let Aousand Senses Bloom
e problem posed by () and () is that classical Boolean conjunc-
tion introduction states that if  and  are true (and thus assertible),
 ^  will also be true (and assertible)—whatever grounds the con-
juncts on their own will also ground their conjunction.
Given commutativity,  ^  will also be true (and assertible) in the
very same circumstances. Yet, intuitively, the order of the conjuncts
makes a diﬀerence to the truth condition of () and () (although
some may grumble that it only makes a diﬀerence to their assertibil-
ity conditions). Change the order, and you change the thought (the
sense expressed by the conjunction). Moreover, as it happens, you
also change its truth value, or so it seems.
ese are cases, then, that seem to invalidate classical conjunction
introduction (at least, if loosely taken—we’re skipping the commuta-
tive step for convenience).
e proposal we are considering in this section denies NLB and
posits that either ‘and’ is indeĕnitely polysemous (one sense of ‘and’
for every possible worldly relation that might hold between the con-
juncts) or that we can give a precisely speciĕed set of ‘and’-like con-
nectives that disambiguate the various possible readings (in the case
at hand, a temporal ‘and’, say: ^T , that is, ‘and then’).
Strictly speaking, these cases pose a problem for one of the structural rules of a logic, namely,
commutativity (and/or premise Exchange in a sequent calculus). A rigorous statement of the in-
troduction rules would attach importance to the order in which the conjuncts are entered in the
derivation but in any case the commutativity of ‘\’ forces commutativity on Boolean ‘and’, given
the clauses given in fn. 6.
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So, on this strategy we multiply senses, either by listing them (we
take the list to be closed and speciĕable), or by taking ‘and’ to be pol-
ysemic in the same open-ended way that, say, ‘cut’ is.
Let’s call strategies of this kind MSA (Multiple Sense Accounts).
Viewing ‘and’ as indeĕnitely polysemous is not, I think, something
that the card-carrying semanticist could endorse (or else the com-
positional clauses would cease to have determinate meanings). As it
happens, this is, very nearly, my own position, and I will argue for it
by a reductio by cases.
Here, I take the only semanticist-friendly version of MSA to be the
thesis that ‘and’ is multiply-ambiguous and that we can enumerate all
possible conjunct-sensitive ‘and’-senses and state precise applicability
conditions for them (note this is a form of CET: any occurrence of
‘and’ can be expanded to reach a maximally speciĕc sense for it).
Accordingly, the MSA-analysis of () will be that there is a varia-
tion in truth-conditions and that we must therefore supplement the
Boolean ‘and’ with a temporal conjunction operator that is sensitive
to the order of the conjuncts.
eMSA position, then, is that what ‘and’ is doing in these cases is
express (rather than implicate) that ordering.
On this horn, we quietly drop NLB, but with only minor adjust-
ments to our semantics (we top up the minimally Boolean sense with
a temporal side-kick if and when needed).
But is this the only way in which ‘and’ can non-Booleanly order (or
Treating ‘and’ as ineradicably polysemic has of course grave consequences for NLB—how
should we set up the compositional machinery if ‘^’ does not properly model NL conjunction?
Strawson (1950: 20) made the striking claim that NL “has no exact logic”. e claim is both curi-
ously inexact and endlessly intriguing. Is he saying it is a vague matter which logic NL has, or that
it is a deĕnite matter that it has a logic which is inexact? And what, exactly, is an inexact logic?
Strawson (1998) is inconclusive on that, for it leaves open whether we want to say that NL logic has
rules which are not precisely stateable, or that it has no rules at all. Strawson seems only committed
to the claim that if there are NL rules, they do not have the character of logical rules, whatever those
are.
From at least von Wright onwards there have been several proposals to model a temporal
reading of ‘and’ by an appropriate relational semantics. A good reference source is §5.12 in Hum-
berstone (forthcoming).
It is curious that the received version of events on these matters is that Grice rejected (or even
refuted) Strawson’s view, but in point of fact Strawson (1952: 81) was already talking of ‘and’ as
carrying “an implication of temporal order”—my emphasis. True, there was what appears a fun-
damental divergence of opinions, because for Strawson, but not for Grice, ‘^’ and ‘and’ diﬀer in
meaning. But Strawson’s view (p. 82) seems to have been that the two connectives share a common,
minimal element, which, in the NL version, gets enriched by “carried” implications (which may, or
may not suggest that such implications were part of the meaning). Were the two views really that
diﬀerent? For a genuine account of ‘and’ ambiguity see e.g. Link (1998: 78).
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otherwise conjoin and connect) its conjuncts? Can we get away with
just one more sense for ‘and’? And even before we worry about that: is
there a rule that would ĕx when an occurrence of ‘and’ is temporally-
laden and when it is instead minimally Boolean?
e answer to these questions is, I fear, dishearteningly negative.
4.2.1. Counting Senses
On the ĕrst question, a cursory look at occurrences of ‘and’ imme-
diately suggests that there are many, indeed quite possibly indeĕ-
nitely many senses of ‘and’ in the market as Ersatz conjunction op-
erators—‘and’, that is, can be taken to express simultaneity, locality,
instrumentality, conditionality, explanatory direction, causality, and
so on.
So, once you admit the temporal reading of ‘and’ as fully semantic
in character, you open the Ęoodgates to an indeĕnitely large array of
sub-(or is that super-?)senses for ‘and’.
To ĕre up the imagination, just consider these examples:
() It’s pm in St Andrews and it is pm in Paris.
() Sally took out her keys and opened the door.
In (), it seems as if the default reading is that ‘and’ is stating that the
two conjuncts describe simultaneous states of aﬀairs (thus disquali-
fying the ‘and then’ reading)—note that the reading is forced on the
hearer by knowledge about the time zone diﬀerence between Scot-
land and France.
In the case of (), instead, the sentence seems to be true only if Sally
used her keys to open the door (giving an instrumental reading for
‘and’).
What these examples seem to show is that given enough patience
and ingenuity it looks as if we could imagine indeĕnitely many dis-
A good start on a list of examples is in Posner (1980: 186); other lists are in Carston (1988:
159, 165) and (2002: 223-24).
Cohen (1971: 55-6) suggested a “strong sense” for ‘and’ (what I call a ‘super-sense’) that in-
cludes all possible sequential orderings for the conjuncts and gets pragmatically trimmed down in
context.
is sort of example is one of the most discussed in the literature. e (contested) intuition
here is that ‘and’ does not just signal a temporal ordering of the conjuncts, but in addition is such
as to make (5) true only if Sally opened the door with her keys. is ‘instrumental’ reading is not
uncontroversial, but is plausible enough.
Tense also plays a part of course, as we shall see later. Similarly, the context would make clear
whether the speaker was oﬀering this as a reminder or an exempliĕcation of the time zone arrange-
ments.
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ambiguations of ‘and’, one for each connection that we can isolate as
holding among the conjuncts.
Each such reading will trigger diﬀerent conditions on the truth of
the conjunction: the speciĕc ‘and’ that gets invoked will dictate that
without the relevant connection holding between the conjuncts the con-
junction will not be true.
e bare truth functionality of ‘and’ is thus questioned for these
cases too; what matters is not just whether the second conjunct of ()
is true but rather by what means it came to be true—the means are
part of the truth conditions.
So it seems as if, just as Grice had warned, as soon as we embark on
theMSA strategy of treating ‘and’ asmultiply-ambiguous (and thus of
locating non-Boolean behaviour at the semantic level), we land our-
selves with a set of ‘and’-senses that seems indeĕnitely extensible and
thus, it seems, computationally unmanageable.
Once again, the semanticist is facing a tension between her separate
insistence on two constraints, the compositional requirement (via
CC) and the learnability constraint. To make ‘and’ PoC-compliant,
that is, we are making its applicability conditions unlearnable. ere
are far too many non-Boolean ‘and’-senses for us to keep track of
them semantically—this time CC is defeated because it seems clear
that we cannot predict ‘and’s behaviour ahead of its embedding some
novel combination of conjuncts.
e trouble doesn’t end here though. For suppose we somehow
manage to list all possible disambiguations for ‘and’ (it turned out
that there weren’t as many as that nasty pragmaticist had suggested).
We then face the issue of how to state the meaning-speciĕcations. e
problem here splits into two sub-problems:
i) whether we can give a rule that ĕxes applicability conditions that
only appeal to linguistic context; and
ii) whether we can so much as state, for each such rule, those condi-
tions.
An argument of this kind can be found in Posner (1980: 188), Levinson (1983: 99), Carston
(1988: §3) and (2002: 224). More in general, there are reasons to distrust a sense-enumeration
strategy for any expression (let alone the connectives). See e.g. van Deemter (1996: 207), Bouillon
and Busa (2001: xv), Taylor (2002) and Kilgarriﬀ (2007). One reason is by now familiar: there is no
way to predict a priori all possible senses.
By contrast, the opposing strategy by the pragmaticist appeals to a few, easily learnable (be-
cause very basic) principles of pragmatic relevance. As was the case with CET, we have no proof
that there would be indeĕnitely many ‘and’-senses, but it does seem fairly plausible (there would
surely be enough of them to create trouble for attempts to discipline their behaviour semantically).
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4.2.2. Specifying Applicability Conditions
To see how awkward the ĕrst problem is, consider this pair of cases:
() Dorothy did her BA in Manchester and she did her A-levels
in Dorchester.
() e vase is broken and it was John who knocked it oﬀ.
Wenaturally read the occurrence of ‘and’ in () as carrying no ‘and-
then’ temporal connotation, no forward-looking narrative, only if we
are familiar with the British education system.
Speakers lacking that knowledge would be inclined to assume there
is a le-to-right temporal ordering of the events described. And it
seems very hard to capture the character of the defeater of the de-
fault temporal reading by purely syntactico-semantic means, since
the ability to individuate the relation signalled by ‘and’ in () is heavily
parasitic on our knowledge of speciĕcmatters of worldly fact—which
lands us straight back into SD IV.
() complicates matters even further, because we have a violation of
the natural direction both of the temporal and of the causal relation
between the conjuncts. In fact, the inversion of the natural temporal
reading is mandated by the greater plausibility of a causal connection
(the causal reading overrules the temporal one, again, it seems, be-
cause of worldly knowledge).
We could say that these are cases in which, as Carston (: ,
fn. ) puts it, “general world knowledge completely reverses some
alleged lexical content.”
Examples of this kind are given in e.g. Carston (2002: 232-33).
ere are of course skirmishes around the area: one could insist that you don’t know themean-
ing of ‘A-levels’ if you don’t know that they normally are a pre-requisite for a BA course. And so
hearers who would mistakenly posit a temporal ‘and’ would be lacking in linguistic competence.
However, the violation imputable to the speaker seems much more plausibly construed as a prag-
matic one, rather than as the breach of a linguistic rule that might be opaque to any but the most
sophisticated of hearers. A Gricean analysis seems also more plausible given the ease with which
in cases of this kind we can cancel and detach each of the possible readings for ‘and’. is seems
in contrast with the standard notion of semantic content as “invariant, context-independent and
uncancellable” (Carston 2002: 233). I think the MSA theorist could resist this move by insisting on
default rules that make semantic content cancellable by semantically disciplined defeaters.
Davidson (1986: 436-37) for one notes that “it does not seem plausible that there is a strict
rule ĕxing the occasions on which we should attach signiĕcance to the order in which conjoined
sentences appear in a conjunction.” Any distinction thatwemake between diﬀerent cases, he opines,
would be grounded in skills that exceed what would count as “linguistic competence.” ere are
however familiar diﬃculties with attempts to keep linguistic andworldly knowledgewholly separate
(see p. 54, fn. 172).
 | Chapter 
Or we could instead say that worldly knowledge directs appropriate
sense-selection.
Either way, I think we should concede that it seems unlikely that
MSA could give us anything better than a (provisional) list of putative
senses (perhaps in the form of default rules) without however being
able to provide eﬀective sense-selection criteria that would be based
on purely linguistic properties of the conjuncts involved.
In fact, the process of individuating which speciĕc non-Boolean
reading is expressed by ‘and’ in a particular context seems tomobilise
a very wide array of cognitive resources—and recall that MSA is a
thesis about the semantic content of ‘and’.
But then, if we need to invoke pragmatics in order both to disam-
biguate from a laundry-list of meanings as well as to determine when
the default rules can ĕre andwhen defeaters will instead force a switch
to another sense from the list, why not let pragmatics do the job di-
rectly and right from the start without pointless (and computationally
ineﬃcient) detours?
Grice did have a point when he invoked Occam, then: purely se-
mantic means won’t get the semanticist what she wants anyway. e
trouble, that is, is that unlike with pure indexicals, character-level
clauses for ‘and’-ambiguity would provide no useable guidance on
occasion-sensitive applicability—theywould be the idlest of semantic
wheels.
4.2.3. Stating the ‘and’ meaning-speciĕcations
Now, suppose that all of these problems can be sorted out and that
we have somehow managed to compile the list of all required ‘and’-
senses; by some means or other, we have even managed to identify
the criteria by which applicability conditions would be regulated.
Note that there seem to be no syntactic explanations available here. It’s certainly not the cle
construction of the second sentence that points to the causal reading (the causal reading would
survive if we dropped ‘and’ and the cle construction, and juxtaposed the two bare sentences).
Tense is not doing work either, at least, not enough work to distinguish which reading of ‘and’ is
operative.
As is familiar, even for pure indexicals there are problems, most notably with ‘here’ and ‘now’;
consider an utterance of ‘it’s cold here’: where? My oﬃce, this building, this area of town, this
town, this country? On a diﬀerent note, Blakemore (1992: 79) has objected to SSA accounts by ar-
guing that ambiguity proper seems to be a language-speciĕc phenomenon—lexical ambiguity, that
is, is in general relative to a language: e.g. ‘bank’ is ambiguous-in-English. By contrast, putative
‘and’-ambiguity is a cross-language occurrence. I do not think this objection is at all on target,
however. ‘And’-ambiguity is more properly construed as polysemic in character, and like similar
much-studied cases of verb polysemy (‘open’, ‘put’, ‘drop’, and indeed ‘cut’) its cross-language oc-
currence is no objection.
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How would we go about specifying these senses and these criteria
in our semantic clauses, though?
e diﬃculty is that any meaning speciĕcation that we would give
to unpack the sense of ‘and’ under consideration would typically em-
ploy ‘and’ (i.e. ‘and then’, ‘and during this time’, ‘and thereby’, etc.).
But if we take the original occurrence of ‘and’ as ambiguous, we
have no reason to take its occurrence(s) in the sense-speciĕcations
as any less ambiguous—both occurrences are occurrences of a sign:
why should polysemy stop on one side of the meaning-theoretic bi-
conditionals?
Once again we have a transition from an underspeciĕed language
(the object language) to its supposedly crystalline counterpart (either
a homophonic metalanguage or the loglishmixture of much contem-
porary semantics) where polysemic ‘misbehaviour’ is magically sus-
pended (at last, signs quieten down andpoint in one direction only).
So, to sum up our discussion in this section: if the semanticist
chooses to go the MSA way, she faces three problems.
First, admitting that ‘and’ is polysemous will make the set of its sub-
senses largely open-ended, for it must be able to accommodate every
kinds of connections that could ever arise between (or among) the
conjuncts.
Secondly, even if we could list all the senses, it would be impossible
to specify applicability conditions in amanner that would ensure they
would be fully constrained by linguisticmeans (that’s SD IV again).
irdly, should the semanticist succeed in overcoming the previ-
ous two problems, she would still face the fact that her semantic
clauses will employ ‘and’ and thus re-open the possibility of polyse-
mous readings for the Boolean connective at themeta-language level.
e ĕrst horn of SD VI, then, is fairly uncomfortable.
4.3. Keeping ‘And’ Univocal
In the previous section, the semanticist embraced a proĘigate mean-
ing ontology, positing as many ‘and’ senses as there are cross-
conjuncts relations.
An objection along these lines is in Posner (1980: 187).
Oen enough, see e.g. Davidson (1967: 30), the claim is that as long as we match ambiguity for
ambiguity across the bi-conditional all will be well. But here instead of doing that we are in fact de-
coupling OL ambiguity fromML univocality!—‘and’ means something diﬀerent on the two sides of
the bi-conditional. Lepore and Ludwig (2005: 128-29) are aware of (some) of the problems thrown
up by ambiguity accounts.
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In this section, Occam-like, we posit just one (semantically con-
veyed) sense and let pragmatic principles explain away what we now
claim to bemere assertibility issues (felicitousness concerns aside, the
conjunction will remain true as long as the conjuncts are).
In contrast to the MSA analysis, according to the Single Sense
Account (SSA) in () there is a mere illusion of truth-conditional
variation (one that is pragmatically implicated, not semantically ex-
pressed). Unintuitive as it may be, a switch of the conjuncts only gen-
erates an impression of falsehood. e speaker has merely violated
the fourth maxim of Manner: “Be orderly”.
On this story, then, we disqualify sentences that misde-
scribe the temporal ordering of the events on purely pragmatic
grounds—uttering them does not amount to expressing an outright
falsehood (a conjunction literally says that the events described by its
conjuncts happened but is otherwise silent regarding their ordering
and the connections, if any, putatively holding between them).
e rich network of (potential and actual) connections and rela-
tions between the conjuncts is thus entirely a product of pragmatic
calculations.
Now, for all the woes of MSA, the prima facie evidence for SSA
is rather indecisive. Recall two of the main features of the classic
Gricean account of conversational implicature:
i) pragmatically inĘected content is derived from semantic content
via an inference that is triggered by some overt violation of conver-
sational maxims;
ii) pragmatically conveyed content is cancellable.
For Grice’s invocation of his Modiĕed Occam Razor see his (1978: 47) and (1981: 186). Inter-
estingly, Neale (2005: 177, fn. 23) is keen to stress that the widely-held opinion that Grice rescued
semanticists from the onslaught of pragmaticists is badly oﬀ-target—Grice conĕded to Neale that
he counted himself as a pragmati[ci]st. Grice’s strategy could also be mobilised against Girard’s
(1995: 2) ‘I bought a packet of Camels’ (presumed) counterexample to idempotency. See Frege
(1923: 59, fn. 15) for a diﬀerent response.
See e.g. Levinson’s (1983: 100) summation of the view: “once pragmatic implications […] are
taken into account, the apparently radical diﬀerences between logic and natural language seem to
fade away”.
See Grice (1967b: 27). Grice (1981: 186) seems to consider it a violation of the more general
supermaxim: “Be perspicuous”.
Echoing EricMorecambe, the Gricean could say that both conjuncts are true, although uttered
not necessarily in the right order.
In Grice (1981: 185) it is stated that an appearance of violation was necessary for (at least)
some conversational implicata to arise (wasGrice being compliantwith his ownmaximswhen using
‘some’ here?). Elsewhere, (1967a: 32), he also considers cases where there is no clear violation, but
it is not obvious to me that the example he gives (the garage case) is violation-free (there’s a jump in
the narration that needs ĕlling in by inference).
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ByGrice’s own lights, the cancellability test is not crucial either way.
For the cases we have examined, however, it seems fairly plausible
(but not compelling). Uttering ‘A and B’ and then adding the appro-
priate disclaimer (e.g. “but I did notmean to say that B happened aer
A”) seems a bit odd but not contradictory.
e question of maxim violation is by no means settled, however.
In standard cases of implicatures, without some violation there is no
triggering of the implicatures. And Grice (: ) was adamant
that the “ĕnal test” for the presence of conversational implicatures had
to be the availability of an explicit (i.e. phenomenologically salient)
derivation of it.
Given that there appears to be no detectable violation of any of the
maxims, and thus no triggering of mandated pragmatic inference,
conjunction would then have to be a case of conventional implicature.
But if we go that way, it then seems to me that the fundamen-
tal problem is that there is no single type of non-Boolean conjunction
that might be conventionally triggered by pragmatics (like Strawson,
Grice seems to have considered only the temporal case: we now know
better than that).
An account in terms of generalised conversational implicatures
would also face problems for exactly the same reasons—what would
cause trouble for that proposal is its aspiration to full generality: the
fact that so many non-Boolean conjunction-senses are (or seem to
be) available seems to exclude both a fully conventionalised and a
generalised (default-led) approach to the problem.
See for instance Grice (1981: 186-7).
If ‘and’ is ambiguous, however, the relative ease of cancellability may be due to that very am-
biguity—cancelling is equivalent to saying: I wasn’t saying ‘A ^T B’; I was just saying ‘A ^ B’. e
test in this case, just as Grice had noted more generally, is inconclusive.
As I’ve already discussed in footnote 33, Grice (1967b: 32) does contemplate a group of im-
plicatures where, he claims, there is no direct violation of a maxim. e garage case he discusses,
however, is precisely a case where there is the appearance of a violation of the maxim of relevance.
We thus derive the implicated content on the basis of a repair strategy that assumes the violation
was only apparent. It seems to me that the distinction Grice had in mind there was between in-
tentional and apparent violation of a maxim: correspondingly, we can have sharp discourse gaps
(which signal overt violations of maxims) and mild discourse gaps (which signal compliance with
the maxims). Without a processing jolt of either kind, however, we would not in fact be mandated
inferentially to recover content that exceeds that strictly expressed by the linguistic material de-
ployed.
See also Grice (1967b: 31), García-Carpintero (2001) and Recanati (2004a: §10.3).
As noted in Levinson (2000: 216).
Recanati (2010: 146) too interprets Grice as being committed to a generalised conversational
implicature (GCI) account of conjunction. I agree that the textual evidence (Grice 1981: 186) sup-
ports this reading. But it is also the case that the passage in question was excised in the reprint in
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In the next section, we’ll examine a neo-Gricean view that attempts
to circumvent this problem from a pragmaticist perspective, but ĕrst
I want to consider one major obstacle for the semanticist who might
be hoping that the MSA account could salvage her commitment to
NLB. We are ĕnally getting, that is, to the other horn of the SD VI
dilemma.
4.3.1.e Cohen Objection
Leaving aside the worries I’ve just voiced, there is another diﬃculty
for the SSA, one of which Grice was keenly aware: embedment of
implicature-carrying sentences under the scope of the connectives
seems to reveal that their (supposedly) pragmatically conveyed con-
tent is captured by the connectives. is worry, if genuine, is fatal
to the Grice-loving semanticist.
Here’s the shape of the diﬃculty for the conjunction case. Consider
the following Cohen-sentence :
() If Harry took oﬀ his boots and went to bed, then his mum
will be happy, but if Harry went to bed and took oﬀ his boots,
then his mum will be unhappy.
It seems fairly clear that we make sense of the contrast between the
two halves of () because whatever kind of sense it is that gets attached
to ‘and’ does survive embedding in the conditional.
On the plausible assumption that the logical connectives only op-
erate on semantic content, the contrast between the two antecedents
can no longer be made sense of as a contrast between pragmatically
computed content (note also that the sentences are unasserted there,
so the conversational maxims would struggle to get mobilised any-
way).
Patently, the purely Boolean account of conjunction would be inad-
equate here, for it would predict that the two antecedents are equiva-
Grice (1989)—I suspect because Grice realised it couldn’t be made to work. For the notion of GCI
see Grice (1967b: 37-40), Levinson (1983: 127), Levinson (2000: 18ﬀ.) and Recanati (2010: §2-3).
e worry initially emerged in the case of negated conditionals: when the aﬃrmed condi-
tional carries an implicature, the Gricean will have to say that in negating the conditional what we
are denying is the implicated content. e problem is that where there is no implicature at play,
the negation of the conditional is just the standard Boolean clause (true antecedent and false con-
sequent). See Grice (1967a: 83).
Adapted from Cohen (1971: 58).
ere are echoes of the Frege-Geach problem here. e assumption is not just plausible: the
MDP makes it mandatory for the semanticist.
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lent (mum is just being irrational—she’s reasoning herself into a con-
tradiction).
But the semanticist who appeals to the Gricean story fares quite
badly too. In fact, she faces the unpalatable (sub-)dilemma SD VII.
For either she drops the truth-functional requirement for the embed-
ding connective (so PoCgoes out of thewindow) to allow conjunction
to operate on implicatures too, or she drops the implicature account
for the embedded one (thus admitting pragmatic intrusion into se-
mantic content), both deeply damaging results for semanticism.
e diﬃculty, then, is that if implicatures get captured by logi-
cal operators (and the Cohen sentence seems to show that if they
exist they do get so captured), then, contrary to the tenets of
Griceanism (and of the anxious semanticist), implicatures must be
part of semantic content, for those operators, by deĕnition, op-
erate truth-functionally on propositions ahead of (inferentially de-
rived) pragmatic input—recall that PoC was formulated as requiring
that complex meanings be a function of the meanings (and not of
the inferentially-derived implicatures) of their constituents and their
mode of combination.
It thus looks as if SSA leaves the semanticist in an even worse po-
sition than MSA. For as we just noted the second horn of the orig-
inal dilemma splits into a further dilemma: either she admits that
pragmatic input gets incorporated into the semantic content of the
conjuncts and then processed by the higher-level compositional op-
erations, or she relaxes the compositional requirement so that some
instances of embedment will Ęout PoC (some pragmatic values get
calculated in parallel with semantic ones).
Either way, the case of conjunction shows that even with words of
very-nearly logical status it is doubtful that PoC can hold in full gen-
erality.
4.3.2.e Scope Principle
e diﬃculties caused by embedment to an implicature account were
already fully present to Grice. Twice he remarked that he had no idea
how to solve the problem. But as we have just seen the diﬃculties
Just as it is unable to make sense of the other classic example from (Wilson 1975: 151) : “Driv-
ing home and drinking a few beers is better than drinking a few beers and driving home”. For
a semanticist treatment of this sort of case involving a Stalnaker-inĘuenced semantics for condi-
tionals see Stanley and King (2005: 165-66). Note that, as I have already stressed, it is essential to
the notion of sense that it make us maximally rational in our competence with language. So the
semanticistmust give a story that can make sense of (7) (and of mum too).
Grice (1989: 83, 375).
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are no less severe for those semanticists who had hoped a Gricean
strategy would provide a good answer to NLB.
In the next section I will consider two lines of response to this
problem, a broadly neo-Gricean one and an indexicalist one. First,
though, to make the problem a little more precise we need to state
the Scope Principle.
eScope Principle (SP): Only semantic content can fall under
the scope of logical operators.
e principle seems highly plausible and indeed constitutive of se-
manticism. And we have just seen the dilemma it engenders for it.
ere remains a question, however, as to what should follow from its
application to a speciĕc case. e principle, that is, leaves unspeciĕed
what the proper diagnosis of cases that fail the obvious test set by the
principle should be like.
Simplifying considerably, we seem to have two options:
i) we could take it that there are only two choices here: either MSA is
true or SSA is. SP shows that SSA fails, hence we need to revisit MSA
and see if we can defend it in some other way, for the temporal order-
ing of the conjuncts must be a semantic fact (if the connectives can
“catch” it), not one that could be accounted for in pragmatic terms;
or ii) we could take SP to show that the contrast in the antecedents
in () was wrongly traced back to the meaning (or the implicatures
attached to the meaning) of ‘and’; what we missed was the possibility
that it could be the conjuncts themselves that were carrying the addi-
tional semantic content captured by the conditional operator.
We have seen that the forced choice between MSA and a Gricean
version of the SSA has landed the semanticist in another nasty-
looking dilemma.
Perhaps there is still hope for her in an updated version of SSA that
A diﬀerent formulation of the principle is in Recanati (1989: 325) and (1993: 271). Carston
(2004b: 74) credits Deirdre Wilson with an earlier version and indeed she herself gives (or antic-
ipates) pretty much Recanati’s principle in her Carston (1988: 172). Arguably, it all goes back to
Cohen (1971). Recanati (2010: 147-48) has a fascinating discussion of a similar principle in the
work of Ducrot and Anscombre (France’s answer to Grice). In general, the principle was intended
as a test to separate implicatures from explicatures (a term of art introduced in Sperber and Wilson
(1986/1995: 182) to denote pragmatically derived content that arises as a development of logical
form, rather than as an inference from it). For (unconvincing) criticism of SP see García-Carpintero
(2001).
We might be tempted by another thought, however. Grice (1967a: 68) mused that, for all the
apparent plenitude of meanings that ‘and’ could acquire (or merely implicate), there was a strange
“kind of emptiness in the notion of conjunction”. To get a feeling for that, just go back to (5) and
(6) above and replace ‘and’ by a period. Not much seems to have changed—see Posner (1980: 187),
Carston (2002: §3.3), Edgington (2006: 788). So, could we go eliminativist about NL conjunction?
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shis the explanatory burden to the conjuncts. In the next section, I
turn to considering this option.
4.4. AWay Out? Enriching the conjuncts
Here, then, is another thought: what if it is the conjuncts, rather
than the dominant connective, doing the work here? Perhaps the
departures from Boolean behaviour are to be blamed on some cru-
cial semantic content that is hidden by the surface structure of the
conjuncts. Maybe that’s where the elusive content that was revealed
under embedment resides.
What if all that needs doing to sort out this mess is appropriately
enriching the conjuncts so that we can bring out the various kinds of
connections holding, when they do, between them?
e idea is promising. Indeed, excitingly so. Let’s see how it could
be carried out. Again, and assuming the desire to preserve PoC in full
generality remains in place, we seem to have two options le standing.
We could hypothesise that
i) the semantic content of the conjuncts is pragmatically enriched
either at the pre-semantic level or in parallel with it; or
ii) the conjuncts are semantically enriched via the syntactic devices
posited by LF-indexicalism.
Let me take these options in turn.
4.4.1. Enriching the Conjuncts, the Pragmaticist Way
eclassic cases of conversational implicature famously fail the Scope
Principle test. If you want to aﬃrm that Jones is a good philosopher,
you can’t do that by denying he has a beautiful handwriting. e im-
Well, no, because ‘and’ and ‘.’ are not everywhere interchangeable. Consider unlucky Jim: (8a) Jim
broke his leg. He tripped and fell. (8b) Jim broke his leg and he tripped and fell (the example is due
to Herb Clark and is discussed in e.g. Carston 2002: 225). Clearly, the occurrence of ‘and’ in (8b)
forces a temporal ordering that is le open in (8a)—the most natural (but by no means the only)
reading there is one of ‘backward-looking’ explanation. A further reason to resist the suggestion
has to do with negation, as Grice (1967a: 68) himself had noted. When we want to deny a certain
conjunctive thought, we need ‘and’. Juxtaposition just won’t do.
e idea is already in Quine (1950: 55-6), where he notes that temporal asymmetries intro-
duced by the use of ‘unless’ may seem to make it unsuitable as a translation of the conditional. His
solution is to rephrase the components as well. Note that this requires a modiĕcation of PoC (the
content of the constituents varies under embedment).
See §3.3.1.2.
is is the standard story. I do not however think it is thewhole story by anymeans. Consider a
bunch of philosophers discussing the outcome of a recent job interview in the department. ey’re
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plicature escapes from the clutches of negation and the semantic con-
tent of the sentence used to convey your bad opinion of poor Jones’
philosophical abilities is le uncontaminated by pragmatic noise.
at’s exactly what you’d expect if implicatures are genuinely post-
semantic aﬀairs that leave semantic content unaﬀected. Not so, as
we’ve just seen, for the case of conjunction interpreted the SSA way.
With the Cohen sentences, the traditional Gricean story cannot be
made to work.
Some prominent neo-Griceans have reversed the moral normally
taken to Ęow from the SP. Rather than taking the test to show that
the stuﬀ responsible for the Cohen eﬀect is not implicated but is in-
stead part of purely semantic content, some neo-Griceans use the SP
verdict to claim that some implicatures are part of the semantic con-
tent of expressions, in this case, the conjuncts.
GCI cases, and conventional implicatures, may be taken to show
that pragmatics can come very close to aﬀecting genuinely semantic
content. e neo-Gricean view under consideration generalises that
position: pragmatic content does commonly become part of semantic
content.
Now, the move is interesting, not least because it shows that the SP
is forcing us towards acceptance of a mixed conception of PoC, i.e. a
conception whereby pragmatically communicated/determined con-
tent can enter the compositional calculation of (broadly conceived)
semantic values.
ere are, I think, four ways in which a pragmaticist could urge
revision of PoC in the light of SP.
She could say i) that the sense of e.g. ‘and’ is pragmatically modu-
lated in context: ‘and’, that is, is one more ad hoc concept that gets
modiĕed (enlarged, narrowed) in context. Clearly, the radicalness of
all seasoned Griceans. And they wonder whether it was Jones who got the job. Smith may well say
“Well, I think he should get it. He’s certainly got awful handwriting”. Maybe I’mbeing nerdish, but in
that context I’d read the second sentence as saying that Jones is a wonderful philosopher. is seems
also to survive the Cohen test. Consider, in the same context, the following dialogue: “If Jones has a
beautiful handwriting, he won’t get the job.” Or “If the Head of School said that Jones has a beautiful
handwriting,White will get the job”. If I reply “No, Jones hasn’t got a beautiful handwriting”, or “No,
White has got better handwriting than Jones”, again given the context I’d expect it to be understood
that I meant to assert that Jones is a good philosopher.
More precisely, they are part of their compositional values, in Recanati’s (2010: 168) terminol-
ogy.
ere are very large issues looming in the background here, notably the extent to which con-
tent that was once pragmatically generated gets absorbed into the grammar. See Ariel (2008) for
discussion.
Or perhaps we should join in with Putnam (1986: 292) and conclude that the prag-
matic/semantic content distinction cannot be drawn systematically.
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this proposal would attack the very heart of PoC and even the boldest
of pragmaticists seem to have shied away from this position.
A second approach would be that ii) ĕrst, the compositional ma-
chinery processes semantic content, and then at the end of all the
steps in the computation the pragmatic module calculates all the im-
plicatures for all the preceding stages and then infers to the overall
(pragmatically-modiĕed) communicated content of the complex ex-
pression as a whole unit.
A third approach takes it that iii) at each compositional step where
a connective rule is deployed, there is an intermediate step where the
implicatures, if any, are also calculated and added to the content be-
fore the next stage is processed.
Finally, we could argue that iv) pragmatic enrichment operates at
each step in the calculation before the rules for the connectives are
applied. In fact, on this view (oen called Truth-Conditional Prag-
matics), the compositional rules operate on pragmatically determined
values (hybrid values incorporating both semantic and pragmatic in-
put in parallel).
Now, it is not always easy to keep track of what neo-pragmaticists
are really committed to. I will consider here the general pragmaticist
suggestion—either as a version of ii) or of iv)—that some pragmati-
cally derived content gets captured by the connectives. Speciĕcally,
that the conjuncts are pragmatically enriched and their content falls
within the scope of the Boolean operators.
For the pragmaticist, then, the SP and the Cohen-sentence show an
important result about NL semantics: contraMDP, there is pragmatic
intrusion into the kind of content that a semantics is supposed to sys-
tematise, the content, that is, that is processed by the compositional
machinery.
e next question is whether the conjunct-enrichment pragmati-
cist strategy can be made to work.
If the strategy is implemented via appeal to inference (as is done
For all that, and as I have already indicated, this is my preferred option.
See Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995: 257), Carston (2002: 245, 258) and (2004b: 85), Saul
(2002: §3.2). ese accounts diﬀer in important ways with regard to the way in which the pragmatic
calculation unfolds.
Posner (1980: §9) and Levinson (2000) advocate a view of this kind. e resulting semantics,
as Posner himself says, would be rather inelegant.
See again fn. 28, p. 71. Recanati (2010) gives the latest version of this approach; see in particular
p. 168. See also Recanati (1993: 266), Bezuidenhout (2002) andHall (2008). Probably the best place
to get a sense of the diverging pragmaticist views is Recanati (2004a: §5.3) and Carston (2004a). See
also Bach (1994a, 1999b) for general criticism of pragmaticism.
See e.g. Carston (2004b: 85) and Recanati (2010: ch. 5).
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within the Relevant eoretic framework), then the dilemma for the
pragmaticist that I raised in the previous chapter will again apply:
there simply is no material available for the (alleged) inference to the
determination of semantic content to be carried out.
If the strategy appeals instead to the notion of primary pragmatic
enrichment, then the problems multiply.
Very brieĘy, the initial diﬃculty is that we are not told what enrich-
ment really is, we are not told how it aﬀects surface structure, why it
enriches content in a certain way rather than another, what can re-
strict it and prevent overgeneration (what can rule out the availabil-
ity of interpretations that are intuitively precluded) and how it would
interact with a compositional machinery which was designed to deal
with precisely computed values.
Furthermore, even if we grant that the notion can be made sta-
ble, we still face the problem of giving a coherent account of how the
compositionalmachinerywould processmixed values, values that are
generated, ex hypothesi, by diﬀerent faculties which seem to be very
hard to integrate smoothly within the workings of that machinery.
To see the broad shape of the problem, recall that the suggestion
we are examining is that all the non-Boolean eﬀects we have consid-
ered (temporal, instrumental, causal, and so on) are to be accounted
for in terms of pragmatic enrichment of the conjuncts under embed-
ment. When the connectives process expressions of a higher-order
of complexity they will then operate on the pragmatically enriched
content of the conjunction.
e question now is, how would we deĕne the function associated
with conjunction that would be responsible for the compositional pro-
cessing of pragmatic enrichment?
Formally speaking, compositionality is a stepwise upwards compu-
Recanati (2010) discusses objections along these lines and makes some defensive moves. I
think the diﬃculty he faces is that of attempting the (near-impossible) task of integrating pragmatic
processes that by their very nature appear to defy systematicity into a fully systematic framework
that perfectly parallels the truth-conditional semantics one. All too oen, the clauses Recanati ends
up proposing have a whatever-it-takes Ęavour. See e.g. Recanati (2010: 9), where we are told that
there is a function that, given an expression in context, returns as a value a particular sense mod-
ulation function that is “contextually salient/relevant/appropriate” at that context. Why think that
we need a function to do that? Talk of idle wheels comes yet again to mind.
e pragmaticist’s problem here is not merely terminological: she needs to accept a robust
distinction between semantic and pragmatic values for her position to be distinctive—indeed, for
her to be able to state it and counter the semanticist’s claim that only semantic values are properly
said to be part of the compositionalmachinery. In doing so, she is forced to say that there is semantic
content (e.g. the expanded material in the conjuncts) that is pragmatically generated, which in turn
gives rise to the technical problems of how to properly deĕne the meaning function for conjunction
that I discuss in the text.
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tation that generates new semantic values from previously determined
values for lower-complexity items.
In contrast, the account under considerationmakes the enrichment
of the conjuncts occur as the conjuncts are embedded (that is, as their
semantic values are being calculated).
If so, it is the operator itself that has to determine the content of its
arguments (there is no properly determined compositional content
assigned to them until embedment).
And we have indeed seen that every problematic example throws
up diﬀerent cross-conjuncts connections (and hence diﬀerent enrich-
ments) which can only be established aer the conjuncts have been
embedded.
It thus looks as if the compositional machinery will need to make
four recursive calls on the conjunction operator.
First, the bare conjuncts are Booleanly embedded, that is, their
truth value is processed; that, ex hypothesi, is however as yet insuf-
ĕcient to determine the truth value of the whole. So far so good.
At the second step in the computation, things already get mud-
dled. For it seems as if the conjunction operator will have to pass
on the bare embedded conjuncts to the pragmatic module, so that
their content can be pragmatically parsed to discover any tempo-
ral/causal/instrumental connection that may exist.
en, and only then, will the conjunction operator be instructed by
the pragmatic module appropriately to enrich the conjuncts’ unem-
bedded content and to order them accordingly.
Finally the operator will re-parse the enriched content of the con-
juncts as a conjunctive thought, assign it a truth-value and then pass it
on to any embedding operators, so that they can operate on the fully
enriched content.
e same four-stage procedure will then be replicated at each fur-
ther step in the meaning computation for expressions of higher com-
plexity, if any.
Clearly, at the very least this looks horrendously inelegant. But I’d
also argue that it is incoherent: no function could be coherently de-
ĕned that would perform these calls. Here’s why.
It is at step two that the account gets into trouble and incoherence
TCP thus requires a form of co-compositionality of the kind suggested in e.g. Pustejovsky
(1995) that I discussed in fn. 145 on p. 47. In that framework, however, the semantic values for
the arguments of the function are pre-deĕned ahead of embedment, whereas in TCP they are gen-
erated more or less ex nihilo.
Wedonot have any detailed story on the table, so here I’m trying to second-guess the pragmati-
cist. As Kadmon (2001: vi) has noted, for the most part we only have “hopelessly underdeveloped
sketches of pragmatic accounts”.
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threatens, for the examples we have considered so far clearly show
that the ordering of the conjuncts is something that reĘects rather
than determine the cross-conjuncts relation.
In processing those examples, that is,wemake retrospective sense of
the ordering because of the cross-conjuncts relations we detect (by some
cognitive means or other) as holding independently of the ordering.
e natural thing to say then is that it is the facts as reĘected in un-
embedded occurrences of the conjuncts that should determine which
kind of enrichment is required for the conjuncts.
If we instead make enrichment functionally dependent on embed-
ment, we force the meaning function to backtrack half-way through
the computation and then forever loop.
e loopy incoherence here is due to the fact that we are asking the
conjunction operator to do two incompatible things: determining the
enrichment of the conjuncts as a pragmatic function of their ordering
and detecting the required ordering as a function of the enriched con-
tent; both ordering and enrichment, however, remain undetermined
until embedment.
I thus conclude that the idea that there could be compositionally-
disciplined pragmatic enrichment is not coherent.
4.4.2. Enriching the Conjuncts, the LF-Indexicalist Way
Perhaps ungenerously, I have given the pragmaticist suggestion rather
short shri. What of its semanticist counterpart?
If we nowgo back to the SP froma semanticist perspective, we could
read it as providing grist to the LF-indexicalism mill, since the Co-
hen sentence can be used as a test to discourage the very idea that
pragmatic chaﬀ couldmake a contribution to semantic content (as we
have just seen, the resulting semantics for complex meanings would
be impossibly unwieldy and almost certainly incoherent).
In the Harry case: whether one should say e.g. ‘Harry went to bed and took oﬀ his boots
aerwards’ or ‘Harry went to bed and he had taken oﬀ his boots before doing so’.
eneed for processing backtracking is not per se peculiar to TCP accounts. Partee and Rooth
(1983: 353, fn. 11) discuss garden-path cases arising from conjunctions mixing extensional and
intensional verbs (in that order) causing diﬃculties for their type-liing account.
Obviously, the detour via the pragmatic module won’t help the conceptual hurdle here.
In essence, the problem for TCP is a special case of the dilemma for pragmaticism I discussed
back in §3.5.
LFI and TCP do coincide in their assumption that the compositional machinery can be made
to work; they diverge on the question of what does the enrichment (syntax in one case, free prag-
matic enrichment for TCP). See e.g. Recanati (2010: 92-3). On the other hand, as we shall see, LFI
has a point of contact with Carston (1988: 161) too, who holds that the temporal ordering of the
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It can then seem as if in response to the SP we are le with no al-
ternative but to posit additional semantic material to account for the
non-Boolean phenomena which have been puzzling us.
Recall that we got into this ĕx because initially we tried to account
for an apparent divergence in the behaviour of ‘and’ from that of ‘^’
by positing a pragmatically derived e.g. temporal sense for ‘and’, su-
perimposed, as it were, on the Boolean core.
e embedding test provided by SP can however be taken to show
that it was a mistake to try and attribute the divergence from the
Boolean ‘and’ to pragmatic factors (at least: to pragmatic facts attach-
ing to ‘and’ itself).
e lesson should instead be: we did not uncover enough semantic
stuﬀ beneath the surface structure of the conjuncts, or so argues the
LFI theorist.
As I discussed already in chapter , LFI posits a variety of hidden
variables nested at LF which get assigned values in context. e pro-
posal in the case of e.g. () is that the variables in question do a kind
of temporal book-keeping job.
LFI assumes (following a suggestion in Partee b) that there is
a broad, pragmatically enforced maxim regulating discourse, namely
that a sequence of sentences frames the narration in a forward man-
ner.
is broad maxim forces semantics to look at the syntax, where the
temporal record of the succession of the events described is stored as
the conjuncts unfold.
With this in mind, LFI can be seen as making twomain claims with
regard to ‘and’: i) that the conjuncts are semantically enriched in a
way that is fully controlled by the syntax (the enrichment obtains at
LF level); ii) that the enrichment is relative to a context.
ese two claims, I will argue, land LFI into trouble, both with re-
gard to the descriptive adequacy of their account of conjunction and
with respect to their more general commitments to PoC and MDP.
events is a “by-product of the reference assignment process” (for the events/times described in the
conjuncts).
As we have seen in the case of (5) and (6) above, this maxim is defeasible. One immediate
problem for LFI is that the variety of ways in which it can be defeated risks trivialising a syntax-
based proposal.
is is the picture in Stanley and King (2005: §V), see in particular their fn. 38 on page 164.
Both claims can be found in Stanley and King (2005: 164).
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4.4.2.1. Syntax and Logical Form
e ĕrst LFI claim is explicitly empirical: at the level of syntax, each
ĕnite verb is said to head a tensed verb phrase with a hidden adjunct
that speciĕes the time of occurrence for the event described.
LF-indexicalists repeatedly appeal to “best” syntactic theory (in-
deed, oen enough, their argument is one from authority). Syntactic
theory, however, keeps changing the amount (and character) of the
structure it posits.
e particularly acute problem for LFI is that in the current frame-
work of the Chomskyan Minimalist Programme (CMP) (and pre-
sumably LFI theorists would consider the Chomskyan orthodoxy as
what is best in the ĕeld) there is no room le for LF.
More generally, the LFI conception of logical formowesmuchmore
to the logician’s view of that notion than to the linguist’s—for even
when Chomskyans were still talking about LF, their notion wasn’t
quite as robust (and semantics-friendly) as LFI assumes.
Furthermore, the notion of variables that LFI employs has no place
at all in current linguistic theory. e entities recognised by syn-
tactic theories are those that can be shown to play a part in syntac-
tic derivation. LFI variables, however, only appear, if at all, aer the
derivation has been carried out and their only motivation is seman-
Aer making rather precise proposals, Stanley and King (2005: 164, fn. 39; 165, fn. 41) then
declare themselves to be “agnostic” as to the precise nature of the (syntactic) mechanisms that im-
plement their LFI with respect to these cases. e point is: given the claimed empirical status of
these elements, this does not quite seem the right position for them to take. But in general, and as
picked up by Collins (2007: 807, 816, 826, 838, 841), LFI defers to the best current syntactic theory,
whatever it is, and whatever structures it posits.
Despite the peremptory Chomsky quote at the opening of Collins (2007) and further state-
ments by Collins himself (e.g. p. 811), this statement is neither fair nor entirely right, for LF survives
in early Chomskyian minimalism (Chomsky 1995a,b), only to be discarded in very recent work,
e.g. Chomsky (2006: 16). It however survives in other accounts, see e.g. Lasnik and Uriagereka
(2005: 8) and Boeckx (2008b: 44-5). What gets jettisoned outright is the idea that LF might re-
side at Deep Structure and with it the misleading contrast between Surface and Deep Structure.
But even that is not as clear-cut as it might seem. See Uriagereka (2008) for a very recent defence
of D-Structure from within the minimalist program. It is however correct that the notion of LF
standardly appealed to in philosophy of language (and Stanley and King are no exception to this)
profoundly diﬀers from that used in linguistics. For some discussion (and contrast) seeMay (1985),
Hornstein (1995) and Preyer and Peter (2002).
Collins (2007) again has a sustained argument in that respect. Even a cursory glance at the
linguistics literature will conĕrm that the problems raised by Collins are robustly supported by the
evidence. Of course, there is no reason to think the linguists’ view of LF is the right one, but as I
noted already LFI routinely appeal (and ostensibly defer) to their authority.
As remarked again by Collins (2007: 832).
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tical (if at all).
And the guiding principle in syntactic theory is that any posited
structure must be traceable to a speciĕc step in the derivation. No
such step exists for the LFI variables.
So it seems as if the two crucial moving parts in the LFI machinery
(LF and hidden variables) receive little or no support from the CMP.
In a nutshell, the methodological problem for LFI is that the main
selling point of the theory is its adherence to syntactic constraints; the
LFI machinery, however, has no syntacticmotivation at all (indeed, it
lacks any support by the syntactic evidence). is seems bad enough
already.
4.4.2.2. Context-relative Semantic Enrichment
ere is, tomymind at least, an evenmore serious problem facing LF-
indexicalism. For suppose there was enough structure at the syntax
level to carry the information required to express the needed con-
nections holding between the conjuncts (maybe the CMP will be re-
inĘated again at some point in the future and LFI variables, and in-
deed LF itself, will be found a place in the syntactic pantheon).
Suppose then that the LFI theoretical machinery is in place and
does enjoy the support of best syntactic theory. I contend that LFI
would still face a ra of problems, as I hope to show in this subsection.
Granted, the LFI account does solve the Cohen problem, for the two
conjuncts are now properly distinguished and mum doesn’t turn out
to be irrational aer all.
One major problem remains, however, and it is that LFI invalidates
conjunction-elimination. Let me try to explain why I think this is the
case.
Since Stanley and King () do not give a fully worked out se-
mantics for ‘and’ but only a bunch of sketchy remarks, there may be
some room formanoeuvre against the argument I’m now assembling,
but here’s what they seem to be saying.
epoint is repeatedly made in Collins (2007: 831). I think it is, as matters stand, unimpeach-
able.
ere is an additional worry, which I’ll discuss later. While LFI seems to handle the temporal
case pretty smoothly (up to a point, as we shall see shortly), when it comes to the other readings for
‘and’ (causal, resultative and so forth), Stanley and King (2005) have to resort to pragmatics again,
taking their clue from Saul (2002). But as we depart from the temporal model, where one sim-
ple, straightforward maxim seems suﬃcient, we require increasingly more complicated and case-
speciĕc maxims and their ability to directly aﬀect syntax seems less and less plausible.
is has happened before. See also the brief discussion in fn. 71.
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According to LFI, a sentence like (), relative to a context, expresses
a proposition of the form:
(b) He took oﬀ his boots at time t and went to bed at time t+ n
ereasonwhy () expresses this particular proposition, and not e.g. :
(c) He took oﬀ his boots at time t+ n and went to bed at time t
is that there is “a pragmatic maxim that aﬀects semantic content by
inĘuencing the semantic content of temporal elements in the syn-
tax”.
Note however that once the context is ĕxed the temporal informa-
tion in the conjuncts is, as it were, given absolutely (i.e. the value for
t is kept constant).
My claim is: this picture is deeply problematic for a semanticist
(and again, deeply incoherent). To see why, consider the quote that
I’ve just given. We are told that the pragmatic maxim digs directly
into semantic content “by inĘuencing” the temporal elements in the
syntax.
But now take the context as we have ĕxed it with this interpretation
for (). In that context, given how the pragmatic maxim has “inĘu-
enced” the syntax, the following will be true, and ĕxedly so:
(C) He took oﬀ his boots at time t
(C) He went to bed at time t + n
If the temporal indexing is part of what the conjuncts semantically ex-
press (that’s the main LFI contention, isn’t it), then, once the content-
in-context of the conjuncts has been ĕxed, reversing the order in ()
should cause no problem at all: they should still say the same thing in
that context, nomatter how you order them (thosewere the boots-bed
facts as described by syntactic elements, aer all).
Once pragmatics has directed syntax to provide a speciĕc semantic
enrichment, then, the hidden layer of content thus determined will
remain ĕxed, no matter what happens at surface structure.
I’m not entirely sure what notion of proposition is at play here. It seems tome they are thinking
in very ĕne-grained terms, possibly along the lines detailed in King (2007) (and one of its sources
of inspiration, Richard 1990).
Stanley and King (2005: 164, fn. 38), my emphasis. As I’ve pointed out before, the maxim is
derived from Partee (1984b: 254).
It is of course CET at work again here.
Note that, assuming the picture of propositions at play in Stanley andKing (2005) is ancestrally
derived from Richard (1990) (via the essays now collected in King 2007), (2) and (2d) say the same
thing at a context and so do e.g. (C1) and (C1b).
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In particular, the LFI claim that the conjunction in question, relative
to that context, expresses the proposition given in (b) cannot be seen
as blocking a double Boolean step of conjunction-elimination (giving
us (C) and (C)—we are, aer all, trying to secure a way for the
semanticist to keep ‘and’ Boolean.
But if the temporal information is normally hidden, we could re-
write the conjuncts as:
(Cb) He took oﬀ his boots
(Cb) He went to bed
And now, again given LFI’s Boolean allegiances, there is nothing
that can prevent a conjunction-introduction step to:
(d) He went to bed and took oﬀ his boots
(d) however comes out intuitively false relative to the original con-
text (that was precisely the problem we started from), and yet there
is nothing in the LFI account that can stop the ‘and’-elimination +
‘and’-introduction steps. On the contrary.
e problem, exactly as for the TCP theorist, is that we are mak-
ing the conjunction operator, rather than the context, responsible for
the enrichment of the conjuncts. By doing so, however, we end up
treating conjunction as an indissoluble entity.
It follows that if we accept the LFI account, there can be no back-
ward road from a conjunction to its conjuncts: LFI may solve the SP
but at the cost of invalidating conjunction-elimination.
ere are further problems for LFI, though.
First, their claim is that pragmatics aﬀects semantic content by
priming syntactic elements in the conjuncts. But now reĘect that it
is perfectly possible to cancel the e.g. temporal sequencing of events
as stated in a conjunction. If LFI gives the correct story about con-
junction, however, we could never, even jokingly, mis-describe the
facts and then specify their appropriate ordering, for that ordering
is ex hypothesi taking place at the level of the syntax (we have liter-
ally said the wrong thing, not just pragmatically implicated it as in
the original Grice story). Indeed, the very act of cancelling would be
unintelligible.
Indeed, we are treating conjunction as relevantist fusion, for LFI now has to say that ‘and’-
elimination steps are invalid.
Were the LFI theorist to reply that I am misunderstanding their proposal, and that the en-
richment only takes place under embedment, I would respond that this too would invalidate
conjunction-elimination.
To repeat, the LFI claim is not that a defeasiblemaxim forces a pragmatic inference. It is, rather,
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Secondly, LFI faces the same problem I raised with regard to the
pragmaticist proposal in a previous sub-section. Under LFI, semantic
enrichment depends on pragmatic factors in a way that would inval-
idate standard views of PoC (and MDP), for either the LFI picture is
that i) you can’t yet enrich the conjuncts in a certain way until you
are directed to do so by pragmatic assumptions that only arise under
embedment or that ii) the syntax-led enrichment of the unembedded
conjuncts will not be ĕxed even within the same extra-linguistic con-
text. Either way, PoC fails.
irdly, in the case of e.g. instrumental readings LFI would have
to posit adjuncts attached to the VPs (e.g. in the case of (): ‘opened
with her keys’), and the problems we now face are that
i) there is nothing given in the syntax of the conjunct itself that de-
mands the adjunct (if anything, the adjuncted material would be
quasi-anaphorically recovered from the preceding conjunct in (),
thus defeating direct, i.e. local, compositionality);
ii) the number of such potential/optional adjuncts would have to be as
large as there are cases of instrumental/causal and countless cognate
connections and their insertion would depend on discourse relations
that seem hard to trace back to the syntax.
e paradox then is that because of their reliance on syntax, LFI
theorists are thus committed to an even more radical form of prag-
maticism than their rivals, for their strategy amounts to a claim that
pragmatics intrudes not just on semantic content but on the syntax as
that a maxim brings out content which is already represented at the level of syntax.
I’m here excluding a retreat strategy for LFI where the compositional rules for ‘and’ are
changed so that the syntactic content of conjuncts changes under embedment. Apart from defeating
the NLB claim, this is tantamount to a form of truth-conditional pragmatics. In Stanley and King’s
(2005) terminology, weak pragmatic eﬀects are controlled by the standing meaning of an expres-
sion (paradigm case: the assignment of reference to indexical expressions); strong pragmatic eﬀects
aren’t. LFI is ĕrmly committed to the denial that there are any strong pragmatic eﬀects on semantic
content, including that of the compositional rules (Stanley and King 2005: 140) and (Stanley 2000:
395). However, for LFI to work at all no determination of the needed syntactic adjustments can be
made until the discourse relations and the relevant worldly knowledge have been fully processed.
Direct compositionality requires that syntax and semantics work very closely (i.e. locally): at
each step in the syntactic derivation, the semantic module is already constructing an interpretation.
e LFI account of conjunction is non-local, in the sense that we cannot assign an interpretation
to the conjuncts until all the (pragmatically regulated) discourse relations (including potential de-
featers) have been assessed. LFI cannot therefore implement direct versions of PoC. Whether that
is a threat to PoC as a whole is a diﬀerent issue of course. See the essays in Barker and Jacobson
(2007) for more on this topic.
Note that in e.g. (8b), fn. 46, p. 115, the causal direction between the tripping/falling/leg-
breaking events is hardly likely to be traceable to syntax. A semantics given in terms of events such
as those in Parsons (1990) and Pietroski (2005a) could perhaps help.
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well (a claim not even the wildest of pragmaticists would make!).
is paradoxical result is a consequence of the fact that according
to the LFI semantics for ‘and’ the conjuncts cannot be enriched until
all the relevant discourse features have been identiĕed (i.e. not just the
relative position of the conjuncts in the conjunction, but also their
interaction with past and future discourse).
It then seems to follow that the conjuncts need to pass on informa-
tion to each other over the dominant connective (up the derivation
tree rather than along sister nodes, that is) for the relevant connection
to become salient and able to “inĘuence” syntax
And we can now see another point of tension between LFI and cur-
rent syntactical thinking. As it happens, one of the few principles
to survive relatively unscathed from the Principles & Parameters era
into the CMP is the Locality Principle which dictates that grammati-
cal operations be local—and indeed, the principle’s resilience under
substantial theoretical revision suggests its crucial importance.
Under the principle, the relevant connections would have to be
traced to the closest element in the derivation, and the connective is
the obvious place where to look.
Positing a syntactic interaction across conjuncts where extra-clausal
distance is involved seems thus to violate one of the keyCMPassump-
tions (LFI syntactic conjuncts enrichment could not possibly be local,
that is). Once again, the putative support for the LFI position by
the ‘best syntactic theory’ seems to evaporate.
And breach of locality is not the only worry here. For what con-
trols phenomena of this kind—e.g. the reverse temporal ordering in
()—seems to be largely dependent on worldly information (once
again, there seems little prospect of a general account that covers all
cases ahead of embedment).
But for many linguists, and certainly for those working within the
CMP, syntax does not have to concern itself with worldly knowledge
(that, they claim, is a matter for a theory of performance, and not of
competence).
As we have seen, LFI makes much of its deference to syntactic
theory and if so, it goes against the grain in making syntactic facts
(the emergence of optional adjuncts not required at any stage in the
See e.g. Radford (2004: 15).
In fact, the LFI picture here faces the same problems I raised for the truth-conditional prag-
matics approach, in that the conjunction operator would have to call on the conjuncts back and
forth a couple of times before directing their enrichment as a function of their content and of any
discourse relations that might be discovered holding between (or among) them.
I’ve questioned this claim repeatedly but it’s a semanticist theory we are testing now.
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derivation for the ĕnished sentence to count as grammatical) depend
crucially on worldly knowledge.
In short, if rhetorical dependencies of the kind we have been con-
sidering are grammatical dependencies, then they have got to respect
the Locality Principle and that seems to suggest that if we are still
looking for a semantical solution to the problem, then MSA (of some
form or other) is the way to go, given that conjunct-enrichment vio-
lates that principle. And so the semanticist who went the LFI way is
now thrown back to the ĕrst horn of SD VI.
To sum up, the LF-indexicalist framework invalidates conjunction-
elimination and can only preserve PoC for ‘and’ by going against a
vast amount of syntactic evidence. And by doing so, it breaks, without
any syntactic motivation at all, the rule-to-rule component of PoC,
one of the main tenets of the compositional credo.
4.4.2.3. Patching LFI: Conjunction As Deletion
Now, if I am right, LFI as it stands does not provide a satisfactory
solution to the problems that have been exercising us in this chapter.
I have indicated that my own view of the matter is that the diﬃ-
culties we have encountered in trying to match ‘and’ to its Boolean
counterpart point towards the conclusion that even logical words suf-
fer from indeterminacy.
Before closing, however, I want to oﬀer the semanticist a way to
patch the LFI account of conjunction.
My suggestion is simple: we should think of the classic Gricean
pragmatic maxims as regulating the deletion of syntactic material in
the conjuncts.
As on the standard LFI account, the conjuncts are semantically en-
riched at a context according to syntactic constraints, but on my pro-
posal the enrichment is a) mandated by the facts as described and b)
Curiously enough, at times Stanley and King (2005: 164, 176) seem indeed to be endorsing an
MSA-like view whereby the default pragmatic assumption of orderliness extracts from the tempo-
ral/causal information contained in the conjuncts a pragmatically derived non-Boolean sense (‘and
then’, ‘and as a result’). is suggests the sketchiness of their remarks regarding ‘and’ may indicate
some indecision on their part. Even this solution, however, would require profound changes to the
compositional machinery, because ‘and’ (that most ubiquitous of connectives) will have not only to
be made sensitive to those elusive hidden variables but also e.g. to return the value ‘false’ when the
conjuncts are presented in the wrong order (and with that, the truth-functionality of ‘and’, and not
just its commutative character, is completely lost, for it no longer takes as arguments truth-values
only).
Wewould that is have an artiĕcial increase to syntactic structure so as to shadow the additional
semantic material needed to keep track of discourse relations. e situation here is analogous to
the one I discussed in chapter 2, fn. 124, p. 41.
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it occurs prior to embedment. Indeed it occurs whether or not the
conjuncts get embedded.
Some uses of ‘and’ (and indeed most unembedded uses) will sanc-
tion deletion of syntactic material for general reasons of conversa-
tional economy; indeed, what material can be safely deleted (elided)
will always be a question of pragmatic maxims of various kind
(chieĘy: the optimal informativeness requirement attached to the
Maxim of Quantity).
Here’s a plausible default rule: if the salient relation between the
conjuncts is suﬃciently perspicuous or suﬃciently entrenched in use,
delete any material that would redundantly specify it!
NL conjunction would thus be kept strictly truth-functional, PoC
would be fully preserved and the problems that I have been consid-
ering above would, I think, disappear.
is is so because on my proposal what pragmatics controls is not
syntactic enrichment (which is instead kept ĕxed in a context), but
rather deletion of syntactic material that is determined and generated
by the facts-at-a-context. Syntax is thus kept fully insulated from
pragmatics, just as the LFI account intended but did not quite ensure.
e explanation of the infelicity of (d) in a context where the facts
are as described by (C) and (C) is given by the fact that informa-
tionally essential syntactic material was unduly deleted from the con-
juncts.
A similar explanation would be available for the Cohen sentence
(mum wasn’t irrational, because diﬀerent material got deleted in the
two conjunctions).
Cancellability too can be explained as backtracking aer having
deleted too much—the deletion failed the optimality test.
For example, in (4) pragmatics would normally force the elision of the ‘with the key’ adjunct
from the second conjunct. emaximwould nicely complywith the anti-redundancymethodology
of CMP. Chomsky has always maintained that ellipsis is deletion, so I would expect this proposal to
be fully consistent with the spirit of CMP.
is is in eﬀect a kind of reversal of the proposal sketched in Edgington (2006: 789) and amod-
iĕed version of the one given in Cohen (1971) where a single rich sense for ‘and’ had been posited,
with non-salient senses removed/neutralised in context. I think Edgington’s proposal suﬀers from
the same issues as LFI. Cohen’s suggestion is good but he wrongly locates the disambiguating stuﬀ
in the semantic content of ‘and’ rather than the conjuncts’, as well as making the sense speciĕcation
too vague (‘and’ expresses “some kind of relation” holding between the conjuncts). at requires,
among other things, that themeaning of ‘and’ be both non-Boolean (or super-Boolean) and contin-
uouslymodulated as newways to exploit rhetorical discourse relations are devised. Onmy proposal
‘and’ remains ĕrmly Boolean and we need posit neither new senses nor new syntactic material.
Yes, I know. I’m defending a view that depends on the falsity of:CET from the previous chap-
ter, for to say that a deletion is optimal is to say that it was maximally speciĕc and I’ve given plenty
of reasons to doubt such a notion is tenable. My lifeline to LFI of course assumes the pragmati-
 | Chapter 
It seems to me that the fact that syntactic material is deleted lends
plausibility to the claim that ‘and’ remains Boolean, for on my pro-
posal what pragmatics regulates is deletion of pre-existing syntactic
material and not its enrichment under embedment and so its role re-
mains limited to the processing of post-semantic content, just asGrice
had intended.
Indeed, in the case of the SP test, we can argue that the connectives
operate on what the content should be under optimal deletion; they as-
sume optimality constraints have been respected and process content
accordingly.
e phenomena under scrutiny here, then, are best seen as cases
of ellipsis, a well-studied syntactic phenomenon, which should please
LFI-inclined theorists.
4.5. Conclusion
Do we now have an answer to the NLB, then? Well, it seems to me
that the revised LFI framework that I sketched above has got some
claim to have solved the problem in favour of a positive answer to
NLB.
e snag of course is that the LFI patch depends on the truth of
CET, a thesis which I have done my best to invalidate in the previous
chapter.
On the pragmaticist side, by contrast, the NLB-reply seems by and
large negative: the TCP account will require of ‘and’ that it be made
sensitive to the calculation of indeĕnitely many pragmatic values,
while the Relevanceeory view is that theNL connectives are not re-
ally truth-functional at all (they do not operate on fully propositional
content but only on schematic entities).
cist worries about CET can be resisted. Some of what I say here also seems to be inconsistent with
the diﬃculties I raised back on page 126—the range of cases and intra-conjuncts relations are too
numerous to be captured by a set of rules. But, to repeat, my proposal is that in a context each con-
junct would carry enough syntactic material to support aminimally non-ambiguous representation
(hence, we are not even entering CET territory here). Pragmatic maxims entirely to do with ease of
performance determine what can be safely deleted to minimise discourse-relative communicative
redundancy. My account should thus parry the worries in section 4.4.2.2 because the material is
already there anyway.
Commutativity is obviously preserved, because the deletion of the material needed to com-
municate the actual order of events won’t be licensed in the “wrong” case.
Onewould of course need an account that tallies with current syntactic thinking, but that does
not seem an impossible task to achieve. I lack the space to sketch out a fuller proposal, but I hope
the direction of further research in this area to make the proposal fully testable is suﬃciently clear.
To be frank, I’m not at all clear what the RT view is with respect to the clauses for the NL
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I have however indicated my reasons for distrusting, once again,
both semanticism and pragmaticism.
Givenmydoubts regardingCET, I would argue that the only surviv-
ing option is the rather bold (if not wild) idea that the NL connectives
are as polysemous as the non-logical vocabulary of our vernacular.
In the next chapter I consider the implications of this conclusion as
we turn to examining the CLB thesis.
connectives. As I’ve said already, their view is that a truth calculus can only apply to sentences in
the language of thought and not to NL—see e.g. Carston (2002: 257). I’ve expressed my doubts
about the tenability of such a view in the previous chapter. e connectives are supposed to operate
on truth values, and yet on the RT account there is no truth value to be fed to them. Despite that, we
are somehow supposed to derive from the composition of lower level schematic entities a higher-
level schematic entity on which we can then perform Gricean inferences to the explicated content
of the whole by reaching out, through the connectives, as it were, back to each of the constituent
schematic entities. Quite frankly, I think this picture is deeply confused.
I haven’t considered dynamic accounts of conjunction. e dynamic view of conjunction is
anticipated in Stalnaker (1970) and Stalnaker (1974: 60): ĕrst assert P and then assert Q. ere
are several implementations of the dynamic framework in the literature (see Muskens et al. (1997)
for an overview). I will only note a couple of things. First, the dynamic account of conjunction
stumbles on a major problem: it Ęattens out the distinction between juxtaposition and conjunction
(as noted in Elbourne 2005: 15). Secondly, it forces a radical revision of the notion of consequence,
for dynamic conjunction will typically fail not just Commutativity but ReĘexivity too. It also, as it
stands, invalidates PoC.
I have repeatedly described my view as radically minimalist about content. My claim about
polysemy might therefore seem inconsistent with that commitment. Well, the fact is that once
again we are trading on an ambiguity (!) between two diﬀerent conceptions of meanings: mini-
malist semantic content is polysemous when viewed from the semanticist perspective; it is ĕrmly




[A] sentence towhich formal logic is appliedmust
be thought of as making one ĕxed statement and
no other.
Quine (b: )
[O]ur interest, as theorists of meaning, is in spec-
iĕcations of the contents of actual and possible
speech acts—speciĕcations of the thoughts pro-
pounded in them. […] [S]peciĕcations of the
contents of assertions will be speciĕcations of
truth-conditions for the sentences used to eﬀect
those assertions.
McDowell (: )
Work in logic just is, to a large extent, a struggle
with the logical defects of language, and yet lan-
guage remains for us an indispensable tool.
Frege (: )
How strange if logic were concerned with an
‘ideal’ language, and not with ours.
Wittgenstein (: I, , )
5.1. Introduction
Over the course of the previous chapters we have been confronted
with an abundance of ‘logical defects’ in our NL. Complex meanings
seem underdetermined by the lexicon, expressions refuse to stay still
and their much-needed (by the theorist!) univocality seems impos-
sible to secure; even the sentential connectives appear to display in-
determinacy features.
If all the problems I have raised are genuine, what prospects for
logic then? As the batch of quotes above shows, it is standard practice

 | Chapter 
to assume that logic needs determinate pieces of content before it can
attempt to discipline our reasoning.
Even the weakest of semanticist assumptions—that all that seman-
tics does is study the systematic connections between assignments of
semantic values to expressions—is under pressure, for in the absence
of a general guarantee that we have a ĕrm grip on what determinacy
of content comes to, we lack a guarantee that the crucial dividing line
between logical andnon-logical vocabulary has been correctly drawn,
and hence that the compositional machinery has been appropriately
primed.
In this chapter, then, our topic is the impact of the essential insta-
bility of the sign on our cherished view of logic. Here’s the plan.
In section  I argue that the claim that logic is the science of reason-
ing is in tension with some of the key theses of semanticism discussed
in previous chapters. In section  I defend the view that logical revi-
sion is content-driven and that Lewis’ attempt to resist anti-CETwor-
ries by appeal to the notion of uniform disambiguation does not suc-
ceed. In section  I dismiss idealising strategies standardly invoked
in defence of LSR. I conclude by introducing the notion of situated
inference in section , before concluding that the only way to salvage
LSR is to espouse a radically minimalist conception of content.
5.2.e Science of Reasoning
Logic, every textbook tells us, is the science of reasoning. Call this
claim ‘LSR’. My task in this chapter is to test LSR. I will argue that it
is incompatible with some key semanticist theses (above all, MDP).
Speciĕcally, LSR, as it stands, makes two claims (that logic has uni-
versal applicability and that it is purely formal) which cannot be rec-
onciled as long as standard semanticist assumptions are in place. As-
suming semanticism, that is, if there is a relation of genuinely log-
ical—i.e. content-neutral—consequence, then that relation is empty
(the more precise content-determination becomes, the less general
that relation).
From Shoenĕeld (1967: 1) and Lemmon (1965: 4-5) to Tourlakis (2003: 1), Hedman (2004:
xii) and Restall (2005: 1). Not just textbooks. See for instance Shoesmith and Smiley (1978: x)
and van Benthem (1995: 271). Dummett (1981: 15) puts the idea in the clearest terms: “logic is
that theory which is required for the analysis of deductive reasoning in general. Within particular
regions of discourse, distinguished by subject-matter, there may be forms of inference peculiar to
those regions, and they will not be the concern of logic as such: but logic must incorporate all prin-
ciples of inference that may need to be invoked independently of subject-matter.” See also Russell
(1914/1993: 66-67). Smiley (1982-1983: 3ﬀ.) begs to diﬀer.
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LSR can be taken in two ways, descriptively or normatively. My
concerns so far have been with (linguistic and reasoning) compe-
tence. Hence I’ll ignore the ĕrst reading and just take LSR to be the
claim that logic studies how we ought to reason.
Now, the logic of the textbook is almost invariably classical logic,
the logic, that is, of indefeasible reasoning (as Frege insisted, a cal-
culus of truths), whereas our epistemic predicament is rather that of
taking our (quasi-)deductive chances from a constitutively defeasible
information base to equally defeasible conclusions.
Onemight therefore be tempted to suggest that the logic of our rea-
soning ought to be a dynamic, non-monotonic logic of belief and be-
lief revision, rather than a static calculus of (unattainable) truths.
I think there is much to be said for a position of this sort. CL con-
demns us to modes of reasoning—e.g. those sanctioned by the truth-
conditions for material implication—that are intuitively invalid, and
it leaves out much that we ought to systematise, if what we are aer
is a full account of the distinctive ways of rationality (the missing bits
are, roughly, those I brieĘy sketched above).
It would thus seem that precisely to the extent that the classi-
cal paradigm of logical thinking is a heavily idealised one (it mod-
els, if anything, unerring mathematicians reasoning about non-time-
bound entities), it can serve no purpose as a guide to those reason-
ing modes that do in fact characterise us as rational (removing the
friction of the rough ground doeth not make for better modelling
I’m being very quick with this but it seems clear that any argument in favour of the compe-
tence/performance distinction in linguistics will apply,mutatis mutandis, to logic. Nevertheless, as
I’ll suggest later, if our logic of choice fails too badly at the descriptive task, we may have reason to
question its normative import. Similarly, it is no coincidence that those authors who, like van Ben-
them (1995: 271), insist that logic ought to be engaged in description of actual reasoning practices
should have a keen interest in alternative logics.
One complaint along these lines (but at the service of a diﬀerent technical approach) is in
Devlin (1991: 10) where classical logic is declared totally unsuited to the claim of being the overar-
ching logic presiding over our practices precisely on these grounds. ere are now well-established
accounts of the logic of sublunary reasoning and dynamic inference. See e.g. van Benthem (1996),
Rott (2001), Bochman (2005), Makinson (2005) and van Ditmarsch et al. (2008). Lewis (1982:
103-05) has an intriguing response to keep CL in place: belief sets are fragmented and inference
is allowed only with respect to unmixed premises within consistent subsets. e idea is striking
(we only ever reason using consistent fragments of an inconsistent corpus). It still fudges the issue
though. For example, which fragment was Frege working with prior to Russell’s letter? We cannot
simply stipulate it was consistent (it most certainly included Basic Law V).
Defeasible reasoning is just a variant of suppositional and modal reasoning more generally,
and these are reasoning modes that are clearly absolutely central to our thinking (normativity, and
rationality, are essentially modal notions). On these matters, however, there is hardly a consen-
sus regarding what principles ought to go into the logic of the textbook (i.e. which account of the
conditional, which system of modal logic and so forth).
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tools in the case of reasoning: it makes for modelling of diﬀerent phe-
nomena altogether—precisely, those inhabited by the unerringmath-
ematician).
My interest here, however, is not with arguing for a particular thesis
about the logic (or the privileged class of logics) that better qualiĕes
as the (fabled) one true logic (or family thereof).
What I want to test, rather, is the general claim that some logic(s)
could be the science of reasoning, regardless ofwhich speciĕc logic(s)
would be put forward as the logic(s) of choice. e diﬃculty I raise
is highly general, and if genuine it will apply whatever the details un-
derpinning a particular formulation of LSR.
5.2.1.e Generality Claim
I take it that the generality claim, the claim that logic is the most gen-
eral of all sciences, is a deĕning part of LSR (logic is the science of all
reasoning).
In the preface to Begriﬀsschri—the work that on the story stan-
dardly told inaugurated the era of modern logic—Frege deĕned logic
as what transcends all particulars (its generality derives from its for-
mality, that is, from its disregard for content).
Presumably, transcendence cannot and mustn’t mean that logic
doesn’t apply to those particulars, though. Rather, logic has to be
both a calculus ratiocinator and a lingua characterica (i.e. a formal
calculus that covers both formal reasoning and thinking more gener-
ally).
And it seems to me that those of us who place a special value on the
I should point out in passing that I think CL is a bad model even of mathematical reasoning.
We might however think with Harman (1999: 28, 46) that logic merely lays down speciĕcations for
what counts as a proof, without having to chart the ways in which proof connects to reasoning. If
logic were silent on those connections, however, why should proof exert any rational force on us?
Indeed, oen enough textbooks will introduce mathematical logic as the study of mathemat-
ical reasoning—e.g. Shoenĕeld (1967: 1), Wolf (2005: vii). Note also that the motivation behind
many (perhaps most) deviant, ‘heretic’ logics is that the proposed replacement is better than CL
when it comes to accounting for our everyday reasoning, see e.g. Mares (2004: 3-4), Brady (2006:
5), Routley et al. (1982: xi). In contrast, defenders of classical logic will typically appeal not just to
theoretical simplicity, but to CL’s indispensability for some aspects of our practice, e.g. mathematics
(see e.g. Burgess 2009: ch. 5), over the supposed (local) advantages of rival logics.
On the notion of formality see e.g. the discussion in Beall and Restall (2006: §2.5).
Indeed, in Grundlagen, p. iii, Frege makes it clear that “[t]hought is in essentials the same
everywhere: it is not true that there are diﬀerent kinds of laws of thought to suit the diﬀerent kinds
of objects thought about.” is is why I disagree with Sher’s (2000: 113) contention that Frege’s
Begriﬀsschri was conceived as a purely logical rather than a universal language.
Frege (1897b: 242).
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role of logic in our practices will also have to insist that formality and
universality (of applicability) are the necessary marks for something
to qualify as the logic that governs our thinking. It is that combination
of claims that is the reason why logic has the unique normative hold
on our practices that it does enjoy.
Remove the universality claim, and it becomes obscure why logic
should be anything more than a specialist tool for reasoning that is
local to highly speciĕc areas of discourse. ese two claims, then, are
the deĕning marks of logic, and yet they are irreconcilable with the
truth of semanticism, as I will try to show in the sequel.
Now, it is of particular interest to my concerns that on the Fregean
conception the whole point of logic is to make precise the “expres-
sion of a content”—where content for him was, in modern parlance,
inferential potential.
On this (pretty standard) view, logic can achieve its overall goals
thanks to its (purported) ability to eliminate guesswork from NL so
that fully determinate thoughts can be expressed bymeans of symbols
and thought-transitions disciplined accordingly.
Indeed, Frege insisted that the greatest advance over Boole that he
had accomplished was a better analysis of the internal structure of
propositions—i.e. modern logic gives us ĕner cutting tools for the
crucial task of carving out content to codify proper inference.
Another way of looking at this is to say that until and unlesswe have
settled on the appropriate way to individuate content (i.e. inferential
potential), we do not possess warrant to claim that our logic is doing
its job in the required way.
Similarly, if we want to preserve the claim that logic is themost gen-
eral of all sciences and the one that encapsulates the laws of thinking,
we must be careful not to idealise away too much.
Generality, that is, requires the unrestricted applicability of the pe-
culiarly logical modes of inference that our textbooks codify—the in-
ferences that are sanctioned by the textbook must be those that we
(and not some impossibly idealised agents) would have to respect.
I shall return to this point a couple of sections down the line.
For now, let me expand a little on the assumption (or claim) tac-
itly made by LSR that, appearances to the contrary, normal everyday
I think the standard view is de facto committed (or somehow equivalent) to Fregean univer-
salism about logic. e discussion in Goldfarb (2010: 68-9) is useful.
See e.g. the discussion at Frege (1880/81: 11-13).
Frege (1880/81: 14-5).
e abstract and general features of reality that logic studies (Russell 1919/1993: 169), that is,
must be features of our reality, not that of some unseen gods.
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reasoning can be appropriately regimented and made ĕt for testing
against the standards set by logic.
5.2.1.1. CET and the Structure of Proof
is, in eﬀect, is a CET-equivalent claim applied to the notions of
proof and inference. It amounts to saying that behind the haze of use
logical thinking is instantiated and it is logic (of course!) that dictates
its essential features.
All that needs doing to vindicate (sound) everyday reasoning, then,
is to ĕll out the various gaps that economy of conversation leaves open
and then show that the properly expanded pieces of content and prop-
erly expanded pieces of reasoning conform to those principles that we
have identiĕed at the formal level.
So, just as the surface structure of NL sentences is generally defec-
tive to the extent that in the absence of further speciĕcations it leaves
its content underdetermined, so is the surface structure of inference
(we reason by leaps and bounds, but the gaps, on the CET view, can
always be ĕlled appropriately).
Accordingly, CET does double duty as the essential tool in our ef-
forts fully to capture the formal (inferential) properties of thoughts
(as the senses of eternal sentences) while also allowing us to capture
the equally precise structure of proof and inference (as appropriately
disciplined movement between precisely speciĕed thoughts).
e CET-equivalent claim with respect to proof (and reasoning in
general) is thus that any piece of informal reasoning can be trans-
formed into an extensionally equivalent formalisation where no step
is omitted and all transitions are shown to be in accordance (or oth-
erwise) with the basic laws of logic.
Properly seen, then, CET is not just a technical claim about NL
semantics: it also encases an ideal of rationality as theoretical reason
(whatever reasoningmovewemake is translatable into a fully explicit,
rigorously assessable form; whatever piece of content we entertain
ere are times when it seems as if Frege is saying that only thinking that accords with logical
laws is thinking properly speaking (i.e. a truth-directed activity), see e.g. Frege (1893/1998: xv) and
(1897b: 128, 149).
A claim of this sort is explicitly mooted in e.g. Priest (2006: 198).
Indeed, right from the start Frege made clear that his great technical achievement, namely,
the making explicit of the hitherto glossed-over structure of proof, was also a profoundly epistemic
one of huge normative import, for it traced the ultimate justiĕcation for our privileged forms of
reasoning back to a priori laws of logic that determine what counts as properly rational thinking,
indeed as thinking at all.
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can be made fully univocal).
In fact, the two roles of CET cannot be torn asunder: a concep-
tion of content as the fully determinate inferential potential of the
thoughts we standardly entertain (implemented by the notion of eter-
nal, fully de-contextualised sentences assigned absolute truth values
by the semantics) goes hand-in-hand with a conception of inference
as codiĕed by precisely stipulated relations holding between eternal
sentences.
Let me assemble these reĘections into one principle:
Determinacyesis for Logic (DETL): LSR) CET
What the thesis says is that any logic that is Fregean in scope, that is,
any genuinely universal logic, requires pieces of determinate content
to operate upon. e threat here of course is contraposition—without
determinacy for the relata of the consequence relation (CR) (and for
the logical constants embodying its properties), we cannot systema-
tise reasoning.
If CET is unimplementable, then the claims of logic become at best
conditional in character: should we succeed inmaking content deter-
minate, then the CR will have a ĕeld to operate on; otherwise it will
be empty.
Let me now recall two claims I made in earlier chapters. I argued
that CET is unimplementable and that the logical constants too dis-
play indeterminacy features (or rather: that attempts to make their
content determinate end up in dead alleys).
If so, DETL fails. ere are no candidate contentful items that we
can take our non-logical and logical vocabulary to range over. And
if content has to be fully determinate, then unless underspeciĕcity is
Let me anticipatemy sympathy for the view of rationality sketched in Ryle (1962) andHacking
(1983). On that view, CET is wrong on both counts. More about this in chapter 6.
As remarked in Black (1937: 77). Let me wave away the classic objection (raised by Hartry
Field in conversation) that asks why we should worry about determinacy of content for the sub-
stituents of the non-logical constants. e very notion of topic-neutrality presupposes that nothing
but the meaning of the logical constants will determine whether an inference counts as genuinely
logical. Indeed, we can use obscure pieces of content to exemplify logicality—classic case: the move
from ‘Every tove is slithy’ and ‘Alice is not slithy’ to ‘Alice is not a tove’ (Bell andMachover 1977: 5).
As long as interpretation is kept ĕxed across diﬀerent tokenings, we are told, everything is all right.
Reply: the point I am considering is whether we can somuch asmake sense of what it means to keep
interpretation ĕxed synchronically, let alone diachronically (for worries about that, see e.g. Williams
2008: §II). Similarly, it is not clear that we can prevent the indeterminacy worries from extending to
what we normally class as logical vocabulary. If indeterminacy-as-instability is an essential feature
of the sign, why should logical signs be immune to it?
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banished we can entertain no content at all.
e upshot is that we have to give up on LSR altogether and restrict
the scope of logic to mathematics and the study of the properties of
logical systems at a purely formal level.
Logic would thus turn out to be merely a highly specialised tool
used inmeta-reasoning of a restricted kind, rather than themost gen-
eral of disciplines.
Note here the connection with the discussion of NS back in chap-
ter : to neutralise worries about nonsense, semantics has to assume
thatmeaningfulness questions have been settled before it gets started;
similarly, logic will have to assume that underspeciĕcity questions
have been settled before it can get going.
Uncertainty on both points makes both semantics and logic con-
ditional enterprises—something else does the dirty job for them, and
their claim to full generality is thus severely curtailed. Not quite the
picture the standard view requires, I’d say.
5.3. Content, Validity and Logical Revision
Now, there is an obvious line of resistance to my argument above.
I seem to be arguing for the (confused) conclusion that considera-
tions to do with content could falsify claims about a discipline that
has traditionally prided itself on its disdain for content. Wasn’t logic
supposed to transcend all particulars, and haven’t I just quoted that
Fregean remark myself?
Well, yes, but things are not that simple.
Let me try to further motivate my insistence on the pivotal role of
CET with a few, very basic examples from the textbook and from the
history of logical revision.
I have already quoted Frege’s claim that his logic was superior to
Boole’s because of its better discriminatory powers with respect to
inference.
DETL is most readily associated with Frege’s work of course. I think we should be reluctant to
think it is an easily discarded thesis however. Frege was remarkably forthright in confronting the
issue head on. Most writers aer him have for the most part ducked the issue. Or, if discussing it
at all, have set it aside with a shrug of the shoulder (see e.g. Lewis 1982: §3). Russell (1923) is one
(partial) exception: but even he ducks out at the last minute, appealing to some sort of Humean
naturalism. Williamson (1994: ch. 2, 6, 7) tackles the issue head on, and so does his (2000). As
far as I can tell, Williamson’s position amounts to a sophisticated version of LIR (see §5.4). To that
extent it does suﬀer from the problems I discuss later in the text.
e requirement is most explicit in Lewis (1982: 107). Strikingly, his discussion in the follow-
ing two pages concedes that there is no guarantee CET can be made to work.
In this respect, the ĕrst three sections of Black (1937) hit the nail square on the head.
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Formy purposes, it is crucial to note that Frege articulated his claim
along three lines: i) that his logic had greater expressive powers; ii)
that his logic could account for a larger class of intuitively valid pat-
terns of inference; and iii) that his logic achieved the dual (and simul-
taneous) task of codifying inference and concept-formation processes
(whereas Boolean and Aristotelian logic had to presuppose concepts
were already formed in a particular way and in good standing).
It is received wisdom that Frege’s work represented the greatest ad-
vance in the history of modern logic. But it was an advance trig-
gered by (and implemented through) considerations to do with con-
tent (through that advance, a better grasp of content was to be had).
Crucially, content-individuation and codiĕcation of inference are
co-occurring acts; and I am urging that we cannot separate worries
about content from claims about logicality.
Let’s see why.
According to semanticism, the logical constants are re-absorbed
into the form of the expressions they govern. What counts as the log-
ical form of an expression, however, is clearly a function of our best
conception of content in force at a time.
Defenders of modal logic, for instance, have claimed that Frege
(: §) missed a trick in dismissing modal content as belonging
merely to a theory of force because by doing so he overlooked the
eﬀect of modality on inferential potential and hence on content.
ere is therefore a very close connection between content-
individuation and the range of inferenceswe are interested in deĕning
as logical—quite clearly, the proper description of the dispute here is
See the already quoted Frege (1880/81: 14-5). Frege speaks here of concept-formation but
elsewhere (1897b: 127) stresses that we grasp, rather than generate, thoughts. I take ‘formation’ to
refer to the process ofmodelling concept-formation in our logic.
Well, that it is received seems undoubted. at it is wisdom has been questioned by e.g. Put-
nam (1982) and Boolos (1994).
See e.g. Frege (1882: 75/55; 74/53), where the role of logic is given precisely as that of split-
ting content into its “ultimate components”, thus showing “the manifold logical relations that join
thoughts together”. Sullivan (2004: 696) has worried about this aspect in Frege’s conception of
logic, since it seems impossible to settle inferential properties independently of (and in advance of)
settling questions of identity of content.
I am not claiming that from the undoubted fact that our conception of logicality is indexed to
our conception of content it follows that logicality is an intrinsically relative question. In fact I am
not sure we can even make sense of the absolute/relative contrast in this (or in any other) case. I am
simply arguing for the point that logical revision (and the attendant re-drawing of the logical/non-
logical distinction) is a content-driven process. at’s why CET matters to the issue. Burge (1998:
354) is useful in this respect (the determination relation between logical structure and the study of
inference runs both ways).
See e.g. Fitting and Mendelsohn (1998: 5).
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that Frege thought modal operators do not express a speciĕc content
butmerely Ęag the speaker-relative degree of epistemic entrenchment
with respect to a given proposition; advocates of modal logic by con-
trast think there is such a thing as modal content and (or rather: be-
cause) it does aﬀect inference in ways that rightfully qualify as logi-
cal.
is sort of dispute concerns which (possibly contentious)
schemata we ought to incorporate in our logic. But consider also
a very basic example familiar from the textbook involving perfectly
uncontroversial schemata: p ` p _ q, we are informed, is either an
instance of the schema ' `  or of ' ` ' _  .
We are then told that only the latter is the appropriate schema under
which to subsume sentences of that form and the moral is supposed
to be that we need to uncover just as much internal structure as is re-
quired to give a plausible account of validity (the ĕrst schema would
be insensitive to a logical particle in the conclusion which ensures va-
lidity: content was carved too coarsely under that schematisation).
Quite. But given existing controversies with regard to the valid-
ity of certain contentious schemata, I maintain that it is still an open
questionwhetherwe have cracked this particular nut (the one relating
to the appropriate connections that have to obtain between schemata
and their instantiations).
Consider, that is, live issues such as the relevantist logician’s attack
One might object that this problem aﬀects only Fregean views of content, where content in-
dividuation is given in inferential terms. I deny this is the case at all. Any account of content in-
dividuation will suﬀer from the same conceptual stumbling block, for logical inference will always
be deĕned in the same terms as those chosen for giving identity criteria for content. We always
draw the logical/non-logical demarcation in the very act of choosing identity criteria—as a brief
examination of accounts given in terms of concept possession, acceptance conditions or even plain
truth-conditions will show.
Oen enough, this sort of example is used to introduce students to the transition between
propositional and predicate logic (i.e. from a coarse to a ĕner-cutting logic).
Here’s yet another problem: logic’s main claim to practical utility is its (purported) ability to
make confusing NL arguments clearer by bringing out their structure—see e.g. Kalish andMontague
(1964: 14) and Forster (2003: 3-4). Since there seems to be no way of isolating structurally impor-
tant aspects of content independently of our views of logicality, it seems as if this task cannot be
carried out either. is is so because the individuation of the logical components of those aspects
cannot be neutral with respect to our intuitions regarding what should count as a valid argument.
Logic’s ability to clarify the structure of argumentation, that is, essentially depends on our (pre-
existing) judgements regarding validity: only aer we have settled on a view regarding logicality
can we then use the tools thus individuated to clarify muddled arguments. e paradox then is that
we are supposed to establish what counts as valid reasoning by making manifest what is hidden be-
hind the confusing cloak of NL expressions (and the haze of use), but we can’t do that until we have
demarcated the logical/non-logical divide, which in turn presupposes we have already clariĕed the
muddle those tools were supposed to dispel.
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on the paradoxes of implication and McGee’s purported counterex-
amples tomodus ponens reasoning.
In the latter case, much of the controversy is over whether McGee’s
cases are genuine instances of the MPP schema. e claim, that is,
is that there are hidden bits of content that once made manifest do
show that everything is all right (the defender of MPP thinks it in-
conceivable that MPP could fail: hence a better account of content is
proposed to salvage the logicality of the schema).
In the case of the relevantist critique, the proposal is that the rules
for the conditional (and other operators) need to be restricted. But
again, the relevantist’s broad requirement of variable-sharing is ĕrst
and foremost one to do with the content of expressions (we need to
cut themmore ĕnely than on the classical view: we need to represent
more of their content in the logical form that regulates that particu-
lar inferential step; and this time the ĕner account of content that is
proposed is at the service of downsizing the class of validities).
I could easily give more examples and in greater detail, but I trust
that the general point is fairly clear.
Faced with questions about validity thrown up by controversial
examples, logicians will either insist that we cut the content of the
propositions involved more ĕnely or that we revise our class of va-
lidities so as to incorporate fresh patterns determined by a new view
about the content of (or rather: about the form/content demarcation
for) the propositions involved.
Sometimes the claims about missing content are not intended as a defence ofMPP. See e.g. Ly-
can (2001: 64). Sometimes they are (evenwhen ostensibly about context-switches and assertibility),
as in Gauker (2005: 86-7). In general, the discussion ofMcGee conditionals shows that philosophers
standardly assume that we can pack an awful lot into content. MPP is salvaged, that is, by showing
that acceptance of a certain “bare” sentence always involves acceptance of a complex set of beliefs
somehow attached to the content of the sentence—see for instance the discussion in Bennett (2003:
§61).
For the requirement see e.g. Brady (2006: 4ﬀ.). For an unusual take on relevance see Lewis
(1988). e discussion in Burgess (2009: ch. 5) is instructive. Burgess ĕrst notes that relevantistic
logic (as he calls it) insists there be topic overlap across an inferential step for it to be valid. Using
Craig Interpolation eorem, he easily shows that even the classical logician can ensure (trivial)
topic-overlap in all but the degenerate cases (the ones involving the paradoxes of material implica-
tion). Burgess then concludes that because of the indispensability tomathematical practice of those
degenerate cases there is no reason to insist on the topic-overlap requirement in full generality. So,
we have here a pragmatic explanation (indispensability) for the insistence that our logic need not
discriminate content as ĕnely as the relevantist logician wants.
One more example, vagueness. ere have been recent attempts (e.g. Cobreros et al. 2010 and
Zardini 2008) to impose local restrictions on some structural features of the CR, e.g. transitivity, to
deal with vague terms. Yet, these attempts face the problem that unless we can discriminate vague
terms from their precise counterparts, if any, there is no way to implement the proposal: before we
can disambiguate the CR we need to have settled whether or not the pieces of content concerned
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To sum up: logic may indeed be deĕned as a topic-neutral disci-
pline. at claim, however, is one we can legitimatelymake only when
taking logic as normal science.
Whenever pressure is applied on the precise shape of its laws, logic
must (and typically does) pay heed to content. In short, logical
paradigm-shis are content-driven, they are shis in the ways we take
ourselves to be grasping content, in the ways we model our grasp of
content (indeed, in the way we read UaGS).
Logical revision, then, is ĕrst and foremost revision of the tools we
use to individuate content (each time we move bits of our vocabulary
across the non-logical/logical divide, each time we impose or li re-
strictions on existing logical particles, we are thereby changing not
just the ĕne-grainedness of our logical tools but also our conception
of the content they operate upon).
If CET cannot be implemented, however, I do not think we can
be as conĕdent as we seem to be that the standard account is telling
the whole story about logic (how can we legitimately draw the
logical/non-logical divide in the absence of an assurance that we
have individuated the content of the propositions involved precisely
enough?).
Before I can move on, there is an immediate objection to the argu-
ment of this section which I need to address.
One could argue that all that logic is required to do is identify, for
each piece of content, initial segments of their CET expansion.
It will then be a matter of deriving general logical principles from
the appropriately logical patterns that emerge from examination of
those segments. As long as we can agree on the character and struc-
ture of the initial segments it doesn’t much matter whether or not we
are vague. A further problem concerns the ad hoc nature of the restrictions on transitive chains (3
elements for Zardini, 2 for Cobreros et al.). Why not 4 or 3? Or 6 or 243? And how can we tell if we
can get away with chaining a hundred pieces of reasoning (for by their own admission transitivity
is not always bad)? ese, it seems to me, are insuperable problems. No formal approach will ever
give a theory-independent answer to these questions.
In Kuhn’s (1962) sense.
If LSR is to hold, the content it oversees must be made up of the subjects of our attitudes. We
may argue about the needed level of transparency, but reasoning is moving between evidence-based
beliefs, and hence some degree of transparency is needed. ).
Logicality is oen deĕned as invariance under permutation. Wouldn’t that escape my CET-
based argument? Well, as is familiar, this proposal helps give necessary conditions for logicality
but it over-generates. Casanovas (2007) is a good recent discussion (with references to the relevant
literature). As far as I can tell, at present there is no deĕnitive result in this ĕeld that could secure a
precise and uncontroversial demarcation of the logical/non-logical divide.
A suggestion of this kind can be found in Russell (1957: 121-22).
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can complete the expansion process,
e objection has initial plausibility, but if one goes back to my
discussion of ‘and’ in the preceding chapter, it should be clear that
we have reason to doubt that we could individuate even the initial
segments with the sort of precision assumed by the logician (for the
worries we raised there concerned precisely the individuation of the
initial fragment; the questions before us were: is there such a thing as
a temporal/instrumental/causal conjunction operator? is it properly
classiĕed as logical?—and those questions arose well before doubts
about CET-completion would ensue).
e fact is, we test validity by appeal to examples stated in NL.
Counterexamples are formulated in NL. Relevant facts about con-
textual embedment and its impact on assertibility are spelled out by
clauses given in NL.
If CET is a chimera, so is the idea of precision even with respect to
initial segments of the expansion process.
In case you are still unconvinced, let me say a little more.
5.3.1. Disambiguation and Inference
I have been arguing that the act of marking out the division between
the logical and the non-logical is eo ipso the act of individuating cer-
tain pieces of content as the pieces they are by virtue of their inferen-
tial properties (or acceptance/possession conditions, or contribution
to truth-conditional content). We do both things at the same time.
e two acts are conceptually inseparable.
e diﬃculty was: how can we establish that the logical vocabulary
is appropriately insensitive to the particularities of content if we can-
not individuate content semantically in the ĕrst place (especially: not
in a logic-independent manner)?
Here’s a strategy to deal with the problem, suggested in Lewis (:
§): suppose we abandon the notion of truth-preservation simpliciter
and adopt a notion of truth-preservation on some disambiguation of
the sentences involved. We assume (or rather: pretend) that CET can
be implemented, and implemented uniformly. We then check for
truth-values distributions under (potential) disambiguation. Prob-
lem sorted.
Indeed, those doubts speciĕcally concerned whether any further steps in the expansion process
were needed (e.g. from ‘and then’ to ‘and then as a result’, and so forth).
I’m aware of no-one who has given a convincing proof that CET can be implemented—and
the close of Lewis (1982) is remarkably (and disarmingly) indecisive in that respect: no such proof
is available; we just shrug our shoulders and move on.
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Well, I don’t think so. is response, I contend, would be far too
quick and in fact question-begging.
Firstly, Lewis (: ) simply stipulates that we can reach a stage
in the disambiguating process where we have settled on a range of
truth-values assignments under disambiguation. But that is precisely
what the anti-CET objection challenges and it cannot be assumed
without argument (and neither Lewis nor the original Quinian strat-
egy of eternalisation have provided one).
More importantly, the Lewis view assumes that we can make sense
of sameness of disambiguation, a notion that we require in order to
enforce the principle of uniform substitution.
But the anti-CET proponent will challenge that assumption too, for
whether there can be non-syntactic criteria for what can count as the
same sentence is precisely the point in dispute.
Given the CET worries, why should a given stage in the expansion
process qualify as expressing the same disambiguation across an in-
ference if what supposedly does the disambiguation is just more ex-
pressions?
If we need to start the expansion process in the ĕrst place, we are
conceding that signs are unstable (that syntax alone cannot disam-
biguate); but then it’s obscure why we should take any stage in the
completion process to be any less unstable.
e thing is, sameness of disambiguation is a deeply incoherent no-
tion. And the diﬃculty is as stark as it is simple to state. It is conceded
on all hands that sameness of syntactic structure does not mean same-
ness of interpretation (or disambiguation)—that’s what it means for
there to be ambiguous expressions in a language.
But if so, we can make no sense of the notion of sameness of disam-
biguation either, for at all stages in the disambiguation process we’ll
have a given syntactic structure that will be just as open to multiple
interpretations as the ĕrst stage. Syntactically, the expansion process
has merely addedmore complexity. In absolute terms, the expression
is still ambiguous. And there is nothing that can ĕx its interpretation
univocally, and hence nothing that can ĕx disambiguation univocally.
It follows that the idea that we could compare disambiguation steps is
conceptually incoherent. Lewis’ strategy cannot succeed.
Quine (1950: 56) defended the thesis that as long as interpretation is uniformwithin a reason-
ing context, there is no problem at all. In other words, as long as CET worries are spread equally
across the board, schematicity is unaﬀected (but again, note that the very choice of words reveals
the instability of the view: uniformity presupposes we can make independent and antecedent sense
of the notion of sameness of form and of the form-content separation—exactly the issues at hand).
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5.4. Logic and Competence: Against Idealisation
I have been arguing that LSR makes two jointly unsatisĕable claims,
for logic cannot fulĕl its universalist ambitions by disregarding ques-
tions of content (by holding on to uncompromising topic-neutrality,
that is). e CET-worries raised in chapter  are in fact ampliĕed in
the case of logic because of its need to carry out two tasks at once (in-
dividuating content and codifying inference) which in fact presup-
pose each other. Without an answer to CET, however, neither task
can be carried out. Or so I have argued.
Letme now consider a typicalmove by the defender of LSR, namely,
the further claim that logic idealises reasoning (LIR) and that there-
fore the issue of a poor match between ‘natural’ and logical reasoning
is no objection to the account.
Ideal reasoners, the proposal goes, would have no diﬃculty in se-
curing determinacy (presumably because they would have access to
a magical language). Odd as it may sound, our logic tracks their be-
haviour. And we are rational to the extent that we approximate their
ideal standards of reasoning, precisely those encased in the logical
laws (indeed, without that regulative ideal to aspire to, our reasoning
practice would be a wholly random aﬀair).
LIR, in eﬀect, is a more radical form of CET. e claim now is
that every reasoning step we take in our daily reasoning could always
be translated into reasoning steps between truths as expressed and
grasped by ideal reasoners. Correct reasoning is reasoning in confor-
mity to the logical laws stated by and meant for such reasoners.
Clearly LIR does not (yet) settle the issue of which logic is the logic
of reasoning. Indeed, as I’ll be arguing shortly, if we espouse LIR
we do face the problem of saying why the particular idealisation we
have chosen should be the one that we have to best approximate in
our everyday reasoning—for unless we can have an independent hold
on the question (which seems doubtful), it is an arbitrary matter at
which point we want to say that idealisation is misrepresenting our
practices, given the proposed choice of ideal logic and the reason-
ing modes that it commends to our attention (the question, that is, is
what independent reasons can we ĕnd in support of the selection of a
speciĕc level of logical strength for our logic of choice).
LIR, however, is oen invoked to defend the claim that CL is the
A similar thesis is commonly held in epistemology with regard to the notion of epistemically
ideal agents. See the recent Christensen (2007) for discussion.
Again, McDowell’s (1981a: 342) remark about the fantasy of a viewpoint external to our prac-
tices applies here.
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one true logic, that it is not just the logic of science and mathematics,
but also the logic that best regulates our (properly idealised) daily
aﬀairs. So let me say something more speciĕc about that claim.
One obvious reply here is that it seems unclear why we should ac-
cept CL as mandated by LIR when it endorses inferences (e.g. the im-
plication paradoxes and monotonic reasoning more generally) that
by the lights of that practice ought to be patently invalid, while also
failing to account for inferences that again any reasonable account of
that practice would classify as intuitively valid (e.g. various forms of
meaning entailment that are no less logical than those attached to the
traditional connectives and so on). Which prompts the question:
why insist on a LIR strategy that falsely represents what our reason-
ing is really like both procedurally and extensionally?
Here’s a counter-reply the LSR/LIR defender could give: my cri-
tique of her position is assuming that reasoning modes and the re-
quirements of ideal rationality must be fully user-transparent. is
assumption however is unrealistic: ideal rationality is a regulative
ideal and may well elude our grasp in a given context (where, for in-
stance, wemay be overwhelmed by pragmatic noise in our reasoning).
Reasoning, the reply continues, is oen a case of doing the best
one can in the circumstances, and our cognitive limitations should
not impact on what the regulative ideal is like. Conversely, the bad
arguments (e.g. positive paradoxes of implication) are only pragmat-
ically fallacious. True, they would be neither persuasive nor practical.
Actually, and as already indicated, I think CL is the wrong logic for science and mathematics
too and not just for their folk versions. It may be the most convenient proof-theoretically speaking,
but that does nothing to establish the claim that it is true of those domains.
Read (2004: §5) defends a wider conception of validity and of the scope of logic: logic is the
study of valid inference, and logical validity is only a sub-class of validity. Read (1988) gives a mild-
mannered attack on the LIR-motivated defence of CL. Anderson and Belnap (1975: 5) and Routley
et al. (1982: xi) are a little less diplomatic.
Wittgenstein (1945/1953: §426) insists that a logic thatwould be unattainable in actual practice
would be an idle wheel of dubious normative hold. I imagine LIR-defenders such asWilliamsonwill
remain unperturbed. See the text and footnote 46 for further discussion. e LIR strategist may
also retreat to a second-order claim: CL (or whatever ideal logic we choose) regulates second-order
disputes about validity. I doubt that would deĘect the argument in the text.
It is worth mentioning a distinction between two conceptions of the requirements of ratio-
nality made by Scanlon (1998: 30-31), namely, the one between being irrational (i.e. going against
one’s basic reasons, as it were) and failing to fulĕl the requirements of ideal rationality (what one
hasmost reason to do). For Scanlon, decision theory and deductive logic only set standards for the
second notion of rational requirements. eworry I’m endorsing in the text is that it is questionable
whether CL sets even merely ideal standards of reasoning.
An argument of this kind regarding epistemic virtues is for instance inWilliamson (2000: §8.7)
and (2005), while his (2007: 92) is mellower. See also Christensen (2007) for further discussion.
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But again, to think that this weakens the status of CL as the logic of
reasoning is to confuse competence with performance (i.e. irrelevant
truths are still truths and irrelevant truth-preserving transitions are
still truth-preserving).
Now, I hear the appeal of a defence of this kind and I can see ways
of adapting e.g. Zinda’s () notion of a linking structure between
imperfect and perfect modes of reasoning to show how ideal stan-
dards of logical thinking can still have normative force for practices
that routinely incorporate incoherent beliefs—the trick (and it’s not
an easy one to pull) is to make (formal) sense of the notion of better
approximation towards the ideal.
Two obstacles however remain. Firstly, there is a diﬃculty here
which is both highly speciĕc and highly general, namely the very pos-
sibility ofmaking sense of a notion of content determinate enough for
us tomake assessments about logicality (consequence is a relation be-
tween pieces of content: no determinate, truth-evaluable content, no
relation); if CL misses out on some subtleties of our thinking be-
cause it carves content too grossly (e.g. it’s insensitive to relevance),
that in itself is reason enough to ditch it (regardless of whether any
replacement might fare better against the indeterminacy issue). And
what needs showing in any case is that the discrepancies between
competence and performance are genuine cases of purely cognitive
imperfections and not, rather, structural failures of the modelling
tools.
Secondly, the possibility of Ęeshing out the notion of better approxi-
mation requires antecedent agreement on what would constitute ideal
reasoning. is latter diﬃculty, that is, concerns the fact that it seems
implausible that we can individuate ideal reasoning patterns that we
strive to ‘better approximate’ without ĕrst coming to a decision from
our viewpoint as imperfect agents as to what would count as ideal (for
even in the philosophical closet we are far from infallible when we
draw up the regulative ideals of rationality).
In short, evaluating judgements about the status of the primacy of
See e.g. the discussion in Williamson (1994: ch. 2).
LIR, that is, should not disregard Chomsky’s (1965: 9) metaphor that competence is the basis
for performance. And yet it seems as if LIR all too oen amounts to the claim that logic is the
language of pure competence (competence irrespective of performance). at, however, would leave
performance ungrounded.
is again requires care: of course we have some kind of antecedent grasp of patterns of rea-
soning: that’s why we ĕnd, when we do, certain aspects of CL implausibly idealised. e point I’m
making in this paragraph is simply that the very notion of approximation is normative (it’s easy to
set up the maths to deal with some version of approximation; the hard part is saying why a certain
function would be acceptable and another wouldn’t).
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CL (or of any other logic that would take its place on the throne) is not
a matter that can be settled independently of judgements about what
would count as ideal rationality—just reĘect: what does the claim that
ideally rational agents would obey the laws of the probability calculus
amount to? Who set up that calculus? Was its precise shape given
to us by some unforgiving god or was it the result of reĘection on a
reasoning base that can only be both the judge and the judged on such
matters?
I do not think that there are clear answers to these questions such
that they could settle once and for all the question of i)which laws are
genuinely logical (in the LSR sense) and ii) which are mere artefacts
of a formal framework that, unless we can antecedently and indepen-
dently establish the truth of a certain view of physics, may not have
genuinely general normative import for us (for instance, outside of
the mathematical domain).
Nevertheless, if we endorse LIR and accept something like the bet-
ter approximation principle, then it seems as if the closer the gap be-
tween the ideal and our approximating eﬀorts themore likely it will be
that the ideal can indeed plausibly be seen as regulating behaviour.
And so a logic that is demonstrably closer to our practices but that can
still keep in place suﬃcient distance between our actual decisions and
those that it mandates would be ceteris paribus preferable.
Whether this provides enough grounds to uphold (or dislodge) CL
from its privileged position is an argument for another day.
Still, our ability to carry out meta-logical assessments over these
I ĕnd the discussion in Sainsbury (2002b) highly instructive in this respect.
at is to say: unless we can establish that nature is appropriately uniform, comfortingly sys-
tematic and fully deterministic, we can always question whether the laws we posit for our various
domains of discourse do in fact provide best ĕt with the facts (classic case: the old Quine-Putnam
dispute over the import of quantum logic). Again, Lewis’ (1982: 101) frankness is refreshing here:
faced with genuinely radical challenges to the logical status quo (such as Routley’s and Priest’s), the
classicist can only stamp her foot and retrench into dogmatism. But why should inconceivability
(to David Lewis in 1982) be a guide to (timeless) illogicality?
eLIR-arguments given inWilliamson (2005: 480-1) strike an odd balance. On the one hand,
we are told that it would be a mistake to expect an ideal theory to have practical import. On the
other, we are told that such a theorywould still enjoy normative force. In support of this,Williamson
appeals to his usual anti-luminosity arguments. If transparency is not a determinant of best theory,
however, it is unclear how we can even choose between competing theories. On what grounds is a
theory that lacks demonstrable connections with our practices to be held to be the theory we ought
to respect in our epistemic activities? As a parenthetical remark, I should perhaps add that I ĕnd
it curious that the very same externalists who accuse internalists of over-intellectualising our grasp
of concepts and more generally of the normative features of our practices should then commend
to our attention regulative ideals that severely over-intellectualise those very practices (and not just
our grasp of their normative features).
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matters does depend on the tenability of some formofCET.And that’s
why an answer to the CET puzzle I discussed in chapter  is due.
e LIR strategy, then, is at the service of the choice of some logic
as the regulative ideal. But any such choice must be justiĕed on the
basis of an argument that it, and no other, is the logic of choice for us.
And I am questioning that this can be done independently of existing
theoretical bias and of a solution to the CET puzzle.
Letme now conclude the discussion of idealising strategies bymak-
ing two more remarks.
Firstly, it seems clear that our theory (our logic as science of reason-
ing) should have as much structure as the subject matter can support
and no more, but also as much as it demands, and no less.
If so, the generality requirement will force pretty severe restric-
tions on certain structural constraints that cause havoc when ap-
plied to natural reasoning (say, transitivity, reĘexivity, exchange, di-
lution, idempotency). For on any plausible reading of those con-
straints, they are in fact best construed as local, i.e. domain-speciĕc
constraints on reasoning (good in some domains, undesirable in oth-
ers) and should not burden our inferential practices more widely.
eupshot is that the idea of a truly universal logic, a logic that sets
reasoning canons of absolutely unrestricted generality, is unlikely
to be achievable (by invoking LIR we lose applicability; by keeping
applicability, we lose generality). e reason is that there are very few
genuinely universal patterns of reasoning that can truly be said to
disregard content (most likely none at all)—the resulting logic would
therefore be extremely weak, and certainly much weaker than CL.
is is a principle that goes back at least to Nichomachean Ethics, I, 7, 1098a 25-29 (“we must
[…] not look for precision in all things alike, but in each class of things such precision as accords
with the subject matter, and so much as is appropriate to the inquiry”), and resurfaces in Peacocke’s
(1999) Integration Challenge.
If we accept that importantly logical features of our everyday reasoning are best modelled by
some form of dynamic, non-monotonic or resource conscious logic, then some (or all) of these
structural rules will fail. See e.g. van Benthem (1996: 26), Marek and Truszczyński (1993) and
Troelstra (1992) for details.
Note that once again eﬀorts to keep these structural constraints in place would involve a revi-
sion of the notion of content at hand. To deĘect e.g. Girard’s (1995: 2) argument against idempo-
tency for ‘and’, that is, one would need to posit a richer notion of content (implemented by some
variety of LFI- or of Clause-indexicalism) to keep track of the events involved (and thus discrimi-
nate between the two alleged co-occurrences of the same token).
For one extreme form of this claim, one that includes illogical, inconsistent and paradoxical
situations, see Routley (1980).
As I discussed in the previous chapter, we could rig up domain-speciĕc connectives that be-
have content-insensitively within their domain (a point pressed on me by Ole Hjortland and Colin
Caret in discussion). e trouble for that suggestion is that, the case of quantiĕers notwithstanding,
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And even if we had settled on an appropriately weak and appropri-
ately general logic, one crucial point would still remain: we pack into
themeaning of the logical connectives just as much as we think serves
the purpose of identifying what we take to be genuinely logical infer-
ence; but the issue of how much structure we should pack into those
connectives is not independent of what we decide to treat as logical.
In short, and unsurprisingly, logic cannot tell us what logic is and
which logic is the true one—there is no hope of detaching evalua-
tive considerations from logical ones when we are testing both the
tenability of LSR and its implementation through the selection of a
particular (and privileged) set of logical tools.
Secondly, I want to note that behind LIR there oen (or perhaps
invariably) lies the assumption that no other account (and certainly
no weaker account than the classical one) would give us the required
systematicity.
We can now see the connection between the insistence on PoC and
the LIR/LSR approach to our conception of logic. For it seems to
me that the PoC rules do encapsulate both the idea that we can (and
must) give a systematic account of linguistic practices (and hence of
rationality as a whole) and that it is those rules (and nothing less than
those rules) that can (and do) embody the logic of choice that regu-
lates our thinking and our agenthood (here, ĕnally, we come to the
standard reply to the CLB question that I le hanging from the last
chapter).
Imposing the speciĕc PoC rules that one does impose on NL se-
mantics is thus of a piece with imposing a logic on our thinking and
our reasoning practices in general. And it is almost uncanny how the
LIR strategy is invoked in precisely the same terms to defend PoC and
UaGS on the one hand, as it is in the case of LSR and CL on the other.
But again, whether systematicity is to be imposed on a theory of
logicality (whether there can be no reasoning and linguistic compe-
tence without systematicity) is precisely the point at issue and one on
which logic itself cannot oﬀer us counsel.
logical connectives are supposed to be domain-insensitive too (their logicality is not supposed to
be domain-relative, that is).
See Field (1977) and Field (2000).
See for instance the instructive conclusion of Williamson (2005: 483). I’m certainly overlook-
ing all the subtleties in his account, but that conclusion, and the preceding discussion, seems to
come close to saying: we give a description that doesn’t ĕt our practices (or even explain them) but
we do it because otherwise we would have no systematic account for the facts. Well, perhaps we
should instead come to accept that there is no systematic account that would do full justice to those
facts.
I have to say that I ĕnd pragmatic justiĕcations of the logical status quoparticularly puzzling. In
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It is thus no argument in favour of CL to insist that no other account
would ensure systematicity. It is simply begging the question against
the deviant logician (or against the theorist impressed by accounts
that make no appeal to structure-directed systematicity) to insist that
precisely the level of systematicity generated by CL is what is needed (let
alone, that systematicity is at all needed to account for our practices
in full generality).
e impasse, then, is between two equally unfriendly options for
the LSR defender: keep generality by weakening the logic and mak-
ing consequence a notion that incorporates pragmatics into the very
fabric of logic (recall that e.g. for the relevantist logician intensional,
and thus non-truth functional, connectives are nevertheless logical:
they embody relevance-sensitivity by imposing further constraints on
classical consequence) or keep the logic classical and defer to prag-
matics to adjudicatewhen a piece of reasoning apparently sanctioned
by the logic can in fact be taken to be what rationality commands in
a particular context.
Either way, logic is made subservient to pragmatic judgement, thus
contradicting the LSR dictum (there is something, namely, pragmatic
thinking, not wholly regulated by logical thinking and in fact regulat-
ing it).
Accordingly, and contrary to what the traditional picture (and ety-
mology too) seemed to assume, logic cannot be the seat of rationality,
for its output is subject to pragmatic ĕltering from an authority (pre-
general, I’m far more sympathetic to constitutive accounts of our practices that spread rational con-
straints across the board, to include both our theories and their meta-theory (broadly construed).
In fact, that’s what I’m trying to do myself in the next chapter.
Another quick example: take the dispute between the classical logician and her relevantist
and intuitionist rivals. e relevantist will insist that the classical account of conditional reasoning
is faulty. e defender of CL will reply that going relevantist would make mathematics and science
a lot harder to discipline (it’s much easier to let pragmatics explain away the paradoxes). But then
in comes the intuitionist logician claiming that classical mathematics is incoherent (the classical
meaning stipulations cannot determine a coherent practice). Were we to adopt intuitionist logic as
the logic of reasoning, however, we would ĕnd that again it is very hard to give a proper model for
natural reasoning. For we certainly do not use e.g. intuitionist disjunction in everyday reasoning,
despite Ranta’s (1994) and Dummett’s (2004: 59) valiant eﬀorts to make a case that we do. Logic
then becomes a kind of short blanket being pulled in diﬀerent directions (the logic that best models
natural reasoning seems ill-suited to model arithmetic reasoning and viceversa). e point once
again is that the defender of CL (and LIR) is imposing on everyday reasoning largely unnatural
forms of reasoning that are justiĕed only on the strength of the (very special) needs ofmathematical
reasoning (and classical reasoning at that). Itmay then begin to look as if the question of universality
is ill-formed.
As is familiar, defenders of CL will oen explain away awkward cases by appeal to questions
of assertibility and pragmatic felicitousness.
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sumably) above it.
5.5. Situated Representation
I hope I’ve said enough to motivate a rejection of radical versions of
LIR that insist on a model of competence that makes invalid reason-
ing acceptable—we cannot really burden pragmatics with the task of
accounting for all discrepancies between idealised canons of reason-
ing and actual practice: some of those canons (e.g. monotonicity and
paradoxes of implication) may well be not idealisations but misprep-
resentations of actual practice.
Alternatively, the orthodox logician will do a modus tollens: if the
anti-CET and anti-LIR worries are sustained, then there can be no
logic; but we clearly do have a logic on our hands, hence the CET
worries are misguided.
My view, however, is that we should instead do a modus ponens
step here (you see, I do admit that there are logical constraints on
our reasoning) and reĘect on what the CET worries seem to teach us
with regard to content and rationality, and of course, the shape of our
logic.
I’ll deal with the question of rationality in the next chapter. Let me
now dig a little deeper into questions of content and consequence as
I move towards my conclusion in this chapter.
To give you a sense of where I am heading, here’s a slogan for you
to mull over. Colin McGinn has nicely summed up one way to read
Kaplan’s account of indexicals (such as ‘I’). e determination of ref-
erence in a particular context by means of a tokening of an indexical
belief (say, one determined by a particular use of ‘I’) can be explained
in terms of a representation in context rather than representation of
the context.
I am aware of a tension in my argument here, for on the one hand I am adjudicating between
logics while on the other I am saying that without a CET-guarantee logic could not even get oﬀ
the ground. e point I am making is that, assuming the truth of semanticism, logic cannot be fully
general, for too-ĕnely cut content will make the CR empty (no genuine universal patterns of validity
will emerge). But as things stand, CL’s supremacist tendencies are in any case unjustiĕed. I think
these two claims of mine are fully compatible.
McGinn (1982: 113). To recall remarks I made in fn. 71, p. 85, one may object to my construal
of the (supposed) CET/LIR problem for semanticism by saying that I am in the grip of what Stal-
naker (1984: ch. 2) called the linguistic picture, the idea that entertained contentmust have propo-
sitional structure as ĕne-grained as the means used to characterise its possession. Stalnaker (2008:
109-11) still pursues roughly the same line. To repeat: I dispute Stalnaker’s contrasting pragmatic
picture anyway, but moreover the problems I am raising here also apply to the descriptive eﬀorts by
the theorist, and not merely to the individuation of entertained content by the practitioners them-
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I think this is exactly right, and Iwill be arguing that linguistic repre-
sentation itself is also representation in a context and not of a context.
Where the CET theorist goes wrong, that is, is in trying to get se-
mantic content (and semantic theories) to do two things at once: rep-
resent facts from a context-bound perspective while also including all
facts about the context in the verymeans of representation of the per-
spectival facts so as to nail down content once and for all.
e point is: there is (and can be) no such thing as representation
of a context, neither as part of semantic content, nor of the clauses
given in the semantics. e representational powers of language and
thought, that is, are far more limited than the traditional picture as-
sumes (neither content nor theories can absorb context within them-
selves).
As a corollary, it is also the case that the idea of logical consequence
as a question of following from no-matter-in-what-context is also in-
coherent (again, as standardly conceived).
Semantics, then, ought not to attempt to exhaustively capture con-
text either into semantic content itself (the various CET strategies of
context-semanticisation) or in the worldly representation that goes
into the semantic clauses (the place where all the relevant contextual
factors needed to individuate content get lined up).
Clearly, this move is forced on the semanticist by the very claim
that she is engaged in giving a truth-conditional semantics in the ĕrst
place—the semanticist slogan aer all is precisely that meaning is
given by stating truth-conditions and that grasp of meaning is grasp
of such conditions; and the natural way to construe truth-conditions
is: anything that would make a diﬀerence to the truth of the sen-
tence gets chucked in the clauses on either side of meaning-giving
bi-conditionals. e move should nevertheless be resisted.
selves. Equally, they aﬀect propositional structure itself, and not just mental content. Indeed, as
I’ll say in the next chapter, I want to give a uniĕed account of (external) content ascription and
(internal) content characterisation. See fn. 2, p. 163.
Am I misreading the purposes of the Clause-indexicalist semanticists here? Aer all, it is one
thing to claim that unarticulated aspects of content are controlled by variables at LF level and quite
another to state the truth-conditions for sentences by including worldly elements in the indices. On
the second strategy one is merely saying that a sentence is true at a world, time, location and so on.
One is not claiming that the sentence is true of the world, time, location and so on. Maybe. But it
seems to me that the essence of the semanticist project is precisely that by giving truth-conditions
we state worldly conditions that are in some way or other represented semantically—when I say ‘I
am cold’ I’m saying thatWalter is cold now and in thisworld (not that the speaker is cold at t in world
w). e line I’m pursuing here is also presented in Searle (1980, 1983a, 1994) and in Dancy (2004:
§11.2). e idea that the content of a sentence is composed out of both the thought expressed by the
sentence and the worldly conditions attached to it has recently been made explicit (and defended)
in Wedgwood (2007: 59).
 | Chapter 
If the worries about CET I just rehearsed are on target, then, and in
the face of the seemingly evident fact that we do succeed, by and large,
in exchanging content and have made undeniable progress in getting
to grips with the world, it seems to me that if we want to properly
explain the role of logic in our practices what we require is a revision
of the notion of content (and of its representational powers) that is
(more or less explicitly) being used (or assumed) in the literature.
What we must give up in the ĕrst instance, then, is the MDP, the
claim that through meaning (alone) we can determinedly reach out to
the world.
5.5.1. OnWhat Is Internal and External to Language
Now, if CET is false, how can we identify content? Already Aristotle
was clear that questions of sameness and diﬀerence are essential to the
identiĕcation of objects (and of our thoughts about them). And so
the question is: if CET fails, can we make sense of partial conditions
on identity of content? Or should we rather go for a criterial view for
such conditions?
I will end up endorsing a weakly criterial conception of content in
the next chapter. For now, let’s stick with the attempt to give precise
(if possibly partial) conditions on content individuation.
If we again turn to Frege we ĕnd that the justiĕcation strategy for
his Begriﬀsschri started by arguing that in order to think we need
to use “sensible signs” and that the great discovery of the sign was
precisely that it made it possible to call to our mind “that which is
absent” (by which he primarily meant non-sensible thoughts and re-
lations holding between them).
We thus seems to have a lethal cocktail of theses underlying the
semanticist (and the LSR) project: namely, that logic (and the theory
of meaning) are about giving an account of reasoning (and meaning)
as a rational activity. And so we must make sense of one’s reasoning
(and one’s use of language) from the perspective of the user, whence
the requirement that a cognitive element be imposed on meaning,
namely, sense.
Under semanticism, it’s the sense of the connectives that directs our
logical thinking; it’s the sense of an expression that guides our ways
with it; it’s the (more or less radical) perspectival character of sense
that justiĕes attributions of rationality in Frege’s Puzzle cases.
See Topics, I, 5, 8-15.
For the joys and sorrows of criteria, see Wright (1978, 1982).
Again, McDowell (2005: 168, 185) is my guide here. Note that the problems I raise for seman-
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Sense, then, is the route not just to reference, but to rationality as
well (it is also its root: we are rational because of our ability to navigate
the routes of sense).
But then, since the need tomake us rational goes hand in hand with
the need to make content precise, CET and (LIR) will have to kick in.
In thinking about the world, that is, we entertain linguistic items
that purport to represent worldly items determinately. Take away
CET, and it then becomes diﬃcult rationally to justify our judgements
as to the truth-value of our statements.
It is the semanticist aer all who does routinely ask of her pragmati-
cist opponent: why are some judgementsmore rational than others?
And one reply seems mandated: because they better track the facts
and they can only do so to the extent that the sentences used at a con-
text make determinate claims about those facts, or else, how could we
assess them for ĕt?
It is at this point that the essential egocentricity of our thought—the
fact that, in Perry’s (: ) terminology, many aspects of our
thought (and of the meaning of our expressions) are not about what
we represent to ourselves but rather concern the object of our vari-
ous attitudes—will clash with the need for cognitive guidance by the
content of expressions.
Why? Because LIR itself has got to confront the issue that Frege
had used to justify the adoption of a formal language to clarify as-
pects of content: we have to use signs to engage in thinking of any
sophistication. But NL is not univocal and to that extent it exposes
us to error.
Moreover, the logical laws are not written into language in such a
way that compliance with grammar would guarantee correctness of
thought process (which is indeed one way of reading the NS problem
we discussed in chapter ).
ticism are not lessened by going for a direct-referential account. I am not assuming here that sense
has to be reference-determining descriptive conceptual content. If you are impressed by the sort
of “lessons” that Soames (2005b: 329) thinks we should draw from the direct-reference revolution,
then just think of sense as the competence-explaining gelling agent (for want of a better term) that
keeps together (and explains) the essential social components of meaning and meaning-practices
so beloved of that revolution (and of course there will not be exactly one such gluing agent). ere
must in any case be something that we are gesturing at when we hand-wave at those components; it
may well be a purely de re piece of cognitive content (and incidentally, there is nothing in this story
that is incompatible with Frege’s original view). e point remains that attributions of (linguistic)
rationality, challenges to improper use of expressions, and illuminating accounts of the distinctive
ways in which we are concept-mongering creatures in our use of words as in (just about) anything
else, all require that some notion of sense be in place. And at that point, the CET worries will apply.
See again fn. 193, p. 61.
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Logical laws, Frege suggested, are laid externally to language, like
a plumb line, and the whole purpose of formal languages is to take
them in from the cold, as it were—or at least to get the language-
building to approximate the straightness of the plumb line as closely
as the terrain will allow.
So, the main motivation for developing a concept-script was pre-
cisely the failure of NL to give us the tools to distinguish bad from
good argument purely on the basis of linguistic form.
A formal language had therefore to achieve two purposes in one:
incorporate logical laws right into its fabric and banish semantic un-
derspeciĕcity by virtue of that incorporation.
e point, however, is that as we saw in the previous two chapters
CET can’t be made to work, and because of that not only do we not
solve the underspeciĕcity problem, but we also do not solve the ques-
tion of logicality.
e move from NL to its formal counterpart(s), that is, does not
remove the essential instability of the sign. e stipulations that sup-
posedly ĕxed sense unambiguously are always formulated in a lan-
guage that cannot be formal (the hierarchy of languages always bot-
toms out into the vernacular). And in any case a formal language is
no less of a language for that.
In short, signs just won’t keep still, no matter howmuchmachinery
you deploy to steady their roots. And crucially: too much machinery
will in any case divest them of those egocentrical traits that alone can
provide cognitive guidance in our eﬀorts to remain rational (this, re-
ally, is the key stumbling block on the way to a proper mapping out
of the routes of sense).
In fact, I think that Frege himself ĕnally came to realise this, and
my suggestion is that this is the way in which we should read his
startling remark (which many have found terminally puzzling) that
the essence of logic lies in its attempt to incorporate the act of as-
sertion into language, failing to do so and in the very enactment of
that failuremanaging, nonetheless, to express the essence of logic (the
word ‘true’ fails to express the essence of logic, but its failure to do so
succeeds in expressing that essence).
Generalising Frege’s insight, we could say that there are certain pro-
e last image is mine; for the plumb line metaphor, see Frege (1882: 72/52).
I.e. the determination of the non-logical/logical divide and of the extension of the CR.
In his post-1902 “thunderstruck” state, Frege explicitly (and repeatedly) blamed the Basic Law
V disaster on themisleading surface structure of NL. See his (1980: 132), (1924: 263) and (1924/25:
270).
Frege (1915: 252).
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cesses essential to the communication of a precise thought which lan-
guage is not equipped to express, model or otherwise capture. ese
processes however are expressed (and indeed represented) in the very
act of attempting to express them.
Chief among these, the very practice of assertion: language cannot
be isolated, abstracted and kept alive in a Petri dish, as it were—a
purely formal language would not be a language at all, its signs would
remain inert, they would indeed cease to be signs.
e contents expressed by that language would provide no rational
guidance to us: they would be de-situated, but we are essentially sit-
uated (we engage with a world where there is no context-free truth)
and furthermore our situatedness is something that eludes theoretical
characterisation and indeed linguistic expressibility.
at NL is immersed in a practice that alone gives the signs life is
a fact that is normally hidden in our everyday use of them. Logic
takes the signs out of that practice and makes perspicuous the impos-
sibility that they could stand on their own feet.
To havemade that evident is logic’s greatest achievement, for logic’s
failed attempt to express the inexpressible does ĕnally pin down the
cognitive predicament we face in our quest for a rational grounding
to our practices (or so I like to read Frege’s gnomic remarks).
It should be clear, then, that the problem goes beyond the issue of
CET; or rather, the assertion problem is one more aspect of the CET
problem.
Try as we may, we cannot encase within language not just content
itself but also whether a particular sentence is being asserted seri-
ously. For we might always raise the issue of whether assertion (the
assertion sign) is some kind of stage direction for an actor rather than
a self-verifying pointer that a sincere, earnest act of assertion is being
performed. And assertion is what establishes the connection between
content and truth; it is what transforms purely formal, toy-like lan-
guages into workable means for the genuine expression of content.
And here, ĕnally, is where I think we should locate the cardinal
mistake, the original sin in the very notion of Sinn, namely, the idea, a
delusive one, that by switching to a formal language we can somehow
In saying this, I think I’m still on the right side of the distinction that e.g. Salmon (1991) and
Cappelen (2008: 265) draw between semantic and communicated content.
On reĘection, it is an astonishing (if not shameful) thing that the remarks along these lines in
the Investigations (§23, 432) should have been seen as revelatory at all.
It seems tome this is one of the points of greatest convergence between Frege andWittgenstein.
Compare Tractatus §4.121: “at which expresses itself through language, we cannot express by
means of it”.
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overcome what are constitutive diﬃculties of any system of signs.
ere is no language, ordinary or extra-ordinary, that can ĕx sense
or extension with unerring speciĕcity. Not even a language that only
gods could use (LIR barks up the wrong tree in that respect). And
this is because there are limits to the expressive powers of any form
of representation (not even a god’s eye view would be exempt).
To put it another way: the limit is ontological, since reality resists
univocal description (the very idea of “the view from nowhere” is in-
coherent, and indeed sinnlos, for it puts the notion of description be-
yond the bounds of sense, both perceptual and linguistic).
In this respect, language does its job perfectly: it reĘects ontolog-
ical complexities (and indeed obstacles to expressibility) in its very
structure.
Accordingly, LIR is mistaken because it assumes that there could be
an idealised language (and a logic) that could escape those limitative
results and that could thus entirely lack underspeciĕcation ‘features’.
And CET poses a ĕnal dilemma for the semanticist as she tries to
secure LSR:
SD VIII: If CET can be implemented, then the LSR-generality
claim entails that the CR is empty (ĕnely-cut content will in-
validate the generality of Tarski’s structural constraints on that
relation). If CET cannot be implemented, then the LSR-
formality claim fails, since we have no warrant for drawing the
logical/non-logical distinction in the absence of the proper de-
termination of content for the relata of the CR.
LSR, LIR and MDP-semanticism are thus incompatible theses to
hold. Logic is, at most, the science of minimal reasoning over min-
imal content. To explain why (and how) we reason rationally under
embedment we require further tools (and a diﬀerent story—which I
sketch in the next chapter).
More generally, Frege’s (and the semanticist’s) grande illusion was
not just that there could be a language immune to underspeciĕcity but
also that the thoughts we think could be fully complete in the required
sense—underspeciĕcation too, and not just indeterminacy, does be-
Indeed, this is a way in which we could take the familiar and celebrated limitative results that
characterise early-to-mid twentieth-century logic. I’m leaving it however open that those results
may be related to properties of the objects of study, rather than the means.
See again fn. 167, p. 52, and references therein for reasons to distrust epistemicist approaches
to this issue.
As we have seen, if e.g. vague content invalidates transitivity, our connectives will become
domain-relative.
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gin at home.
Accordingly, if we want to give a proper account of rationality that
takes the full measure of the CET-failure, we have to conclude that the
objects of our attitudes are radically and ineliminably minimal pieces
of content: call that Radical Content Minimalism (RCM).
e task for the next chapter is to make that notion as precise as I
can. Before that, let me brieĘy sum up my discussion in this chapter.
5.6. Conclusion
Once again, my enterprise has been almost entirely negative. I have
argued that the semanticist assumption that meaning determines
truth-conditions, and hence content, is incompatible with the claim
that logic is the science of reasoning. Sentential meaning is not deter-
minate in the strong sense assumed by the semanticist—it does not
suﬃce to lay out the conditions for its own truth. If so, there are no
candidate pieces of content for the consequence relation to operate
upon.
Given the impossibility to secure determinacy of content and to
draw a theory-independent demarcation between the non-logical
and the logical vocabulary, I have argued that, as long as we insist
that logic is a calculus of truths, then the consequence relation will be
empty (very roughly: transitivity fails because of vagueness, reĘex-
ivity and monotonicity fail because of the dynamic character of our
reasoning).
I have discounted idealising strategies and argued that they cannot
rationally establish the primacy of any particular logic in respect of
its (putative) normative hold on our practices. e regulative ideal
they posit is either too remote from our concerns or not rationally
warranted by them.
I have ended yet again by commending a radically minimal notion
of content. Remove the aspiration to determinacy and much of our
conception of logic survives, more or less unscathed, I claim.
For the latter, see Quine (1968: 46).
Again, it would be no help to modify the claim to the conditional one that logic is a calculus of
potential truths (a calculus of place-holders, that is). Given the failure of CET, we have no rational
warrant for a particular transition from schemata to their instances.
Purely pragmatic explanations for a given choice of logic cannot transmit rational warrant to
their adoption.
is is not quite the whole story though. What I would want to argue, had I the space, is that
logic is best construed as the sciences of reasoning. I say a bit more about this in the next chapter,
especially fn. 170.
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We thus save Fregean logic but at the cost of losing Fregean con-
tent (we must renounce the idea that thoughts are the senses of eter-
nalised, fully speciĕed pieces of content).
So, while one facet of my conclusion is perfectly standard (conse-
quence is indeed highly schematic), the other side is a little less famil-
iar, for my view is that not just semantic content, but the very content
of our thoughts is better seen as highly schematic too.
Unlike standard forms of minimalism, then, I think that content
is irredeemably schematic: there is no completion in the oﬃng, ei-
ther for us or for the unseen gods of semantics (and logic). oughts
are not propositions, nor are they propositional functions-like objects
awaiting saturation-in-context.
My CET-free vindication of LSR is thus fairly obviously unfriendly
to one key aspect of the Fregean project (my slogan: sense is ineradi-
cably thin). I do not think there was any other option, though.
It is now high time I do something positive for a change. In the next
and ĕnal chapter I turn to spelling out my minimalist proposal in a
little more detail.
Chapter 
When Authority Gives Out
6.1. Introduction
roughout this dissertation, I have had one overall concern, namely,
how semantics and logic can secure their constitutive normative hold
on our practices by imparting an appropriate cognitive proĕle to
meaning and reasoning.
e routes of sense, that is, are those of rationality; they mark out
accountable (and discernible) paths for our actions, they establish the
network of correctly implementedmovements of thought, they deĕne
our ethical stance in the world, they direct our self-constitution as
agents.
I have argued that both semanticism and pragmaticismmake amys-
tery of that hold, indeed of its very possibility.
On the semanticist picture, linguistic (and reasoning) competence
is but a matter of following the commands of the compositional ma-
chinery. e rational engine of language, on that picture, is rule-
based and recursive. All that we need contribute is the (largely pas-
sive) recognition of the appropriatemeaning function attached to each
expression and the (active) tracking of its deliverances-in-context.
Recursively generated output, however, is by deĕnition something
My view of sense-determination (i.e. of novel meaning computation) is exactly Wittgenstein’s
(1933-1944: III-43, 173): “e proof is not a movement but a route”. It is (settled) sense-recovery
which is a movement (there, we merely rehearse previously established proof-patterns).
ere are points of contact between RCM and some aspects of Bilgrami’s (1992) conception
of individualistic externalism, in particular his admirable attempt to reconcile the agent-relative
explanatory role of sense with its world-rooted aspects. I join him in opposing the narrow/wide
content distinction, but I’m not taking theories of meaning to be agent-indexed. For me, a theory
of meaning states theminimal content attached to expressions as generated by an internal grammar
that expresses practice-relative (rather than speaker-relative) contents.
Edwards (1990: 185).

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that can be followed, in Tennant’s (: ) memorable phrase, by“a
comprehensively briefed moron”.
One (embarrassing) problem with this view is that, intuitively at
least, we Ęatter ourselves that a proper account of our condition
would require positing a language faculty that delivers output ĕt not
for morons but, rather, for insuﬃciently briefed reasoners.
By hook or crook we use words felicitously in novel and familiar
contexts in ways that transcend pure mechanicalness: we decide and
determine fresh meanings or assent to the licit endorsement of ex-
isting ones in an open-ended variety of contexts that seem to resist
systematisation, and these are the facts to be explained.
What calls for theoretical explanation, that is, is our convergence
towards negotiated agreements in judgement as meanings are bent to
accommodate contextual embedment, rather than our presumed obe-
dient compliance with the putative superlative facts delivered by a
super-rigid machinery. It is there that the roots of rationality (and
of sense) are to be sought.
Moreover, it seems obscure how we could possibly divine which
particularmeaning function is operative at a context, since theworld is
generally short on comprehensive brieĕngs (Fregean meaning func-
tions are supposed to be transparent to the user, but the unique-
ness assumption—the semanticist idea that each expression has one
and only one meaning function attached to it—makes them utterly
opaque).
Lastly, semanticism imposes a picture on us whereby language is
e contrast I’m drawing here is no hyperbole. Semanticism assigns the crucial competence-
explaining role to a recursive engine that delivers algorithms which are “of a peculiarly deadening
and redundant sort’, to borrow from O’Neill’s (2000: 53) useful discussion of rules and principles
of practical reasoning. Put pressure on their MDP claim, however, and (generalist) semanticists
will qualify their claim and replace ‘regiment’ and ‘determine’ with ‘constrain’ (see e.g.Whiting
(2007a) and the references in fn. 163, p. 51). No rule, they concede, could ever make provisions for
all cases. Rules, that is, require supplementation (but not supplantation) by judgement—O’Neill
(2000: ch. 3) and Dancy (2004) give a Ęavour of the parallel debate in meta-ethics regarding these
issues. As I have indicated already and as will become clear in this chapter, I’m convinced that the
answer(s) we give in meta-ethics will be the same as the one(s) we give in meta-semantics (and I
don’t think we have good answers on either side yet). One diﬃculty we face is familiar: reĘective
judgements onmeaning-inferences will generate a Carroll-style regress; another diﬃculty is insuﬃ-
ciently rehearsed: in her retreat, the semanticist insists that we canmake sense ofmeaning functions
delivering a unique verdict attained via indeĕnitely many routes. is, I maintain, is a fantasy. e
diﬃculty for semanticism is not the multiplicity of the routes of sense: it’s rather in the idea that, as
required by MDP and UaKTC, those routes all lead to the same endpoint.
e jargon here is intentionally Wittgensteinian but Chomsky’s (1966: 62) view of CC is sur-
prisingly very close in spirit.
e point has been convincingly made in Travis (2006b: ch. 3).
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claimed to possess the capacity to secure determinacy of content (the
MDP again). at claim, however, Ęies against the evidence of the
intrinsic expressive limitations of language and the ever-changing va-
riety of the world we interact with (neither our words nor our world
are as determinate as the semanticist presumes).
On the pragmaticist picture, by contrast, linguistic indeterminacy
manages, by ways just as mysterious as the semanticist’s, to reach
out to perfectly determinate thought contents. Semantics is sub-
propositional, but thought is fully propositional, we are told. e
precise character of what bridges that gap is however le mostly un-
speciĕed. And as I argued in chapter , the little that is speciĕed adds
up to an incoherent framework.
On neither account do we come out as fully rational, then, and our
competence with signs remains still a mystery.
My ĕnal task in this dissertation is to suggest a way out of the dif-
ĕculty. My proposal is that we take both meanings and thoughts to
be radically minimal entities. I’ll ĕll in the details from section  on-
wards. First, though, I need to say something about the normativity
of meaning, for the very idea that semantics may have normative im-
port has come under pressure recently.
6.2. Normativity and Its Sources
Wilfrid Sellars once wrote that “[t]o say that man is a rational ani-
mal, is to say that man is a creature not of habits, but of rules”. We
are reasoning creatures, and reasoning is not (and ought not to be)
the mere treading of settled ground. Rather, being rational is a mat-
ter of obeying rules that must be available to conscious reĘection and
recognisable by reasoners as the norms that regulate one’s practice.
In short, what deĕnes us qua seats of rationality is our peculiar sen-
sitivity to the demands placed on us by rules that purport to take us
beyond mere regularities in behaviour—there is no explaining what
we are without appeal to rules.
For what rules do is partition the class of possible actions into rea-
Sellars (1950: 138). Sellars’ conclusion (p. 155) was that rules are largely ineﬀable (mixing, or
so it seems, early and late Wittgenstein). Talk about rules, on this diagnosis, is nonsensical because
rules are to be lived rather than described. For an attack on rule-based accounts of rationality, see
e.g. Putnam (1981: 124-26) and Rorty (1985). Edwards (1990), in particular pp. 51-63, gives a
thought-provoking take on the rise and fall of the view of human activity as rule-governed.
Rules of reasoning, that is, are those that guide us, not merely those to which our behaviour
does (perhaps wholly contingently) conform (a distinction ĕrst mooted in Quine 1972: 442).
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sonable and unreasonable ones, and by so doing they deĕne a prac-
tice (in prettymuch the same robust sense in which rules of inference,
and/or of proof, deĕne a logic by determining its class of validities)
while also specifying what it is to be a participant in that practice.
Both tasks are achieved not just by setting clear-cut standards for
rationality to which practitioners will be answerable, but also by lay-
ing down what it is to be a move in the reasoning game: change the
rules and you change the game; change the logic, and you change,
allegedly, the subject. ere is, it seems, no escaping the domain of
rules, if one is pledged to rational self-constitution: forsaking rules
altogether is forsaking our essence (for there are no alternative im-
plementations of rationality, nor of logic).
Accordingly, rule-governed behaviour is precisely what exempliĕes
a practice as the practice it is, and one’s rationality will then be as-
sessed against the background of the rules that are taken to be in force
within that practice. We are rational, and interpretable as such, be-
cause (and to the extent that) we are sensitive to reasons as provided
by rules; rules-as-reasons, that is, generate standards-setting oughts
in appropriately responsive beings. Reject all rules, reject the claim
that they hold normative force over us, and you place yourself outside
humanity.
emaster thought here, whether or not expressed in Sellars’ terms,
is familiar from discussions in, inter alia, metaethics and appears ir-
resistible—what else but submission to rules could make us the dis-
tinctively rational beings we are?
Rules, however, are (by deĕnition, it seems) given, not found;
Here I’m thinking of ‘actions’ as the purposeful taking of steps of whatever kind, to include
purely theoretical reasoning.
I borrow the notion of sensitivity to reasons from Raz (1999: 11). Since at least Sellars (1956),
it is now of course a completely standard notion. See e.g. Scanlon (1998: ch. 1), Skorupski (1997,
2010) and Parĕt (2011: ch. 1).
Relatedly, we are sensitive to reasons to the extent that we are sensitive to value—that we ĕnd
something valuable is a reason for action. See e.g. Raz (1999: 1), Korsgaard (1996: 7). Some form
of self-constitution is to be found in most meta-ethical accounts, from neo-Kantian constructivists
(Korsgaard 2008, 2009 and O’Neill 1996) to contractualists like Scanlon (1998). Even expressivists
like Gibbard (1990) require that our lives be deĕned by one’s endorsement of a system of norms
before they can count as fully rational. Norms, in otherwords, are self-given and this is an important
part of the distinctiveness of our situation in the physicalist’s world. Moral realists such as Shafer-
Landau (2003) or Wedgwood (2007) would of course object to my characterisation.
And would it even be possible to reject rules altogether? e very idea presupposes system-
aticity—a globally negative attitude with respect to rules, that is, is itself a rule (of sorts). e point
here is similar to the idea of the inescapability of agency: we cannot escape agenthood, and it is
constitutive of agency that it be sensitive to norms of rationality. See Ferrero (2009) and Enoch
(2011) for a recent discussion.
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to take us beyond sheer habit, to be more than mere dispositions
(whether brute or genteel) they require a (highly pronounced) degree
of detachment from purely naturalistic properties.
And so the next pressing question usually raised is: whence the
source of the normativity that seems required in order to ground the
rules by which we deĕne ourselves? Not just any old rule will do: we
need rules grounded in the right sort of normative authority, rules
that deliver the right account of rationality in the various domains.
Given the paucity of immediately available naturalistic reductions,
an equally familiar answer has been: reĘective scrutiny, whether or
not tinged with Kantianism, will yield the most plausible (i.e.: more
easily vindicated) candidate(s) as the source of the normative com-
mands under which we labour.
In other words, wemore or less self-legislate ourselves into being by
acknowledging rules that disclose their character only under reĘec-
tion. Fully-Ęedged rationality, that is, is not just a matter of pur-
posely following rules; it also requires that we (be able to) examine
the pedigree and grounding of those rules, perhaps tracing them back
to the very nature of thinking itself. Indeed, we may even conclude
not just that we must follow rules to be rational, but that we are the
rules, or at least: that we are their privileged vehicles—the rules, that
is, tell us deep facts about the very structure of our minds.
6.2.1. Rules of Language
ere is one area where the question of normative grounding is par-
ticularly urgent while also presenting itself as very nearly intractable,
namely, language. At ĕrst blush, language seems to be the very
See e.g. Onora O’ Neill’s introduction to Korsgaard (1996: xiv). ere are of course non-
Kantian variants of this thesis, or radical alternatives to the reĘective view, such as the account of
desire-based normativity sketched in Finlay (2007). My sympathies, however, lie unashamedly with
broadly constructivist approaches.
It may be objected that reĘection is also needed to disclose fully naturalistic properties. To use
Sellars’ (1960) terminology: the move from the manifest image to its scientiĕc counterpart is never
immediate, that is. I grant that point. But what is distinctive about normativity is that reĘection is
intrinsic to its grounding—when (if) we ĕnally uncover the bedrock of our norms, we do ĕnd our
reĘective eﬀorts built right into its layers (even on a realist construal). Or at least: that’s what strikes
me as the most plausible story we can tell about that grounding.
is seems to be a fairly reasonable gloss on e.g. Chomsky’s insistence that the structure of
linguistic representations (the internal setting of the local linguistic parameters required by the
universal principles underpinning the language faculty) discloses biological facts about the archi-
tecture of our mind.
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paradigm of a rule-following activity. And yet, the attempt to es-
tablish a grounding for its authority over our practices soon lands us
into deep paradox, as we shall presently see.
Now, if the picture above is accepted, it looks as if a necessary con-
dition on rationality is the ability to follow rules (and nowhere more
so than in language); but then, a convincing answer is owed to the
intricate issues raised byWittgenstein’s rule-following considerations
(RFC). For on one reading of those considerations it seems to be quite
impossible to follow rules at all, or at least (but no less devastatingly):
it seems impossible to do so in the manner assumed by the standard
picture—what the RFC challenge, that is, is the very idea that rule-
following be a rational activity.
e RFC paradox, ultimately, highlights the deep tension between
the insistence that we are rational to the extent that we have the ca-
pacity to follow and respond to rules and the realisation that the only
workable explanation of that capacity is a heavily naturalistic one:
that’s what we do, that’s the way our brain is structured. We are thus
caught between the need for a rule-based account and the fact that
rules have no normative basis themselves (the ought bottoms out into
the is).
Hence, unless we can show where Wittgenstein’s reasoning went
astray, our cherished conception of rationality appears to be under
terminal threat, since Wittgenstein’s own conclusion was that rule-
following mandates that there be a (more or less pervasive) layer of
blind reasoning built into our practices—and reasoning conducted
in utter darkness is not an activity, it seems, where rationality may
Ęourish.
I’ll return to this issue in section .. For now let me try to secure
the thesis that meaning-rules are appropriately normative.
6.2.2.e Normativity of Meaning
At least since Kripke () it has become commonplace to speak
of meaning as being normative, thereby providing the old common-
place view that language is a rule-based activity with a fresh, more
Without rules, we lack the means to distinguish noise from speech, or so argues Blackburn
(1985: 213).
It is of course an interesting question whether only normative facts (of the kind sought by the
moral realist) can ground normative constraints on our practices.
I need that in place, since my account insists that grasp of content occurs under normative,
non-naturalistic constraints.
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substantive slogan.
More recently, however, the contention thatmeaning is a normative
notion has come under increasing challenge. Very brieĘy, the main
problem is supposed to be as follows.
If we take the normativity thesis (NT) to involve the claim that
meaning is essentially normative, then we should expect (at least) two
things: ) that from a meaning speciĕcation a binding prescription
for use should straightforwardly follow (either immediately or via in-
ference); ) that breaches of the rule would immediately amount to
changes ofmeaning (for a violation of semantic norms should directly
aﬀect the semantic content of an expression).
In other words, if the NT holds, only correct uses of an expression
can convey (i.e. individuate) its meaning (and perhaps more strongly
still: if it holds, the meaning of a word is the equivalence class of all
and only its correct applications). According to the NT, then, when-
ever you disregard the applicability conditions attached to the norms
for use, you are thereby changing the meaning of the expression. Or
so the objection goes.
What is supposed to make trouble for the NT thus stated is that
fairly oen we do use expressions in utter disregard of their cor-
rectness conditions, and this can happen for a wide variety of non-
semantic reasons; pragmatic factors of various kinds, that is, may (and
do) trump compliance with those conditions, or may even make it
impermissible formoral reasons.
e point of the objection is that even in those circumstances it
would not follow that the term is not being used in full respect of
its meaning. It is uncontentious that in those circumstances we mis-
applied the term, butmisapplication, in and of itself, does not weaken
the standing meaning stipulations. On the contrary. For there is no
question that the breaches of the meaning-norms attached to an ex-
pression leave our competence fully intact. And this, the objector
Brandom (1994: 10) attributes to Sellars the idea thatmeaning is “fraughtwith ought”. Gibbard
(1994: 96) has even grabbed the opportunity thus provided to metaethicists to claim philosophy of
language as their (sub)-province. I commend the move.
See e.g. Bilgrami (1992: 110-113), Glüer and Pagin (1999), Wikforss (2001), Glüer (2001),
Boghossian (2003, 2005a), Horwich (2005: Ch.5, 6), Hattiangadi (2006, 2008), Glüer and Wikforss
(2009). For a defence of the normativity thesis see Whiting (2007b).
Misapplication of termsmay indeed be the right thing to dowhen engaging in irony, deception,
white lies and so forth. And in all such cases we disregard the norm while retaining mastery of the
expression: or rather, the very act of disregarding the norm exploits the meaning-speciĕcations
themselves.
Note that it is not just purely local, episodic breaches that do not impinge on the force of the
standingmeaning-norms. We can easily imagine a perverse speaker who, although fully conversant
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concludes, shows that at best semantic normativity is hypothetical in
character. Our obligation to comply with semantic norms, that is,
is entirely conditional on our other desires and interests.
e objection, then, grants that correctness conditions do attach
to expressions, but insists that from those conditions no categori-
cal command can ensue unless additional, and substantive, extra-
semantic premises are added. If meaning is normative, then, it is not
essentially so. at is, contra the NT, meaning’s sway over our prac-
tices is not exhausted by its alleged normative character (something
more is needed for normative constraints to be attached to the use of
an expression than the purely semantic stipulations associated with
it).
To put it another way still: meaning clauses given in normative
terms will not individuate (or deĕne) meanings appropriately; they
will not capture all occasions of use of an expression with that par-
ticular meaning attached to it, if determination of meaning is seen as
purely normative in character (more precisely, if the normative con-
straints attached to the expression are limited to a speciĕcation of its
correctness conditions).
Now, that from correctness conditions, as normally stated, no cat-
egorical obligations ensue is undeniable, as far as it goes, but also
relatively uninteresting. It seems fairly clear, that is, that a form of
internalism about motivation would be extremely implausible as an
account of linguistic competence, at least as far as the NT-proposal
currently stands. If we e.g. judge that expression e means (e) (for
some meaning-function  mapping syntactic strings to a domain of
meanings), it does not seem to follow, on any reasonable view, that we
ought to be compelled to use e only in the circumstances mandated
with the meaning-stipulations for an expression, systematically and wilfully misapplies the term.
e point is that even to make sense of the case we have to accept that the norm is fully salient
to the speaker (and its salience is indeed required for the agent to be able to direct her obstinate
deviancy). Linguistic akrasia, that is, is a perfectly imaginable scenario that unlike its intentional
counterpart triggers no contradiction, at least under the proposal discussed in the text.
See the references in fn. 20. Hattiangadi (2006: 220) has a useful bibliography for the two
positions.
ere is a stronger conclusion oen drawn, namely that semantic norms qua semantic norms
either do not place any obligations on language speakers, or if they do, they do so in a supererogatory
manner. Bilgrami (1992: 111-3) seems to be pushing for a conclusion of this kind, no doubt under
the inĘuence of Davidson (1986). is seems to go beyond what the anti-NT argument has so far
established, though.
For Davidson (2001: 297), all that meaningfulness requires is “a considerable degree of con-
sistency in the use of words”, and no more. And that, he adds, is a practical norm, not a semantic
one, and it arises from a desire to be understood and not from intrinsically semantic obligations.
Similar points are made in Bilgrami (1992: 112-13).
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by the conditions speciĕed by (e). A proper theory of linguistic ac-
tion requires amuchmore sophisticated formof internalism than this
crude proposal does allow, and in any case the early proponents of
the NT were already clear that meaning stipulations furnish only hy-
pothetical reasons for (linguistic) action.
e diﬃculty for the defender of NT is supposed to be that
meaning-speciĕcations are not categorical in the sense that they re-
quire integration by non-semantic desires of various kinds before
they canmove agents to (linguistic) action.
NT is thus seen as a form of meaning rationalism: semantic norms
provide reasons not just to form beliefs about meanings but they also,
and eo ipso, make available ought-reasons to the agent with respect
to the lawful employment of expressions.
Clearly, we should concede that non-compliance with semantic
norms isnot a case of outrightmeaning-deviance. enon-compliant
speaker is not being irrational in her meaning-judgements (linguis-
tic akrasia is sui generisweakness of the (linguistic) will), whereas if
the NTwere true it would seem to follow that a charge of irrationality
should be in order (if meaning-speciĕcations carry purely semantic
normativity, then failure to comply should oﬀend against one’s better
semantic judgement and yet intuitively it does not do so).
Let me now oﬀer a revised version of NT that should be able to
address the issue of the supposed inertness of semantic judgement
with respect to action. If sound, my proposal will end up making
non-compliant speakers irrational aer all.
6.2.3.Meaning as Expectation
e challenge we face is to explain how norms can individuate mean-
ings and thereby also provide essentially semantic reasons for com-
Discussion of internalism about reasons/motivation is lively in contemporary metaethics.
Shafer-Landau (2003: ch. 5-7) is a useful starting point.
As Miller (2006: 109) notes with respect to Kripke and Boghossian.
‘Meaning rationalism’ is a label due toMillikan (1993b). In her use, this is intended to indicate
a commitment to the generalised scrutability of sense to the agent. In contrast, my use here is in-
tended to refer to rationalism about reasons. Meaning rationalism, as I use the term, is thus the view
that grasp of meaning suﬃces to provide semantically-based ought-reasons to use an expression in
a certain way. So, if the speaker judges that an expression e means F, then either she is motivated
to use e to mean F or she is irrational (and on my view, she is not just practically irrational, for she
is instead to be convicted of an inconsistency of pure rationality. In the next section, I explain how
this can be the case).
I’m assuming akrasia is to be equated with weakness of the will, which, at least since Holton
(1999) has been called into question. And I’m also assuming that the proper analysis of akrasia is a
charge of irrationality against the akratic subject, which again might be questioned.
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pliance with those speciĕcations. We want to secure, that is, intrinsic
normative valence for expressions, a normativity that derives entirely
from semantic considerations (and not from pragmatic ones)—the
routes from sense to action must be entirely semantic in character.
My suggestion is that we should think of semantic norms as com-
ing in pairs. For each expression in the language, that is, there are
norms of expectation, which are inviolable on pain ofmeaninglessness
(and indeed of irrationality), and norms of fulĕlment, which can, and
routinely are, infringed on pragmatic grounds.
What a semantic norm primarily prescribes is what one should ex-
pect the word to be used for (i.e. the set of circumstances where its
sincere use would be warranted):
ExpNorm Necessarily [for any L-speaker S , for any L-expression e
(e means F-in-L only if (absent reasons to the contrary, S will
expect (and be expected) to apply e only if conditions CF are
seen to be satisĕed))]
All other things being equal, the expectation will be fulĕlled. Vi-
olation of the norms of fulĕlment, however, is to be countenanced
and indeed rationally anticipated (since fulĕlment-defeaters abound
in the most normal of cases, triggered by, as well as triggering the
standard Gricean mechanisms).
Norms of expectation, however, are constitutively inviolable by par-
ticipants in the language game. To violate those norms would be,
As Hattiangadi (2008: 55) makes clear, the objector intends to exclude a wide class of non-
semantic considerations, including prudential, moral, legal ones, as well as communicative inten-
tions. It is an interesting question whether one can espouse some form of intention-based semantics
and yet placate an objector who takes Hattiangadi’s line.
I’m taking a cue here from remarks in Husserl’s Sixth Investigation (1900-01/2001: ch. 1, §10),
Heyting (1931: 58-9), Wittgenstein (1930: §33) and (1945/1953: §445). Smith (1994: 85-7) speaks
of expectations with respect to moral norms.
Onemight worry here about the beginning of a regress problem for a view of rules that makes
their applicability conditional on the antecedent recognition of the obtaining of certain conditions.
e regress problem is one that has been much discussed in the meaning normativity literature and
all I can do at this stage is point towards the recent discussions in Boghossian (2001, 2005b, 2008b)
and Wright (2001b). Sellars (1954) is also (still) relevant.
I am not entirely sure how to ĕt speakers’ judgements in the deĕnition, since a charge of ir-
rationality against those who Ęout ExpNorm will only stand in case S judges that emeans F-in-L
and thatCF obtain. Perhaps the stipulation that S is in relevantly ideal epistemic conditions would
suﬃce.
See Boghossian (2005a: 97) for the obvious point that we oen lie, set out to deceive, joke or
what have you. Othermore outlandish cases of norm violation are also discussed in e.g. Hattiangadi
(2006).
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truly, to change not just the meaning of an expression (a concep-
tual impossibility, given the deĕnition), but the entire language game
too.
Or rather: it would mean placing oneself outside humanity, and
indeed consigning oneself to idiocy, in the original (Greek) sense of
the word, since the putatively deviant S would simultaneously judge
that emeans F and that there is no expectation that she would use it
to mean F. It seems, that is, a conceptual truth that to mean F by e
is to expect that e be taken to mean F on an occasion of use (quite
regardless of whether the applicability conditions are actuallymet).
It is expectation conditions that individuate content; it is expec-
tation conditions that set the standards for linguistic competence;
it is expectation conditions that make deviancy with respect to the
standards they set truly irrational. To understand an expression is
ipso facto to understand the expectation commitments incurred by
its uses.
What recent discussions of meaning-normativity seem to have
overlooked, then, is precisely the fact that meaning-norms are com-
posite: the exclusive focus on applicability conditions has distorted
the debate about these issues. Or so I have argued in this brief
sketch.
Accordingly, it is a conceptual truth that meaning is given in
terms of expectation conditions, and those conditions are categori-
cal—unlike correctness conditions, any violation of expectation con-
ditions oﬀends against purely semantic normativity.
For the game we play is one where it is essential that norms of expectation be respected, on
pain of global incoherence for the practice—in Gibbard’s (1990: 65) terms, you may think here of
linguistic cooperation as coordinate expectations. To mean F by e is to (defeasibly) expect e to be
used to mean F. Norms of expectation, then, allow us to recognise a token as a token of its type, in
exactly the way in which we identify the King in chess as that particular Spielĕgur and not the actual
“bit of wood” on the board (Investigations §35). e distinction between norms of expectation and
norms of fulĕlment is similar (but not identical) to Searle’s (1969: 33) distinction between regulative
and constitutive rules (the former regulating antecedently existing behaviour, the latter bringing a
practice into being). Norms of expectation are constitutive precisely because to disregard them is to
annihilate meaning: by breaking them, you’ve indeed changed the subject; you’re no longer using
signs (Zettel §320).
Another way of putting the point is that norms of expectation are norms about competence,
whereas norms of fulĕlment are norms about performance.
We could imagine objections to this account along these lines: the account makes meaning
mysterious, inaccessible, private. To which the proper reply is: certainly not, for the very possibility
of communication requires a ĕxed point in our conversational scorekeeping. Expectation condi-
tions are the rock on which everything else stands. at they are in place is a detectable condition,
fully manifest in the linguistic behaviour of the participants. Of course, expectation conditions are
just as vulnerable to RFC as any version of the language-as-rule-governed hypothesis. But that’s a
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6.2.4. From Norms to Rules
If what I’ve said so far is on the right track, it seems to be both possi-
ble and necessary to give an account of language as an activity de-
ĕned (and policed) by rules for use that do carry categorical nor-
mative force.. In the next section, my concern will be with what
grounds their authority. In this section, I want to brieĘy revisit the
much-discussed issue of the Wittgenstenian RFC.
As we saw in chapter , PoC commits the semanticist to the claim
that the compositional rules and the lexicon willmandate a verdict by
which we have to abide (meaning rationalism is the contractual view
of meaning).
Now, PoC in eﬀect makes exactly the sort of claim that the RFC
are supposed to have shown to be incoherent, namely, that we can
rationally project from a ĕnite basis to an open-ended totality of yet-
to-unfold use. e RFC-lesson, allegedly, is that there could be no
rules able to eﬀect the transition from a semantics for the basis to one
for the complex (and indeed viceversa)—or, equivalently, that if there
could be rules of that sort, we could have no epistemic access to them.
In other words, if the RFC are correct then the EP has no solution.
Moreover, ExpNorm, as I have stated it, is (partly) about intentions:
attaching a certainmeaning to e entails forming a certain expectation-
intention. As such, it is immediately vulnerable to the RFC, which fa-
mously attack the ability of any norm to establish an internal relation
between intention and future use.
But we needed ExpNorm in place to defend the NT, which in turn
seems to be required to make our linguistic practice a matter gov-
erned by rules-as-norms and not by habit (something that I am com-
mitted to). And so the conundrum is that if we want to defend a
view of language as a rational activity (one where our beliefs about
meanings are accountable to clear standards of rationality) we need
to appeal to something like ExpNorm, which in turn opens up the
diﬀerent worry altogether.
Anote of warning: I amnot sidingwith prescriptivists about grammar here. In fact, my conclu-
sion will be quite the opposite of a prescriptivist view. All I am saying is that for language to occur
there have to be some norms concerning meaning-expectations. It is consistent with that position
to maintain that the privileged status of those norms is provisional. One might object that Exp-
Norm does not really give norms of outward use and is thus no better oﬀ than traditional accounts
(in fact, it completely by-passes the problem). Short reply: unlike use-dispositional accounts, Exp-
Norm puts very precise constraints on an explanation of fulĕlment failure.
To adapt a vivid image from McDowell (1993: 274), the compositional machinery is already
waiting for us at the end of the meaning-computation ready to pass judgement on our performance
as we process complex meanings.
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Ęank to the RFC.
e additional problem is that even if we managed to secure the
internal connection between intention and future use, there is good
evidence (or at least, evidence that suﬃces to give pause) that the kind
of rules that could attach to expressions (including the connectives!)
cannot make provisions for all cases.
I’m here merely highlighting the diﬃculties for the thesis I’m de-
fending. I’ll try to provide an answer to the RFC in section .. First,
I need to discuss a further problem we face in this area.
6.3.e Paradox of Authority
Let me take stock brieĘy. We started oﬀ by noting that a proper
account of what is distinctive about our practices seems to require
norms and rules to be in place, rather than just habit-induced propen-
sities. I tried to stabilise a view of linguistic norms that would allow
language to qualify as a fully rational activity, governed by meaning-
determining rules. I then raised the question of the impact of the
RFC on all of this.
I now want to consider the question of the authority of language in
a little more depth.
Language poses a special problem about the grounding of its
norms. If the sources of those norms are themselves norm-laden
entities, then the origin of those sources cannot, or so it seems, refer
back to either the norm themselves or the practitioners involved. A
naturalistic reduction of those norms—the obvious non-Platonistic
strategy, one would think—would however face the familiar problem
of justifying a transition from a biological ‘is’ to a mental/linguistic
‘ought’, and that’s precisely why we needed the NT in place.
And so we have (at least) two paradoxes in this area, the second one
generated by the attempt to escape the ĕrst (that is, the RFC one). e
shape of the second paradox is well brought out by Dummett in his
William James Lectures:
at’s Zettel §440 again.
e problem, in fact, is perfectly analogous to that facing the foundations of ethics. at’s
why I agree with Gibbard’s judgement that the theory of meaning falls largely under the scope of
meta-ethical reĘection (see also Russell 1940: 238).
Dretske (1998: 245-46). One might of course be perfectly untroubled by this and suggest that
there are such things as biological norms à laMillikan (2005). Or that there are Platonistic accounts
that are non-reductive but epistemologically ‘sensible’, where reĘection on facts about essences and
conceptual structure provides the required grounding, as with Wedgwood’s (2007) notion of nor-
mative dispositions.
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e paradoxical character of language lies in the fact that while
its practice must be subject to standards of correctness, there is
no ultimate authority to impose those standards from without.
e only ultimate determinant of what the standards of correct-
ness are is the general practice of those recognised as primary
speakers of the language.
We are forced into this paradox (just as into the RFC one) by the ob-
servation that the requirement that norms be in place is a precondi-
tion on meaningfulness:
if there cease to be right and wrong uses of a word, the word
loses its meaning.
So, it looks as if a) we need rule-based normativity to be in place for
expressions to be meaningful; but b) rule-based accounts give rise to
paradoxes about i) the grounding of the rules and ii) our ability to
follow them.
e rule-requirement, then, appears to generate near-intractable
paradoxes, and meaning skepticism (if not outright nihilism) seems
the only likely outcome. But the problem about language is not just
special: it is urgent, for without a solution to it, we lack a clear account
of how we can even think under rational constraints, and if so it is
unclear how anything we do can ever be considered rational.
It thus seems as if we have no option but to confront the RFC issue
head-on, since making sense of the possibility of rule-governed be-
haviour is arguably the task that we have to confront as self-reĘective
beings.
I need to discuss one more issue before I can move on to sketching
my own position.
6.3.1. A Response-Dependence Account of Linguistic Judgements
At the end of the ReĘections on Chomsky volume edited by Alexan-
der George in , Crispin Wright put forward the suggestion that
Dummett (1991: 85). Here’s another nice paradox: ‘vernacular’ comes from the Latin
‘verna/vernaculus’, the tag given by masters to slaves born in their home. ere you have it: to
the extent that we are born into it, we are both masters and slaves of our vernacular.
One worry oen raised in Boghossian (2008a) is precisely a regress of content determination:
we’d need to have contentful items already in place as we try to ground content itself. No non-
circular analysis seems possible. And there is a related worry in this area well-expressed by Gibbard
(2003: 86): “What I am thinking is a matter of the rules I am following in my thinking.” So, if an
appeal to rules cannot be made to work, the very act of thinking would be paralised by the absence
of rules, for the very act ofmeaning individuation onwhich, presumably, the entertaining of content
itself depends, is in turn dependent on the existence (and observance) of rules.
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one might escape the RFC bind by conceiving of semantic content as
secondary in character.
e idea, very roughly, is that the properties that attach to NL
strings are best conceived as incorporating our responses into their
very fabric, by analogy with the familiar post-Lockean conception of
colour predicates.
In particular, Wright’s proposal was that when stating truth-
conditions for sentences we should “write human responses into the
account”—hence the label Response-Dependence (RD).
e objectivity of meaning (whatever that means) would then be
deĕned in terms of best opinion (opinion reached by ideal participants
in ideal conditions, i.e. in an unimprovable information state).
Accordingly, our judgements about the semantic properties of
sentences would be extension-determining rather than extension-
reĘecting—the deliverances of the compositional machinery, there-
fore, would be both content-generating and provisional, awaiting rat-
iĕcation by competent judges.
6.3.2. Some Diﬃculties
To date, Wright’s suggestion has remained largely untapped. I will
incorporate elements from the suggestion into my own account, but
let me ĕrst discuss some of the problems it gives rise to.
George (1989). Wright had already expressed astonishment at the “scandalous” lack of interest
shown by semanticists with respect to the RFC back in his (1980: 279). Since inaugurating the
Minimalist Program, Chomsky has moved away from a view of I-language as a rule-based system,
so Wright’s original target has somewhat shied. A reply of sorts to Wright’s paper is in Chomsky
(2000: 143). For his part, Chomsky (1986: 223ﬀ.) seems to have taken the RFC rather seriously.
I think it is no coincidence that two of the major proponents of Response-Dependence
accounts were heavily involved in the debate on the theory of meaning that took place in the
1970s/1980s—see Wright’s (1986a) and Johnston’s (1988) contributions to the ‘swan-song’ sym-
posium on that topic devoted to Schiﬀer (1987). One of the earliest discussions in this area is
McDowell (1981b). Johnston (1989) is the ĕrst published statement of a Response-Dependence
account of value properties. Wright (1992: fn. 16, 20) traces the genealogy of the idea.
Wright (1992: 109).
Wright (1989: 212).
A distinction due, again, to Wright (1992: 110).
I may be adding more to the view than was intended by Wright. Note that strictly speak-
ing a view of this kind is more properly construed as judgement-dependence rather than response-
dependence. See Holton (1992) for the distinction.
Wright himself has given the topic another gentle tap in his (2007). e wider literature on
Response-Dependence is intricate and fairly varied, but it has for the most part concentrated on
discussion of the classic cases of colour and value properties. Casati and Tappolet (1998) gives a
useful taster.
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It is an essential part of the RD claim that there be a conceptual con-
nection between our responses andwhat it is for the relevant property
to obtain. It is, that is, a priori that our judgements be extension-
determining with respect to the domain claimed to satisfy the RD
constraint. And it is constitutive of the RD-norm attaching to an ex-
pression that our judgements be the ultimate arbiter of its exact pro-
ĕle.
On the Chomksyan picture, however, speakers’ judgements as to
grammaticality and meaning are “merely data” in the empirical quest
directed at the “real object of inquiry”, namely, the “internal mecha-
nisms that generate linguistics expressions and determine their sound
andmeaning”. AnRD-account for such judgements would presum-
ably have to insist that they are connected to the internal mechanisms
as an a priorimatter (to judge that emeans F is what it is for e tomean
F).
But now here’s a ĕrst awkwardness: whose judgements are we ex-
trapolating the a priori connection from? It is a familiar problem in
linguistics that the judgements of the experts (presumably the em-
bodiment of best opinion in these matters) are almost invariably
theory-laden. Despite all eﬀort, they inevitably reĘect, that is, en-
trenched ideological commitment to a theory.
As for ‘folk’ opinion, well, it is an equally familiar fact that their
judgement is just as oen clouded by pragmatic considerations, unfa-
miliarity and processing limitations. In short, grammaticality judge-
ments are aﬀected by noise at both ends of the competence spec-
trum.
It thus seems implausible thatwe could ever devise appropriate con-
straints both with regard to what would count as ideal judging con-
ditions and as to who would qualify as an ideal judge.
e issue is further complicated by phenomena such as semantic
saturation (the loss of meaningfulness commonly experienced aer
prolonged repetition of a string) and the already-discussed cases of
verbal illusions.
Here’s whereDummett’s paradox presents itself again, should we choose to give an RD account
of semantic properties.
Chomsky (2009: 19).
epoint ismade in e.g. Dąbrowska (2004: 2). Divergence of opinion among experts is equally
well-attested. For just one example see Chomsky (1972a: 148).
See ch. 2, fn. 181, p. 57. e interesting point about verbal illusions is that while they show
some analogies to cases of visual illusions (the diﬃculty in shaking them oﬀ, for instance), there
persists some disagreement as to whether they are genuine cases of illusions. Experts themselves
disagree on the full extent of the phenomenon, that is. Here’s another case for you to mull over:
‘Many more people have been to New York than I have’—Smith (2006: 960), originally due to Paul
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Examples of this sort suggest both that meanings may outrun (or
at least: outfox) best opinion, and that our judgements are too in-
herently unstable to qualify as a priori connected to the putative RD-
norms. We seem unable, that is, to rely on the innocence of intu-
itions (whether tutored or untutored) and if we deferred to impossibly
ideal judges we would simply be replacing the inscrutability of refer-
ence with the inscrutability of deference—hardly an improvement on
our predicament.
Now, if we recall the EP, it seems clear that an RD-solution to that
problem will have diﬃculties in providing warrant for a projection
from past judgements to future verdicts on complex meanings unless
a background theory of some kind is in place—mere past consensus
will not rationally ground either the future judgements themselves or
our expectations concerning those judgements.
Arguably, the only promisingway to secure judgement-stability un-
der extension (of the language, or of the range of expressions being
assessed) is to build an a priori assumption to that extent right into
the account.
But then, it is hard to see how an RD-account would substantially
diﬀer from the Platonistic framework it was trying to escape, since
the good epistemic standing of our conĕdence in the authority of our
judgements would still be stipulated by ĕat.
Note also that with that a priori assumption in place, the RD-story
would carry the further assumption that ideal speakers would return
a unique judgement with respect to an expression-in-context, which
in eﬀect amounts to the Fregean assumption of Eindeutigkeit for NL
expressions which had caused the problems in the ĕrst place.
Pietroski.
Further evidence also accrues from the literature on language change and the changing exten-
sion of the class of expressions that belong to the grammar proper—see ch. 2, fn. 119 p. 40.
is diﬃculty is raised for the case of colour in the last section of Edwards (1998), from where
I’ve borrowed and adapted the argument. Wright’s (1992: 112) Substantiality Condition was meant
to address this worry. However, no substantive account of its substantiality has yet been provided
(Pettit (1999: §1) admirably sums up the diﬃculties). Wedgwood (1998) sketches an RD-account
in terms of essences whereby RD-concepts would be such as to determine a unique property in
virtue of facts about their essence (in the case of semantic properties, some version of Husserl’s
theory about the laws of meaning would need to be defended). Some of the claims made with
respect to the principles of Universal Grammar are indeed claims about all possible languages. See
e.g. Culicover (1997) and Newmeyer (1998, 2005). But these claims are far from undisputed. See
e.g. Cro (2001), Hudson (2007) and Evans (2009).
We cannot sensibly maintain that indeterminate content could give rise to (uniquely) deter-
minate responses, that is.
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6.3.3.Mind andWord
Despite these diﬃculties, it seems undeniable that our judgements
do play at least a part (perhaps even a crucial one) in ĕxing (rather
than merely tracking) linguistic structure. Incidentally, it was in any
case rather curious that Wright should have read the RFC as posing
a serious challenge to the Chomskyan project, for that project had
a very ready answer to the Wittgensteinian claim that in following a
rule we need have nothing in mind: in fact, all that we need is to
have a certain kind of mind.
at is to say, following rules in the (unthinking) manner that we
do is but a reĘection of “the way we are constructed”. From the
“biolinguistic” perspective, nothing but “the inherent structure of
ourminds” could provide grounding for the normative hold linguistic
rules have over our practices. Language, that is, is not a formal
object to be captured by rules of inference of the kind given in logic,
but rather, it is a biological object, on a par with other modules in
our perceptual system. And in searching for the Wittgenstenian
Lebensformen that alone can give signs their powers, we need look no
further than the principles of Universal Grammar hard-wired into
our brains.
Clearly, a reply of this kind will not placate those hankering for nor-
mative constraints. We are back, aer all, to the self-attribution of
fairly brutish dispositions to humour the dictates of our internal rep-
resentations. And what is there to distinguish that frommere habits?
Well, here’s a possible suggestion: the internal representations
posited by linguistic theories do express normative constraints to the
extent that they reĘect deep facts about conceptual structure.
e idea would be that whatever ‘naturalness’ is contained in the
norms that we ĕnd compelled to encapsulate in our judgements re-
garding semantic properties derives its good standing from the fact
As Wright (2007: 486) “dangerously” phrased it.
at is the blunt answer to the RFC (and Wright’s anti-Chomsky use of them) contained in
Chomsky (2000: 143). Similarly, for Hinzen (2007: 27) the normative force of linguistic structure
is due to structural facts about our minds.
Chomsky (2009: 13).
Hinzen (2006: 147-48).
Hinzen (2007: 154-55) remarks that linguistic structure is much more constrained than logic.
ere is no way to derive the structuring principles of language on purely logical grounds, we are
told.
Chomsky (1986: 232).
erewill be a certain feeling of déjà lu for the next page or so for those readers who remember
our discussion from §2.4.
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that those judgements are tracking ‘eligible referents’ of some sort or
other.
ere is thus a metaphysical (and not purely biological) underpin-
ning to those norms—the ‘right’ sorts of judgement are those that
stay suﬃciently close to the order of things, an order that our con-
cepts faithfully mirror. On this view, the RD-account had shied the
balance too far on the side of the judging subject (and, in the Chom-
skyan approach, her mental structures): the genuine normative con-
straints that we are aer should rather be located in the way in which
we properly model reality by our use of language.
6.3.3.1. La Règle du Jeu
Now, the thought is indeed reassuring, for it seems to reconcile intu-
itions about that traditional philosophical pursuit, the a priori inves-
tigation of conceptual structure, with the comforts of having evolu-
tionary science on your side (the language faculty has developed in
the way it has because of a sound, and indeed sane, connection with
the facts out there).
But we are not out of the woods yet, because there are a couple of
remaining wrinkles in the story.
Firstly, it has long been a favourite contention of Chomsky’s that
what is signiĕcant about the language faculty is its independence
fromother cognitive faculties: syntax is autonomous, is thewar-cry.
And indeed Chomsky’s understanding of the CC departs from the
Fregean tradition prevalent in philosophy of language: for him, the
remarkable feature of language is its ability to detach itself from con-
text; it is the adaptive character of the output of the language faculty
that is taken to be the genuinely creative aspect in need of explana-
tion.
By contrast, the philosopher’s obsession is with how to bridge the
gap between (possibly skeletal) linguistic expressions and the full de-
termination of the truth-conditions standardly attached to them.
e notion comes from Lewis (1983: 479).
Note however that Chomsky (1975b: 59) has been careful to keep evolutionary issues well
separate from questions as to the intrinsic properties of linguistic structures.
See e.g. Chomsky (1957: ch. 2), (1986: xxvi) and (1975b: 55).
See Chomsky (1966: ch. 2) and the discussion in McGilvray (2001). ere are, rather surpris-
ingly, points of contact here with Derrida (1982: 317).
As is familiar, Chomksy has always been distrustful of the very notion of truth-conditions
preferring that of ‘truth-indications’. Quite how that squares up with his insistence that a grammar
is about sound-meaning pairings is an intriguing question. My proposal in the ĕnal section will
actually be very close indeed to his views on this matter.
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Secondly, the linguist’s preoccupation is usually with what language
does not allow you to do, whereas the philosopher’s is with the
unbounded possibilities that language can encompass, the indeĕnite
number of ways there are for leaves to be green, for instance.
eproblemwith locating language’s normativity (and its authority
over us) in facts about ourminds, possibly buttressed by deepermeta-
physical underpinnings, is thus two-fold: a reply of this kind is largely
naturalistic, whereas the proper construal of Wittgenstein’s RFC re-
quires seeing it as posing an anthropological question, the question of
what it is about our practices that makes us rational, and not that of
what it is about our brains being wired along certain principles that
might have served us well.
Moreover, the hope of anchoring language on conceptual structure
faces the further issue that we seem forced to try to map a realm,
that of our concepts, populated by entities that are constitutively
unambiguous (for that is what alone can identify them—nothing
short of sharply deĕned possession conditions will do in pinning
down a concept as the concept it is), by means of entities, our signs,
that are (just as constitutively) ambiguous (or rather: polysemic).
e traditional answer inherited from the Frege-Russell tradition
is that we bridge the gap by making language rigid enough to mir-
ror the putative stability of our concepts—we idealise away the rough
edges, we capture the hard kernel of our concepts by appropriate reg-
imentation of our language; we translate the ordinary language of the
vernacular into the extraordinary language of the logician.
On this view, then, our sensitivity to rules-as-reasons is best con-
strued as the ability to track the sharp boundaries of our concepts
beneath the confusing looseness of our signs. And indeed, as is fa-
miliar, the idea behind the Fregean notion of Sinnwas that our words
could express a conceptual content precise enough to map our route
to their referents within uniqueness.
But that was precisely the picture that the RFC had put under
pressure: we cannot construe our rationality qua language users as
the (uncanny) ability to ‘read-oﬀ ’ which Fregean meaning-function
is associated with a (potentially polysemic) expression and track its
deliverances-in-context (on the whole) with accomplished (if defea-
See for instance Newmeyer (2005: ch. 1).
e concern, as already mentioned, is with what Sainsbury (2001: 201) has called the Travis
Eﬀect, the seemingly ineradicable underspeciĕcation of all our sublunary predicates.
As e.g. Miller (1998: 179) spells it out, a Platonistic conception of semantic properties would
have it that expressions have correctness conditions attached to them such that our competence
consists in the ability to track whether or not the property is instantiated in a given context of use.
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sible) eﬃciency.
e epistemology of such functions is, it seems, incoherent (we
could always raise doubts as to its eﬃcacy). And it is equally unclear
what normative hold they could possibly have on us, since we would
always doubt that we had implemented their instructions appropri-
ately.
e rules of our language game, that is, are (or ought to be) ĕrst and
foremost rules about its jeu, about the essential instability of the sign,
the play (the give-and-take) that ties concepts to their expression as
both signs and concepts adapt to contexts that are always diﬀerent in
signiĕcant respects. Neither concepts nor words are as sharp as the
semanticist picture assumes, that is.
So, while I do incorporate RD-elements inmy account, I am instead
discounting both the sort of purely naturalistic answer standardly
given within the Chomskyan framework and the view that would an-
chor normative constraints purely on the equally natural eligibility of
a certain range of referential anchors for our conceptual scheme.
6.4. Background, Blindsight, and Authority: Generalising In-
dexicalought
It is now time, at last, for me to sketch my view on these matters.
To introduce my proposal, let me recall Perry’s (: ) point that
self-locating beliefs do not consist in believing a Fregean thought.
I’m proposing that all thoughts are best characterised as indexical
(i.e. sharply non-Fregean) in this sense, i.e. they all rely on (note: I
am not claiming that they contain) irreducibly perspectival compo-
nents of various degrees of strength, no matter how ‘timeless’ those
thoughtsmay look on the surface—evenmathematical thought is per-
spectival, to the extent that it is relative to (and, crucially, parasitic on)
certain background conditions being operative in a discourse (that,
for instance, signs mean the same in all their occurrences).
See also Williamson (1994: 281, fn. 25) for criticism of this view.
Travis (2006b) is rather convincing on this point.
e discussion in Glendinning (1998: ch. 5, 6) is particularly illuminating, and it informs,
along with Edwards (1990), much (but not all) of my thinking in this area.
As I discussed already in chapter 2, anchoring semantic judgement to conceptual structure
weakens the PoC/CC explanatory connection because of the demonstrable diachronic and syn-
chronic Ęuidity of our conceptual schemes.
I have given reasons for distrusting both views back in chapter 2 and 3.
Here I was tempted to talk of thoughts as containing indexical elements and explain that away
as mere rhetoric. e important point, regardless of how I formulate it, is that I am not maintaining
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None of them ever expresses (or is equivalent to) a Fregean thought,
for such thoughts would be literally unthinkable: Frege’sDrittes Reich
is not just inaccessible; it is empty.
Accordingly, grasp of sense ought to be seen as grasp of entities that
depend (for their achieving whatever determinacy they can achieve)
on irreducible perspectival elements which themselves resist full ar-
ticulation. is is of course because of the anti-CETworries: just as
facts about one’s self-location are not expressible in a language (any
language), so background-driven facts about content sharpenings are
similarly not expressible in language.
I will therefore argue that, strange as it may seem, we can secure de-
terminacy of truth-value in the absence of truth-conditions semanti-
cally conceived.
What will guarantee determinacy will be agreement in judgements,
but this will be only ex post facto determinacy. Neither the facts trig-
gering that agreement, nor the facts about the content agreed upon,
however, can be captured formally—in the latter case, because there
are no such facts (the determinacy is posited, not “real”: thinking is
that egocentrical elements are part of what we think. What I later call ‘enabling conditions’ make
it possible for us to have a world-directed thought—that’s the sense in which our thoughts are in-
dexical. But properly speaking those conditions are never part of our thoughts (nor of our theory).
Our thoughts (and our theories) remain (frighteningly) minimal.
Two things: ĕrst, what we grasp are minimal entities (purely internal representations); they
depend on perspectival components to approximate determinacy-in-context. Secondly, note that
this generalisation is not intended to make all sentences essentially indexical, or else we’d lose a
good distinction between saying ‘I am cold’ and ‘Walter is cold’. As suggested by e.g. Dancy (2004:
196-97) and Schiﬀer (2003: 100), here it may be not entirely unhelpful to think of grasp of sense as
something akin to knowledge by acquaintance, for knowledge of language is more akin to knowing-
how than to knowing a bunch of (propositionally stateable) rules for use. e claim that knowledge
of language is an ability has of course been made oen. What is distinctive about my position is
that even those aspects of competence that one is tempted to characterise in terms of propositional
knowledge require substantive amounts of knowledge by acquaintance to be implementable. To
the extent that we can make sense of rules of language, they will be essentially incomplete, they
will be functions that are partial in a very strong sense (no value is deĕned until our judgements
are incorporated into the workings of the function in situ). Evidence from language change shows
that there is no reason to discount a view whereby settled facts about syntax are nothing but long-
standing judgements congealed in the very fabric of language. See Newmeyer (1998: ch. 5) for a
contrary view.
To echoWright’s (2002b: 421) remarks in a diﬀerent context. Unlike him, I think this is a live
possibility.
As will become obvious, there are numerous points of contact here with the work of a number
of post-Wittgenstenians, e.g. Stanley Cavell, Charles Travis, and JonathanDancy. I’m really not sure
where to place John Searle in all of this. At times he’s very radical in this respect, at other times he
sides with what I would call semanticist positions. For the radical aspect of his view, see e.g. Searle
(1994: 640). For the conservative aspect see Searle (1994: 660), where we are told that the meaning
of the type can be insulated from the inĘuence of the changing Background.
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not, and could not be, themanipulation of fully determinate entities).
If I am right, it follows that logic does not deal with fully deter-
minate entities either. e relata of the consequence relation, that is,
are not fully-blown propositional entities but rather somethingmuch
moreminimal—not in the sense that we reason about thought-kernels
amenable to expansion-in-context; we always reason with essentially
minimal entities.
Accordingly, and to answer a question that I le dangling from the
last chapter, consequence is situated in the sense that for ' to fol-
low from  we require a pre-existing agreement in judgement regard-
ing the reasonableness (or otherwise) of investing the expressions in-
volvedwith a given understanding. Neither the required understand-
ing nor the agreement concerning it are however susceptible to formal
treatment.
Let me now detail some more reasons that might support a view of
the kind I’m defending.
6.4.1. FourWays of Mapping Language toought
As we saw, behind the semanticist’s insistence on determinacy lies
the presumption that the very act of thinking a thought G can only
be individuated by the univocality of that thought. e idea is: while
signs may be ambiguous, thoughts cannot be so—they are constitu-
tively unambiguous, that is, fully speciĕed, without gaps of any sort
(that’s what thoughts are; they couldn’t be otherwise). ere may be
room for variation in thewaywe all home in on the same thought. But
it is the stability of the target content that guarantees interpersonal
agreement, and indeed interpersonal communication tout court.
I think this picture is deeplymisguided. To showwhy it is so, I need
to sketch what seem to be the only conceivable ways for the connec-
tion between thought and language to hold.
It seems as if we have four broad possibilities to begin with (where
‘D’ and ‘I’ stand for ‘determinate’ and ‘indeterminate’ respectively):
e fourth option seems hardly plausible, so I won’t consider it
here. e ĕrst option seems to express most people’s view of
As Travis (1996: 102) and (2008: 6) has argued, there is no way to have a logic of understand-
ings (as functions that “extract content from circumstances”) for there is no ĕxed list of under-
standings. But we cannot require either, as Travis (2009) instead suggested, that logic incorporate
additional assumption rules dictating that only formulas satisfying certain conditions (e.g. that their
meaning be made uniformly determinate by antecedent understandings) would be admissible for
purposes of proof (the reasons are detailed in Williamson (2009) and have to do mostly with the
crippling loss of the principle of uniform substitutivity).
at’s not quite right, actually. For there is a way of reading my proposal as being committed
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the matter, if language is taken to be NL. e second option is the
Fregean (and indeed the logician’s) view of what a formal language
can achieve: matching thought’s determinacy blow by blow, as it were.
Bridging the gap between position  and  is what semanticists (and
RT- and TCP-pragmaticists) are trying to secure: making NL as pre-
cise as thought, by some means or other. e third option is the
one genuinely radical pragmaticists like e.g. Travis favour.
My own view is a kind of hybrid between  and —just avert your
incredulous stare until the next section, if you please. Before I turn to
that, let me ĕrst review the possible ways of implementing the tran-
sition between  and .
So, position  has it, with Frege, that thoughts are determinate
(TD), univocal, constitutively unambiguous, fully speciĕc entities;
in contrast to that, NL is instead endemically indeterminate, ubiq-
uitously equivocal and so forth.
How can we bridge the gap between the two layers? How, that
is, can we ĕx semantic content in such a way as to map it to pre-
cisely determined thought content (and thus move from position 
to )? Well, a ĕrst option is to argue that formalisation provides an
intermediate step that allows us to map underspeciĕed sentences to
fully speciĕed thoughts. is could be done i) the wayMontague did,
or ii) by means of some form of indexicalism (either LF- or Clause-
indexicalism, as we have seen in chapter  and ). Or iii)we could in-
stead argue that it is pragmatic means that get us from the schematic
entities outputted by the semantic module to fully speciĕed thoughts
(as formal pragmaticists have argued).
to precisely this position: that language is disquotationally determinate while thought is indetermi-
nate. My view however is that thought too is disquotational, in the sense to be made precise in the
text. In any case, the notion of determinacy in the literature is usually assumed to be something
like: ‘questions regarding truth-conditions are univocally settled by the rules associated with the
expression’. And that’s a notion that I reject for both thought and language.
As I argued in chapter 3, while pragmaticists oen insist that semantic content is underspec-
iĕed, they still allow that it can be completed-in-context: the ĕnal outcome of the interpretation
process is still some sort of Fregean thought. And indeed, with the exception of Travis, their anti-
semanticist argument relies on the alleged contrast between fully saturated thoughts and the radi-
cally unsaturated character of all linguistic content.
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As I’ve indicated in previous chapters, I think the ĕrst two views
are unstable, to the extent that they try to get language to match the
supposed determinacy of thoughts in terms of expressible determi-
nacy—we somehow stipulate the identity conditions for a thought
(either in terms of possession conditions or of clauses formulated in a
semi-formal language) and then proceed to Ęesh out semantic clauses
of various kinds to secure the same level of determinacy for our signs
as that enjoyed by our thoughts, either via an intermediate transla-
tional stage (the disambiguating languagemediating betweenNL and
thought) or via the positing of hidden semantic enrichment at LF. But
clearly, for by now familiar reasons, it is obscure why the description
(and grasp) of those conditions should be immune to indeterminacy
doubts. e third view is equally unstable, again, for the reasons I
already discussed in chapter .
A fourth option is to admit that iv) determinacy by purely seman-
tic means is unattainable. Determinacy is nevertheless ensured by a
convergence in understanding by “the great majority of hearers com-
petent in the language” Dummett (: ). And even though facts
about that convergence are not captured by rule-based accounts, the
fully Fregean status of our thoughts is unimpeached.
Now, although this position is a deĕnite improvement over the
previous three (for it acknowledges the constitutive shortcomings of
signs and rules with regard to the ĕxing of content), it is still, to my
mind at least, unsatisfactory, because on the one hand it does admit
the gravity of our predicament (the inability of our language to secure
content individuation: the inability of unaided rule-based accounts to
ĕx determinacy) whilst still insisting on the ultimate determinacy of
thought (and understanding).
A burning question remains, however: What evidence do we have
to believe that thought itself is determinate, if we have no better evi-
dence for it than the portentous convergence in judgement as towhich
understanding is reasonable in a given context?
In fact, the very idea that we do home in on a single understanding
is just as incoherent as the Relevance eory position I critiqued in
chapter , for it assumes that there is a range of candidate interpreta-
tions available for the taking that are themselves determinate, whilst
It looks tome as ifMcGinn’s (1989: 199) position is along similar lines: “models realize content
only in as much as they are embedded in a certain background of goals, behavioural propensities
and a network of causally related states”. e ĕnal step to full Fregean determinacy is the one I want
to resist.
Moreover, the very same determinacy is claimed to be reachable by the theorist in her semantic
clauses.
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also insisting thatwe can all converge on that mysteriously elusive tar-
get from starting points that are, ex hypothesi, deeply indeterminate.
e point is exactly the same as the one raised in connection with
the CET worries: what we agree upon in a context can not be a de-
terminate thought, for if we could agree that it is, we would not have
had a problem in the ĕrst place (there can be no determinacy for the
candidate items if there isn’t determinacy for the sentence we started
from—can you sharpen a blunt instrument with a blunt ĕle?).
More generally: if convergence in judgements regarding how an
expression ought to be understood is a pre-condition on determinacy,
it is not clear to me why the existence (or is that the appearance?) of
such a convergence should be taken to entail the existence of determi-
nacy at the level of thought (there’s an unwarranted slide from a ne-
cessity claim to a suﬃciency one: convergence may be necessary for
determinacy, but it doesn’t follow it gives suﬃcient reason to believe
there is such a thing as determinacy of content). Aer all, transcen-
dental arguments do not have much of a track record in establishing
existence claims and the implicit modus tollens step that supposedly
sustain the transcendental move (i.e. : or else we would have no prac-
tice to speak of) can enjoy no privileged status over themodus ponens
step I’ll be going for.
A ĕh way of implementing TD (with substantial elements of over-
lap with Dummett’s idea) is v) the one defended in various versions of
situation theory. On this view, semantic content is relatively thin,
but by adding background/contextual components to it we obtain an
Austinian propositionwhich is in eﬀect a complete Fregean thought.
Both these last two strategies in eﬀect propound a composite view
of content: content is factored out into a semantic component in-
tegrated by a background component. Determinacy requires both
components. Both iv) and v), that is, allow that background condi-
tions are not speciĕable in the way the semanticist wants, but never-
theless maintain that those factors somehow add up to a fully deter-
minate piece of content.
Predictably, I do not think the Situationeoretical view is tenable
either. It just buys the eternalist a little more time, but the ultimate
problems still remain; they just arise at a diﬀerent level in the posited
machinery—very roughly, the chief diﬃculty is how to match situa-
tion and lekton (i.e. the level of semantically expressed content which
To repeat: the diﬃculty here is that the move from surface indeterminacy to hidden determi-
nacy is supposed to be carried out using exactly the same sort of means, i.e. content-bearing entities.
Barwise (1989), Barwise and Perry (1983), Recanati (2007a: 46-7).
See Recanati (2007a: 46).
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is, again roughly, a propositional function from situation to content)
uniquely.
A ĕnal and sixth way is, roughly, a version of the epistemicist view:
there is determinacy in thought and content, and it’s only our igno-
rance (rather than just constitutive facts about signs) that blocks our
access to facts about extension. NL is a blunt instrument but merci-
fully logic (classical logic of course, for underneath the non-classical
dust the world is resolutely classical ) provides a regulative ideal that
lays down clear stipulations as to what counts as inference—and be-
low it all, the extensional boundaries of our thoughts are as sharp as
we may wish them to be.
Clearly, this is a radical form of LIR (as is explicit in e.g.Williamson
, , ) and again its main motivation is a modus tollens
move to save logic, science, and realism (a troika that, apparently, we
cannot do without) from the radical contextualist rabble. For my
purposes this is just a (more rabid) version of ii) above and hence I
deem it just as (if not more) unpalatable.
6.5. Radical Minimalism (Without Boundaries)
We are le with option , then, the idea, that is, that both language
and thought are indeterminate—whatever sharpness we think (some
at least of) our concepts may have is merely in the eye of the beholder,
so to speak (underneath, it’s all a bit of a muddle, really).
On the face of it, the viewmight seem a little curious, for we seem to
be saying that thoughts are indeterminate but nevertheless language,
Note that Austinian propositions include both semantic content and circumstance. Its typical
statement is something of the form s j= , where s is a situation and  an infon, a propositional
function making a claim about a situation. ey are in eﬀect situated Fregean thoughts and have ab-
solute truth values—see Barwise (1989: 273). Once we have Austinian propositions, we’ve therefore
gone fully back to classical logic and indeed the consequence relation in situation theory is deĕned
in completely classical terms. See Seligman and Moss (1997: 283, 295). Situational information is
used to account for the direct content of the attitudes, but once circumstance is included the story
joins up the classical account and truth is readmitted on the scene. Situation theory, however, suf-
fers from the Problem of Speciĕcity, that is, how to specify the connection between the information
content of a statement and the situation that supports it. e problem for traditional semantics was
how to connect underspeciĕed semantic content to truth conditions; that for situation theory is
how to connect the situation to the Austinian propositions that it supports.
As Quine (1960: 193) put it with his trademark conĕdence: “vagueness, ambiguity, fugacity
of reference, are traits of verbal forms and do not extend to the objects referred to”. I’m not sure
of two things here: whether this tallies with Quine’s ontological views as expressed elsewhere, and
whether we have good reason to dismiss ontic indeterminacy so insouciantly.
For this move, see especially Williamson (2009: 377-384).
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itself a largely indeterminate aﬀair, somehow succeeds in determi-
nately referring to indeterminate concepts.
I say “that’s round”, and I thus determinately express a concept
(there is no doubt about which concept I intend to refer to) which
is itself indeterminate. But if the concept is itself indeterminate, how
do I know (how does anyone know) that I’ve hit the intensional target,
let alone that I have thereby hit its (underspeciĕed) extension too?
Here’s a suggestion. ink of a concept-word as expressing some-
thing veryminimal (mutatis mutandis, similar considerations will ap-
ply to all expressions). Don’t think of it as an abstraction from all
contexts of use (the minimal core that all uses of that concept-word
have in common).
ink of it as a minimal concept deĕned in terms of its relations
to other concepts (e.g. ‘not square’) as well as in terms of its connec-
tion with a range of prototypes (paradigm cases of e.g. roundness that
you’ve been trained to recognise as such)—weneed this second clause
to go beyond a purely structuralist view of properties (in the post-
Saussurian sense). e concept—and the expression—will be indi-
viduated in virtue of those relations.
Crucially, don’t think of it as something deĕned in terms of its in-
trinsic properties (sense is not something that gets you the ‘cognitive
ĕx’ onto a referent by means of necessary and suﬃcient conditions
for the applicability of an expression). Don’t think of it in terms of
Lewisian natural eligibility either (whatever eligibility there might be
is anything but natural).
ink of it, rather, as something deĕned in terms of its extrin-
sic, relational properties, properties that are themselves largely open-
ended and provisional (they are indeed broadly criterial, judgement-
based).
Szabó (2000: 42-3) does suggest that we could have precisely speciĕed rules picking out inde-
terminate entities. I struggle to make sense of this proposal.
An idea of this kind seems behind the classic semantic minimalism of Soames (2002), Borg
(2004) andCappelen and Lepore (2005a). For (very good) reasons why it is a bad idea see e.g. Taylor
(1989: ch. 8) and Travis (2000: ch. 1, 3, 7).
is seems to force a holism about meanings that is alleged (see e.g. the classic attack in Fodor
1987: ch. 3) to make meaning a mystery (there is no knowing a single meaning without knowing
the entire language). Answering this charge as applied to RCM would take more space than I have
le. You will just have to take my word for it.
On the criterial conception, see againWright (1978, 1982). Note that my conception isweakly
criterial, in the sense that while content is indeed ĕxed by criterial satisfaction, there is no mapping
from criteria to their potential satisĕers. One more word about judgements: on the Chomskyan
picture, speakers’ judgements are evidence (or rather one piece of data among many) on which we
build our theory of competence. By claiming that semantic properties are (partly) judgement-based,
I seem to be reversing that picture, since I seem to be explaining semantic judgements in terms of
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Like the objects studied in e.g. Categoryeory, then, semantic ob-
jects (and the corresponding concepts) are thus individuated in terms
of the relations holding between them, rather than in terms of their
relations to e.g. full-blooded propositions, facts, or what have you.
Shockingly, again, they are objects depleted of nearly all content. It’s
the mapping between them that will establish their ability to carry
content in context. And those mappings are ĕxed by their embed-
ments in various linguistic and extra-linguistic contexts.
e further point is that on this proposal rationality (in the sense
of: rational use of language and indeed: rational entertaining of
thoughts) is not a question of just obeying rules (i.e. of conforming
to their dictates, of being disposed to acknowledge the guiding power
of those rules) but rather a question of having the ability to deploy
essentially skeletal concepts in ways that are appropriate to the cir-
cumstances as judged to be so by competent speakers.
Now, one key part of my proposal is that we cannot go beyond the
purely homophonic clauses in any robust sense. If you are still in
the thrall of semanticism and pragmaticism, my claim here is that no
further step is to be taken. ere is no completion in the oﬃng. ere
is no further (and ĕner) carving for content available.
e fact is, minimal content, in the sense sketched above, cannot
be sharpened. It is as sharp as it’ll ever get. Indeed, it is not the sort of
thing that is amenable to sharpenings.
And there is no hidden sharpening in the background beyond our
epistemic reach either—it’s not that background conditions, immer-
sion in Wittgensteinian ‘forms of life’ or the McDowellian partaking
in the stable deliverances of Aristotelian second nature could play a
semantic judgements. I think the circularity is only apparent and no more vicious than is the case
with standard accounts of rationality and agenthood (characterising normative notions is a circular
enterprise: that’s what it means for something to be normative).
Here’s another analogy: consider the Frege-Hilbert controversy; Frege (1880/81: 48) argued
that we could not speak of the parallel axiom “as if it was the same in every special geometry”.
Only the wording is the same, he explained: “the thought content is diﬀerent in every diﬀerent
geometry”—that’s CET again. I side with Hilbert’s reply (p. 51): “a concept can be ĕxed logically
only by its relations to other concepts”.
I take this view of the Category eory approach to object individuation from Lawvere and
Rosebrugh (2003: ix). Relational views of meaning are also operative in Cro (2001), Goldberg
(1995, 2006), Hudson (2007) and Fine (2007). Inferential properties do play a major part in estab-
lishing an expression’s cognitive proĕle. RCM is however more radically anti-representationalist
than Brandom (1994, 2000, 2008) for I discount the possibility of deĕning content in terms of in-
compatibilities—I take Wright (2001a: 350) to have disclosed the hidden representationalist com-
mitments of that notion.
If one complains that this leaves the grounding of those judgements obscure, I reply: quite so.
In that respect, but in that respect alone, I share Segal’s (2000) slim notion of content.
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role (unbeknownst to us) inmaking content determinate: such things
can do no more than merely force parochial agreement; they leave
content absolutely untouched in its stubborn minimality.
Onmy view, then, content remains ĕrmly sub-propositional (in the
traditional sense) all the way through.
Properly speaking, then, sentence-type semantics is no semantics
at all. And competence is not competence with abstract types,
for the very simple reason that there is no such thing as the null-
context, or the entertaining of types in abstraction from all contexts.
We always think in a context (even when we write books about se-
mantics), we project ourselves in a context, and we always entertain
sentence-tokens in a given (if possibly highly etiolated) context. In
other words, competence is grasp of prototypical tokens, not of fully
de-contextualised types.
How do we succeed in referring to each of the ways for things to be
round, then? Well, here’s where I also part company with the com-
posite views of content I clustered under iv) and v) above. For, as I’ve
just said, I do not think that content is made determinate by some
kind of compounding of semantics and situatedness.
Situatedness, that is, does not add sharpness to our concepts (or ex-
pressions). It just makes it appropriate to treat concepts (and expres-
sions) as if they were sharp, given the purposes and norms operative
within that situation.
What situatedness does provide is enabling conditions for certain
judgements about the appropriateness or otherwise of e.g. asserting
a sentence in a given context. But these conditions are neither
at’s where I think I depart from Searle’s view.
Relatedly, I also reject the claim typicallymade byminimalists that pragmatics does not intrude
on semantic content, for I happen to think both that settled semantic content is shaped by pragmatic
concerns that have seeped into the very fabric of language and that without continuing pragmatic
input there is no individuation of content at all. e compositional machinery however operates
only on radicallyminimal semantic content.
ParaphrasingTennyson, such a semanticswould indeed be so careful of the type and so careless
of the single token. ere’s however a contrary argument (which I reject) to the extent that our
competence is competencewith types, and that there could be no semantics of tokens because unless
we can identify a token as the token of a certain type, there’s no individuation of content-in-context.
See e.g. Bach (1994a: 85-86).
Again, I should address Fodor’s (1998: ch. 5) anti-prototype argument here, but lack of space
prevents me from doing so. At any rate, my view of prototypes diﬀers from the one targeted by
Fodor.
Talk of enabling conditions may invite comparison with discussions of content externalism. I
would not discourage that. If you want to think of enabling conditions as the obtaining of certain
causal relations between our words and the world, I won’t object to that either. What I resist is
the claim that those relations are in any non-trivial way determined by our words (or theories).
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amenable to theoretical treatment nor do they succeed in CET-ĕxing
content (not even in ways beyond our ken).
Mine, in short, is a kind of reverse Humeanism about semantics
(and thought): it’s not our mind spreading over the world; it’s not
even the world spreading onto our words. It’s rather that we simply
get our projections thrown back at us in our words. And at no
point in the procedure is there determinacy.
To see the contrast with the view from which we started, con-
sider once again Frege’s (: /) take on the matter: “e
word ‘interpretation’ [Deutung] is objectionable, for when properly
expressed, a thought leaves no room for diﬀerent interpretations.”
Given the semanticist framework, there is no alternative but to take
that view: once we reach Bedeutung, we ĕnd its Deutung built right
into it.
Determinacy is thus the absence, indeed the exclusion of alternatives
(and the process of interpretation is therefore seen as the decremental
shedding of discarded alternatives until a unique last candidate is le
standing).
I hope I’ve convinced (or perhaps reminded) you of the reasons
why the Fregean position is mistaken (it paints us into a very tight
epistemic corner indeed).
Our problem seemed to be how to express unambiguous thoughts
by guesswork-ridden means (and in response one gestured impa-
tiently at the limitative features of NL that logic was speciĕcally de-
signed to redress).
e real obstacle, however, resided in the mistaken conception of
the stuﬀ we were trying to express in the ĕrst place. It is the mistaken
Barwise (1989: 66-67) points out that there are some components of circumstances that are both
unarticulated and non-constituents; that is, they are neither part of the syntax (hidden or overt)
nor of the context as described/evoked by the propositional content. ey are in eﬀect Searlean
background conditions, or rather background conventions. Barwise notes correctly that the dividing
line betweenwhen a certain piece of information goes into the background or into the propositional
content is not a sharp one. It varies across time and contexts.
Strawson (1998: 24) had concluded that contextual inĘuence on content cannot be reduced
to “precisely statable rules”. My point is that it cannot be reduced to rules at all, for in a very good
sense there is no inĘuence of context on content (only on truth value). RCM is a strongly invariantist
conception of content, that is.
I reinforce and widen Investigations §104, that is: the objects of our thought are methods of
representation, whether or not they are actually world-directed. And our thoughts can have no
more determinacy than those methods aﬀord. However, RCM is no neo-Lockean ideationism.
e play on words here is lame: we are supposed to talk about Sinn here. But think of Bedeu-
tung as the semanticist’s notion of semantic content.
I cannot resist the (mischievous) temptation to invoke e.g. Rorty (1978): what I have been
(surreptitiously) urging throughout this dissertation is that, yes, philosophy is a kind of writing.
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view of (perfect) thoughts that generated a mistaken view of (imper-
fect) language.
In response to our original diﬃculty, it should now be clear that I do
not accept what I take to be a grave non sequitur which e.g. Dummett
(: ) is guilty of when he moves from the Travis-like observation
that (something like) the CET considerations force us “to consider
statements, not as mere concatenations of words, but as subject to
particular ways of understanding them” to the Frege-friendly con-
clusion (introduced via a wholly misguided ‘that is’) that those ways
express “speciĕc thoughts and propositions”.
is is the conclusion I’ve spent the previous chapters trying to un-
dermine. It is shared by all positions on the table (bar Travis’), and
it is the idea that the end result of interpretation is, if not a speciĕc
thought outright, something (a Kaplanian character perhaps in need
of integration via a logic of ‘understandings’) that nevertheless can
take us, given certain background conditions in place, to a speciĕc
thought.
What divides the opposing accounts which I have rehearsed un-
til now is disagreement over the ways (and means) by which we get
to that ĕnal stage in the interpretive process. All accounts however
agree on the contention that we get there all right, that we do achieve
determinacy, one way or another. Or else, we’re invariably told, how
could we possibly understand each other?
is is what I want to resist and the thing is: if their picture were
accurate, we could not understand each other (and logic could not be
the science of reasoning, and semantics could impose no normative
guidance on use).
Given the facts about our language, determinacy in the hugely ro-
bust sense assumed by all participants in the dispute would be an ob-
stacle to understanding. Fully determinate thoughts (or partially de-
terminate thoughts made precise by grasp of situatedness) would be
computationally opaque and thus beyond our cognitive reach.
Similarly, Fregean meaning functions that would unerringly deter-
mine the content of our expressions would transcend our cognitive
powers—there could be no agreement on their deliverances.
And this is also why a move to a character-level logic (and seman-
e account of communication in Bilgrami (1992) was meant to address this diﬃculty in the
semanticist account. I do not think it succeeds but I have no space to argue for this here.
e point is made repeatedly in Travis’ work, see for instance Travis (2006b: 134-39). As
Sainsbury (2001: 203) notes, Travis-meaning is both unspeciĕc and interest-relative. More gener-
ally, Fregean meaning functions would fall foul of Peacocke’s Integration Challenge by supposing
(to paraphrase Johnston 1989: 171) that the demands of semantics could be thoroughly indepen-
dent of our ability to respond to them.
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tics) cannot solve our diﬃculty. For the transition from character
to content cannot be disciplinedwith the required degree of formality
either—again, all we’re doing is shiing the CET problem at diﬀer-
ent joints in the machinery; the problematic assumption that at some
node there is a uniquely determined instruction (or set thereof) re-
mains in place.
e upshot then is that there can be no more precision to our
thoughts than what is secured by our agreements-in-judgement (and
openness to negotiation under reĘective scrutiny).
6.5.1. AWrong Turn?
So, do I think that my RCM is the way forward, indeed the way out of
all the worries that I have raised up to now? Or couldn’t one rather say
that in fact RCM is the fruit of yet another deep confusion between
competence and performance, in the sense that it overlooks the possi-
bility that the semanticist might simply say that “cognitive processes
can be sensitive to available evidence without having to represent all
of it explicitly”?
is latter thought is basically on a par with one obvious way of
reading the McGinn idea I sketched at the end of the last chapter: the
fact that linguistic representation ought to be receptive to contextual
factors does not entail that it has to incorporate those factors into its
own content.
Sure, our use of language is receptive to content-ĕxing contextual
elements that elude representation, the objection goes. It does not
follow from that consideration that content itself cannot ever be de-
terminate—and indeed (and moreover), RCM does get the direction
of ĕt (aswell as the explanatory priority) back to front: we best explain
agreement in judgement as recognition of an antecedent ĕt between
possible sharpenings of our expressions and worldly facts.
e charge would then be that I’ve simply badly misread the
Of the kind sketched in e.g. Williamson’s (2009) response to Travis.
Suppose we give a logic of characters: the problem then becomes how we can ensure that the
move from type to token preserves validity. We need a guarantee, that is, that whatever features
of an expression we have identiĕed at the type level is preserved when we move to its tokenings.
Dever (2006: 655) points out some diﬃculties with reference to the compositionality of characters.
See also Schiﬀer (2003: 120) for the remark that there are sentence-types whose character does not
determine content (I take Schiﬀer to be saying that for some sentence-types, the characters we can
formulate are too imprecise to determine content).
is is where the connection with Scanlon’s (1998: 368) notion of reĘective modiĕcation
comes into play.
Bach (2007: 40).
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purposes of the semanticist project whenever I’ve assumed that
e.g. Clause-indexicalismwas committed to the claim that thematerial
in the semantic clauses had to be taken as internal to linguistic rep-
resentation (i.e. as part of the very content semantically expressed).
Well, I do not think RCM is guilty of a conĘation that suppos-
edly ĕrst lands us into (largely spurious) diﬃculties which are then
taken to motivate the minimalist turn. e default position in se-
mantics is still that meaning is given by stating syntax-determined
truth-conditions and that a compositional semantics maps out the
connections between expressions that generate those conditions.
As long as this remains the paradigm in semantics, it will follow
that the stuﬀ in the semantic clauses (the worldly conditions) is part
of the content expressed in a context (that’s what a tokening of a given
sentence picks out)—or else, what would the MDP amounts to?
When I utter a true sentence, on the semanticist picture I am saying
that the world is thus-and-so, I am giving a precise description of the
world such that the sentence can be compared to the world and when
things are as the semanticist’s clauses say they are, then, and only then,
will the sentence be true.
Accordingly, the suggestion that we ought to separate the theorist’s
posits from the question of speakers’ cognitive access to those posits
is, it seems to me, a red herring—sure, RCM itself is committed to
a very similar idea, namely, that of enabling conditions which elude
representation; but it is distinctive of RCM that there is no corre-
sponding commitment to the idea that those conditions are in any
way part of what a particular use of a sentence says (or determines).
Hence I reject Bach’s (and others’) dismissal of pragmaticist objec-
tions to the traditional conception of semantics (and its possible use
against RCM as well).
6.6. Six Objections to RCM
What now of the positive part of the RCM proposal? How plausible
is it? Let me voice some concerns that might well throw the tenability
of RCM into doubt.
For a start, RCM seems to be Ęattening out a whole ra of good
(if contentious) distinctions regarding diﬀerent levels of content-
“completeness” (corresponding to diﬀerent conceptions of ‘what is
said’). We seem e.g. to have a rather ĕrm intuition that ‘Tipper is
e materials for an objection along these lines are to be found in the discussion in Bach
(1994b: 268-9).
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ready’ is less complete than ‘Tipper is ready for the hunt’, for instance.
If we deny that we ever approximate (let alone reach) a fully com-
plete propositional content, it seems as if we lose perfectly workable
distinctions of this kind (we should recognise, that is, that although
each step in the completion process does introduce fresh ambiguities
it also seems to remove pre-existing ones: some aspects of content are
made more precise as the expansion process unfolds).
Secondly, we seem to lose a basic principle that is widely accepted in
semantics, namely, that a diﬀerence in truth-conditions points out to
some (potential, at least) diﬀerence in content. For, under RCM, dif-
ferences in truth-value assignments seems relatively unconstrained
by the semantics—it is up to the judgements of competent speakers,
given the enabling conditions provided by the background, to assign
a certain truth-value to a sentence (and those judgements are guided
by the adoption of the supra-semantic notion of understandings: it is
this notion that makes a diﬀerence to truth-value assignments).
It therefore looks, again, as if we are losing a perfectly good opera-
tive distinction that allowed us to individuate content fairly precisely
(what mattered to a piece of content being the content it is was the
diﬀerence it could make to the truth-conditions of expressions under
embedment; there are no prospects, however, for a logic of under-
standings, given that the variety of transitions from content to truth-
value assignment is indeed negotiated on case-by-case basis. It there-
fore looks as if nothing could account for intuitive diﬀerences in the
content of expressions).
irdly, there is something strange about saying that there are rules
of language (or rules of inference) that do somehow determine (in
a more or less loose sense) a level of content that, by RCM’s lights,
is never fully determinate. For there is a plausible principle, which
Aristotle stated in e.g.Nichomachean Ethics (V, , -) that “when
the thing is indeĕnite, so is the rule”. at is, the key idea behind
RCM, that content is rudely minimal but nevertheless disciplined by
rules, seems infected with incoherence.
Fourthly, it seems as if the truth-value ĕxing role of understand-
ere’s a related objection, namely, roughly the same one that I invoked against Emma Borg
back in chapter 2. It was raised by e.g. Blackburn (1986) against Perry’s (1986) account and it con-
cerns precisely the status of content in this sense: for Perry, it is oen a propositional function, not
yet truth-evaluable, while for Blackburn it is counterintuitive to credit thinkers with the thinking
of general properties as characterised by propositional functions rather than speciĕc fully truth-
evaluable contents. I agree fully with Blackburn’s point as an objection against semanticism. As far
as RCM is concerned, though, my claim is that we do entertain thoughts that are themselves ‘in-
complete’ but gain their (non-CET) speciĕcity via embedment (we do not think skeletal matrices
awaiting completion: we think thoughts that are as complete as they’ll ever get).
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ings will cause a proliferation of contradictions (or a slide into un-
restrained relativism: truth is always relative to an understanding).
In a given context (and keeping the facts external to speakers’ judge-
ment ĕxed), the same semantically expressed property (say, round-
ness) will be properly attributed and denied to the same object (say,
a squash ball) by diﬀerent speakers (given their diﬀerent interest-
relative understandings).
Fihly, to the extent that it denies that sentences have truth-
conditions, RCM appears to amount to some form of content irreal-
ism. If so, it seems vulnerable to Boghossian’s (: §III) charge of
incoherence, since in making the claim that all sentences lack truth-
conditions, RCM seems committed to the non-factuality of that very
claim as well as to the attribution of truth-conditions to e.g. the se-
manticist’s meaning theorems (or else, how could those theorems be
false?).
e last and sixth objection is that it is not clear whether RCM is a
semantic theory at all: by denying that we ever entertain fully propo-
sitional content, it seems as if RCM is saying that our attitudes are
non-propositional, that our sentences never express (or communi-
cate) propositional content. And it has long been argued (most fa-
mously in Lewis : ) that a semanticswithout truth-conditions
is no semantics at all (and wasn’t that a key part of RCM’s attack on
semanticism?).
6.6.1. Replies
Before I respond in detail to these objections, let me make clear the
rather obvious fact that much of what I say here is little more than
a promissory note. I needed to do a lot of work to motivate a move
towards a radically minimalist position and I now lack the space for
a full-blown exposition of RCM. Clearly, a thorough defence of RCM
is something for future work. Here I can only indicate its likely direc-
tion.
e RCM reply to the ĕrst two objections is simple: we only have
syntactic criteria for content individuation; the only constraints on
interpretation that ought to be acknowledged are those that rule out
unavailable interpretations rather than those that allegedly determine
the mandated interpretation (even those constraints however have
more limited reach than standardly assumed and they do vary as lan-
guages change, which suggests their privileged status is contingent
Williamson (2009: 379-80) voices these concerns most forcefully.
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and oen enough a mere honoriĕc).
More speciĕcally, while I’m happy to concede the prima facie plau-
sibility of the remarks regarding the contrast between ‘Tipper is ready’
and its possible “completions”, I suggest that further scrutiny should
suggest that those remarks are not as well-grounded as it may seem
at ĕrst.
Consider the move to ‘Tipper is ready for the hunt’; this may in-
deed have made precise the target of Tipper’s readiness. Are we any
the wiser however with regard to what would count as being ready,
given that target? Suﬃciently trained? Properly groomed? Appro-
priately fed? We simply don’t know. And the appearance of determi-
nacy that these questions suggest is, I submit, only an appearance, for
if we stop and ask e.g.: trained in what sense? Stamina? Olfactory
prowess? Team discipline (trained to get along with the other dogs
or with horses, or with strangers, whatever)?—the answer, again, will
be that we just don’t know.
e initial impression of a diﬀerence in determinacy between the
two sentences has thus turned out to be rather deceptive. And in-
deed the undercurrent of this thesis is that we should not derive con-
clusions about underlying structure from the appearance of determi-
nacy, which in itself may only show that a practice is settled, and no
more (it is the settled nature of a given practicewith a term-in-context
that makes questions about its sharpening both otiose and unan-
swerable—and if you think this conjunction is paradoxical, think
again).
So, it seems to me that the contrast between diﬀerent sentences
with respect to the presumed determinacy of their content ought to
be taken exactly at (their syntactic) face value, and I am therefore not
As I mentioned already, linguists have long drawn attention to what language cannot do. See
e.g. Newmeyer (2005: §1.2.2), Hinzen (2006: 167), Pietroski (2005b: §2.1).
Note that it is no reply to say ‘ready for the hunt in some contextually salient way’. at’s not
what wemean, or say, when we entertain the thought-in-context, nor when we consider the expres-
sion in abstraction from its use-in-context—in fact, there’s good reason to think abstractions of this
kind are entirely artiĕcial constructions (see again Taylor 1989: ch. 8 for discussion). Besides, why
would that be an improvement over ‘ready for some contextually salient activity in some contextu-
ally salient way’? Note that each question wemight raise as to the possible sharpenings of an expression
would add one more ‘contextually salient’ clause more or less ad inĕnitum. RCM does away with
all the epicycles, which some might take to be an indication of its better ĕt with the phenomena.
To see how much a practice can do for the appearance of determinacy consider the familiar
diﬃculty that philosophers trained in contemporary analytic philosophy experience when tackling,
say, medieval logic texts, or continental philosophy. Lack of familiarity with the practice of using
certain terms in a certain way does make language opaque to the point of incomprehension for the
uninitiated. And yet to the conĕdent practitioners those texts are as crystalline as the jargon we’ve
been browbeaten into accepting. Once again, familiarity breeds content (and content too).
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sure that RCM is Ęattening out important distinctions bubbling un-
derneath surface structure aer all.
Relatedly, the question of matching all variation in content as a
function of variations in truth value cannot be uncoupled from the
need for the deployment of speakers’ judgement before content can
be ĕxed as univocally as we can ever hope to achieve—the lesson from
NS, I think, is that genuinely novel cases are problematic precisely be-
cause (and to the extent that) we do not (yet) have grammaticalised
access to settled opinion on the matter. Horriĕc as the thought may
sound, I contend that grammar (largely) recapitulates opinion.
With regard to the third objection, themistake here is in thinking of
‘rule’ in the terms made familiar within the semanticist framework.
e point is, RCM rules are always provisional, open to negotiation
and ongoing reĕnement, and so while the indeĕniteness of the rules
fully reĘects the open-endedness of our concepts (and of our prac-
tices), that (in itself) doesn’t lessen the normative import of those
rules, or indeed their status as rules—they are the bearers of norma-
tive properties precisely to the extent that they are parochially grounded
(the rails they lay down are wholly visible and it is we who tighten
their bolts as new sections are added). For we are part of a prac-
tice to the extent that we acknowledge the power of those rules: the
contract we enter into as rational communicators is not negotiated
with unseen and unreachable authorities but rather with our reĘec-
tive peers. is, I think, answers the Dummett Paradox above.
My view on these matters, then, is that we ought to replace the con-
tractual view of meaning (whereby the compositional machinery en-
forces hard, unalterable rules to which we are at all times account-
able) with the contractualist view, whereby meanings and rules are
is goes of course against the revisionary tradition that stems at least from Frege and Russell’s
(1914/1993: 53) eﬀorts to extract logical form from its linguistic “integuments”, but so be it: I’m
Chomskyanlyminimalist at least inmy admiration for the optimal elegance of NL surface structure.
I’m being provocative here, but up to a point. Again, the literature on grammaticalisation
contains pause-giving stuﬀ for the semanticist. See e.g. Hopper and Traugott (1993/2003), Roberts
and Roussou (2003), Traugott and Dasher (2005), Aarts (2007), Ariel (2008) and Muysken (2008).
Even familiar claims about the relationship between linear and hierarchical structure in linguistics
(e.g. Moro 2008: 203-04) heavily rely on theoretical prejudice against, say, claims that there are
non-conĕgurational languages. Note that even leading pragmaticists have what looks like a failure
of nerve on this point. Even Recanati (2010: 117) talks of “special, deviant sense” and “marginal”
cases/scenarios for NS-like strings. Zettel §393 is the antidote here.
I’m here endorsing, modifying and expanding remarks repeatedly made in Travis (2006b).
ese ideas are fairly familiar from discussion in meta-ethics. It may sound heretic if not
outright incoherent to claim that the fabric of contentmay equally be open to negotiation. My point
is that it is of the essence of being the sort of reasoners we are that our concepts are in standing need
of re-negotiation. It’s the haze of use that again obscures this fact.
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negotiable—they are on the same level as more general principles of
morality and practical rationality. Much to Carnap’s dismay, then,
my claim is that in logic, as in language, there are onlymorals.
At this point, the semanticist will recoil in horror and claim that this
makes a mockery of the very idea of accountability and objectivity:
without hard and fast linguistic rules our very thinking threatens to
collapse into generalised incoherence.
My opponent will then insist that theremust be ĕxed points in our
language, that grammar requires Archimedean points, that not ev-
erything can be up for grabs (not everything is up for grabs, not ev-
erything can be put in the lexicon: practice-constraining structure
surely belongs to grammar); it’s already bad enough that we may lack
external leverage in much of our practice, but language, of all things,
language just cannot fall prey to this fate, the horriĕed reaction goes.
In short, theremust be a role for syntax (broadly conceived), if not for
full-blooded semantics, and that is where objectivity resides (indeed,
that is what makes language possible).
I acknowledge the constraining role of syntax. I deny it reaches
out as far as the semanticist (and on occasion, the Chomskyan too)
thinks that it does, though. And I also deny that the lexicon/grammar
division (i.e. the contrast between the idiosyncrasies of the lexicon
and the compositional rules of the grammar, the nasty irregularities
of the tokens and the reassuring regularities of the types) is as sharp
as the semanticist thinks it is (and as indispensable as argued for at
the theoretical level).
Furthermore, I also insist that the search for objectivity, as tradi-
tionally conceived, is as misguided in language as it is elsewhere in
philosophy: all we can have, even in language, is (Rortyean) solidar-
ity among epistemic peers, and we’re much the better for it.
e fact is, we can only be genuinely answerable to our peers; it is
the semanticist idea thatwe could be answerable to the obscure doings
Consider Grice’s own view of the conversational maxims as something that regulates what
might be said (in a deontic sense of ‘might’)—they are “desiderata […] accepted by any rational
discourser” (1981: 185). Discourse is deontically disciplined that is. And this was taken to regulate
the level of post-semantic content. e (bold and I hope not foolish) idea behind the meaning-
contractualism I endorse is instead that deontic criteria are already operative at the level of content.
at’s why I needed ExpNorm in my picture. On contractualism in ethics see e.g. Scanlon (1998:
5).
See e.g. Hinzen (2006: 152-53, 167). I accept, of course I do, that there are constraints on
interpretation imposed by syntax. But again the lessons from ch. 2 should be that those constraints
are not as pervasive and as independent of our doings as the linguist routinely thinks.
See Hudson (2007: 3-4) for some arguments against that division.
See e.g. Rorty (1985).
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of the compositional machinery that is defective (and too horrible to
contemplate).
Fear of parochialism, then, is simply misplaced, since only
parochialism can genuinely constrain our language, and our logic too
is much the richer for it.
e problem, and it’s an awkward one, is to give an account of
parochialismwith a godly face, as it were, while resisting the temp-
tation to try and incorporate parochialism into our machine and to
think that we could have semanticist compositionality with a human
face.
e machine and our parochial input, rather, are to be taken as
both distinct and intertwined. If we are genuinely interested in the
workings of language, then the facts about our competence demand
that we view the machine as independent but only as a function of its
embedment within a wider normative practice.
It is the machine’s relative independence that generates radically
minimal content: how that content gets assigned a truth value, how-
ever, is a matter (largely) for our judgement (MDP and UaKTC must
go, that is).
Since the transition from content to truth-value assignments is es-
sentially regulated by our judgements, it follows that the structure of
the machine itself must reĘect our normative stance towards the world:
without that stance, the machine is blind.
It also follows that the best theory of competence must indeed be
structure-reĘecting (just as the semanticist insisted), but the struc-
ture itself is in turn judgement-reĘecting, for the steps along the route
from sense to reference are not determined by the machine alone but
are essentially guided by our judgements (our sensitivity to particular
reasons-in-context).
I am not sure whether here I’m simply speaking diﬀerently, rather than arguing well. For Rorty
(1989a: 7) with his Kuhnian hat on, speaking diﬀerently is all that is required for cultural change.
I’m hoping I have also provided some arguments along the way
Defences of parochialism can be found in Rorty (1985: 21), Gibbard (1990: ch. 10) and Travis
(2006b: 107, 115). Speciĕcally, Travis’ suggestion is that themost a rule can do is give a prescription
under a parochial understanding of it. I am aware of a seeming paradox in this area, for that pre-
scription will strike us as reasonable only under an equally parochial understanding of ‘reasonable’.
Make of that what you will.
A reversal and adaption of the title of Putnam (1990).
What powers the machinery is the kind of rationality sketched in Scanlon (1998: 25).
See also Sellars (1954: 340). is is a good place to stress again the diﬀerence between RCM
and other forms of minimalism. Borg’s view of content in eﬀect is anything but minimal: for her,
the semantic content of a sentence determines (and presumably expresses) a large class of possible
states of aﬀairs thatmay satisfy a sentence (byminimalmeans, content represents huge chunks of re-
ality); Cappelen and Lepore’s view is that we explain the apparent disconnection between minimal
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e overall structure of the machine-cum-judgements is there-
fore constitutive of our ethical stance as agents-in-the-world under a
standing obligation to renegotiate our epistemic position, including
our semantic beliefs (and it is those beliefs that prime themachine).
But what of the fourth objection, the charge that RCM will spawn
contradictions at the drop of a ball (one and the same ball will both
be roundRCM and not roundRCM)? Isn’t a theory of meaning that dis-
penses contradictions with such abandon a bad theory, one that pre-
cipitates everything into triviality right from the start?
Well, in response, let me ĕrst note that in dealing with the Travis
eﬀect the semanticist alternative to RCM goes through an appeal to
the character/content distinction. e apparent contradictions are
thus smoothed out by cutting content as ĕnely as there are contexts
of utterance/evaluation. I have already rejected this move at several
places in this thesis. But as far as RCM is concerned, the point is that
there can be no assignment of truth value until an expression has been
taken under a certain understanding. In other words, the content of an
expression, in and of itself, is never truth-evaluable, so it is a category
mistake (!) to think there is a contradiction at all here (the enabling
conditions are diﬀerent, and so is the appropriate assignment of truth
value).
Similar considerations would apply to a related objection one could
make, namely, that RCM faces a diﬃculty in giving a smooth account
of bog-standard cases of ambiguity: when I think to myself “that’s a
nice bank”, which minimal content am I entertaining, and is it diﬀer-
ent if I’m embedded in a river-scenario or in a ĕnancial institution-
semantic content and truth-value variation across contexts by appeal to speech act theory (with the
result that we say false things a lot of the time); Soames’ minimalism (especially in his (2005a) revi-
sion) is another form of CET, for he takes sentential content to be a propositional matrix awaiting
completion-in-context. By contrast, RCM keeps content genuinely minimal at all times. Whether
we say true things is for our judgements to establish. e compositional machinery is silent on that.
I am pleased that even a Chomskyan like Newmeyer (2005: 116) acknowledges the limit of
syntax in this respect.
Williamson (2009), and the similar move in Predelli (2005).
Williamson (2009: 379) constructs the problematic case for a version of RCM by recourse to a
‘says that’ clause exploiting Travis’ contention that homophonic reporting is allowed for the Travis
sentence (unlike, say, with indexicals): “is ball is round andMary truly says that it isn’t”. e point
however is that the mid-sentence switch in understandings blocks the conjunction introduction
move. Clearly this makes the ‘says that’ operator a non-extensional one, which seems to require
extensive revision of our practices—and wouldn’t a contextualist account presupposing a diﬀerence
in content between the properties ascribed in the two conjuncts be the obvious, most natural way of
dealing with a case of this kind? Two quick remarks: all solutions have costs anyway; I’m happy to
shoulder this particular one; quotation is messy anyway and quite oen we read indirect quotation
as being direct instead.
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scenario? Clearly, if I say that there is a diﬀerence, I am embarking
on the same path as the semanticist; if I say the entertained content
is the same, I am defying common-sense.
Well, shocking as it may seem, the CRM reply is that I’m entertain-
ing exactly the same piece of content in the two cases. Expressions
only acquire a meaning in virtue of a network of relations that con-
nect them to other expressions, their causal histories, a community
practice with them, their contextual embedment, our speciĕc inter-
ests and so forth.
ere is no surprise in the fact that the very same word acquires
diﬀerent meanings under diﬀerent contextual embedments. We only
ever learn words-in-context. ere is no acquiring competence out-
side of a context. e ambiguity account presupposes not just that
you can take words out of context but that you can also take context
out of words; however, as Dorothy Parker would say, that is some-
thing you can never really do.
According to RCM, then, the environment’s contribution to con-
tent confers determinacy to an attribution of content without imping-
ing in any way at all on the semantic proĕle of the expression.
As for the ĕh objection, Boghossian claims that any form of con-
tent irrealism (any view on which there is no straightforward deter-
I suspect this is where RCM diverges sharply fromWittgenstein’s later view ofmeaning (com-
pare §139-140).
Or should have said, rather.
To repeat, the RCM view is that I entertain the word ‘bank’ neutrally, as it were. Consider a
further example: on my way to the oﬃce, I walk by Inchdairnie Properties, a St Andrews estate
agent. I glance at the sign. I take in, more or less unreĘectively, the shop window, displaying the
usual pictures of Ęats and houses. Do I even for a second entertain the thought that ‘properties’
might play the same role as in ‘Cambridge Properties’ when read in a metaphysics paper? I submit
that in both cases we neutrally entertain the string ‘properties’ and nothing else. And astonishingly
(I know), it’s no diﬀerent at the level of thought. Language is no more than a grid. And a very thin
one at that. Embedment lays that grid down on things andwith any luckwe get where we need to go.
Another objection needs addressing here: surely I cannot be serious in saying that the entertained
content is the same in the two readings of ‘bank’. For a start we can make sense of the claim that
there could (indeed that there are) two readings available. Additionally, my view seems committed
to the incredible claim that we entertain diﬀerent content if we use words for the same thing from
diﬀerent languages (on the face of it, a rather extreme version of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis). Am
I then not confusing the door with the contents of the building? Isn’t it more plausible to think
that in entertaining semantic content we enter into a relation to a (perhaps Russellian) proposition,
and if Salmon (2001) is right, isn’t (something like) this actually necessary for the very possibility
of language? Well, I stand my ground here. On the RCM view, propositions, or something like
them, are essentially embedded entities. Sense is our way into them, but it only gains us access
under embedment. at diﬀerent entities get us to the same place is no objection to my account.
e strangeness is, I contend, entirely an artefact of our training into model-theoretic accounts that
pretend to incorporate the world into their very fabric. Il n’y a pas de hors-texte, honey.
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mination of worldly conditions by the form of the entertained items
of content) is terminally incoherent. My reply is that in taking it as a
given that unless sentences determine truth-conditions there can be
no such thing as content Boghossian is simply begging the question.
In fact, if we heed Evans (: ), Boghossian’s (and Lewis’) claim
must be strengthened to the requirement that a semantics give the ac-
tual truth conditions of sentences. And if the arguments of the pre-
vious chapters were any good, it seems clear that semanticism (and
MDP in particular) does not provide such an account—it gives no
genuine explanation of why an utterance of a sentence is true at a
context. RCM’s claim is that entertained content is always embed-
ded content but sentences (and our thoughts) make only a minimal
contribution to that content.
ere is no greater determinacy to the possible individuation of en-
tertained content than what minimal disquotational means allow.
But that is not a problem for my account because we only assess con-
tent from a context. It is that which secures determinacy, and as I
insisted already several times, that is something that eludes descrip-
tion and indeed theoretical systematisation.
ere’s more, however. Boghossian argues that the irrealist who
endorses
() All sentences of the form “S has truth condition p” are false
is thereby committed to the Liar-like contradictory thought that no
sentence (including (), that is) has a truth condition. But instances of
is is hard to put in clear terms. e idea is that there are two senses of ‘entertain’ at play
here (but they do not coincide, not even modulo the necessary amendments, with the traditional
notions of narrow and wide content). e content we entertain in the ĕrst, weaker sense is what
we actually think (and disquotationally describe); by contrast, the act of entertaining the thought is
environmentally embedded. So, it is the act of thinking it that thickens radically minimal content,
but in this second sense it is not a sort of content that we could think (the thickening is carried out
by the act of thinking-in-context but all along the object of thought remains minimal). So when I
speak of entertained content what I mean is: radically minimal content being entertained thickly.
I am not yet sure what RCM should say about false thoughts and Scheingedanken—how can mere
thinking do the thickening in those cases?
Here’s another objection: we have (what we think of as) a well-understood grasp of quantiĕ-
cation and, relatedly, of diﬀerent levels of (semantic) abstraction. Compare ‘x is F’, ‘x is hungry’
and ‘John is hungry’. If semantic content is always radically minimal, doesn’t RCM Ęatten out all
such distinctions? Well, on the contrary: it is the semanticist (and the pragmaticist) who let go
of useful distinctions here, for oen enough they maintain that NL sentences are mere matrices,
propositional functions, and the like. For RCM, in contrast, those three strings are indeed diﬀer-
ent and express diﬀerent thoughts, made determinate-in-context by various situated embeddings. It
would take a rather long time to explain what RCMhas to say about the notion of object-dependent
thought, incidentally.
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the quoted sentence in () can only be false, we are then told, if they do
have truth conditions. Hence, content irrealism both attributes and
denies the possession of truth conditions to sentences of that form.
RCM denies this is the case at all. Boghossian’s objection confuses
having warrant to deny that a sentence has truth conditions as the
notion is deployed by semanticists with the semanticist requirement
that without truth conditions there is no asserting that a sentence is
false.
If I deny that the inferential rules for tonk aremeaning-constitutive,
if I deny that any sentence having tonk as its main connective does
have a truth-condition, I need not presuppose that tonk determines a
truth condition. Boghossian himself is on record as denying precisely
this. I doubt he would want to encourage the thought that he was
thereby committed to a contradiction.
e fact is, it is perfectly coherent to deny that sentences have truth
conditions as standardly intendedwhile insisting that one has warrant
for that denial.
On the ĕnal objection that RCM is no semantics at all: I borrow
from Travis (a: ) the ground rule that semantics ought to at-
tribute to expressions semantic properties that expressions do have
(rather than those fantasised about by over-eager theorists). If so,
RCM is a semantics, to the extent that it respects attribution to expres-
sions of the minimal properties that our best syntactic theory (once
divested of its occasional excesses) says they have. e thing that
must be stabilised of course is the idea that we can individuate con-
tent ĕnely enough without recourse to the traditional conception of
truth-conditions. Again, that calls for further work, but I do not see
in principle obstacles to achieving that goal.
ere are remaining worries of course, in particular the fact that
RCM appears to be but a (rather extreme) version of truth-relativism,
with all the attendant and familiar problems. Recall however that
See e.g. Boghossian (2001, 2003).
As my discussion of Chomsky’s conception back in chapter 2 made clear, I agree with much
of that framework but resist conclusions about the deĕnitive status of sub-categorisation principles.
On my view, syntax is both more and less autonomous of semantics than on Chomsky’s view. It is
even more detached from the world and from robustly conceived reference relations (for I deny the
existence of the category of grammatical nonsense), but it is less autonomous than on his view to
the extent that worldly inĘuences have seeped into the priming of e.g. -properties.
How would RCM account for disagreement? Could it give an account in terms of cognitive
shortcoming—as urged e.g. by Wright (1992: 14)? e diﬃculty is that RCM seems forced to say
that when opinions clash we disagree not about content but about whether the enabling conditions
justify assertion of a certain minimal piece of content. Trouble is, we lack the means so much as to
describe those conditions; we lack, that is, the verymeans to spell out the details of the disagreement
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RCM’s claim is that convergence in understanding is an enabling con-
dition, not something that is part of the machinery itself—we assume
convergence and we then assign truth values absolutely. I therefore
do not think that relativistic worries are justiĕed here—on the RCM
view, the standpoint is not agent-relative: it is convergence-relative,
and that’s the best shot we can take at objectivity.
6.7. Conclusion
Let me now add a few more details regarding the RCM proposal.
We started oﬀ with the appealing thought that our self-constitution
as rational agents seems to require an account in terms of rules rather
than of habits. Language is, clearly enough, the distinguished homeof
our rationality, and our diﬃculty was to locate a rule-based account
for it that wouldmake its normative hold on our practices suﬃciently
detached from best opinion tomake it capable of guiding us in appro-
priate ways, without doing violence either to the known facts about
language itself (its relative structural independence, its internal laws),
or to intuitively desirable constraints on our epistemic access to those
rules.
Over the previous chapters, I have assembled what I think are good
reasons to argue that the compositional rules fall short of full deter-
mination for both meaning and truth-conditions. An account that
incorporated our responses (our judgements as to the obtaining of
those conditions) right in the driving seat appeared just as problem-
atic, for it is unclear how we could secure the required a priori con-
nections between the judgements of ideal speakers and the truth of
those judgements, given the elusiveness of the required idealisation.
e diﬃculty then was that on neither account do we have a vin-
(and hence for mapping the road to conĘict-resolution). e diﬃculty is sharp but I think there is
space for saying that our sensitivity to pro tanto reasons-in-context tracks the obtaining of the ap-
propriate enabling conditions in a manner that although not amenable to theoretical description is
nevertheless answerable to peer-review. e shortcoming is therefore eminently ethical—the guilty
party failed to detect properties that resist formalisation but that we are nonetheless under a stand-
ing obligation to respond to. e improvement over semanticism is that under RCM room is made
for our tinkering with the compositional machinery (we are entitled to challenge settled opinion as
encased in the rules of grammar).
Skorupski’s (1985; 2010) work on the notion of convergence provides the beginning of an ac-
count in this direction. If you want to call my position semantic irrealism, I won’t be oﬀended
(contra Wiggins (1987), I don’t accept that convergence has to be the mark of truth). Of course, I
concede that more work is needed to stabilise the view, but in this dissertation my main concern
is with providing motives to move away from the CET-inĘuenced picture. I am still working on
making RCM a compelling view in its own right (and to myself in the ĕrst place).
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dication of our practices (let alone their justiĕcation), for on the
Fregean account we posit inĘexible rules that supposedly map sloppy
expressions to sharply deĕned concepts, whereas on the alternative
account the circumstances of our agreement in judgements are le
just as mysterious as the Platonistic epistemology it was purporting
to leave behind. e mechanisms that are supposedly ensuring
agreement and tracking in the respective accounts, that is, seem to be
le Ęoating in an epistemic void.
In response to these diﬃculties, the basic idea behind RCM is that
we should move away from a conception of the compositional ma-
chinery as presiding over a calculus of standing reasons based on rules
(with rules deĕned as unerring Fregean functions beyond our epis-
temic reach) to a conception whereby what themachinery disciplines
is, rather, a calculus of entrenched reasons (those generated by logic
and semantics qua Kuhnianly normal disciplines).
e traditional contractual picture of meaning whereby we dele-
gate the task of determining complex meanings to compositional de-
vices should therefore be replaced with a contractualist view, where
the commitments we incur with respect to atomic meanings are only
provisional and do not as yet suﬃce to force a corresponding com-
mitment with respect to complex meanings.
As we confront genuinely new complex meanings, the old lexical
meanings have to be revised, and on occasion even our conceptual
scheme may need revising—in eﬀect, a new concept comes to be de-
termined as we grasp new content that wasn’t contained in the original
stipulations for the atoms.
Moreover, the gradience from the grammar to the lexicon is never
sharp, but, again, is always provisional, for revisions to meanings and
concepts will also force changes in grammatical categories and hence
in the compositional machinery itself.
In short, CC has engendered an illusion of productive understand-
ing that we must be rid of: if understanding is knowledge of truth-
conditions robustly conceived, then we do not understand genuinely
novel sentences. And when we do understand them, we do not do
so from the bottom up anyway. At best, PoC explains judgements
I’m simplifying horrendously here, of course. But Wright’s (2007) most recent reĘections on
thesematters are remarkably honest in the assessment of the diﬃculties in stabilising an RD account
in this area.
Does this not concede that the machinery did determine complex meanings on the basis of
the oldmeanings? Here I can only answer: yes and no.
See again footnote 141 ch. 2.
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regarding settled meanings.
My account does incorporate opinion, but not as an a priori con-
straint on meaning-determination. It is, so to speak, structure-
inĘected opinion that can properly be said to determine extension-
under-embedment. is, I think answers the EP and illuminates
the CC/PoC connection in a manner that is more respectful of the
facts than semanticism.
But what of the RFC challenge to the very idea that we can inter-
pret signs without getting caught in a vicious regress? Well, in tacitly
agreeing on what counts as a reasonable interpretation-in-context, it
is correct to say that we go beyond the evidence-in-context (linguistic
and worldly), for countless alternative interpretations are available,
given the facts and dispositions in that context.
In settling on what counts as reasonable, in that context, it might
then seem that we fall prey to mere habit rather than engaging in a
rational response to properly salient rules. But in fact, what we do do
is properly (i.e. rationally) ignore alternative interpretations.
So, the blindness in our basic reasoning, our blind submission to
rules of language that we cannot raise to consciousness on pain of
paradox, remains nevertheless fully rational because, contrary to a
suggestion in Pettit (b: ), it is not due to lack of imagination—it
is most resolutely not a cognitive failure.
Wittgensteinian blind obedience to the rules, rather, is properly
seen as a semantic blindsight phenomenon: interpretive choices that
are unwarranted by our embedment go unseen.
Given the facts about our contextual embedment, that is, doubts
But even there, the empirical evidence is inconclusive. Some results seem to indicate a dif-
ference in processing speed between idioms and compositionally-generated meanings (Ariel 2008:
208-09). Other results suggest we seldom make recourse to compositional rules in parsing mean-
ings. See the already-cited Dąbrowska (2004: ch. 2).
To adapt Evans (1982: 209, fn. 7), best opinion is driven by structured responses to situations.
Chomsky (1986: 263-264) draws a fascinating parallel between the reliance on background
assumptions that is built into our judgements about moving objects (on observing a head turning
to face us in the distance, the visual evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that the person has
changed shape, not that she has turned round) and a parallel dependency in the case of judgements
about sententialmeanings. It is a network of background assumptions that secures stability for our
meanings just as it does for our perceptual judgements.
Am I sliding into a form of Relevance eory here? I don’t think so, at least in the sense that
I am not positing determinate candidate interpretations there for the taking. Properly speaking, on
the RCM view our expressions are not interpreted at all. As soon as interpretive doubt is raised,
there is no possibility of neutralising it—the evidence is always compatible with indeĕnitely many
readings (and the standard Chomskyan invocation of nativismmerely pushes the problem one step
back). Note a double sense of blindsight here: enabling conditions are seen (Luntley 2003: 50) and
responded to, while we are desensitised to blind semantic alleys.
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concerning interpretation cannot even arise, because it is that embed-
ment (and nothing else) that has sharpened content and neutralised
alternative readings of the expressions—those readings could not even
be salient.
Now, this is of course all too quick, but there are two important
points to note here.
First, the blocking of alternatives is only temporary, and it is ra-
tional inasmuch as the set of Exp-norms in force in the practice as
a whole is itself temporary (it is amenable to self-correction at any
time, at any node in the belief system).
Secondly, we are conĕned within minimal content at all times
(there’s nothing, or at least very little, beyond disquotation). Lan-
guage, that is, generates genuinely and irreducibly skeletal content and
it is our situatedness that makes it as determinate as it’ll ever get.
In other words, there is in our practices an illusion of determinacy
which, given the circumstances, is entirely harmless; harm (and vi-
cious paradox) ensues if we try to make content determinate.
Our thinking operates, in essence, on radically minimal pieces of
content. But we are fully rational in treating them as if they were fully
determinate thoughts because it is facts about our embedment that
secure whatever determinacy can be achieved for them— here’s an-
other slogan: no identity without embedment.
Here I disagree with the otherwise penetrating analysis in Staten (1984: 105) that in “yielding
to the automatism of language” as we follow rules we are also “multiplying possibilities” and “creat-
ing alternatives” (that’s, I suppose, an allusion to the intrinsic polysemy of the sign that so exercises
Derrida 1972: 2). What matters, rather, is our rightful blocking oﬀ of interpretative side-roads. And
to answer McDowell’s (1987: 96) question regarding the right with which one ignore alternatives:
there is no one story to tell about that.
Just as Sellars (1956: 170) had famously taught us. Lance and O’Leary-Hawthorne (1997:
131ﬀ.) develop the theme further. It is a delicate question how far we can push the analogy with
other enterprises. An obvious analogy is with positions in metaethics such as Scanlon (1998), Gib-
bard (1990) and Skorupski (2010). e diﬃculty is to imagine what, say, radical contractualism
about semantics would really amount to. Skorupski’s (1996: 73) deĕnition of convergence as the
mutual recognition by epistemic peers of the rationality of one’s commitments is promising, but
there remain lingering doubts as to whether an approach of this kind can get the explanatory prior-
ity right. As I say in the text, the truth of the matter is more likely to be that there is no single source
for the authority of language over us.
My earlier talk of alternative readings may have suggested that determinacy of content was
waiting in the wings, as it were. at, I think, is a temptation to be resisted, or else we end up
making this proposal just as incoherent as the two alternatives from which we started. It is not that
we have fully complete interpretations awaiting selection. at is precisely what the RFC forbid.
All candidate pieces of content are incomplete. Again, it is our situatedness that bestows as much
determinacy as they’ll ever get.
Undoubtedly, I’m here sympathetic to the anti-representationalist strain in e.g. Taylor (1980)
and much of Rorty, in particular, I suppose, his (1989a). But Chomsky too is deeply anti-
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Unless I am mistaken, it seems to me that this qualiĕes as a form
of meaning rationalism in the sense sketched above. We are sensitive
and answerable to reasons which are made precise (and normatively
relevant) by facts about our situatedness that do escape systematisa-
tion (those facts are enabling conditions for our thinking, they cannot
be represented in our thinking, nor can they be captured theoreti-
cally).
Accordingly, our rationality is fully preserved even in the face of
apparently blind reasoning precisely because we display sensitivity to
reasons which are made salient only by facts about our situatedness.
And so the norms of meaning-expectation that I sketched in sec-
tion .. with respect to reasons-meanings pairings are themselves
(partly) grounded in facts about our very situatedness. Given those
(ineﬀable) facts, the rational thing to do is to issue certain kinds of
judgement. is, I think, answers the RFC paradox (as best as we
can, at least).
Note however that judgements thus grounded are not extension-
determining properly speaking. Rather, they reĘect facts about exten-
sions that are (partly) determined by the practice as a whole (by our
rationally taking our embedment as simultaneously content-ĕxing
and reasons-generating in the appropriate way).
One might nonetheless complain that this proposal seems to leave
largely untouched the greater puzzle about language: its ability to
point in indeĕnitely many directions and our ability rationally to se-
lect the correct direction-in-context without having to give thanks to
representationalist with respect to the properties of expressions. I like to think that RCM (but not
Chomsky) does take the full measure of that stance.
Here there are points of contact with Searle (1980, 1983a), Glendinning (1998: ch. 8) and
Dancy (2004: ch. 11.2).
e RCM picture here is that in asserting the minimal content (I won’t call it a proposition,
because strictly speaking we are not asserting a proposition), we are saying that there are enough
grounds available in the context for us to commit ourselves to the truth of the statement made by
our use of a certain sentence. e crucial point is that neither the sentence nor the context uniquely
determine which grounds will warrant assertion. What makes one judgement more justiĕed than
other, then? Sadly, neither we nor our theories can provide an answer to that. Am I ducking out
of the issue? Isn’t semanticism explanatorily superior to RCM in that respect? No, on either count.
ere is no one answer to that question. And semanticismmisrepresents the facts grounding agree-
ment by pretending that there is. Is RCM-sensitivity-to-reasons-in-context then a form of semantic
epistemicism—didn’t aer all Williamson (2000: 180) speak of epistemic agents as “causally sensi-
tive” to evidence beyond their direct grasp? Well, it is and it isn’t. We draw boundaries that cannot
be given (Investigations §68). See also Richard (2008: 3).
In a sense, the role of our decisions is thus only partially extension-determining. Here there
are points of contact with Rayo (2008).
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the Deity for our subsequent agreement in judgement.
Well, much as I dislike hand-waving talk of ‘forms of life’, andmuch
as I wish there was a conceptual analysis account available in this area
to keep us all honest, I cannot see a more promising way of account-
ing for our blind acceptance of judgements about semantic properties
than the one I have just sketched in terms of sensitivity to reasons-in-
context. e puzzle, it seems to me, only persists if we examine lan-
guage in isolation, as if it were, precisely, a formal object—but then,
even formal objects are objects-in-context anyway.
e claim I’ve been labouring towards, then, is that while there
are normative conditions attaching to our expressions, they are al-
ways provisional and largely parasitic on background conditions that
elude articulation. Accordingly, the judgements about their satisfac-
tion that we routinely make are, although fully rational, essentially
pro tanto and pro tem.
In that sense, it is probably correct to say that we do indeed delegate
authority to the compositional machinery, but only with respect to
those selections that we have no reason (or no need) to question. It
is rational to project in the standard cases, that is, because those cases
have already been tested (and if need be, adjusted for). In genuinely
novel cases, however, our judgements play a diﬀerent, extension-
determining role, for the selectional properties of the atoms are not
fully determined until our judgements reset the machinery appropri-
ately.
e Extension Problem, then, has no single solution, but rather
a whole array of them, which is what we should have expected all
along because the authority of language over us has no single source
either but, again, is drawn from a multitude of facts about our em-
bedment.
PI §234.
And just as enabling conditions resist explicit theoretical treatment, so does agreement—they
both are presuppositions for meaningfulness (Zettel §430). But again, RCM departs from Chom-
skyan orthodoxy in thinking that the agreement is grounded in anthropological (and deeply nor-
mative) facts and not biological ones.
is is where I strongly disagree with Chomsky’s idea that deviant sentences require an in-
terpretive eﬀort, whereas standard sentences impose an interpretation irrespective of our judge-
ments. is confuses semantic entrenchment with the presumed facts of ‘natural’ necessity, as the
Chomksyan like to put it—for example, Boeckx (2006: 4), Hinzen (2007: 27). ere are of course
several areas of diﬃculty le unaddressed on my account. Why, for instance, should the RFC not
apply to the judgement that, in a particular case, the PoC-driven selection is indeed a tried-and-
tested one?
To return to the quote from Carnap (1942: §7) I discussed back in §3.2, p. 65, according to
RCM what sentences provide as a starting point for evaluation is a search procedure—my preferred
formal account of this is, near enough, of the kind given in Crouch and van Genabith (1999), Dal-
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And this too is what we should have expected all along, because the
reality confronting our epistemic eﬀorts has an essentially dispersed
nature—it was our our compulsive craving for generality (and our
acquiescence in “the deeply ingrained worship of tidy-looking di-
chotomies”) that made us overlook that.
e title of this dissertation leaves it open that there could be many
routes to and from sense. is is as intended. e account we need is
one that does justice to the many ways in which words are used, the
manyways in which reference is secured, themanyways in which our
skeletal thoughts are made true under contextual embedment.
e long-suﬀering reader will however demand that now I give the
truth-conditions, under my account, for a sentence like ‘John cut the
sun’ (or ‘this chair is brown’ for that matter).
Well, here RCM departs from e.g. Borg’s (: ) minimal con-
ception of liberal truth-conditions that semantically expressed sets of
conditions admit of satisfaction by a wide class of states of aﬀairs. For
on that account it is part of the content of the expression that there be
claimed to be the cutting relation holding between John and the sun.
ere is, of course, no such unique relation. e semantic con-
tent of that sentence is exactly its face-value content, disquotationally
minimal, and no more. Try as we may, we could never specify that
relation, and the problem is not merely one concerning the limitative
powers of the language (of any language), but rather it is a problem
rymple (2001: ch. 9) and Kempson et al. (2001: ch. 3). Unlike these authors, however, I don’t see the
online interpretive search as the progressive reĕnement of content (all of these approaches still fall
within the scope of my CET label). Moreover, I’m quite happy to contemplate empty searches too:
just as nonsense showed, we can entertain perfectly well-formed semantic content that bears no rep-
resentational/referential import. In case there are any doubts le, I’m drastically internalist about
content while remaining sanely externalist about our practices. e thing is, unlike e.g. Stalnaker
(2008: 135)—and any other wholesale (and wholesome) externalist—I do not think that our causal
interactions with the world determine meaning and content. at, I suggest, misconstrues what
embedment is, and what it does to us. Properly speaking, our words do not reach out all the way to
the world, and neither does the world reach all the way to us (content is two-way non-luminous,
that is).
As Edwards (1990: 232) happily put it.
Wittgenstein (1933-35/1958: 17), Austin (1962: 3).
Again go back to Dunbar (2005) for some lessons about the semantics of compound nouns.
e priming and compositional processing of the semantic features of the atoms for the most basic
Merge operations is largely judgement-dependent. It doesn’t follow that it is always so (anaphora
imposes rather strict constraints on interpretation, for instance). And the upshot is: if we can-
not give a unitary semantics for meaning-composition, the insistence that complex meanings are
nonetheless compositionally determined is just sheer dogma. And if you (still) think compound
nouns and nonsense are marginal cases, consider the problems that prepositions pose to PoC (see
e.g. Taylor 1989: §8.3).
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about the metaphysics of properties (there is indeterminacy all the
way down) and content.
It is therefore only facts about our embedment that will make it
rational for us to judge that, given the obtaining of certain other facts,
John did indeed cut the sun. ose facts, as we have seen, are only
partially about our responses, though.
I thus reverse Williamson’s (2003a: 706) judgement and say that the determinacy assumption
embodied in CET and DETL derives linguistic conclusions from ontological prejudice.
ere are of course lots of loose ends in my account. Let me say a few very quick things here.
First, why should we take my account of semantic blindsight as the proper ignoring of alterna-
tives to be any improvement over the Relevance eory (RT) story? On that picture we are at least
given some constraints on interpretation (e.g. the Principle of Relevance) and an explanation of
why speakers home in on a unique interpretive choice. In contrast, to isolate content I merely of-
fered generic (and mysterious) talk of sensitivity-to-reasons-in-context. Well, as I see it, two things
favour RCM: doing away with the problematic assumption of content determinacy removes the in-
coherence that dogged RT; further, the phenomenologically implausible RT claim that content is
always secured inferentially is also removed (on the RCM story, grasp of semantic content is im-
mediate, indeed quasi-perceptual). Secondly, what does RCM have to say about NS? Well, RCM
views syntax as radically independent of reference. We understand NSminimally—grasp of NS con-
tent is exactly the same as grasp of so-called normal sentences; what we lack is enabling conditions
for NS, but in that respect Chesterton’seMan Who Was ursday or Charlie Mingus’ Tonight at
Noon are no odder than the Monty Python cheese shop that doesn’t sell cheese, Tommy Cooper’s
corner shop that sells corners, or Jack Benny’s cat burglar who stole 15 cats last week. RCM, in
short, does away with the MDP and with the untenable commitment to the semanticist claim that
meaning reaches out all the way to the world. irdly, what of the CR? What does RCM say about
that? e reply is that RCM denies there is such a thing as a domain-neutral CR. Just as the radical
Quine insisted, all logical principles are amenable to revision: moreover, there is no theoretical gain
in imposing a CR that would hold (even only provisionally) everywhere. Each domain of enquiry
will impose its own CR and each CR will be incommensurable to the others—logic is the many
sciences of reasoning (I think Sainsbury 2002a has indirectly answered the doubts about radical
Quinianism raised in Wright 1986b and incommensurability should take care of the monistic cri-
tique of pluralism in Priest 2006: ch. 12 and Read 2006). Finally, note that RCM-semantics, like
cognition generally (Williamson 2000: 180), is indeed a highly opportunistic enterprise (Uriagereka
2008: xvi)—but contra Putnam, it’s not sloppy: there is no one single process that secures semantic
content; content-determination is a complex process involving several faculties even with respect
to allegedly pure semantic content; whilst there is still space for grasp of structure under RCM, its
signiĕcance is toned down, since structure itself is seen as the grammaticalisation of past pragmatic
input (see e.g. Kay 1997: 4) and its grasp in any case relies essentially on awareness of ungras-
pable enabling conditions: sensitivity to those reasons is constitutive of our being agents (reasoners,
thinkers, selves). It’s not just that language does a lot more than communicate information (Gib-
bard 1990: 3). It’s that the way in which it carries information reĘects that extra-communicative
(reason-constitutive) function (Valin 2001: 321). at’s why RCM is a proper part of meta-ethics:
you do not place yourself appropriately as an agent in the world until you see the world properly
in terms of responsibly responding to reasons-in-context for the making of certain (reĘective and
unreĘective) judgements regarding the apt employment of sentences. Syntactico-semantic struc-
ture is thus ineliminably ethical to the extent that it requires at all times our validating judgement
(under the constraints above) as to which representational claim is being made and as to whether it
is correctly judged to ĕt the facts. I think this retention of a modiĕed UaGS by RCM should address
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What we require, then, is a dappled semantics that perfectly
matches a dappled world.
Dummett’s (1989: 181-83) powerful objection against Wittgenstenian accounts of meaning. It also
ensures that the facts directly attributable to semantic competence fully rationalise our semantic
beliefs.





CC Creativity Considerations p. 
CET Content Expansionesis p. 
CL Classical Logic p. 
CMP Chomskyan Minimalist Programme p. 
CR Consequence Relation p. 
C-sentence Chomsky-sentence (“colorless green ideas…”) p. 
DETL Determinacy esis for Logic p. 
ECE Epistemic Constraint on Explanation p. 
EP Extension Problem p. 
EPoC Epistemic Principle of Compositionality p. 
ExpNorm Expectation Norms of Meaning p. 
EPU Epistemic Conception of Understanding p. 
GCI Generalised Conventional Implicature p. 
GP Generative Principle p. 
LCB e (genuinely) logical connectives are Boolean p. 
LF Logical Form p. 
LF-Indexicalism/LFI Logical Form Indexicalism p. 
LIR Logic as Idealised Reasoning p. 
LSR Logic is the Science of Reasoning p. 
MDP Meaning Determination Principle p. 
MSA Multiple Senses Account p. 
NL Natural Language p. 
NLB NL connectives are Boolean p. 
NS Nonsensical Sentences p. 
NT (Meaning) Normativity esis p. 
PI Philosophical Investigations
PoC Principle of Compositionality p. 
PoCU Principle of the Compositionality of Understanding p. 
RCM Radical Content Minimalism p. 
RD Response-Dependence p. 
RFC Rule-following Considerations p. 
RPA Radical Pragmaticist Argument p. 
SD I Semanticist Dilemma I (learnability) p. 
SD II Semanticist Dilemma II (understanding) p. 
SD III Semanticist Dilemma III (building-blocks) p. 
SD IV Semanticist Dilemma IV (worldly knowledge) p. 
SD V Semanticist Dilemma V (CET) p. 
SD VI Semanticist Dilemma VI (MSA/SSA) p. 
SD VII Semanticist Dilemma VII (Scope Problem) p. 
SD VIII Semanticist Dilemma VIII (CET/LSR connection) p. 
SP e Scope Principle p. 
SSA Single Sense Account p. 
TCP Truth-conditional Pragmatics p. , fn. 
TD oughts are Determinate p. 
UaGS Understanding as Grasp of Structure p. 
UaKTC Understanding as Knowledge of Truth-conditions p. 
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